Wilkins v. United States

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 598 U. S. Part 1

Pages 152–174

OFFICIAL REPORTS

OF

THE SUPREME COURT

March 28, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF

reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

152 OCTOBER TERM, 2022

Syllabus

WILKINS et al. v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the ninth circuit

No. 21–1164. Argued November 30, 2022—Decided March 28, 2023

Petitioners Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton own properties in

rural Montana that border a road for which the United States has held

an easement since 1962. The Government claims that the easement

includes public access, which petitioners dispute. In 2018, petitioners

sued the Government under the Quiet Title Act, which allows challenges

to the United States' rights in real property. The Government moved

to dismiss on the ground that petitioners' claim is barred by the Act's

12-year time bar. 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(g). Petitioners countered that

§ 2409a(g)'s time limit is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule.

The District Court agreed with the Government and dismissed the case

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that

§ 2409a(g) had already been interpreted as jurisdictional in Block v.

North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273,

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and affrmed.

Held: Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule.

Pp. 156–165.

(a) Jurisdiction is a word of many meanings. This Court has empha-

sized the distinction between “the classes of cases a court may entertain

(subject-matter jurisdiction)” and “nonjurisdictional claim-processing

rules, which seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requir-

ing that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specifed

times.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. –––, –––. Nonjurisdic-

tional claim-processing rules generally include a range of “threshold re-

quirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, before fling a

lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166. Ju-

risdictional bars—which may be raised by any party at any time dur-

ing the proceedings and which are required to be raised by a court

sua sponte—run the risk of disrupting the “orderly progress of litiga-

tion” that procedural rules often “seek to promote.” Henderson v.

Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435.

Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the jurisdic-

tional label, a procedural requirement will be construed as jurisdictional

only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. Boechler v. Commissioner,

596 U. S. –––, –––. To determine whether the statutory text “plainly

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 153

Syllabus

show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional con-

sequences,” courts apply “traditional tools of statutory construction.”

United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410.

Section 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing

about § 2409a(g)'s text or context gives reason to depart from this

Court's observation that “most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” Ibid.

Section 2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is com-

menced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.” This

“text speaks only to a claim's timeliness,” and its “mundane statute-of-

limitations language say[s] only what every time bar, by defnition, must:

that after a certain time a claim is barred.” Ibid. Further, “[t]his

Court has often explained that Congress's separation of a fling deadline

from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdic-

tional.” Id., at 411. Here, the Quiet Title Act's jurisdictional grant

is in § 1346(f), well afeld of § 2409a(g). And “[n]othing [in § 1346(f)]

conditions the jurisdictional grant on the limitations perio[d in

§ 2409a(g)] or otherwise links those separate provisions.” Id., at 412.

Pp. 156–159.

(b) None of the three decisions of this Court on which the Govern-

ment relies—Block, 461 U. S. 273, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S.

834, and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38—defnitively interpreted

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§ 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. This Court has made clear that it will not

undo a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provision as ju-

risdictional without due regard for the principles of stare decisis. John

R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138. Yet the mere

fact that this Court previously described something as jurisdictional is

not dispositive, as “[c]ourts, including this Court, have more than occa-

sionally misused the term `jurisdictional' to refer to nonjurisdictional

prescriptions.” Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ––– – –––, n. 4 (some internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted). To separate “defnitive” inter-

pretations of jurisdiction from those in which the term “jurisdictional” has

been used imprecisely, the Court asks if a prior decision addressed

whether a provision is “ `technically jurisdictional,' ” i. e., whether it truly

operates as a limit on a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether

anything in the decision “turn[ed] on that characterization.” Arbaugh v.

Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better

Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 91). A decision that simply states that “the

court is dismissing `for lack of jurisdiction' when some threshold fact has

not been established” is understood as a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]”

and receives “no precedential effect.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 511.

Block is a textbook “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].” Arbaugh, 546

U. S., at 511. The Government points to a statement in that opinion's

154 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

conclusion that if the Quiet Title Act's time limit applied, “the courts

below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” Block, 461 U. S.,

at 292. Yet there is no discussion in Block about whether the provision

is “ `technically jurisdictional' ”—just a mere statement that a “thresh-

old fact” must “b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” Ar-

baugh, 546 U. S., at 512. While Block did describe the Act's time limit

as “a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,” 461 U. S., at 287,

Block never addressed whether the Act's time limit was truly a limit on

subject-matter jurisdiction, nor did anything in the case turn on this

question. Contrary to the Government's contentions, even in that era,

time limits in suits against the Government were not necessarily

subject-matter jurisdictional under this Court's case law.

Like Block, Mottaz contains no discussion of whether the Quiet Title

Act's 12-year time bar was technically jurisdictional. Instead, the

Court decided which of two possible time bars applied and, having de-

termined it was the Quiet Title Act's 12-year limit, concluded that the

plaintiff had notice over 12 years before she sued. Neither step in the

Court's analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ `techni-

cally jurisdictional.' ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512. Once again, general

statements in the opinion about waivers of immunity cannot change this

basic fact.

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Finally, in Beggerly, the Court carefully analyzed whether the text

and context of § 2409a(g) were consistent with equitable tolling. This

would have been a mere waste of words if the Court had already held

in Block and Mottaz that § 2409a(g) was jurisdictional.

These three cases point in one direction: This Court has never defni-

tively interpreted § 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. The Government's argu-

ment about legislative acquiescence is unavailing given the absence of

any defnitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce.

Pp. 159–165.

13 F. 4th 791, reversed and remanded.

Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan,

Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J.,

fled a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, J., joined,

post, p. 166.

Jeffrey W. McCoy argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs were Damien M. Schiff, James M. Manley,

and Ethan Blevins.

Benjamin W. Snyder argued the cause for the United

States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Pre-

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 155

Opinion of the Court

logar, Assistant Attorney General Kim, Deputy Solicitor

General Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, John L. Smeltzer,

Kevin W. McArdle, and Babak Rastgoufard.*

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.

Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton wanted quiet titles

and a quiet road. Wilkins and Stanton, the petitioners here,

both live alongside Robbins Gulch Road in rural Montana.

The United States has permission, called an easement, for

use of the road, which the Government interprets to include

making the road available for public use. Petitioners allege

that the road's public use has intruded upon their private

lives, with strangers trespassing, stealing, and even shooting

Wilkins' cat.

Petitioners sued over the scope of the easement under

the Quiet Title Act, which allows challenges to the United

States' rights in real property. Invoking the Act's 12-year

time limit, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(g), the Government maintains

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that the suit is jurisdictionally barred. Petitioners counter,

and the Court holds, that § 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional

claims-processing rule.

I

Robbins Gulch Road runs through about a mile of private

property. Petitioners acquired their properties along the

road in 1991 and 2004. Back in 1962, petitioners' predeces-

sors in interest had granted the United States an easement

for the road. The Government contends that the easement

includes public access, which petitioners dispute. On peti-

tioners' telling, the easement does not allow access to the

general public and requires the Government to maintain and

patrol the road.

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Local Government

Organizations by Daniel H. Bromberg and Jeffrey W. Mikoni; and for the

National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Cen-

ter et al. by Elizabeth Gaudio Milito, Robert Henneke, and Chance

Weldon.

156 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

In 2018, petitioners brought suit under the Quiet Title Act.

The Government moved to dismiss the action on the ground

that the Act's 12-year time limit had expired. Under the

Act, “[a]ny civil action . . . , except for an action brought by

a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve

years of the date upon which it accrued.” § 2409a(g). Ac-

crual occurs “on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in

interest knew or should have known of the claim of the

United States.” Ibid. The parties disagreed as to whether

the Act's time limit is jurisdictional, which is relevant to the

procedures for litigating whether § 2409a(g) bars petition-

ers' claim.1

The District Court agreed with the Government and dis-

missed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The

Ninth Circuit affrmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

13 F. 4th 791 (2021). Applying Circuit precedent, the Court

of Appeals held that this Court had already interpreted

§ 2409a(g) as jurisdictional in Block v. North Dakota ex rel.

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Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983).

This further entrenched a divide among the Courts of Ap-

peals.2 This Court granted certiorari to resolve the split,

596 U. S. ––– (2022), and now reverses the Ninth Circuit's

judgment.

II

A

“Jurisdiction, this Court has observed, is a word of many,

too many, meanings.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.

1

The parties dispute the precise implications on remand of a ruling that

§ 2409a(g) is nonjurisdictional. This Court takes no position on that

dispute.

2

Compare Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co. v. United States, 569

F. 3d 331, 333–335 (CA7 2009), with, e. g., Bank One Texas v. United States,

157 F. 3d 397, 402–403 (CA5 1998); Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262

F. 3d 732, 737–738 (CA8 2001); Kane County v. United States, 772 F. 3d

1205, 1214–1215 (CA10 2014); and F.E.B. Corp. v. United States, 818 F. 3d

681, 685–686 (CA11 2016).

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 157

Opinion of the Court

500, 510 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In par-

ticular, this Court has emphasized the distinction between

limits on “ the classes of cases a court may entertain

(subject-matter jurisdiction)” and “nonjurisdictional claim-

processing rules, which seek to promote the orderly progress

of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain proce-

dural steps at certain specifed times.” Fort Bend County

v. Davis, 587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The latter category generally includes a

range of “threshold requirements that claimants must com-

plete, or exhaust, before fling a lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier,

Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166 (2010).

To police this jurisdictional line, this Court will “treat a

procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress

`clearly states' that it is.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596

U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515).

This principle of construction is not a burden courts impose

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on Congress. To the contrary, this principle seeks to avoid

judicial interpretations that undermine Congress' judgment.

Loosely treating procedural requirements as jurisdictional

risks undermining the very reason Congress enacted them.

Procedural rules often “seek to promote the orderly prog-

ress of litigation” within our adversarial system. Hender-

son v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). Limits on

subject-matter jurisdiction, in contrast, have a unique poten-

tial to disrupt the orderly course of litigation. “Branding a

rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters

the normal operation of our adversarial system.” Id., at

434. “For purposes of effciency and fairness, our legal sys-

tem is replete with rules” like forfeiture, which require par-

ties to raise arguments themselves and to do so at certain

times. Ibid. Jurisdictional bars, however, “may be raised

at any time” and courts have a duty to consider them

sua sponte. Ibid. When such eleventh-hour jurisdictional

objections prevail post-trial or on appeal, “many months of

work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be

158 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

wasted.” Id., at 435. Similarly, doctrines like waiver and

estoppel ensure effciency and fairness by precluding parties

from raising arguments they had previously disavowed.

Because these doctrines do not apply to jurisdictional objec-

tions, parties can disclaim such an objection, only to resur-

rect it when things go poorly for them on the merits. Ibid.

Given this risk of disruption and waste that accompanies

the jurisdictional label, courts will not lightly apply it to pro-

cedures Congress enacted to keep things running smoothly

and effciently. Courts will also not assume that in creating

a mundane claims-processing rule, Congress made it “unique

in our adversarial system” by allowing parties to raise it

at any time and requiring courts to consider it sua sponte.

Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145,

153 (2013). Instead, “traditional tools of statutory construc-

tion must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural

bar with jurisdictional consequences.” United States v.

Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410 (2015).

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Under this clear statement rule, the analysis of § 2409a(g)

is straightforward.3 “[I]n applying th[e] clear statement

rule, we have made plain that most time bars are nonjuris-

3

The dissent maintains that this Court's settled clear statement rule

does not apply here because § 2409a(g) is a condition on a waiver of sover-

eign immunity and “as such, this Court should interpret it as a jurisdic-

tional bar to suit.” Post, at 166 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Over three dec-

ades ago, this Court in “Irwin . . . foreclose[d] th[e] argument” that “time

limits” are jurisdictional simply because they “function as conditions on

the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity.” Wong, 575 U. S., at

417–418 (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89

(1990)). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, Irwin extends to the “many

statutes that create claims for relief against the United States or its agen-

cies [and] apply only to Government defendants.” Scarborough v. Prin-

cipi, 541 U. S. 401, 422 (2004); cf. also Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S.

––– (2022) (applying clear statement rule to petitions for review of agency

action). Notably, even the dissent in Wong did not engage in such an

attempt to turn back the clock, instead arguing that the provision in that

case was jurisdictional based on its specifc text and history. See 575

U. S., at 423–428 (opinion of Alito, J.).

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 159

Opinion of the Court

dictional.” Ibid. Nothing about § 2409a(g)'s text or con-

text gives reason to depart from this beaten path. Section

2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is

commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it

accrued.” This “text speaks only to a claim's timeliness,”

and its “mundane statute-of-limitations language . . . say[s]

only what every time bar, by defnition, must: that after a

certain time a claim is barred.” Id., at 410. Further, “[t]his

Court has often explained that Congress's separation of a

fling deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the

time bar is not jurisdictional.” Id., at 411. The Quiet Title

Act's jurisdictional grant is in 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f),4 well afeld

of § 2409a(g). And “[n]othing conditions the jurisdictional

grant on the limitations perio[d], or otherwise links those

separate provisions.” Wong, 575 U. S., at 412. Section

2409a(g) therefore lacks a jurisdictional clear statement.

B

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The Government Publication

not focus on the text of § 2409a(g),

but instead points to a trilogy of decisions by this Court that

purportedly establish that the provision is jurisdictional.

None of these three decisions defnitively interpreted

§ 2409a(g) as jurisdictional.

This Court has made clear that it will not undo a “defni-

tive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provision as juris-

dictional without due regard for principles of stare decisis.

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130,

138 (2008). At the same time, however, “[c]ourts, including

this Court, have more than occasionally misused the term

`jurisdictional' to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.”

Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ––– – –––, n. 4 (some internal quota-

tion marks and alterations omitted). The mere fact that this

4

Section 1346(f ) provides that “[t]he district courts shall have exclusive

original jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an

estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the

United States.”

160 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Court previously described something “without elaboration”

as jurisdictional therefore does not end the inquiry. Hen-

derson, 562 U. S., at 437. To separate the wheat from the

chaff, this Court has asked if the prior decision addressed

whether a provision is “ ` technically jurisdictional' ”—

whether it truly operates as a limit on a court's subject-

matter jurisdiction—and whether anything in the decision

“turn[ed] on that characterization.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at

512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,

523 U. S. 83, 91 (1998)); see also Zipes v. Trans World Air-

lines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 395 (1982) (looking to whether “the

legal character of the requirement was . . . at issue”). If a

decision simply states that “the court is dismissing `for lack

of jurisdiction' when some threshold fact has not been estab-

lished,” it is understood as a “drive-by jurisdictional rul-

in[g]” that receives “no precedential effect.” Arbaugh, 546

U. S., at 511 (some internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Government begins with Block, 461 U. S. 273. The

case presented “two separate issues” about the Quiet Title

Act, neither of which was whether the 12-year limit was ju-

risdictional. Id., at 276. First, the Court held that the Act

was “the exclusive procedure” for challenging “the title of

the United States to real property.” Id., at 276–277, 286.

Second, the Court held that the 12-year limit applied to

States. Id., at 277. It was only in the opinion's conclusion

that, in remanding, the Court remarked that if the time limit

applied, “the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into

the merits.” Id., at 292. The opinion contains no discus-

sion of whether the provision was “ `technically jurisdic-

tional' ” or what in the case would have “turn[ed] on that

characterization.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting Steel

Co., 523 U. S., at 91). There is nothing more than an “unre-

fned dispositio[n]” stating that a “threshold fact” must “b[e]

established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” 546 U. S., at 511

(internal quotation marks omitted). This is a textbook

“drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” that Arbaugh held “should

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 161

Opinion of the Court

be accorded no precedential effect” as to whether a limit is

jurisdictional. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In an effort to endow a feeting statement with lasting

signifcance, the Government and the dissent invoke histori-

cal context. Block described the Act's time limit as “a con-

dition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.” 461 U. S., at

287. Block never stated, however, that the Act's time limit

was therefore truly a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction.

Yet according to the Government and the dissent, this went

without saying because the case law at the time was “unmis-

takably” clear that conditions on waivers of immunity were

subject-matter jurisdictional. Post, at 174.

This reading is undermined by the very history on which

it draws. In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498

U. S. 89 (1990), the Court surveyed the case law about

whether “time limits in suits against the Government” are

subject to “equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel.” Id., at

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94. If associating time limits with waivers of sovereign im-

munity clearly made those limits jurisdictional, equitable ex-

ceptions would be just as clearly foreclosed. Instead, Irwin

described the Court's approach to this question as “ad hoc”

and “unpredictab[le],” “leaving open” whether equitable ex-

ceptions were available in any given case. Id., at 94–95.

Accordingly, even if “a statute of limitations [was] a condition

on the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be

strictly construed,” this still “d[id] not answer the question

whether equitable tolling can be applied to this statute of

limitations.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 479

(1986). The Court instead analyzed the specifc statutory

scheme at issue, with varying results. Ibid. (citing Honda

v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967)).

Block itself refected the ambivalent nature of time limits

for suits against the Government. Block recognized that

“we should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly

restrictively,” 461 U. S., at 287, which the Court quoted just

a few years later in support of the proposition that some

162 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

such limits are subject to equitable tolling, Bowen, 476 U. S.,

at 479; see also Irwin, 498 U. S., at 94. Similarly, while

Block cautioned that exceptions to such time limits will not

“be lightly implied,” it did not hold they were categorically

precluded. 461 U. S., at 287. Block thus acknowledged

nothing more than a general proposition, echoed by Irwin,

that “a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity . . .

must be strictly construed.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 94. In

Irwin, as elsewhere, this did not mean that time limits ac-

companying such waivers are necessarily jurisdictional.

Next, the Government offers United States v. Mottaz, 476

U. S. 834 (1986). Once again, the question presented was

not whether the Quiet Title Act's 12-year time limit was

technically jurisdictional. The Court instead had to de-

cide which of two possible statutory time bars applied. Id.,

at 841. This analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the

Court asked which of several federal statutes—“the Quiet

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Title Act; the Allotment Acts; [or] the Tucker Act”—was the

“source of . . . jurisdiction” based on the nature of the plain-

tiff's claim and the relief sought. Ibid. (citations omitted).

The Court explained that the Quiet Title Act applied because

it was “ `the exclusive means by which adverse claimants

could challenge the United States' title to real property,' ”

and the plaintiff's claim fell “within the Act's scope.” Id., at

841–842 (quoting Block, 461 U. S., at 286). Second, the

Court “then determine[d] whether [the] suit was brought

within the relevant limitations period.” Mottaz, 476 U. S.,

at 841. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had notice

over 12 years before she sued, and “[h]er claim [was] there-

fore barred.” Id., at 843–844. Neither step in the Court's

analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ `tech-

nically jurisdictional.' ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting

Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91).

General statements in the opinion about waivers of immu-

nity cannot change this basic fact. At the outset of its anal-

ysis, the Court observed that “the terms of [the United

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 163

Opinion of the Court

States'] waiver of sovereign immunity defne the extent of

the court's jurisdiction” and that “ `a statute of limitations

. . . constitutes a condition on the waiver.' ” Mottaz, 476

U. S., at 841 (quoting Block, 461 U. S., at 287). Neither of

these statements, however, played a role in determining

which statute applied or whether the plaintiff brought her

claim within 12 years after it accrued. There is also no indi-

cation in the opinion that the parties raised tolling or other

equitable exceptions. As such, “ `the legal character' ” of

the time limit was never “ `at issue.' ” Reed Elsevier, 559

U. S., at 169, n. 8 (quoting Zipes, 455 U. S., at 395).

The Government also points to Mottaz's procedural back-

ground section. Buried in a paragraph recounting a tangled

procedural history, the Court remarked that the Government

raised the Quiet Title Act, “apparently for the frst time,” in

a petition for rehearing. 476 U. S., at 840. This supposedly

reveals that the Court sua sponte and sub silentio raised,

considered, and rejected an argument that the Government

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had forfeited the Quiet Title Act's time limit, doing so all

because the time limit was jurisdictional. Yet a background

section is an unlikely place for such a ruling. This is partic-

ularly true where, as the word “apparently” indicates, the

Court did not pause over its passing remark. Nor did the

Court mention this again. Further, even if the Court had

secretly considered forfeiture, there were nonjurisdictional

reasons the Court could have concluded forfeiture did not

apply.5 Speculating about what this Court might have

5

For example, the Court might have concluded forfeiture did not apply

because of the confusing way the case had been pleaded, see Brief for

United States in United States v. Mottaz, O. T. 1985, No. 85–546, p. 22,

n. 11, or that any forfeiture argument had itself been forfeited. Or the

Court might have, on refection, agreed with the Government that it had

suffciently raised the Quiet Title Act prior to rehearing. Ibid. The dis-

sent, post, at 173, n. 3, mistakes these observations as a suggestion that

Mottaz actually took one of those approaches. Far from it. This Court

is merely declining to read tea leaves to divine lost meanings about what

the Mottaz Court might have thought about a forfeiture argument it never

164 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

thought about arguments it never addressed needlessly in-

troduces confusion. This Court looks for defnitive interpre-

tations, not holdings in hiding.

Finally, there is United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38

(1998). The Court in Beggerly addressed whether § 2409a(g)

could be equitably tolled. Id., at 48–49. Subject-matter ju-

risdiction, as noted, is never subject to equitable tolling. If

Block and Mottaz had defnitely interpreted § 2409a(g) as

subject-matter jurisdictional, the Court could have just cited

those cases and ended the matter without further discus-

sion.6 Instead, the Court parsed the provision's text and

context, concluding that “by providing that the statute of

limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff `knew or

should have known of the claim of the United States,' ” the

law “has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.”

Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48. Also relevant were “the unusu-

ally generous” time limit and the importance of clarity when

it comes to land rights. Id., at 48–49. This careful analysis

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of whether the text and context were consistent with equita-

ble tolling would have been wasted words if the Court had

already held that § 2409a(g) was jurisdictional. Precisely

because the Court's inquiry was so focused on the particular

nature of equitable tolling, Beggerly also did not address

whether other exceptions such as “fraudulent concealment

or equitable estoppel might apply,” as Justice Stevens noted

in his concurrence. Id., at 49. If anything, Beggerly's dis-

cussion of nonjurisdictional reasons why tolling specifcally

was unavailable indicates the Court understood § 2409a(g)

not to be jurisdictional. Thus, Beggerly undermines any no-

tion that Block and Mottaz had put the jurisdictional ques-

tion to rest.

raised and over which “the parties did not cross swords.” Arbaugh v.

Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (2006).

6

The Court was not unaware of Block, quoting it for a different point

in the very same section. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48.

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 165

Opinion of the Court

All three cases therefore point in one direction: This

Court has never defnitively interpreted § 2409a(g) as ju-

risdictional.7 For similar reasons, the Government's argu-

ment about legislative acquiescence is unavailing. Congress

amended the Act in 1986 to provide special rules for States

in the wake of Block. See 100 Stat. 3351–3352. Then, as

now, “none of our decisions establishe[d]” that the time limit

was jurisdictional, so there was no defnitive judicial inter-

pretation to which Congress could acquiesce. Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 291 (2001). The mere existence of a

decision employing the term jurisdiction without elaboration

does not show Congress adopted that view. Nor can the

Government's handful of lower court opinions stand in for

a ruling of this Court, especially where some of these deci-

sions contain only feeting references to jurisdiction.8 See

Boechler, 596 U. S., at –––.

All told, neither this Court's precedents nor Congress' ac-

tions established that § 2409a(g) is jurisdictional. While the

Page Proof Pending Publication

Government warns that revisiting precedent results in un-

certainty, no revisiting is necessary here. Far more uncer-

tainty would follow from the Government's method of divin-

ing defnitive interpretations from stray remarks.

* * *

Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing

rule. The Court of Appeals' contrary judgment is reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

7

The dissent invokes a fourth case, United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596

(1990), which offers no more support. Dalm involved a separate provision

of a separate statute, see id., at 601–602, and cannot render § 2490a(g)

jurisdictional when Quiet Title Act cases like Block, Mottaz, and Beggerly

failed to do so.

8 See Fulcher v. United States, 696 F. 2d 1073, 1078 (CA4 1982).

166 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and

Justice Alito join, dissenting.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the

United States. But, in the Quiet Title Act of 1972, Congress

waived this immunity and consented to suits against the

United States in order to determine the status of disputed

property. 28 U. S. C. § 2409a. Congress conditioned this

consent on, among other things, a 12-year statute of limita-

tions: “Any civil action under this section, except for an ac-

tion brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is com-

menced within twelve years of the date upon which it

accrued.” § 2409a(g). This Court has long construed such

conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity as jurisdic-

tional. And, it has acknowledged the jurisdictional nature

of the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations in several

precedents.

In holding that § 2409a(g) is not jurisdictional, the majority

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commits two critical errors. First, it applies the same inter-

pretive approach to a condition on a waiver of sovereign im-

munity that it would apply to any run-of-the-mill procedural

rule. Second, by reading the Court's prior Quiet Title Act

precedents in this way, the Court disregards their express

recognition of the jurisdictional character of the Act's time

bar. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I

This Court's skepticism of the jurisdictional character of

procedural bars does not extend to conditions on a waiver of

sovereign immunity. In the context of a waiver of sovereign

immunity, the Court presumes that procedural limitations

are jurisdictional. The Act's time bar is one such provision,

and, as such, this Court should interpret it as a jurisdictional

bar to suit.

As a sovereign, the United States “is immune from suit

save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its con-

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 167

Thomas, J., dissenting

sent to be sued in any court defne that court's jurisdiction

to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S.

584, 586 (1941); see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156,

160 (1981); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 212 (1983)

(describing this principle as “axiomatic”). Consequently,

“[s]overeign immunity is by nature jurisdictional.” Hender-

son v. United States, 517 U. S. 654, 675 (1996) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting). This principle is longstanding, and the majority

does not dispute it. See ante, at 161.

“A necessary corollary of this rule,” however, “is that

when Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving the

sovereign immunity of the United States, those conditions

must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to

be lightly implied.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of

Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983); see also

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992)

(stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity “must be con-

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strued strictly in favor of the sovereign” and “not enlarge[d]

. . . beyond what the language requires” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Thus, “in many cases this Court has read

procedural rules embodied in statutes waiving immunity

strictly, with an eye to effectuating a restrictive legislative

purpose when Congress relinquishes sovereign immunity.”

Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967). In United States

v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596 (1990), the Court reaffrmed this “set-

tled principl[e]” in the specifc context of “[a] statute of limi-

tations requiring that a suit against the Government be

brought within a certain time period.” Id., at 608. Such a

requirement, the Court explained, “is one of ” the “terms of

[the United States'] consent to be sued” and, therefore, “de-

fne[s] th[e] court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Ibid.

(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).

Those straightforward principles resolve this case. The

Quiet Title Act partially waives the immunity of the United

States by granting federal district courts “exclusive original

168 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title

to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest

is claimed by the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f ).

This provision's cross-reference to § 2409a incorporates sev-

eral conditions on this waiver. For example, the Act speci-

fes that the United States “shall not be disturbed in posses-

sion or control” of contested land “pending a fnal judgment

or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty

days,” and “if the fnal determination [is] adverse,” the

United States shall have the right to purchase the land for

just compensation. § 2409a(b). Similarly, the Act provides

that any “civil action against the United States under this

section shall be tried by the court without a jury” and bars

suits based on adverse possession. § § 2409a(f ), (n). It also

incorporates the time bar at issue here: “Any civil action

under this section, except for an action brought by a State,

shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years

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of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be

deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his pred-

ecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim

of the United States.” § 2409a(g).

These provisions carefully delineate the scope of the Act's

limited waiver of sovereign immunity, establishing condi-

tions on which the United States has consented to be sued.

The United States has not, for example, consented to a jury

trial or to be sued on an adverse possession theory. Simi-

larly, and just as critically, it has not consented to be sued

(except by a State) once the 12-year statute of limitations

has passed.

The majority acknowledges that these restrictions must be

strictly construed. See ante, at 161. Yet, it concludes that

the time bar should not be considered jurisdictional. In an-

other context, the majority's conclusion is arguably plausible.

But, in this context, it is simply incorrect. As a condition

on the United States' limited waiver of sovereign immunity

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 169

Thomas, J., dissenting

in the Quiet Title Act, the Act's statute of limitations is juris-

dictional. Moreover, in light of this Court's longstanding

case law, the jurisdictional character of the time bar would

have been well understood by the 1972 Congress. See ante,

at 157 (suggesting that the Court should “avoid judicial in-

terpretations that undermine Congress' judgment” when in-

terpreting arguably jurisdictional provisions).

With no answer to the Court's longstanding view that con-

ditions on waivers of sovereign immunity are jurisdictional,

the majority seeks refuge in Irwin v. Department of Veter-

ans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990). Ante, at 161. Irwin con-

sidered whether equitable tolling should apply to the time to

fle an employment-discrimination lawsuit against the Gov-

ernment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

There, the Court reasoned that “[t]ime requirements in law-

suits between private litigants are customarily subject to

`equitable tolling,' ” and that “[o]nce Congress has made . . .

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a waiver [of sovereign immunity], . . . making the rule of

equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government,

in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts

to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.”

Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. It thus concluded that “[s]uch a prin-

ciple is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent

as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation.”

Ibid.

The majority suggests that Irwin stands for the proposi-

tion that a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity must

be strictly construed, but then goes on to argue that it is

not necessarily jurisdictional. Ante, at 161. However, our

decision in United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527 (1995),

decided fve years after Irwin, demonstrates that statutes of

limitations in suits brought against the United States are

no less jurisdictional now than they were before Irwin. In

Williams, the Court cited Dalm's holding that failure to fle

a claim against the Government for a federal tax refund

170 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

within the statute-of-limitations period operates as a juris-

dictional bar to suit, and the Court reaffrmed that a statute

of limitations “narrow[s] the waiver of sovereign immunity.”

514 U. S., at 534, n. 7 (citing 494 U. S., at 602).1 Irwin, thus,

does not disrupt this Court's long held understanding that

conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity are presump-

tively jurisdictional.

II

Regardless of whether conditions on waivers of sovereign

immunity remain jurisdictional post-Irwin, we have said

that, where the Court has offered a “defnitive earlier inter-

pretation” of a statutory time bar as jurisdictional, we will

continue to treat it as jurisdictional unless and until Con-

gress directs otherwise. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.

United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008); see also United

States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 416 (2015) (reaf-

frming John R. Sand's rule). And, we have emphasized

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that Irwin “does not imply revisiting past precedents.”

John R. Sand, 552 U. S., at 137.

The John R. Sand standard is amply met here. This

Court concluded in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of

Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983), and again in

United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834 (1986), that compliance

with the Quiet Title Act's 12-year time bar is a jurisdic-

tional prerequisite.

1

I have previously noted that Irwin “does perhaps narrow the scope of

the sovereign immunity canon.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401,

426 (2004) (dissenting opinion). But, it “does so only in limited circum-

stances,” such as “where the Government is made subject to suit to the

same extent and in the same manner as private parties are.” Ibid. (em-

phasis added). This is not one of those circumstances. The Quiet Title

Act's framework exclusively governs actions to quiet title against the

United States. And, it includes a number of conditions favorable to the

Federal Government that would not apply in traditional quiet title actions

among private litigants.

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 171

Thomas, J., dissenting

Block considered whether the Act's statute of limitations

applied to state litigants.2 There, the Government had ar-

gued that the plaintiffs' failure to sue within the 12-year

deadline established by the statute meant that the “district

court lacked jurisdiction” to consider the plaintiffs' claims.

Brief for Petitioners in Block v. North Dakota ex rel.

Board of Univ. and School Lands, O. T. 1982, No. 81–2337,

p. 5. In assessing this argument, the Court made clear that

it understood the Act's statute of limitations to arise in the

context of a waiver of sovereign immunity, discussing at

some length the tradeoffs proposed as Congress deliberated

over the scope of the Act. See 461 U. S., at 280–285. The

Court also prominently invoked Sherwood and Lehman,

cases discussing the jurisdictional nature of sovereign-

immunity waivers, to explain why the limitations provision

must be “strictly observed.” Block, 461 U. S., at 287.

After concluding that States were not exempt from the time

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bar, the Court stated that, “[i]f North Dakota's suit is barred

by [the statute of limitations], the courts below had no juris-

diction to inquire into the merits,” and it remanded for the

lower courts to determine whether the suit was so barred.

Id., at 292–293. This statement that the time bar went to

“jurisdiction” was an integral part of the Court's instructions

on remand. Moreover, on remand, the Eighth Circuit un-

derstood the Court to have used the term “jurisdiction” to

refer to a court's authority to hear the case. See North Da-

kota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands v. Block, 789

2

At the time of the Court's decision, the Act's statute of limitations read

as follows: “Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is

commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such

action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his

predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the

United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(f) (1982 ed.). Congress subsequently

amended the provision to add its current language excepting actions

brought by States.

172 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

F. 2d 1308, 1310 (CA8 1986) (noting that neither the Eighth

Circuit nor the District Court had “ `jurisdiction to inquire

into the merits' ” because the Act's “statute of limitations

is jurisdictional”).

In Mottaz, three years after Block, the Court again consid-

ered the jurisdictional nature of the Act's time bar. In the

lower courts, the Government initially defended against a

“somewhat opaque” set of claims by relying on the general

6-year statute of limitations for actions against the United

States, 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a). Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 839. The

District Court held that the suit was time barred under

§ 2401(a), but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Id., at 838–839. The Government then argued, for the frst

time, in its petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals

that the suit arose under the Quiet Title Act and was thus

subject to the Act's 12-year statute of limitations. Id.,

at 840–841. This Court granted certiorari “to consider

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whether [the] respondent's claim was barred under either

[the 6-year bar] or [the 12-year bar].” Id., at 841.

In addressing these, the Court cited Sherwood for the

proposition that, “[w]hen the United States consents to be

sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity defne

the extent of the court's jurisdiction.” 476 U. S., at 841. It

then quoted Block for the proposition that “ `[w]hen waiver

legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations

provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign

immunity,' ” treating Block as precedential on this point.

476 U. S., at 841. The Court also characterized the statute

of limitations as a “central condition of the consent given by

the Act.” Id., at 843 (citing Block, 461 U. S., at 283–285).

As in Block, this reasoning was a critical and substantial

part of the Court's opinion. The Court ultimately concluded

that the plaintiff's claim was untimely and thus barred under

the Act. 476 U. S., at 844. The Court further concluded

that no other statute “conferred jurisdiction” on the lower

courts to adjudicate her claim. Id., at 841; see also id., 844–

Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 173

Thomas, J., dissenting

851. In deciding the case, the Court noticeably did not en-

gage in a forfeiture analysis, underscoring that it understood

the Government's late-raised statute-of-limitations argument

to be jurisdictional and, thus, capable of being raised at any

point in the proceedings. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546

U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that jurisdictional argu-

ments cannot be forfeited).3

United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998), on which the

majority relies, see ante, at 164, is not to the contrary. In

that case, the Court considered whether the Quiet Title Act's

time bar may be equitably tolled. After noting that the

Court of Appeals had considered the statute of limitations

jurisdictional, see Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 42, the Court turned

to the language of the Act. The Court emphasized that the

12-year statute of limitations began to accrue when the liti-

gants knew or should have known of the claim of the United

States, and it observed that the provision's text “has already

effectively allowed for equitable tolling.” Id., at 48 (citing

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Irwin, 498 U. S., at 96). “Given this fact, and the unusually

generous nature of the [Act]'s limitations time period,” the

Court concluded that “extension of the statutory period

by additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” 524

U. S., at 48–49. Thus, while Beggerly might be read to view

the Act's time bar as potentially susceptible to tolling (and

thus, by inference, nonjurisdictional), the Court did not hold

3

The majority suggests that United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, may

have (sub silentio) concluded that forfeiture did not apply in that case.

See ante, at 163, and n. 5. But, presumably, such a conclusion would have

merited mention in the Court's opinion. To be sure, the majority notes

that the Government had raised the statute of limitations “ `apparently

for the frst time' ” in a petition for rehearing. Ante, at 163 (quoting Mot-

taz, 476 U. S., at 840 (emphasis added)). However, the use of the word

“apparently” does not indicate that the Court “did not pause over its pass-

ing remark,” as the majority contends. See ante, at 163. To the con-

trary, it suggests that the Court did not need to conduct a forfeiture analy-

sis, because the provision was jurisdictional in any event (and thus not

subject to forfeiture).

174 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

that the bar actually could be tolled. Rather, the Court

held the opposite. Beggerly is therefore, at best, ambiguous

with respect to the jurisdictional nature of the time bar. As

such, it does not overcome the Court's clear prior view set

out in both Block and Mottaz.

For the majority, the Court's statements in Block and Mot-

taz are not “defnitiv[e]” enough to satisfy John R. Sand.

Ante, at 165. But, the import of the Court's references to

“jurisdiction” in Block and Mottaz would have been clear at

the time. A court in the 1980s discussing a provision of a

statute as a waiver of sovereign immunity, citing Sherwood

(and, later, Block), invoked a well-known set of ideas that

readers at the time unmistakably associated with the concept

of jurisdiction. In fact, the Court in Dalm cited Block and

Mottaz—and no other cases—for the proposition that condi-

tions on waivers of sovereign immunity “defne th[e] court's

jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 494 U. S., at 608 (empha-

sis added; internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's

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precedents must be understood in that context.

* * *

The Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations functions as a

condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity, and is therefore

jurisdictional. This Court has repeatedly characterized the

Act's time bar as jurisdictional, and that interpretation re-

mains authoritative under John R. Sand. Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent.

Reporter’s Note

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions

Page Proof Pending Publication

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant

punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None