Opinion

State of Tennessee v. William Roger Campbell

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Aug 21, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge J. Ross Dyer
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.5%

“[W]hen trial courts fail to include the two additional findings before classifying a defendant as a dangerous offender, they have failed to adequately provide reasons on the record to support the imposition of consecutive - 19 - sentences.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[W]hen trial courts fail to include the two additional findings before classifying a defendant as a dangerous offender, they have failed to adequately provide reasons on the record to support the imposition of consecutive - 19 - sentences.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

08/21/2024

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

July 16, 2024 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM ROGER CAMPBELL

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. 63CC1-2021-CR-761 Robert Bateman, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2023-00779-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

The defendant, William Roger Campbell, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of

two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, and the trial court imposed consecutive

life sentences. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting one

of the victim’s cellphone records into evidence; the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

convictions; and the trial court erred in ordering his life sentences be served consecutively.

Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,

we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we reverse the imposition of consecutive

sentences and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for consideration of

the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn.

1995).

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed in

Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,

JR., and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Kendall Stivers Jones, Assistant Public Defender – Appellate Division, Tennessee Public

Defenders Conference (on appeal); Roger Nell and Joseph Price, Assistant Public

Defenders (at trial), for the appellant, William Roger Campbell.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney

General; Robert J. Nash, District Attorney General; and Marianne L. Bell and Crystal

Morgan, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

In January 2010, eighty-two-year-old William “Bill” Campbell and eighty-one-

year-old Ina Lucille Campbell,1 the victims, were both shot in the head while they were

sleeping. Eleven years later, in June 2021, their adopted son, the defendant, was indicted

for their premeditated first-degree murders. The State’s theory at trial for the motive of the

murders was that the defendant was in debt, and as the secondary beneficiary in his parents’

wills, would only inherit if both were deceased.

Daniel Champagne had lived next door to the victims since 1972 and considered

Mr. Campbell to be a second father. He said the victims had one child, the defendant,

whom Mr. Champagne first met when the defendant was twelve or thirteen years old. Mr.

Champagne recalled that the defendant joined the military and then moved away but he

would return home to visit the victims from time to time.

Mr. Champagne had a key to the victims’ home and knew the inside of their home

as well as he knew his own. Mr. Champagne learned the victims’ routines over the years,

noting that Mr. Campbell went to the mailbox to get the newspaper first thing in the

morning. When he went to visit the victims and knew they were home, Mr. Champagne

entered through the back door. He recalled that Mrs. Campbell collected crystal and Mr.

Campbell “was an avid gun collector. He had an enormous collection of rifles and pistols.”

Mr. Champagne noted that the victims’ dogs barked when anyone entered the house.

Mr. Champagne said that the victims would do anything for the defendant, and if

the defendant wanted something, they would get it for him. Mr. Champagne heard the

victims talking a couple of times before their deaths about selling some weapons to get

money. Mrs. Campbell was asking Mr. Campbell for money, and Mr. Champagne had

perceived over the years that financially supporting the defendant was a source of

contention between the two of them.

Mr. Champagne knew the defendant visited his parents the week of January 24,

2010, because the defendant’s gray Ford F-150 truck was parked in the driveway. Mr.

Champagne last remembered seeing the defendant’s truck the morning of Wednesday,

January 27, when Mr. Champagne saw Mr. Campbell get his newspaper from the mailbox

and the two talked for several minutes before Mr. Campbell walked towards his back deck.

That was the last time Mr. Champagne saw Mr. Campbell alive.

1

Because the defendant, the victims, and some of the witnesses have the same surname, we will refer to

them by first name at times for clarity. We mean no disrespect by this practice.

-2-

Around 6:00 p.m. on Friday, January 29, Mr. Champagne received a call from the

neighbor who lived across the street from the victims, telling him that she had been trying

to reach the victims because she hit their mailbox when she backed out of her driveway.

There had been a bad winter storm, and the roads were covered in sleet and ice. The

neighbor asked if Mr. Champagne had heard from the victims because they had not

answered her calls. Mr. Champagne also tried to call the victims, and when they did not

answer, he decided to walk over and check on them. Mr. Champagne walked through the

gate that connected their backyards and saw that the glass was broken on the door leading

into the basement and the door was ajar. However, Mr. Champagne did not see any

footsteps in the snow. The basement was ransacked and there were pill bottles all over the

floor. Mr. Champagne went up the stairway leading to the kitchen, while calling for the

victims, but the dogs barked in response.

Mr. Champagne proceeded through the house, observing open drawers in the dining

room cabinet and items strewn onto the floor, while he continued to call for the victims.

When he went through the hallway toward the bedrooms, he noticed that Mr. Campbell’s

bedroom door was closed, which was unusual. Mr. Champagne opened the door and saw

Mr. Campbell lying in the bed with blood on him. Mr. Champagne went to check Mrs.

Campbell’s bedroom, opened the door, and found her in the same condition. Mrs.

Campbell’s bedroom had been ransacked and drawers pulled out of her dresser, but Mrs.

Campbell still had rings on her fingers. Mr. Champagne went back to his house and called

the police.

Mr. Champagne saw the defendant at the victims’ funeral and noted that he “didn’t

seem very shocked or upset.” About a week after the funeral, Mr. Champagne saw the

defendant and a woman in a red pickup truck at the victims’ home, loading the truck with

items.

Deputy Pete Millan worked for the Clarksville Police Department (“CPD”) at the

time of the offense. On January 29, 2010, Deputy Millan assisted in a welfare check at the

victims’ home around 7:00 p.m. It was very snowy that evening, and the driving conditions

were “terrible.” When Deputy Millan arrived, he and his partner entered the house through

the rear basement door like Mr. Champagne had done. The officers cleared the house room

by room, eventually reaching the upstairs bedrooms. In Mrs. Campbell’s bedroom, Deputy

Millan saw what appeared to be a human body on the bed, and a similar shape was on the

bed in Mr. Campbell’s bedroom. Deputy Millan observed a wound to the back of Mr.

Campbell’s head and began securing the scene. Deputy Millan noted there was an

“extremely aggressive” small dog in the room with the male victim that animal control had

to remove in order for emergency personnel to access the victim.

-3-

Detective Timothy Finley, who had retired from the CPD by the time of trial,

responded to the scene shortly after the initial patrol officers. When he arrived, there were

two dogs still inside the house, and one of the dogs “wasn’t being real friendly.” Detective

Finley requested additional support from the rest of the homicide unit, and Detective Tim

Anderson with the CPD took over as the lead detective. Detective Finley requested Mr.

Campbell’s cellphone records from New Cingular Wireless at Detective Anderson’s

direction. Detective Finley received the records, and the records showed that no calls were

placed from Mr. Campbell’s cellphone number from January 28 to February 1, 2010. The

last call made from Mr. Campbell’s phone was on January 27, 2010. However, Detective

Finley agreed that based on his review of the records, Mr. Campbell would routinely go

several days without using his cellphone.

Detective Tim Anderson, who had retired from the CPD by the time of trial, led the

investigation in the case. He recalled that officers had difficulty responding to the scene

due to the weather, and dogs hindered first responders from getting to the victims.

However, animal control had removed the dogs by the time he arrived. In his survey of

the scene, Detective Anderson noticed that both victims were in their beds and appeared to

simply be asleep if not for the gunshot wounds to their heads. Mrs. Campbell’s bedroom

was “in somewhat of disarray,” with drawers pulled out of the dresser and items on top of

the dresser shuffled around, but “[n]othing appeared disturbed in Mr. Campbell’s room.”

Detective Anderson noted that in Mr. Campbell’s room there was a wooden gun rack with

glass-front doors and several firearms “obviously visible” through the glass door, as well

as a handgun lying under the edge of the bed. The initial responding officers had described

the scene as a possible “burglary-type situation,” and Detective Anderson thought

“something went terribly wrong during [the] burglary” for there to still be guns in the

residence because “that’s the number one thing that gets stolen . . . during burglaries.”

Detective Anderson also noticed a few things amiss in the victims’ kitchen. There

were no grounds in the coffee pot and the trash can appeared to have been emptied. He

also noted that in what appeared to be a medication log, there was no entry for January 28.

In the mailbox outside, there were still newspapers for January 28 and 29. Detective

Anderson described that the temperature in the home was “[f]airly warm[.]”

Detective Anderson learned that the defendant was the victims’ son, and he

contacted the defendant to notify him of his parents’ deaths and to inquire about the

defendant’s recent visit with the victims. The defendant told Detective Anderson that he

had just visited his parents, having arrived on January 24 and “le[aving] on the morning of

the 28th, about 7 a.m.” The defendant relayed that, while there, he had accompanied his

parents to a veterinary appointment concerning one of the dogs. He said his parents had

no other visitors while he was in town, and he stayed in the basement bedroom that had the

sliding glass door to the outside of the house.

-4-

Detective Anderson decided that he need to speak with the defendant in person, and

on January 31, he and Sergeant Lon Chaney with the CPD made the “[c]lose to nine hour[]”

drive to Lowndes County, Georgia. When they arrived, the officers parked up the street

from the defendant’s home to conduct surveillance while calling the defendant. Detective

Anderson called the defendant and asked him if they could meet at the sheriff’s department

to review some photographs. The defendant agreed to meet the officers. Shortly thereafter,

the defendant walked out of the house carrying a walking cane. The defendant did not use

the cane for support but, instead, carried it and placed it in the backseat of his vehicle.

When they all arrived at the sheriff’s department, Detective Anderson observed the

defendant retrieve his cane and use it with “what appeared to be some difficulty” as he

entered the facility and walked to the interview room. Once Detective Anderson and the

defendant sat down to talk, the defendant denied that there had been “any family problems”

recently or that the victims had any enemies. The defendant said “they were just an old

couple, just old people.” The defendant gave the officers consent to search his vehicle.

One of the items recovered in the search was a gas receipt from Watson’s Food Store in

Cordele, Georgia, dated January 28, 2010, at 3:29 p.m. After the search revealed bedsheets

shoved under the truck seat, Detective Anderson asked the defendant if he had brought

anything back from his parents’ house when he left, “specifically any items of cloth,” and

the defendant said he had not. Detective Anderson pressed a second time, referring to “a

washcloth, a towel, bedding[,] [a]nd again, [the defendant] said that he did not.” However,

the defendant did admit to bringing back an electric throw blanket.

Sergeant Lon Chaney described the assistance he provided in the investigation of

the case. Sergeant Chaney accompanied Detective Anderson to Georgia on January 31,

2010, to speak with the defendant in person. Sergeant Chaney conducted a search of the

defendant’s gray Ford F-150 in the parking lot of the Lowndes County Sheriff’s

Department. There was an envelope under the driver’s seat with a handwritten note that

said, “Give to Roger.” Eight credit or gas cards, in either the defendant’s or his girlfriend’s,

Gayle Tune, names, were located in the vehicle. Two bedsheets with a “reddish stain”

were found under the back bench seat.

The defendant and Ms. Tune also gave Sergeant Chaney and Detective Anderson

permission to search their home, stating “they wanted to help with the investigation

however they could.” Detective Anderson noted that the defendant did not use a cane for

assistance to walk while at his home. In the home, the officers saw “[j]ewelry laid out”

and more credit cards. They also discovered a piece of mail from the Pioneer American

Insurance Company addressed to “William R. Campbell” on Jackson Road in Clarksville;

an envelope addressed to “Mrs. William Campbell” on Jackson Road in Clarksville; and a

Chase Visa credit card statement from early 2009 showing a balance of $22,861.72 that

-5-

included charges made in Georgia. The Chase statement gave no indication of the names

on the credit card account.

After the officers returned to Clarksville from Georgia, Sergeant Chaney and

Detective Anderson conducted another search of the victims’ home on February 2, 2010.

The officers found lockboxes under the bed in Mr. Campbell’s room and in the top of his

closet, a loaded and holstered firearm under Mr. Campbell’s bedroom dresser, a firearm

and cash inside the drawers of that same dresser, a jewelry box, two jars of loose change

and rolled coins, and a $5000 life insurance policy with a note that stated, “Roger, keep

address in case of death with death certificate.” Sergeant Chaney was not sure if the

lockbox under Mr. Campbell’s bed was in plain view but said that the lockbox in the closet

would have been “hard to see from standing on the ground.”

Sergeant Chaney stated that the alarm clock in Mr. Campbell’s bedroom had alarms

programmed for 4:00 a.m. and 4:04 a.m., and the analog alarm clock in Mrs. Campbell’s

bedroom had an alarm set to go off around 3:15 or 3:20 and would do so every twelve

hours. Sergeant Chaney also investigated the sliding glass door in the basement and found

that, although the lock worked, if the lock were engaged while the door was open, the lock

would disengage when the door was shut.

On February 3, 2010, Detective Anderson received a call from the defendant stating

he was going to be in Clarksville for a memorial service for the victims and wanted several

items from the victims’ home, including a Bible, their address book, and copies of their

wills. Detective Anderson attended the graveside service for the victims and saw the

defendant there with his attorney, Randy Miles. Detective Anderson did not know the

nature of Mr. Miles’ representation of the defendant. Mr. Miles approached Detective

Anderson at the service and asked him to leave, explaining that Detective Anderson’s

presence was “making the family nervous.”

Detective Anderson and Sergeant Chaney returned to the victims’ home again on

February 5, 2010, to investigate the safe in the basement. The combination to the safe was

written on a business card that was lying on top of the safe. Inside the safe, officers found

jewelry, firearms and magazines, a knife, a pocket watch, a $100 bill, and “personal

documents [and] insurance stuff[.]”

Officer Scott Beaubien with the CPD was one of the officers responsible for

processing the crime scene, which included logging the photographs taken by another

officer and creating a sketch of the home’s interior. Officer Beaubien recalled that the

house was “pretty warm” and there was an odor. Both victims “were on oxygen,” and the

machines were running when the police arrived.

-6-

As he processed the scene, Officer Beaubien noted that dresser drawers were pulled

open in both Mr. Campbell’s and Mrs. Campbell’s bedrooms. A .25-caliber automatic

shell casing was found on Mr. Campbell’s bed next to his pillow, and a rifle was next to

the door in Mr. Campbell’s bedroom. Two boxes of .25-caliber automatic mixed

ammunition were found in the gun cabinet in Mr. Campbell’s bedroom, with 41 rounds in

each box. A .25-caliber automatic shell casing was also found in Mrs. Campbell’s

bedroom, on the floor behind her nightstand. Individual boxes of jewelry and jewelry trays

were at the foot of Mrs. Campbell’s bed.

In the dining room, Officer Beaubien noted that several drawers of the hutch were

open. On the server in the dining room, Officer Beaubien found an envelope containing

$240 dollars with a handwritten note on the outside of the envelope that said, “$240, got

now,” and “$200, owe.” A newspaper dated January 27, 2010, was also on the server in

the dining room. Inside the china cabinet, Officer Beaubien came across what appeared to

be a medication log with the final entry on January 27, 2010. Another logbook of some

type was lying on the dining table with the date of January 27, 2010. In the kitchen, a

bottle of Clorox bleach on top of the washing machine and a bottle of Palmolive dish soap

at the sink were documented. It was noted that there were no coffee grounds in the coffee

pot.

The water in the sink of the downstairs bathroom was still running, and a bottle of

Clorox bleach was noted in the bathroom. One of the bedrooms downstairs had a bed with

no sheets on it. The other bedroom downstairs also contained a bed, but it appeared as if

the room was primarily used for storage of boxes, hanging clothes, and miscellaneous items

such as a “[s]ilver-like serving set.” A gun safe was located in the basement, and inside it

was a .25-caliber automatic Iver Johnson handgun. A pack of Marlboro Light 100

cigarettes, as well as a partially burned cigarette, sat on top of the gun safe.

Officer Bradley Crowe, who was retired from the CPD at the time of trial, was also

involved in processing the scene. Officer Crowe was primarily involved with the collection

of evidence. Officer Crowe processed the kitchen floor for footprints but was unable to lift

any because “prints can be very finicky.” He also swabbed items throughout the house,

including “anything that looked like it had been pulled open, touched, that was out of its

natural place.” Officer Crowe recovered two boxes of .25-caliber ammunition from the

gun cabinet in Mr. Campbell’s bedroom. The boxes appeared to be different types because

the rounds in one box had a red coating and the rounds in the other box had a copper jacket

with no red coating. Officer Crowe noted that there were ten rounds missing from one of

the boxes and eleven rounds missing from the other box. From the dining room, Officer

Crowe collected a January 27, 2010 newspaper, a Mead notebook that contained

handwritten logs by dates with the last entry on January 27, 2010, and a spiral notebook

that contained what appeared to be a medication log with the last entry on January 27,

-7-

2010. Officer Crowe also collected the bed covers and a pair of gray sweatpants from the

downstairs bedroom, and a spent .25-caliber shell casing from each victim’s bedroom.

Investigator Fred McClintock with the CPD documented the “events” that

“surround[ed]” the crime scene. The temperature inside the home was 79 degrees, and

there was a set of gas logs in the “stand-up gas register” in the basement that was turned

three-quarters of the way up. Investigator McClintock inspected the three entry points in

the basement: two sliding glass doors and one pedestrian wood door with a glass panel.

One of the sliding glass units was locked and secure; the other sliding glass unit had a bar

or stick placed in the track that would still allow the door to open approximately ten inches;

and the pedestrian door had a pane of glass broken and its screen pushed in, which was

believed to be the point of entry. Investigator McClintock determined that a person could

unlock the door from the outside by reaching through the broken pane of glass. Investigator

McClintock also inspected the kitchen and noticed that a bottle of dish soap had a reddish-

brown stain on it, reminiscent of blood, so he swabbed the stain for testing. A presumptive

field test of the stain indicated it contained blood, and the other swab was sent to the

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) lab for further testing.

Investigator Alan Charvis, who was retired from the CPD at the time of trial, called

the defendant on January 30, 2010, to inquire about the defendant’s recent visit to his

parents’ home in Clarksville. The defendant was at his home in Georgia at the time of the

call, and the defendant’s girlfriend, Gayle Tune, was also on the line. Investigator Charvis

described the defendant’s tone as normal rather than “crying or upset.” The defendant told

the investigator that he left his parents’ home the morning of January 28 before 7:00 a.m.

The defendant said that both of his parents were awake when he left but were still wearing

their pajamas. The defendant denied that either he or his parents had eaten breakfast while

he was there. The defendant relayed that his father checked his blood sugar twice a day

using a glucometer he kept in one of the drawers in the dining room, but the defendant did

not know whether he had checked it the morning of the 28th. Investigator Charvis asked

the defendant about his father’s firearms, and the defendant said his father kept two

firearms in the house: a .380 and a .22. The defendant mentioned to Investigator Charvis

that he accompanied his mother to the Fort Campbell commissary where they ran into

Linda Campbell, his ex-wife. At first, the defendant just said that he had “ran into her,”

but then said that his mother had “dared him” to page Linda as a joke. Investigator Charvis

assisted with the collection of the contents of the drains from the kitchen and the upstairs

bathroom sinks.

Several TBI agents were responsible for analyzing the various samples and evidence

collected during the course of the investigation. Agent Bradley Everett tested the blood

stain on the bottle of dish soap and determined that it was the defendant’s blood, but he

agreed that he had no way of determining how long the stain had been there. Agent Everett

-8-

also tested the drain from the upstairs bathroom sink. The presumptive test indicated the

presence of blood, but Agent Everett was unable to obtain a DNA profile upon further

testing. Agent Everett also tested samples taken from the stained bedsheets found in the

defendant’s truck, but the testing did not indicate the presence of blood. Agent Everett

agreed, however, that the ability to detect blood would be affected if the sheets had been

cleaned with detergent or bleach.

Agent Miranda Gaddes performed microanalysis on fibers from the bed covers and

gray sweatpants found in the basement bedroom at the victims’ home, as well as on the

bedsheets found in the defendant’s truck. Agent Gaddes found blue fibers on the bedsheets

and bed covers that appeared to have been transferred from something else. Based on her

analysis, Agent Gaddes determined that the fibers “could have shared a common origin”

of an unknown source. The gray sweatpants did not have the same transferred fibers on

them. The CPD sent Agent Gaddes several items from around the victims’ house, but none

of them matched the blue fibers that had been transferred onto the bed covers and

bedsheets.

Agent Daniel Royse examined the two spent shell casings recovered from the

victims’ house. He identified one casing as a Remington Peters brand .25-caliber and the

other as a Federal brand .25-caliber. Upon his examination of the casings, Agent Royse

determined that both were fired from the same .25-caliber automatic pistol. Agent Royse

also compared the bunter tool marks on each casing to the boxes of live shells found in the

victims’ home and determined that the Remington Peters spent casing came from the boxes

of live ammunition found in Mr. Campbell’s room.

Medical examiner, Dr. Amy Hawes, performed the autopsies on the victims. Mr.

Campbell was 82 years old at the time of his death, and Mrs. Campbell was 81 years old.

Dr. Hawes determined that both victims died from a “gunshot wound of the head” by

“another person or persons.” Mr. Campbell’s gunshot wound entered the back left side of

his scalp, and there was discoloration around the wound indicating the gun was held very

close to his skin when it was fired. Mrs. Campbell’s gunshot wound entered through her

left cheek, and powder stippling around the wound indicated the firearm did not make

contact with her skin.

Dr. Hawes noted that “the progress of decomposition is extremely variable” and

“extremely dependent primarily on temperature among other things,” meaning time-of-

death determinations were usually estimates within a 12- to 24-hour window. Dr. Hawes

estimated that Mr. Campbell died approximately 24 hours before his body was discovered.

She estimated that Mrs. Campbell’s time of death was “approximately the same as it would

[be] for [Mr. Campbell]. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 24 hours, potentially 24 to

36 hours.”

-9-

Shawn Campbell, the defendant’s son and victims’ grandson, testified that his

parents divorced when he was a baby, and although he lived with his mother, he maintained

a close relationship with his father’s parents while he was growing up. Shawn said that he,

however, had no relationship with his father and probably “spent less than 24 hours around

him” his entire life. The only time Shawn saw his father was when he was visiting his

grandparents, and the defendant happened to be there for a visit as well. Shawn visited his

grandparents regularly as a child but admitted his visits became less frequent as he got

older. Shawn recalled that Mrs. Campbell collected crystal, china, and Hummel figurines,

and Mr. Campbell was believed to keep a log of the guns he owned. From Shawn’s

observations, the defendant seemed to be a lot closer to Mrs. Campbell than to Mr.

Campbell.

Shawn was with his mother, Linda, at her house when a deputy from the

Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office arrived and informed them that Mrs. Campbell and

Mr. Campbell had died. Shawn said the defendant had always had a slight limp due to an

accident, but Shawn noted that the defendant did not have any difficulty standing at the

funeral. Sometime after the funeral, an auction was held at the victims’ home. Shawn

attended the auction and purchased a few items as keepsakes, and he later purchased Mrs.

Campbell’s truck as well.

Linda Campbell worked as the lead accounting store clerk at the commissary at Fort

Campbell and during her years of working there, had never seen the defendant or the

victims there. However, on Tuesday, January 26, 2010, she was in her office at the

commissary when she was paged to Register 17. When she got to the register, the

defendant and Mrs. Campbell were there checking out groceries. Linda had not seen the

defendant in thirteen years at that point. He did not appear to be physically disabled in any

way or have a cane or walker. The defendant said to Linda, “I want you to know I’m

leaving on Thursday,” causing Linda think to herself, “okay, great, you’re leaving on

Thursday, . . . . why do I care when you’re leaving[,] . . . why do you need to tell me?”

Linda learned about the victims’ deaths a few days later, on Friday evening, when

it was snowing heavily. Officers came to her house and told her that both Mr. Campbell

and Mrs. Campbell had died. Linda inquired further as to the cause, but the officers would

not provide additional details. Linda attended the funeral and observed that the defendant

had “[n]o tears, no emotion, no[t] upset.” The defendant did not use a cane or walker or

appear to need any assistance walking. Linda recalled that Mrs. Campbell “would give

[the defendant] everything and anything.” She said Mrs. Campbell spent a lot of money

on the defendant and spoiled him.

- 10 -

Dr. Jackie Smith, a veterinarian, took care of the victims’ pets over the years. In

January 2010, the victims had two dogs that were patients of Dr. Smith’s—Lucky, a black

Lab mix, and Patino, a small Terrier mix. Lucky was a “happy-go-lucky” dog, but Patino

was temperamental and had to be handled with caution. Bloodwork indicated that Lucky

was in renal failure, which precipitated a series of office visits in late January. On January

27th, Mr. Campbell came in with the defendant to discuss Lucky’s condition and treatment

plan. Dr. Smith allowed Lucky to return home but advised Mr. Campbell that he might

need to decide about euthanasia soon.

Major Andrew Schmidt, a horologist and owner of what was formerly called “It’s

Time Clock Shop” in Clarksville, was familiar with the victims because Mr. Campbell

owned a rare and elaborate Lenzkirch grandfather clock that was “the epitome of

horology,” and Major Schmidt performed annual in-home services on the clock. Major

Schmidt offered to purchase the clock each time he performed a service call, but Mr.

Campbell always declined. Specifically, during a service call on July 28, 2009, Major

Schmidt offered to buy the clock for $5000, while in the presence of the defendant, but Mr.

Campbell declined this offer as usual.

In February 2010, Major Schmidt received a call about purchasing a grandfather

clock. Major Schmidt did not associate the caller’s name with anyone he knew, but when

he reached the address provided by the caller, Major Schmidt realized it was Mr.

Campbell’s house and felt “a very high-point glee.” Major Schmidt was met at the door

by the defendant, and when Major Schmidt inquired about Mr. Campbell and Mrs.

Campbell, the defendant stated, “Well, Didn’t you hear? . . . Mom and Dad were shot and

killed in their bedroom.” Major Schmidt described the defendant’s demeanor as “[n]ervous

and jerky,” which was different from his behavior in 2009 when Major Schmidt first saw

him. Upon learning this information, Major Schmidt said that he could not purchase the

clock because their estates were in probate, but the defendant responded, “I am the sole

heir of the estate and it is clear for me to sell.” The defendant first wanted $6000 for the

clock but eventually accepted Major Schmidt’s original offer of $5000. Major Schmidt

paid the defendant in cash and gave him a receipt. A short time after the sale, Detective

Anderson came into Major Schmidt’s shop to ask about the clock.

Montgomery County Chancery Court Clerk and Master Heather Moore maintained

the probate files for the separate estates of Mrs. Campbell and Mr. Campbell. On February

26, 2010, the defendant filed letters of administration in both cases, which is done when a

victim died intestate. Both letters listed the defendant as the sole heir. A preliminary

inventory was filed for both estates on September 17, 2010, valuing Mrs. Campbell’s estate

at $120,472.39 and Mr. Campbell’s estate at $130,964.25.

- 11 -

On December 9, 2010, Clerk Moore received notice that Mrs. Campbell’s and Mr.

Campbell’s wills had been filed with the court, but the discovery of the wills did not alter

how the estates were probated because the documents contained no specific bequests and

followed the rules of intestacy. Both estates were closed on November 4, 2011; the final

accountings showed distributions of $74,083.31 and $107,332.29, respectively, to the

defendant.

Upon the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the defendant of two counts of

premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing, after

which it imposed consecutive life sentences. The defendant appealed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting a victim’s

cellphone records into evidence; that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions;

and that the trial court erred in ordering his life sentences be served consecutively. We will

address each issue in turn.

I. Admission of Cellphone Records

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his father’s cellphone

records into evidence without following the procedure for admission under the business

records exception to the rule against hearsay, which required that the records be introduced

through the testimony of a custodian or a self-authenticating affidavit from a custodian

pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(11). The State concedes that the

appropriate procedure was not followed when introducing the records but asserts that the

error was harmless. We agree with the State.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides an exception to the rule against

hearsay for records of regularly conducted activity as follows:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of

acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses made at or near the time by

or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge and a business

duty to record or transmit if kept in the course of a regularly conducted

business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to

make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by

the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness or by certification

that complies with Rule 902(11) or a statute permitting certification, unless

the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation

indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this

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paragraph includes business, institution, profession, occupation, and calling

of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 902(11) provides the procedure for authentication of

certified records of regularly conducted activity as follows:

The original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted

activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by an

affidavit of its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record:

(A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set

forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge

of and a business duty to record or transmit those matters;

(B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and

(C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.

A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph must

provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, and must make

the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of

their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity

to challenge them.

Detective Finley testified at trial that at some point during the investigation,

Detective Anderson directed him to request Mr. Campbell’s cellphone records. After the

prosecutor passed Detective Finley a set of documents, defense counsel requested a bench

conference. Counsel told the trial court that he believed the documents stemmed from a

subpoena issued to AT&T but “[t]here’s no business certification for 902(11) indicating

these are business records for the company[.]” The trial court conducted a jury-out hearing,

during which counsel restated his objection to the admission of Mr. Campbell’s cellphone

records. Counsel explained that he received eight pages of records that appeared to have

been sent from AT&T by fax, but the records lacked any certification from AT&T and,

thus, did not satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 902(11).

The State responded that a judge signed a subpoena for the records on February 1,

2010. The subpoena was sent to the custodian of records for New Cingular Wireless,2 and

the custodian of records was commanded to produce the records for Mr. Campbell’s

cellphone number to Detective Finley. The phone records revealed no calls from January

2

New Cingular Wireless was later acquired by AT&T.

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28 to February 1, 2010, and provided the records for all calls made from January 1 to

January 27. The State asserted that the records were admissible without an affidavit from

the custodian of records because they were received in response to a subpoena from a judge.

The trial court told the parties it would rule on the objection the following morning.

The jury-out hearing continued the next day. The State restated its position that

there is not an affidavit from the custodian of records, however, these were

given to Detective Finley in response to a judicial subpoena and in response

to an affidavit that he made to the Judge regarding exactly what he wanted

and AT&T exactly produced what was requested. And so [w]e believe that

although it’s hearsay, it is reliable hearsay that was made available to him

pursuant to a judicial subpoena and that is should be admissible.

Detective Finley was called to the stand and testified that he recognized the records

at issue. The first page was the affidavit for judicial subpoena to New Cingular Wireless

that he prepared. In the affidavit, Detective Finley requested, in part, the incoming and

outgoing call detail from January 1 to February 1, 2010, for Mr. Campbell’s cellphone

number. A judge signed the subpoena, and Detective Finley faxed it to the attention of the

custodian of records at New Cingular Wireless per departmental procedure. The subpoena

provided instructions that New Cingular Wireless should deliver the requested information

to Detective Finley by hand, mail, fax, or email. Detective Finley received the requested

information on March 9, 2010, “from the National Compliance Center from AT&T.” The

records revealed that there were no calls sent or received from January 28 to February 1,

2010. On cross-examination, Detective Finley admitted that he did not know which

employee at “the Compliance Center” prepared and sent him the phone records.

The trial court found that a judicial subpoena was issued pursuant to Tennessee

Code Annotated section 40-17-123 for cellphone records for Cingular Wireless, a

subsidiary of AT&T, and said that it reviewed “the small amount of case law” interpreting

the statute. Specifically, the court said that it reviewed State v. Brown, 2019 WL 1514551

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019), State v. Bond, 2016 WL 4548107 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Aug. 31, 2016), and Fry v. Indiana, 885 N.E.2d 742 (Ind. 2008). Based on its review, the

court determined that “the documents obtained pursuant to the judicial subpoena can be

admitted[.]” Accordingly, the court admitted pages 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, but did not admit

pages 2 and 3, which contained Detective Finley’s affidavit and subpoena.

The State acknowledges that the trial court did not consider whether the cellphone

records fell within the business records exception to the rule against hearsay and that the

requirements of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(11) were not met but asserts

that the error was harmless because the records were only a “small part” of the State’s case

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and not “particularly compelling.” Improperly admitted evidence is reviewed under a non-

constitutional harmless error analysis. State v. Carter, 2010 WL 5343212, at *13 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2010) (citing State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2003)). In

determining whether non-constitutional errors are harmless, “Tennessee law places the

burden on the defendant who is seeking to invalidate his or her conviction to demonstrate

that the error ‘more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice

to the judicial process.’” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 372 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting

Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)).

We agree that the error in admitting the cellphone records was harmless. As noted

by Detective Finley, the records showed that Mr. Campbell would regularly go several

days without using his phone, and common sense suggests that Mr. Campbell was of a

generation not completely reliant on a cellphone. The jury also heard evidence that the

victims had a landline telephone and could have used the landline to place and receive calls

instead of the cellphone. Therefore, we do not view evidence that Mr. Campbell did not

use his cellphone after January 27, 2010, as substantially noteworthy. Moreover, the

defendant admitted to visiting his parents the week of their deaths, and by his statements

to officers, suggested that his parents were killed sometime after he left the morning of

January 28. Again, the fact that Mr. Campbell did not use his cellphone after January 27

does not specifically negate that possibility. Furthermore, other evidence aside from Mr.

Campbell’s cellphone records supported the State’s timeline and intimation that the

defendant killed his parents before leaving their home the morning of January 28. This

evidence included newspapers in the mailbox for January 28 and 29, medication logs with

no entries past January 27, and the medical examiner’s estimation that the victims died

twenty-four to thirty-six hours prior to their bodies being discovered around 6:00 p.m. on

January 29. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the error in admitting the cellphone

records “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the

judicial process.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). The defendant is, therefore, not entitled to relief.

II. Sufficiency

The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. The

defendant does not dispute that the elements of premeditated first-degree murder were

established but, instead, challenges the proof establishing his identity as the perpetrator.

The State argues that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions. We

agree with the State.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.

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R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions

involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and

all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,

623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,

accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of

the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme

Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464,

370 S.W.2d 523 (1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with

which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a

convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.”

State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776,

779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977);

Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or

circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of fact must

evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331,

335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)).

Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the

inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and “the extent to which the circumstances are

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the jury.”

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)).

This Court, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh the

evidence or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Id.

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The identity of the perpetrator “is an essential element of any crime.” State v. Rice,

184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn.

1975)). The perpetrator’s identity “may be established solely on the basis of circumstantial

evidence.” State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tenn. 2010). The identification of the

defendant as the perpetrator is “a question of fact for the jury upon its consideration of all

competent proof.” State v. Bell, 512 S.W.3d 167, 198 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Thomas,

158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005)).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the

defendant killed his parents while they slept during the early morning hours of January 28,

2010, and then staged the home to appear as if it had been burglarized. The defendant

received financial assistance from his parents over the years but was in debt. Apparently

realizing that he stood to gain more if they both were dead or worried that their aid would

end, the defendant began establishing his alibi in the days leading up to the murders. The

defendant visited his ex-wife, Linda, at her place of employment, something he had never

done in thirteen years, and made the point of telling her that he was leaving town on

Thursday, January 28. Linda found the defendant’s communication to be very unusual.

Mr. Champagne, the victims’ next-door neighbor, recounted the victims’ habits,

specifically noting that Mr. Campbell retrieved the newspaper every morning and had done

so on January 27. When the victims’ bodies were discovered, the newspaper for January

27 was found inside the home, and the newspapers for January 28 and 29 were still in the

mailbox. Purported medication logs found inside the home bore no entries past January

27. All of this evidence suggested that the victims did not wake up on January 28.

Moreover, had the victims been awake in the kitchen when he left the morning of the 28th

as the defendant reported to officers, it is illogical that their bodies were found in their beds

both wearing the oxygen masks they wore for sleeping. Also illogical is that if the victims

were killed during a burglary, why plainly visible jewelry, firearms, and other items of

value were not taken.

Officers’ processing of the crime scene revealed suspicious findings, including that

the trash can in the kitchen had been emptied, the defendant’s blood was on the bottle of

Palmolive dish soap in the kitchen, and bedsheets were missing from the bed the defendant

slept in during his visit. Bedsheets with a rust-colored stain were found under the seat in

the defendant’s truck, and although testing of the stain did not reveal the presence of blood,

the analyst testified that the ability to detect blood would have been affected if the sheets

had been cleaned with detergent or bleach. Fibers found on the bedsheets were consistent

with fibers found on bedcovers recovered from the basement bedroom, suggesting that the

bedsheets came from the victims’ home. Examination of the spent shell casings from the

bullets that killed the victims revealed that one of the bullets was from Mr. Campbell’s

supply of ammunition. The defendant’s behavior following the murders is also revealing.

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The defendant sold Mr. Campbell’s grandfather clock shortly after the victims’ deaths,

claiming he was “clear” to do so, before initiating court proceedings to gain control of the

estates. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the sum of the circumstantial

evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to determine that the defendant committed

the premeditated first-degree murders of his parents.

III. Sentencing

The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing in which the defendant’s presentence

report, a victim impact statement from Shawn Campbell, the victims’ grandson, and

certified judgments of the defendant’s prior convictions for embezzlement and obtaining

money by a false check were entered into evidence. Shawn testified that his grandmother

had promised him certain items from her house, but the defendant “auctioned off”

everything before he received them. As to his feelings concerning the defendant, Shawn

said that “there is nobody walking the face of this earth that will have anything positive to

say about him. He’s been nothing but a plague and just a virus to anybody he’s ever been

around.” Shawn continued that “anybody who has ever had [the defendant] in his life has

a horrible story to tell.”

By law, the defendant received life sentences for each of the first-degree murder

convictions, and it was for the trial court’s determination whether the sentences would be

served concurrently or consecutively. In ordering consecutive sentencing, the trial court

found the defendant to be a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard

for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life is

high. The trial court’s reasoning for making this determination was as follows:

The facts of this case would show that each victim was shot in the

head, shot in a separate bedroom. The Court calls attention to that and makes

those factual findings to show that it wasn’t one event.

There had to be some activity in one bedroom, when one victim was

shot. And then there had to be more activity in the other bedroom.

There’s no evidence that the two victims were shot in the same

location. They were shot in two separate locations in the house.

The Court makes those findings and believes that under 40-35-

115(B)(4) that in the Court’s discretion, the Court can find that these actions

are of a dangerous offender, whose behavior indicates little or no regard for

human life and no hesitation about a crime for which the risk to life is high,

the risk to human life is high.

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So the Court finds that based on the fact that the first victim was

murdered in one room and there had to be a time period before the second

victim was murder[ed] in a separate room, that given the severity of the crime

and the complete disregard for life of both victims, that consecutive

sentences are necessary to protect the public.

And the Court finds that this sentence is reasonably related to the

severity of the offense.

This Court reviews consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court under an abuse

of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d

851, 859-60 (Tenn. 2013). A trial court “may order sentences to run consecutively” if it

finds the defendant is “a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard

for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life

is high[.]” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4); see Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at 936. Before

a trial court may impose consecutive sentences on the basis that a defendant is a dangerous

offender, the trial court must find “that an extended sentence is necessary to protect the

public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences

. . . reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d

at 939. Our supreme court has stated that the trial court must make specific findings about

“particular facts” which show the Wilkerson factors apply to the defendant. State v. Lane,

3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

Although the trial court stated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect

the public and reasonably related to the severity of the offenses, the trial court failed to

state the specific facts on which it relied to satisfy this conclusion. It is incumbent on the

trial court to state facts that support each factor, and, in this case, it is particularly unclear

what facts the court relied on in finding that an extended sentence was necessary to protect

the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant. “The mere recitation of the

Wilkerson factors is not a substitute for the requirement of making specific findings.” State

v. Calloway, 2005 WL 1307800, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2005); see also State v.

Craig, 2002 WL 1972892, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2002) (“A mere statement

that confinement is necessary to protect society and that the severity of the sentence is

reasonably related to the convicted offenses, without more, is insufficient to justify

consecutive sentences [under Wilkerson].”). Because the trial court failed to make any

specific findings regarding the defendant’s actions as they related to the Wilkerson factors

in determining that he was a dangerous offender, the record does not support consecutive

sentencing. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (“[W]hen trial courts fail to include the two

additional findings before classifying a defendant as a dangerous offender, they have failed

to adequately provide reasons on the record to support the imposition of consecutive

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sentences.”). Accordingly, this Court cannot defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion

nor presume that the imposition of consecutive sentences was reasonable.

In Pollard, our supreme court explained that, when facing this situation, this Court

has two options: “(1) conduct a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate

basis for imposing consecutive sentences; or (2) remand for the trial court to consider the

requisite factors in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.” Pollard, 432

S.W.3d at 864 (citing Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705 & n.41). Because the consideration required

under Wilkerson involves a fact-intensive inquiry, the better course is to remand the case

to the trial court to determine the propriety of consecutive sentencing. Id. Accordingly,

we vacate the imposition of consecutive sentencing and remand to the trial court for a new

sentencing hearing. The new sentencing hearing is limited to consideration of the

Wilkerson factors to determine the propriety of consecutive sentencing in this case.

Conclusion

Based on the forgoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the defendant’s

convictions. However, we vacate the imposition of consecutive sentencing and remand to

the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

____________________________________

J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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