Hillsborough County, Florida v. The School Board of Hillsborough County

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, by and through its

Board of County Commissioners,

Appellant,

v.

SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, and

CRAIG LATIMER, in his capacity as the

Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections,

Appellees.

No. 2D2024-1871

August 19, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Emily A.

Peacock, Judge.

Samuel J. Salario, Jr., and Jessica Slatten of Lawson Huck Gonzalez,

PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant.

Kristen M. Fiore and Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; and

Jason L. Margolin and Keenan Molaskey of Akerman LLP, Tampa, for

Appellee School Board of Hillsborough County.

No appearance for Appellee Craig Latimer.

PER CURIAM.

Hillsborough County, by and through the Hillsborough County

Board of County Commissioners, appeals from the trial court order

granting the Hillsborough County School Board's emergency petition for

writ of mandamus.1 We affirm.

On April 2, 2024, the School Board adopted resolution 24-SB-1,

which called for a referendum on an additional millage to be placed on

the November 5, 2024, general election ballot. See § 1011.71(9), Fla.

Stat. (2023). The resolution and the text of the referendum called for the

tax to be imposed from July 1, 2025, until June 30, 2029. See

§ 1011.73(2). The referendum directed the County Commissioners to

instruct Craig Latimer, the Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections,2

to place the measure on the November 5, 2024, general election ballot.

See § 1011.73(3).

On July 17, 2024, the County Commissioners determined that they

had the authority to decide when the School Board's referendum should

go on the ballot. They passed a motion resolving to work with the School

Board on the proper time to place the measure on the ballot with a

recommendation of the November 2026 general election—the County

Commissioners did not definitively place the measure on the 2026 ballot.

The School Board filed an emergency petition for writ of

mandamus, seeking to compel the County Commissioners to direct the

Supervisor of Elections to place the 24-SB-1 referendum on the 2024

1 The trial court's order is a final, appealable order, and we have

jurisdiction. See Browning v. Young, 993 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA

2008).

2 The Supervisor of Elections was also named as a respondent in

the School Board's petition. The trial court dismissed the petition as to

the Supervisor of Elections, and that ruling is not at issue in this appeal.

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general election ballot. In the trial court, the parties disputed which

entity, the School Board or the County Commissioners, had the authority

to decide on which ballot the referendum would be placed. The trial

court granted the petition, determining that section 1011.73 vested the

School Board with the right to select the general election at which the

referendum would be voted on and that the County Commissioners had

the ministerial duty of "calling an election" on the date selected by the

School Board. This appeal followed.3

"In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus the petitioner must

have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have

an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the

petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available." Villa Bellini

Ristorante & Lounge, Inc. v. Mancini, 283 So. 3d 972, 976–77 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2019) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000)).

Mandamus does not lie if the respondent has discretion in carrying out

the duty. City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel's, Inc., 351 So. 2d 719, 722

(Fla. 1977). In this appeal, the County Commissioners ask us to decide

whether the trial court correctly determined that they had a ministerial

duty to call an election on the date selected by the School Board.

"While the granting of a writ of mandamus petition is typically

reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 'to the extent our decision turns on

statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review.' " Bd. of

Cnty. Comm'rs Broward Cnty. Fla. v. Parrish, 154 So. 3d 412, 417 (Fla.

4th DCA 2014) (quoting Harvard ex rel. J.H. v. Vill. of Palm Springs, 98

3 The County Commissioners' appeal automatically stayed the trial

court's order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2). On the School Board's

motion, the trial court vacated the stay, and by prior order we expedited

this appeal.

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So. 3d 645, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). "The 'plain meaning of the statute

is always the starting point in statutory interpretation.' " Alachua County

v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar,

967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)). "A 'statute should be interpreted to

give effect to every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to

all of its parts' and is not to be read in isolation, but in the context of the

entire section." Fla. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC,

986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Jones v. ETS of New Orleans,

Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 914–15 (Fla. 2001)). And we must "exhaust 'all the

textual and structural clues' that bear on the meaning of a disputed

text." Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting

Watson, 333 So. 3d at 169).

Section 1011.73 provides in pertinent part:

(2) MILLAGE AUTHORIZED NOT TO EXCEED 4 YEARS.—The

district school board, pursuant to resolution adopted at a

regular meeting, shall direct the county commissioners to call

an election at which the electors within the school district

may approve an ad valorem tax millage as authorized under

s. 1011.71(9). Such election may be held at any time, except

that not more than one such election shall be held during any

12-month period. Any millage so authorized shall be levied

for a period not in excess of 4 years or until changed by

another millage election, whichever is earlier. If any such

election is invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction,

such invalidated election shall be considered not to have been

held.

(3) HOLDING ELECTIONS.—All school district millage

elections shall be held and conducted in the manner

prescribed by law for holding general elections, except as

provided in this chapter. A referendum under this part shall

be held only at a general election, as defined in s. 97.021.

(4) FORM OF BALLOT.—

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(a) The district school board may propose a single millage or

two millages, with one for operating expenses and another for

a local capital improvement reserve fund. When two millage

figures are proposed, each millage must be voted on

separately.

(b) The district school board shall provide the wording of the

substance of the measure and the ballot title in the resolution

calling for the election. The wording of the ballot must

conform to the provisions of s. 101.161.

....

(7) EXPENSES OF ELECTION.—The cost of the publication of

the notice of the election and all expenses of the election in

the school district shall be paid by the district school board.

The County Commissioners insist that they have discretion to set

the date of the election because under section 1011.73(2) they have the

duty to "call an election" and that the phrase "call an election" means to

pick a time during which an election will be held. In support of this

argument, the County Commissioners cite various definitions of "call an

election" and In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 60 So. 2d 285, 287

(Fla. 1952).

In the advisory opinion, the supreme court addressed whether

under section 100.111(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1951), the governor had

the authority to fix the date of an election when the statute contemplated

an election "to be called by the governor." 60 So. 2d at 286. At the time,

section 100.111(2)(c) provided:

When a vacancy occurs later than thirty days before the first

primary and before forty days prior to the general election, it

shall be subject to a special first primary and if necessary

seven days later a special second primary to be called by the

governor. Ten days shall be allowed from the time the

vacancy occurs in which to specially qualify and the name of

the person nominated in the special primary shall be placed

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on the general election ballot but in event the general election

ballots have already been printed then a separate ballot shall

be prepared.

60 So. 2d at 286 (quoting § 100.111(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1951)). The court

reasoned that "if a statute imposes a duty upon a public officer to

accomplish a stated governmental purpose, it also confers by implication

every particular power necessary or proper for complete exercise or

performance of the duty that is not in violation of law or public policy."

Id. at 287. Consequently, the court opined that the governor necessarily

had the authority to fix the date of the special election because the lack

of such authority would make it impossible for the governor to call the

election as provided for by the then-applicable version of section

100.111(2)(c). 60 So. 2d at 287.

In re Advisory Opinion does not command the outcome advocated

for by the County Commissioners. The statute at issue in that case and

the statute at issue in this case are materially distinguishable. Section

100.111(2)(c) placed the sole authority on the governor to "call" the

election. That statute did not give the authority to any other entity to

direct the governor to do so. In contrast, section 1011.73(2) expressly

gives the School Board the authority to direct the County Commissioners

to call an election.

Further, we cannot decide this issue by defining "call an election"

as it is used in section 1011.73(2) in a vacuum. Rather, we must

consider the context of the statute and give effect to every clause in

section 1011.73, according meaning and harmony to all of it parts. See

ContractPoint Fla. Parks, 986 So. 2d at 1265. And while the County

Commissioners argue that the legislature must have intended for them to

have discretion in setting the date of the election because there must be

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a reason for their presence in the statute, the County Commissioners'

mere presence in the statutory process does not mean that they have

discretion to set the date of the election. The legislature simply elected to

have the County Commissioners serve as the mechanism by which the

School Board's measure is placed on the ballot.4

This is illustrated by the context of section 1011.73, including the

rights and obligations of the School Board under Florida's Constitution

and part II of chapter 1011, titled Funding for School Districts. The

School Board has the authority to "operate, control and supervise all free

public schools within the school district and determine the rate of school

district taxes within the limits" imposed by the Florida Constitution. Art.

IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.; see also § 1003.02(1)(g)1, Fla. Stat. (2024)

("[S]chool boards must . . . arrange for the levying of district school taxes

necessary to provide the amount needed from district sources.").

Section 1011.71(9) provides that "a school district may levy, by

local referendum or in a general election, additional millage for school

operational purposes . . . . Millage elections conducted under the

authority granted pursuant to this section are subject to s. 1011.73."

4 County commissioners have the general authority to place

questions or propositions on the ballot. See § 125.01(1)(y), Fla. Stat.

(2023). School boards do not have this general authority. See art. IX, §

4(b), Fla. Const.; § 1001.42, Fla. Stat. (2023) (outlining the powers and

obligations of district school boards). Although county commissioners'

general authority to place questions or propositions on the ballot is

subject to a majority vote of the county commissioners, § 125.01(1)(y),

the more specific provision of section 1011.73(2) imposing a ministerial

duty to call an election as directed by school boards controls in this case.

See McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) ("[A] specific statute

covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering

the same and other subjects in more general terms.").

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Reading these provisions together, section 1011.73(2) requires that the

School Board exercise its authority to levy additional millage under

section 1011.71(9) by resolution adopted at a regular meeting.

§ 1011.73(2). Control of the wording of the substance and the ballot title

lies with the School Board. § 1011.73(4)(b). And the statute empowers

the School Board to direct the County Commissioners to "call an

election" on the matter. § 1011.73(2). The election can be "at any time,

except that not more than one such election shall be held during any 12-

month period." Id. Further, the election can only be held during a

general election. § 1011.73(3). Finally, the School Board is responsible

for the associated costs. § 1011.73(7). Reading section 1011.73(2) in

context with the School Board's constitutional and statutory rights and

obligations, it is apparent that the School Board's directive to the County

Commissioners necessarily includes the date of the election and that the

County Commissioners' duty is to adhere to the date directed by the

School Board—a purely ministerial task. Cf. Volusia County v. Eubank,

151 So. 2d 37, 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) ("The duty of the Board to call an

election under [chapter 138] is strictly ministerial in character and

mandatory upon the filing of a petition as provided by law.").

The foregoing analysis of the plain statutory language compels our

conclusion. Bolstering that conclusion is the fact that construing the

statute as granting the County Commissioners' discretion to select the

date of the election would give the County Commissioners the ability to

upend the School Board's authority to levy additional millage and the

School Board's control over the substance of the measure to appear on

the ballot. One need only look to the facts of this case for demonstration.

Here, the School Board exercised its tax authority and control over the

substance of the measure for the ballot. That measure expressly called

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for the tax to be imposed from "July 1, 2025[,] through June 30, 2029."

In refusing to call the election as directed by the School Board, the

County Commissioners have effectively overridden the School Board's

decision as to the dates the tax should be imposed and its control over

the language of the measure.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting the School

Board's mandamus petition. We make no comment as to additional

millage proposed by the School Board—whether to approve the measure

is for the voters to decide.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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