The opinion
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Lauren Taylor ) Docket No. 2020-06-0517
)
v. ) State File No. 34641-2019
)
John & Stephanie Ingram, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )
Affirmed and Certified as Final
This is the second appeal in this case involving severe injuries. The employee worked at a
horse farm located in Franklin, Tennessee. The position required the employee to travel to
horse shows in other states, and, while in South Carolina for such a show, a horse kicked
the employee in the head. The employee received immediate emergency medical treatment
as well as extensive rehabilitation for her traumatic brain injury at facilities located in
Georgia and Nebraska. During the course of the employee’s treatment and recovery,
disputes arose over the employee’s competency and who should represent her interests. A
Georgia probate court ultimately appointed a conservator and a guardian ad litem for the
employee. The conservator hired a lawyer in Tennessee to represent the employee in her
workers’ compensation claim, and the conservator, the employee’s attorney, and the
employer’s attorney reached an agreement to settle the employee’s workers’ compensation
claim under Tennessee law. Following a hearing at which the employee was not present,
the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims approved the settlement. Thereafter, upon
receipt of the settlement documents, the employee, acting in a self-represented capacity,
filed a motion to set aside the settlement. The trial court denied the motion, determining
the employee did not have standing to make the motion as she was still a ward in an active
conservatorship in Georgia and was represented by counsel in Tennessee. The employee
appealed, and we remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Tennessee could
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the workers’ compensation case. After a hearing,
the trial court determined it did have subject matter jurisdiction. We then dismissed the
appeal, agreeing with the trial court that the employee did not have standing under the facts
of the case. Two years later, the employee again filed a motion to set aside the settlement,
averring that the conservatorship had been terminated and the guardianship extinguished
by a Missouri court and presenting the trial court with court orders to that effect. The trial
1
court determined that although the employee was no longer in an active conservatorship
and was no longer incapacitated, the employee had not filed her motion to set aside the
settlement within a reasonable time and thus denied the motion. The employee has
appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and
certify it as final.
Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.
Lauren Taylor, Foristell, Missouri, employee-appellant, pro se
John Barringer, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, John and Stephanie
Ingram, LLC
Factual and Procedural Background
This case has a long and complicated history. Lauren Taylor (“Employee”) was
originally hired in 2018 to work as an intern on a horse farm operated by John and
Stephanie Ingram, LLC (“Employer”), in Franklin, Tennessee. The following year,
Employer offered her full-time employment as a groom, which she accepted. Employee’s
work duties consisted of grooming, caring for, and exercising the horses, both at the farm
in Franklin and at horse shows in various other states.
On May 12, 2019, Employee was at a horse show in Aiken, South Carolina, when a
horse “double-barrel” kicked her in the head, causing a severe traumatic brain injury. 1
Following emergency medical care, Employee was transferred to the Shepherd Center in
Atlanta, Georgia, for further care and rehabilitation. Employee’s mother, Elaine Taylor
(“Mother”), joined her there, and in June 2019, petitioned the Fulton County Georgia
Probate Court (“the Probate Court”) to establish a conservatorship on behalf of Employee
with Mother as conservator and guardian. On September 10, the Probate Court issued
Letters of Guardianship to Mother. It subsequently issued an order appointing Mother as
conservator for Employee as well as issued Letters of Conservatorship in October 2019.
On November 19, 2019, over Mother’s objection, Employee was transferred to a
rehabilitation center in Omaha, Nebraska called Quality Life, Inc. In April 2020, while
Employee was still treating at Quality Life, Employer’s insurer filed a petition with the
Probate Court asking for a temporary substitute guardian for Employee and alleging that
Mother was not acting in Employee’s best interests as conservator and guardian. One week
later, the Probate Court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) and instructed her to
prepare a report advising the court as to whether Mother was acting in Employee’s best
1
Employee was later diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, neurocognitive disorder with memory deficit,
and adjustment disorder, among other conditions.
2
interest as her guardian and conservator. Meanwhile, on May 2, 2020, Quality Life
released Employee to live with Mother in Missouri and receive outpatient medical
treatment there.
On May 7, 2020, the Probate Court issued an order appointing a temporary
substitute conservator, William Jenkins (“Conservator Jenkins”), and then issued another
order on July 9, 2020, naming Sharon Gorman as temporary substitute guardian (“Guardian
Gorman”). 2 Conservator Jenkins then retained Jeffrey S. Roberts (“Attorney Roberts”) to
serve as Employee’s legal counsel in Tennessee to pursue her workers’ compensation
claim. Attorney Roberts filed a petition for benefit determination on July 8, 2020, seeking
modifications to the home in Missouri, and Employer filed a petition regarding Employee’s
failure to comply with medical treatment on August 24, 2021. The Probate Court continued
to reappoint Conservator Jenkins and Guardian Gorman throughout 2020 and 2021.
Although the record does not reflect that Employee had been placed at maximum
medical improvement by any medical providers, Attorney Roberts and Employer
negotiated an agreement for settlement of her workers’ compensation claim. The
agreement called for a settlement equal to ninety-nine percent of permanent total disability,
or 2,202 weeks at Employee’s compensation rate, to be administered through a special
needs trust. The agreement also provided for the closure of medical benefits for an
additional amount of $410,000, also to be administered through an annuity within the same
special needs trust. Employer’s counsel and Attorney Roberts signed the agreement, as did
Conservator Jenkins and Guardian Gorman. Neither Employee nor Mother were present
at the settlement approval hearing, and they did not sign the agreement. They both later
alleged they were unaware of the settlement approval hearing. 3 Following a hearing at
which the terms of the proposed settlement were presented and discussed, the Court of
Workers’ Compensation Claims (“the trial court”) approved the settlement agreement on
August 24, 2021. The Probate Court then approved the settlement on August 26, 2021, in
its supervisory capacity over the conservatorship.
Thereafter, Mother sent correspondence to the trial court on September 15, 2021,
indicating she and Employee had just received copies of the workers’ compensation
settlement agreement. She then filed a notice of appeal with us on September 23, 2021,
indicating that the orders from the Probate Court reappointing Conservator Jenkins and
Guardian Gorman, as well as approving the workers’ compensation settlement, were being
appealed. Employee also filed a motion to set aside the settlement with the trial court, and
2
According to the May 7 order, the Probate Court’s reasoning for removing Mother as conservator was her
failure to post a bond and file an Inventory and Asset Management Plan as required by Georgia law and her
purported interference with Employee’s medical care.
3
Although there is a purported transcript of the settlement approval hearing in the record, there is no
indication it was prepared by a certified court reporter as required by Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-
22-.05(1). As such, we have not considered it in this appeal.
3
Employer filed a motion asking us to remand the case to the trial court for it to consider
Employee’s motion. We granted the motion to remand and held the appeal in abeyance.
The trial court issued an order on October 7, 2021, denying the motion to set aside filed by
Employee, finding Employee lacked standing as a ward of the state of Georgia and giving
full faith and credit to the orders of the Probate Court pursuant to the United States
Constitution. 4 At that point, the appeal before us proceeded, and we remanded the case a
second time for the trial court to determine whether it could exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Because
Employee lived in Missouri at the time of the appeal, the injury happened in South
Carolina, and treatment was rendered in Georgia and Nebraska, we asked the trial court to
address whether Tennessee law afforded Employee a remedy as provided in Tennessee
Code Annotated section 50-6-115(b)(2).
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on November 18, 2021, during which
Employer’s financial assistant and a “barn manager” testified. 5 The trial court allowed
Employee and Mother to listen to the hearing, but it did not allow them to participate. The
financial assistant testified that Employer’s principal office is in Nashville, Tennessee, as
listed on the articles of organization. The barn manager testified that Employee began
working for Employer as an intern in 2018 and was offered full time work in 2019. During
that time, Employee resided with other employees in a home on a property next to
Employer’s farm in Franklin. When she accepted the position to be a groom, Employee
completed an IRS Form W-4, an employee eligibility verification form, and a new
employee form. Employee wrote the same address in Franklin, Tennessee on all three
forms. The barn manager also testified he and Employee intended to live in a condominium
in Brentwood, Tennessee, when they returned from the trip to South Carolina.
Based on these documents and the testimony summarized above, the trial court
determined Tennessee law provided Employee a remedy and it could exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over Employee’s claim for benefits. Specifically, the court found that
the employment was principally located in Tennessee and that, at the time of injury,
Employee was a Tennessee resident and that there were substantial connections between
the state of Tennessee and the employment relationship. Once it made that determination,
the trial court reiterated its rationale for denying the motion to set aside the settlement.
Thereafter, the appeal before us proceeded, and Conservator Jenkins filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, arguing Employee filed the appeal in a pro se capacity even though she
was represented by counsel. In a December 20, 2021 order, we agreed and dismissed the
appeal, stating, “When a party is represented by counsel, courts are only bound to recognize
filings submitted by counsel.”
4
Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution states, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”
5
There is not a transcript of the hearing contained in the record. The statements regarding the testimony
at the hearing are reflected in the trial court’s November 24, 2021 order.
4
Over two years later, on January 24, 2024, Employee filed another motion to set
aside the settlement under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. At that
time, she alleged fraud on the part of Employer, Conservator Jenkins, and Guardian
Gorman, as well as other people and organizations involved in her workers’ compensation
claim. She also argued the settlement was approved based, in part, on void judgments of
other courts or on court orders that have been or will be vacated. Employee stated the
conservatorship had been terminated by a court in Missouri and that she therefore had
standing to contest the settlement. Employer filed a response in opposition to the motion
and requested sanctions. The trial court issued an order on February 26, 2024, stating no
documentation of the termination of the conservatorship had been filed and instructing
Employee to file any such documentation within thirty days. Employee filed both an
October 25, 2022 order terminating the conservatorship from a circuit court in Missouri
and a November 11, 2022 order from the same court discharging the conservator and
guardian. She also filed a letter to Employer, Conservator Jenkins, and Guardian Gorman,
as well as GAL and all attorneys involved, indicating she had been notified the entity
holding her special needs trust had filed for bankruptcy and both her “lost wages” account
and her medical expenses account had been “compromised by a shortfall of assets.”
Employer did not file a response to these filings.
Upon receipt of these documents, the trial court issued another order dated March
21, 2024, in which it determined that although Employee had standing to file the motion,
the settlement would not be set aside. The court reasoned that under Rule 60.02, an order
can only be set aside due to fraud within one year of its entry, and Employee had filed this
motion well over a year after the settlement had been approved and after the initial
unsuccessful appeal, as well as over a year after her conservatorship was terminated and
she regained capacity to act on her own behalf. It further found that the remaining
circumstances of Rule 60.02 allowing the settlement to be set side did not apply because
they require the motion to be filed within a reasonable time, and Employee’s motion was
not filed within a reasonable time. Finally, it denied Employer’s Rule 11 request for
sanctions due to procedural errors in the request. Employee has appealed. 6
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2023). When the trial judge has had the opportunity
to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable
deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn.,
Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar deference need be
6
Employee also filed a motion to reconsider with the trial court on the same date as filing her notice of
appeal. Both Employer and Attorney Roberts filed responses opposing the motion, and the trial court
denied the motion while this appeal was pending.
5
afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v.
Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and application of
statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor
either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2023).
Analysis
On appeal, Employee raises a multitude of issues regarding the validity of the
various orders from the Probate Court, as well as the trial court’s decision to give full faith
and credit to those orders. Employee also avers that the trial court lacked both personal
and subject matter jurisdiction over her claim for workers’ compensation benefits. For its
part, Employer contends several of the issues Employee raises on appeal have been waived,
as they were not raised at the trial court level. Furthermore, Employer argues the orders
from the Probate Court are valid and that, even if they were invalid, Employee’s current
attempt to set aside the settlement based on the allegedly invalid orders is untimely.
Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue in this appeal. Employer contends that the trial court
previously resolved the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and it should not be re-litigated.
Although the trial court held a hearing on subject matter jurisdiction, we did not address
that issue in the first appeal because we dismissed the appeal on other grounds. Further, it
still remains that “the issue of subject [] matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during
the proceedings, by the parties or by the court.” Wilken v. Wilken, No. W2012-00989-
COA-R3-CV, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 907, at *10-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2012)
(citations omitted). Also, “[w]hether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is
a question of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Morgan
Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 602 (Tenn. 2013).
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-115(b)(2) addresses a Tennessee court’s
authority to exercise jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases involving multiple
states:
If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of this state other
than temporarily, suffers an injury on account of which the
employee . . . would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this
chapter had the injury occurred within this state, the employee . . . shall be
6
entitled to the benefits provided by this chapter; provided, that at the time of
the injury:
(A) The employment was principally localized within this state;
(B) The contract of hire was made in this state; or
(C) If at the time of the injury the injured worker was a Tennessee resident
and there existed a substantial connection between this state and the
particular employer and employee relationship.
The parties here agreed that the contract of hire was not made in Tennessee,
rendering subsection (B) inapplicable. However, Employer contends, based on witness
testimony and documentation completed by Employee at the time of hire, that the
employment was principally localized within the state of Tennessee, that Employee was a
Tennessee resident at the time of the injury, and that there were substantial connections
between the state of Tennessee and the employment relationship. For her part, Employee
argues that the Probate Court in Georgia did not have the requisite jurisdiction to continue
to deem Employee incompetent and maintain her status as a ward of the state of Georgia
given that she resided in Missouri once her treatment in Georgia had concluded. Therefore,
according to Employee, the orders of the Probate Court were invalid, and Conservator
Jenkins had no authority to hire a Tennessee attorney and present a proposed workers’
compensation settlement to a Tennessee court.
We conclude Employee conflates the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction in her argument. Prior to the current appeal, Employee did not assert
that the trial court improperly exercised personal jurisdiction over the parties in this case.
It is well settled that personal jurisdiction can be agreed to or waived. See, e.g., Powers v.
Franklin Cnty., No. 01-A-01-9002-CH-00081, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 1, 1990) (“jurisdiction of the person may be waived or conferred by consent”).
Here, the trial court was presented with orders from another jurisdiction evidencing the
appointment of a conservator and a guardian over Employee. Employee has not established
those orders were fraudulent, invalid, or otherwise improperly considered by the trial court.
The attorney retained by the conservator filed a petition for benefits on Employee’s behalf
in July 2020 and presented the proposed settlement to the trial court for its consideration,
subjecting Employee and the conservatorship to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court.
Thus, we conclude the issue of personal jurisdiction has been waived.
Furthermore, neither we nor the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims has the
authority to ascertain the jurisdictional authority of a court in another state with respect to
the appointment of conservators and/or guardians. “The Tennessee Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims is a court of statutorily defined, limited jurisdiction. The court was
created as of July 1, 2014, to have ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all contested
7
claims for workers’ compensation benefits.’” Martinez v. ACG Roofing, Inc., No. 2021-
08-0059, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31, at *10-11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.
App. Bd. July 12, 2023). The Workers’ Compensation Law, itself, limits its scope to
“[e]very employer and employee subject to this chapter” who are obligated to “pay and
accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising primarily out of and
in the course and scope of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103 (2023). As such,
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court and the legal validity of orders issued by that court are
questions for Georgia courts. However, irrespective of the orders from the Probate Court
establishing Employee’s conservatorship, it is still our role to address the threshold
question of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Employee’s
workers’ compensation claim pursuant to Tennessee law.
As noted above, Employee was under a conservatorship and did not have an
opportunity to testify or provide any evidence at the initial hearing on subject matter
jurisdiction. However, on appeal, she has not argued that the evidence presented at that
hearing was false or that the trial court erred in considering it. Among other things, the
proof contains three documents completed by Employee just before her injury indicating a
home address in Tennessee. There was undisputed testimony that Employee resided with
other employees at a Tennessee location during her employment in Tennessee and planned
to return to Tennessee following the trip to South Carolina. Articles of organization
identified Nashville, Tennessee as the principal place of business for Employer. Our
review of this documentary evidence leads us to conclude the trial court did not err in
determining Employee was a Tennessee resident at the time of the injury and that there was
a substantial connection between the state of Tennessee and Employee’s relationship with
Employer. Thus, we conclude the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims properly
determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over Employee’s claim for workers’
compensation benefits in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-115(b)
and could consider the proposed settlement.
Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside
Employee next contends the settlement approved by the court in August 2021
should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states in part:
On motion . . ., the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal
representative from a final judgment . . . for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (3) the
judgment is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based had been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective
application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
8
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1) and (2) not more than one year after the judgment, order[,] or
proceeding was entered or taken.
Employee argued in her motion to set aside the settlement that all of the grounds contained
in Rule 60.02 existed in this case, with the exception of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.” Employee makes numerous statements in both her brief on appeal
and her affidavit filed with the trial court alleging fraud and collusion on the part of
Employer, Employer’s counsel, Conservator Jenkins, Guardian Gorman, and GAL.
Employee also posits that the determinations of the Probate Court are void due to either
the alleged fraud or fatal defects in the procedures of that court, and as such, the trial court
erred in giving full faith and credit to the orders.
To be successful, a motion to set aside pursuant to Rule 60.02 must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church,
958 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). “Clear and convincing evidence means
evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the
conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901
n.3 (Tenn. 1992). “In other words, the evidence must be such that the truth of the facts
asserted [is] ‘highly probable.’” Goff v. Elmo Greer & Sons Constr. Co., 297 S.W.3d 175,
187 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn.
2005)). In general, “the bar for attaining relief is set very high and the burden borne by the
movant is heavy.” Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 895 n.2 (Tenn. 2001). For the
reasons noted below, we conclude Employee has not met this burden.
Allegations of Fraud
First, Employee asserts numerous fraudulent acts occurring from the date of injury
through the date of settlement approval involving Employer, Employer’s attorneys,
Conservator Jenkins, Guardian Gorman, GAL, the Probate Court, medical providers, and
others. She does so through an affidavit completed by herself and Mother, but she did not
offer any evidence to support the accusations. Mere allegations are not evidence. See, e.g.,
Akers v. Dale, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1988) (“[M]ere
allegations of an act of fraud . . . [are] insufficient without facts evidencing a fraudulent
intent.”). Here, there is simply no clear and convincing evidence in the record of any such
acts of fraud or fraudulent intent.
Moreover, Employee’s motion also fails with respect to timeliness. The trial court
approved the settlement on August 24, 2021, and Employee’s conservatorship was
terminated on October 25, 2022. Employee did not file her motion to set aside the
settlement until January 24, 2024, over two years after the settlement approval and fifteen
months after she regained capacity as determined by the Missouri court. As such, even if
the record contained evidence of fraud, which it does not, we agree with the trial court that
9
this order cannot be set aside pursuant to Rule 60.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a motion to set aside based on fraud to be filed within one year
of the entry of the judgment.
Validity of Order Approving Settlement
Next, Employee argues that the trial court’s order approving the settlement is invalid
because it was based, in part, on the orders of the Probate Court establishing her
conservatorship and thus taking away her legal standing in her workers’ compensation
case, which she claims are void. She lists numerous reasons why the Probate Court’s orders
were void, but her arguments hinge on whether those orders are unconstitutional or
otherwise contravene Georgia law in appointing and reappointing Conservator Jenkins,
Guardian Gorman, and GAL. She further questions the timing of several orders of the
Probate Court. She argues that, because these orders are legally void, Attorney Roberts
was not properly retained, the involvement of Conservator Jenkins and Guardian Gorman
was improper, and the settlement agreement and order approving the settlement are invalid.
For its part, Employer asserts that any challenges to the Probate Court’s orders are within
the jurisdiction of Georgia courts and that the trial court was correct in giving those orders
full faith and credit under Tennessee law and the United States Constitution. Employer
argues in the alternative that even if the orders were invalid, Employee did not file her
motion to set aside within a reasonable time within the meaning of the Tennessee Rules of
Civil Procedure. We agree with Employer on both counts.
As the trial court correctly noted in its initial denial of the motion to set aside, dated
October 7, 2021, it did not have authority to determine the validity of court orders issued
in another state in another cause of action. It, and we, are compelled pursuant to the United
States Constitution and the statutes of the state of Tennessee to give full faith and credit to
the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” of other states when they are properly
authenticated. See U.S. Const., art. IV, §1; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq.
These mandates apply to all courts in the state of Tennessee. The record on appeal contains
no evidence whatsoever that a Georgia court has invalidated or declared void any order
issued by the Probate Court in this case. Thus, we conclude that there is no evidence in the
record supporting Employee’s contention that Conservator Jenkins and Guardian Gorman
were improperly appointed and/or that Attorney Roberts was improperly retained to
represent Employee’s interests and present the negotiated settlement to the trial court for
approval.
Furthermore, for a judgment to be set aside due to voidness or for “any other reason
justifying relief,” as stated in Rule 60.02, the party seeking the relief must file the motion
within a “reasonable time.” The trial court concluded that the fifteen months that elapsed
10
between the termination of Employee’s conservatorship and her filing the motion to set
aside was not a reasonable time. 7
“Whether a Rule 60.02[] motion is filed within a reasonable time is a question of
fact for the trial court, and [we] will review the trial court’s determination under the abuse
of discretion standard.” Walker v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. M2009-00273-COA-R3-CV,
2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009) (citing Rogers v. Estate
of Russell, 50 S.W.3d 441, 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). An abuse of discretion occurs if
the trial court “applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its
decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that
causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty.
Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008). Here, the order terminating the
conservatorship was entered by a Missouri court on October 25, 2022, but the most recent
motion to set aside the workers’ compensation settlement was not filed until January 24,
2024, approximately fifteen months later. Employee has offered no explanation for this
delay. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
amount of time that passed between Employee’s regaining legal capacity and the filing of
her motion to set aside the settlement was not reasonable. As such, the court’s
determination in that regard is also affirmed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order in all respects and certify
it as final. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee.
7
There has been at least one workers’ compensation settlement set aside after a longer period of time. In
Dennis v. Erin Truckways, Ltd., the employee sought to have his workers’ compensation settlement set
aside twenty-two months after the initial settlement agreement had been approved. Dennis v. Erin
Truckways, Ltd., 188 S.W.3d 578, 585-586 (Tenn. 2006). However, the employee in that case requested
the settlement be deemed void for a lack of compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-206,
which at the time required the Commissioner’s designee, if the settlement was not being approved in a court
of law, to confirm “the employee is receiving, substantially, the benefits provided by the Workers’
Compensation Law.” Id. at 587; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-206(c)(1)(B) (2005). Further, the
employee in Dennis was not informed of his right to have his settlement approved by a judge in a court of
law rather than a designee at the Tennessee Department of Labor. Id. at 587; see also Tenn. Code Ann. §
50-6-206(c)(3)(B) (2005). The Supreme Court agreed that the approval of the settlement did not comply
with the procedural safeguards mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-206 and set aside the
settlement. Dennis, at 588-589. Furthermore, it specifically determined it need not analyze whether the
settlement could be set aside under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure as “the trial court
did not rely on [that] rule in setting aside the settlement.” Id. at 589. Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-206 has since been repealed, and now the sole authority to approve workers’ compensation settlements
lies with the judges of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
sections 50-6-238(a)(3) and 50-6-240. In circumstances such as are present in this case, they are required
to determine the settlement provides “substantially” the benefits to which the employee is entitled under
the Workers’ Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-240(a) (2023). The trial court’s order approving
the settlement confirms that it made that determination in this case.
11
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Lauren Taylor ) Docket No. 2020-06-0517
)
v. ) State File No. 34641-2019
)
John & Stephanie Ingram, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 9th day
of August, 2024.
Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Lauren Taylor X laurentaylor135@hotmail.com
Elaine Taylor rosewood321@icloud.com
John Barringer X jbarringer@manierherod.com
Jenna Macnair jmacnair@manierherod.com
sknack@manierherod.com
Jeffrey S. Roberts X jeff@middletninjury.com
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims
Matthew Keene
Acting Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-532-1564
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov