Jerry Robertson, a/k/a Jere Robertson v. Clara Robertson Hodges, et ux.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

April 20, 2010 Session

JERRY ROBERTSON, A/K/A JERE ROBERTSON, v. CLARA

ROBERTSON HODGES, ET UX., ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sevier County

No. 05-5-201 Hon. Telford E. Forgety, Jr., Chancellor

No. E2009-01335-COA-R3-CV - FILED JUNE 28, 2010

In this action plaintiff asked the Court to declare that he had an interest in property which he

inherited by will, and for a partition and sale of the land. The Trial Court determined that

plaintiff was judicially estopped to claim an interest in the land and dismissed the action. On

appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

H ERSCHEL P ICKENS F RANKS, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. M ICHAEL

S WINEY, J., joined and J OHN W. M CC LARTY, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

Onnie Winebarger, Byrdstown, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jerry Robertson, a/k/a Jere

Robertson.

Jeffrey R. Murrell and James H. Ripley, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Clara

Robertson Hodges, et vir., et al.

Lars E. Schuller, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Branch Bank and Trust Company

and BB&T Collateral Service Corporation.

OPINION

This is an appeal of the dismissal of a petition for partition and sale of land. Plaintiff,

Jerry Robertson, a/k/a Jere Robertson (hereinafter Jerry Robertson) filed the petition for

partition and sale of land on May 24, 2005 in the Chancery Court. The petition sought a

declaration that Jerry Robertson, as an adopted son of Tillman Robertson, was a one half-

owner of a certain tract of land in Sevier County and that an order of reference be made for

an accounting and that the property be sold. Defendant, Clara Robertson Hodges, the

daughter of Tillman Robertson, was alleged to be the other half-owner of the subject

property. Clara Hodges' husband, Dwayne Hodges, was also a named defendant. Ray G.

Hodges and Voletta Hodges, son and daughter-in-law of Clara Hodges, were made

defendants as they lived on the subject property and had been conveyed a portion of the

property by deed from Clara Hodges. Other defendants were named who had a leasehold or

security interest in the property.

The petition alleged the land subject to the petition was devised to Tillman Robertson

as a life interest with the remainder to go to the “heirs of law” by the will of Henry C. Butler.

Tillman Robertson took possession of the property upon the death of Henry C. Butler and

farmed and lived on the tract of land during his lifetime. Tillman Robertson died in 1990.

Tillman Robertson had two children, plaintiff Jerry Robertson and defendant Clara Hodges.

Jerry Robertson claims he and his sister Clara were “all the heirs at law” of Tillman

Robertson. The petition alleges that Clara Hodges has controlled the property and collected

rents, profits and proceeds from it. Further Clara Hodges was alleged to have conveyed

approximately 3.53 acres of the property to Ray and Voletta Hodges. The petition prayed that

the court find that Jerry Robertson and Clara Hodges are all the heirs at law of Tillman

Robertson and that Jerry Robertson is one half owner of the property, and also establish any

other interest. The petition asked for an accounting of the rents and profits derived from the

property by Clara Hodges, and that she pay plaintiff one half of those rents and profits and,

that the property be offered for sale.

The Hodges defendants filed an answer admitting that Jerry Robertson was the

adopted son of Tillman Robertson and that, upon information and belief, Jerry Robertson was

an heir at law of Tillman Robertson. The Hodges defendants raised the affirmative defenses

of the statute of limitations, laches, estoppel and waiver.

Motions for summary judgment were filed, but all motions for summary judgment

were denied.

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By agreement of counsel and consent of the Trial Court, the matter was bifurcated and

the trial was first to be conducted regarding whether Jerry Robertson had any interest in the

land. If judgment was in Jerry Robertson’s favor, the remaining issues regarding partition

and sale would be tried.

The trial was held on May 19, 2009 before Chancellor Telford E. Forgety, Jr. and at

the close of the hearing the Court ruled in favor of the defendants and provided extensive

oral findings of fact and conclusions of law which were incorporated by reference in the final

judgment.

The memorandum opinion provided the following findings:

1. Jerry Robertson owns no interest in the property as of today.

2. Based on the Court’s interpretation of the Corbitt1 case relied on by

defendants, and the Court’s opinion that the Corbitt definition of heir would

apply in 1936 when the Butler will was probated, the Court stated that it

believed Jerry Robertson would not be considered the heir at law of H. C.

Butler. However, the Court seemed to express some concern about the

correctness of this statement later in the opinion. At the very end of the

opinion, the Court tried to clarify this issue and stated that “without question

he [Jerry Robertson] was an heir at law of Tillman Robertson. . . . . Is he to be

construed to be an heir at law, to have been the intended beneficiary as an heir

at law under the Will of H.C. Butler, that was the real question. . . . I told you

I think the Corbitt rule probably would have been the law in 1936, but I have

not . . . my ruling on that ground.

3. Jerry Robertson was told in 1958 by an attorney and by the clerk of court of

Sevier County, who was his uncle, that under the will of H. C. Butler he would

have a one half interest in the property at the death of his adoptive father,

Tillman Robertson.

4. Jerry Robertson was divorced after the death of Tillman Robertson and he did

not disclose in the marital dissolution agreement that he had an ownership

interest in the property. Further, he did not list the property in Schedule A of

a bankruptcy petition he filed in 1993.

5. The Trial Court stated that it could not “accredit” Jerry Robertson’s

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Union Planters v. Corbitt, 474 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. App. 1971).

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explanation of why he did not disclose his ownership interest in the property

in the divorce and bankruptcy proceedings. Jerry Robertson’s explanation was

after being told in 1958 by an attorney and by his uncle that upon Tillman

Robertson’s death, he would have an ownership interest in the property, he

talked to another attorney, Wanda White, about the issue following the death

of Tillman Robertson in 1990. Jerry Robertson claimed that Ms. White

reviewed Tillman Robertson’s will and possibly H. C. Butler’s will and

informed him that any claim he may have had to the property at the time of

Tillman Robertson’s death had expired due to his sister’s occupancy of the

property for more than six months. Based on this determination that Jerry

Robertson’s explanation of why he did not include the ownership interest in

the property in the divorce and bankruptcy filings was not credible, the Court

held that Jerry Robertson’s claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial

estoppel.

6. The Trial Court also found that Jerry Robertson had lost whatever ownership

interest he might have had in the property based on the adverse possession of

his sister Clara Hodges. The judge held that Clara Hodges’ statement to Jerry

Robertson at the funeral of Tillman Robertson in 1990 that “Daddy left the

farm to me” functioned as an ouster as he was on notice that Clara Hodges

thought the farm was hers and that she was claiming it. The Court also stated

that the evidence showed that for fifteen years, from 1990 to 2005 when the

suit was filed, Clara Hodges and her husband lived on the property, farmed it,

worked it every day, improved it by spending thousands of dollars on it,

borrowed on it, sold one tract of it, leased another tract and collected rents.

The Court concluded that the adverse possession statute of limitations had run

against Jerry Robertson with respect to his claim of ownership of the property.

7. The Court addressed the defendants’ other defenses of laches and unclean

hands and stated that Jerry Robertson should have asserted his claim “a long

long time before he did”. However the Court did not specifically state that it

held that Jerry Robertson’s claims were barred by the doctrines of laches or

unclean hands. The Court only said that “there are multiple, multiple, as I said,

multiple grounds here upon which the defendants prevail in this case, and I’ve

touched upon those in my remarks."

8. As to the claims against Ray and Voletta Hodges and BB&T, the Court held

that Ray and Voletta Hodges “own their property in fee simple with good title

and that, therefore, the mortgage with BB&T bank . . . is also good and valid.

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9. The Court summarized its reasons for dismissing Jerry Robertson’s claims as

based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, adverse possess, actual ouster,

unclean hands and, vaguely stated “there is other defenses that apply even in

the event that Jerry Robertson were to have been considered included in the

class of people who would have taken as beneficiaries under the Will of H. C.

Butler.

Jerry Robertson has appealed and raises these issues:

A. Did the Trial Court err in dismissing the petition upon a finding that the action

was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel?

B. Did the Trial Court err in dismissing the petition upon a finding that plaintiff,

as a co-tenant, was actually ousted and barred by adverse possession?

C. Did the Trial Court err in dismissing the petition upon a finding that it was

barred by the doctrine of unclean hands?

D. Whether the Trial Court should have additionally found in favor of defendants

because plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary of H.C.. butler and therefore,

acquired no interest in the subject property?

A trial court’s findings of fact in a non-jury trial are reviewed de novo upon the

record. The trial court's findings are afforded a presumption of correctness unless the

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13 (d); Wright v. City of

Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995). This Court reviews credibility determinations

made by the trial court with great deference. Keaton v. Hancock County Bd. of Educ., 119

S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed

under a purely de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. Taylor v. Fezell, 158

S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005), Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston 854 S.W.2d 87, 91

(Tenn. 1993).

Appellant contends the Trial Court erred when it dismissed his petition upon a finding

that his claim of ownership in the H.C. Butler Farm was barred by the doctrine of judicial

estoppel. The fact that Jerry Robertson knew by 1958 that he had a property interest in the

H.C. Butler Farm under the H.C. Butler will, should he outlive his adopted father Tillman

Robertson, is undisputed. It is further undisputed that Jerry Robertson was required to make

a disclosure of his assets in both his bankruptcy proceeding and the divorce from his wife

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Vivian. It is likewise undisputed that Jerry Robertson, in sworn statements filed with the

courts, failed to disclose his property interest in the H.C. Butler Farm in both of these

proceedings. The Trial Court found that Jerry Robertson’s failure to make such disclosures

in the bankruptcy and divorce cases barred him from setting forth a claim to the property in

the instant case under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

Jerry Robertson’s defense to the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel was

that he relied on the legal advice he received from Wanda White in 1992 that he had no claim

to the property when he filed his sworn statements in the bankruptcy and divorce

proceedings. The Trial Court clearly articulated that it did not “accredit” Jerry Robertson’s

account of his dealings with Wanda White when it found that appellant’s claim to the

property was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

The Tennessee Supreme Court recently discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel in

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303 (Tenn. 2009) as

follows:

The distinctive feature of the Tennessee law of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath)

is the expressed purpose of the court, on broad grounds of public policy, to uphold the

sanctity of an oath. The sworn statement is not merely evidence against the litigant,

but (unless explained) precludes him from denying its truth. It is not merely an

admission, but an absolute bar. Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999)

(emphases added) (quoting Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 266

S.W. 313, 318 (1924)). While the doctrine of judicial estoppel is applied to prohibit

a party from taking “a position that is directly contrary to or inconsistent with a

position previously taken by the party,” Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 382

(Tenn.2006), the doctrine generally only applies to “sworn statements made in the

course of judicial proceedings.” Sartain, 266 S.W. at 316; accord Carvell v. Bottoms,

900 S.W.2d 23, 30 (Tenn.1995) (noting that “parties are ‘judicially estopped’ from

taking contrary sworn positions on the same issue in different lawsuits”); Layhew v.

Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975) (noting that “judicial estoppels are not

favored and ordinarily do not arise out of mere unsworn pleadings”).

Epperson at 314.

The elements necessary for the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel are

present in this case. Jerry Robertson made sworn statements in two judicial proceedings (the

bankruptcy and divorce) wherein he did not list his interest in the H.C. Butler property. This

failure to disclose his property interest is directly contrary to and inconsistent with his

position in this suit, that he has a one-half ownership interest in the property pursuant to the

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H. C. Butler will. His sworn oaths in the earlier proceedings are thus a bar to his claiming

the property in this suit unless he can show that an exception to the doctrine applies.

This Court in Gordon, ex. rel Gordon v. Draughn, No. M2008-02224-COA-R10-CV,

2009 WL 1704470 (Tenn. Ct. App., Jun. 16, 2009) examined whether the omission of a

medical malpractice claim from a bankruptcy petition judicially estopped the plaintiff, Ms.

Gordon, from pursing the malpractice claim. Gordon at * 7. The Court in Gordon examined

the doctrine of judicial as an exception to that doctrine as set forth by the Tennessee Supreme

Court in Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 266 S.W. 313 (Tenn. 1924):

While the appellate courts of Tennessee have ... upheld and preserved the sanctity of

an oath by the application of this principle [of judicial estoppel], yet, in order to avoid

injustice, the severity of the rule has been tempered by this exception, viz.: If the party

sought to be estopped can show that his previous statement under oath was made

inadvertently or through mistake ... he will not be precluded by his former statement.

Id. [Sarain] at 317-18; see D.M. Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 206 S.W.2d 897, 906

(Tenn.1947) (holding that “[w]hile judicial estoppel applies where there is no

explanation of the previous contradictory sworn statement, it does not apply where

there is an explanation showing such statement was inadvertent, inconsiderate,

mistaken, or anything short of a ‘willfully false’ statement of fact”) (internal citations

omitted). “Anything short of ‘conscious and deliberate perjury’ is insufficient to give

rise to the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” Echols v. Echols, 2007 WL 1756711, at *3

(Tenn. Ct.App. June 19, 2007) (citing State ex rel. Scott v. Brown, 937 S.W.2d 934,

936 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996)). “A trial court's application of the doctrine of judicial

estoppel presents a question of law.” Frazier v. Pomeroy, 2006 WL 3542534, at *10

(Tenn.Ct.App.2006).

Gordon at * 5 - 6.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to anything short of a willfully false

statement of fact and a litigant is entitled to have an opportunity to explain that a prior

statement was inadvertent, made inconsiderately, or based on a mistake of fact or law before

the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be applied. Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005-00911-

COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3542534, 10 -11 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 7, 2006)(citing State ex rel.

Scott v. Brown, 937 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996); State ex rel. Ammons v. City of

Knoxville, 33 Tenn.App. 622, 630-31, 232 S.W.2d 564, 567-68 (1950); Estate of Boote, 198

S.W.3d 699, 719-20 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005)).

Jerry Robertson sought to explain his failure to disclose his interest in the H.C. Butler

Farm in the earlier litigations by explaining that Ms. White had told him in 1992 or 1993 that

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he had lost any claim to the property that he may have had. According to Robertson, he

relied on this legal advice from Ms. White when he failed to list the H.C. Butler Farm as an

asset in his divorce and bankruptcy cases.

The Trial Court stated it did not believe Robertson’s explanation regarding his

dealings with Wanda White and held that the petition was barred by the doctrine of judicial

estoppel. Given the deference this Court must attribute to the findings of credibility made

by the Trial Court, we do not disagree with the Trial Court for the following reasons.

Jerry Robertson’s statements regarding his brief consultation with Ms White are vague

and unsubstantiated. He claims that he went to see her in her office on the court house

square in Brydstown in 1992 about a collection matter. At the same time he asked her to

review the H.C. Butler will regarding any rights he may have had under it. He claims that

as he happened to pass by Ms. White’s office a short time later, she called him and told him

that he had lost his rights to the farm because his sister had lived on the farm for more than

six months after Tillman Robertson’s death. He claims that Ms. White showed him a law

book that so provided and that he read the law in the book. Neither Robertson, nor his

counsel, offered any suggestion as to what principle of law Ms. White supposedly relied on

when she offered this advice. Ms. White's deposition was entered into evidence, but she did

not substantiate any of Jerry Robertson’s account of his dealings with her. The most she

could say was that she had an office in the place described by Mr. Robertson between 1990

and 1991 and that she had a casual, but not a professional, acquaintance with him. She had

no recollection or records of giving him any legal advice and she had never seen a copy of

the H. C. Butler will. Notably, Ms. White testified that she had moved her office to a

different location than described by Mr. Robertson by 1992, when he claimed to have visited

her in that office. Further, Mr. Robertson attempted to rely on his son Mitchell to verify his

account of the legal advice provided by Ms. White. Mitchell Robertson was unable to do so.

Given the vague and unsubstantiated nature of Jerry Robertson’s explanation of why

he “mistakenly” did not list his interest in the H.C. Butler Farm as an asset in his divorce and

bankruptcy cases, we hold the Trial Court did not err when it did not “accredit” Robertson’s

testimony on the issue. His position in this case is clearly inconsistent with the sworn

statements he made in the two prior court cases, and we affirm the Trial Court's dismissal of

plaintiff's petition, based on a finding of judicial estoppel should be affirmed.

Upon this holding, the remaining issues raised on appeal are moot and are

pretermitted.

In conclusion, we hold the Trial Court was correct in determining Robertson's claims

in this matter were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and we affirm the Judgment

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of the Trial Court dismissing this suit. The cost of this appeal is assessed to Jerry Robertson.

_________________________________

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J.

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