Opinion

Aaron Walker v. Tennessee Department of Correction

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jul 18, 2007
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge William B. Cain
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.4%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 14, 2007

AARON WALKER v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 04-777-I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor

No. M2005-00209-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 18, 2007

An inmate of the Department of Correction appeals dismissal by the trial court of his Petition for

Writ of Certiorari of a Department of Correction Disciplinary Proceeding. The trial court upheld the

action of the Department of Correction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

WILLIAM B. CAIN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., P.J., M.S.,

and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., joined.

Aaron Walker, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jennifer R. Bailey, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Correction.

OPINION

Appellant is an inmate in the Department of Correction who was charged with the possession

of contraband, same being a cell phone and a DVD player. On January 5, 2004, he was found guilty

of the offense by the hearing officer. On January 16, Appellant filed an appeal to Warden Ricky Bell

who affirmed the ruling of the disciplinary board. On March 16, 2004, Appellant filed his Petition

for Writ of Certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee.

The primary complaint made by Appellant is that he was placed in administrative segregation

as a punitive measure contrary to TDOC Policy No. 404.10(IV) restricting administrative segregation

to “non-punitive segregation for control purposes of inmates who are believed to be a threat to the

security of the institution, the welfare of staff, or to other inmates.”

The trial court found the record to be deficient and, on October 27, 2004, issued an order for

the Department to produce the Administrative Segregation Placement Form for review by the Court.

On December 9, 2004, the trial court, in a commendable in-depth consideration of the record, entered

its Order Dismissing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari holding:

Petitioner, an inmate at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in

Nashville, Tennessee, filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a

disciplinary board decision that found him guilty of possessing contraband and

ordered him to administrative segregation. Petitioner alleges that his placement in

segregation pending investigation of the charges was illegal and unauthorized.

Petitioner also alleges that the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) violated

its own policies.

The Court has reviewed the record: On December 29, 2003, Sergeant Valerie

Cecil (Sergeant Cecil), Institutional Investigator, filed an incident report stating that

a cell phone and DVD player were found in Petitioner’s cell, Unit 6A-121. This cell

also housed Inmate Phillip Cotton. Both Petitioner and Inmate Cotton were placed

on lock down pending an investigation. Petitioner was placed in segregation pending

the investigation.

The investigation established that the cell phone and the DVD player were

found in Petitioner’s cell area, but that both inmates had use of the cell phone and for

that reason, both inmates were formally charged with possession of contraband. On

January 5, 2004, Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing was held at the Riverbend

Maximum Security Institution. An inmate advisor, Mr. Jorge Sanjines, represented

Petitioner at this hearing. The cell phone and DVD player were produced as

evidence. Petitioner stated that he used the cell phone and the DVD player, but that

they did not belong to him. Petitioner further stated that Derrick Johnson bought the

phone and pays the bill, and that Mr. Johnson had been released from TDOC custody

7 or 8 months ago. Petitioner waived his right to call witnesses on his behalf.

Sergeant Cecil testified at the disciplinary hearing that both devices were

found in Petitioner’s cell area and that the numbers called on the cell phone are

Petitioner’s phone numbers. The disciplinary hearing officer found Petitioner guilty

of contraband because these devices were found in his cell and recommended

administrative segregation for Petitioner. Petitioner filed a disciplinary report appeal,

but Warden Bell did not find any procedural violations in Petitioner’s disciplinary

hearing and affirmed the punishment as appropriate.

Sergeant Cecil also wrote a report dated January 20, 2004. The report

summarized the reasonable suspicion cell search that took place on December 20,

2003. Sergeant Cecil stated that Officer Carson admitted bringing the cell phone into

the institutional [sic] and giving the cell phone to Petitioner. Officer Carson also

admitted to bringing in cigars, movies, and music to give to inmates. Officer Carson

also stated that he did not know who brought in the DVD player, but he knew that it

belonged to Petitioner because Officer Carson had brought movies in for him.

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In an order dated October 27, 2004, the Court directed Respondent to file the

administrative segregation placement form because the Court could not discern from

the record whether the hearing officer exceeded his authority by imposing

administrative segregation. The Court needed to review the form so that it could

determine whether the Warden imposed the administrative segregation and if so,

why.

Prison disciplinary proceedings are properly reviewable through the common

law writ of certiorari. Rhoden v. State Department of Correction, 984 S.W.2d 955

(Tenn.Ct.App.1998). The scope of review available through this writ is extremely

narrow. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn.1997). The

writ may be used only to determine whether, in a particular case, the board in

question exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily; it may

not be used to review the correctness of the board’s decision. Id.

The Court does not find the hearing officer’s decision to be illegal, fraudulent,

or arbitrary. The record substantiates Petitioner’s conviction of possession of

contraband. Nothing in the record leads the Court to conclude that Petitioner’s

disciplinary hearing was not fair or not impartial. The administrative segregation

placement form verifies that the Warden imposed segregation upon recommendation

of the Board, based on a threat to the security of the institution.

Further, the Court finds a “reliable determination of guilt.” See Willis v.

Tennessee Dept’ of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tenn.2003)(If the Tennessee

Department of Correction were (sic) to violate its own policies to such a degree that

it administered punishment without a reliable determination of guilt, such a violation

would be without legal authority and an abuse of discretion.”) The Court does not

find a violation of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause violation. In

Willis, the Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995), held that punitive and administrative segregation does not deprive an inmate

of a liberty interest. Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 711. However, the imposition of a

monetary fine to be paid from a prison trust fund account would constitute a

deprivation of a property interest. In the instant case, Petitioner was not fined

monetarily.

For the above state reasons, Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Petitioner is taxed with the costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Final Order of the trial court is made after a review of the Administrative Segregation

Placement Form appearing in the record from which it is indeed clear that the warden imposed

segregation upon recommendation of the Board based on a threat to the security of the Institution.

The trial court observed:

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TDOC policies state that administrative segregation must be based on safety and

security, not as punishment. The TDOC policy defines administrative segregation

as “The non-punitive segregation of inmates, for control purposes, who are believed

to be a threat to the security of the institution, the welfare of staff, or to other

inmates.” TDOC 404.10(IV)(A).

Since there is no evidence in the record to the contrary and the Administrative Segregation

Placement Form is undisputed, the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial

court.

The action of the trial court is in all respects affirmed, and costs of the cause are assessed to

Appellant, Aaron Walker.

___________________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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