Opinion

State v. Hardin

2024 Ohio 2943

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed: Aug 2, 2024
Status: Published
On the bench: Osowik
Cited by: 2 cases
Authority: More cited than 49.2%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Hardin, 2024-Ohio-2943.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-22-1215

L-22-1216

Appellee

Trial Court No. CR0202102664

CR0202102967

Shawnte Hardin DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: August 2, 2024

*****

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and

Brad Tammaro and Drew Wood, Assistant

Attorneys General, for appellee.

Adam M. VanHo, for appellant.

*****

OSOWIK, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an August 5, 2022 judgment of the Lucas County

Court of Common Pleas, convicting appellant of 31 felony and misdemeanor offenses, all

resulting from appellant’s unlawful engagement in death-related services, for which

appellant lacked the required education, training, licensure, facilities, and equipment, and

which caused catastrophic damage to the remains of the deceased and anguish to the

families and loved ones of the deceased.

{¶ 2} At appellant’s election, the right to a jury trial was waived and all cases were

tried to the bench. Following his convictions, appellant was sentenced to a total term of

incarceration ranging from 11 years, 10 months, to 14 years, 10 months. For the reasons

set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.

{¶ 3} Appellant, Shawnte Harden, sets forth the following three assignments of

error:

ONE: APPELLANT’S [CONVICTIONS] FOR ENGAGING IN A

PATTERN OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, TAMPERING WITH RECORDS,

TELECOMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, ABUSE OF A CORPSE, AND/OR

POSSESSION OF CRIMINAL TOOLS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS

BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE [].

TWO: APPELLANT’S [CONVICTIONS FOR] ABUSE OF A

CORPSE ARE VOID AS THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

VAGUE [].

THREE: APPELLANT’S [CONVICTIONS] FOR FAILURE TO

FILE TAXES, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 5747.19 OF THE OHIO

REVISED CODE ARE VOID AS LUCAS COUNTY WAS [AN]

IMPROPER VENUE [].

{¶ 4} As noted above, this case centers upon uniquely unsettling

circumstances arising from appellant’s widespread engagement in the unlawful

provision of death-related services throughout Ohio, predominantly in Franklin,

Summit, and Lucas counties. Appellant’s scheme unraveled upon a succession of

survivors in different regions of Ohio learning that their loved ones’ remains had

been fundamentally mishandled and left to decompose in varying locations.

Following the discovery and investigation into these events, appellant was indicted

on numerous offenses arising from these actions.

{¶ 5} Specifically, appellant routinely failed to refrigerate remains, to

properly embalm and preserve remains, to properly store remains, to properly

transport remains, and failed to cremate or properly dispose of remains for which

cremation services had been paid by the families of the deceased. To facilitate the

scheme, appellant falsely represented himself to members of the public as a

qualified, licensed funeral director. He was not. In conjunction, appellant held

himself out as both a Christian pastor, and separately, as a Muslim, through which

he generated interest in his services from various faith-based communities.

{¶ 6} In truth, appellant once started a course at a Pennsylvania mortuary

school, failed, dropped out of the program, and never obtained the required

education and licensure to provide funeral services. Nevertheless, appellant

fabricated multiple legitimate-sounding funeral business identities, including

Celebration of Life Memorial Chapel, Hardin funeral home, Hussein funeral

home, Shawnte Hardin Services LLC, and Islamic Funeral Homes. None of these

businesses actually existed. Appellant is not, and never has been, a licensed

funeral director, is not Islamic, never possessed a physical funeral home location,

never possessed proper equipment, and never possessed a license to operate a

funeral home and/or crematorium. The entirety was an artifice.

{¶ 7} To facilitate his actions, appellant would obtain different vehicles,

including rental cars, and utilize transient locations, such as storage units, empty

storefronts, and the like. These locations invariably lacked the necessary facilities

and equipment for the performance of funeral activities, such as refrigeration

units, proper embalming equipment, suitable sinks and drains, or crematoriums.

{¶ 8} Given the nature and scope of the damage caused by appellant’s

actions, select examples will be conveyed to provide a snapshot of the events. In

one Lucas County case, appellant directed a driver to transport the body of a

decedent, J.P., from the Lucas County coroner’s office to a dilapidated former

daycare center in Toledo. The delivery driver’s suspicions of illegitimacy were

triggered upon being instructed by appellant to leave the unenbalmed body on a

table in a back room without refrigeration, storage, or any preservation or

containment mechanism. In conjunction, the deceased had died of a highly

contagious condition known as necrotizing bronchopneumonia. The potential

public health implications of such circumstances are considerable.

{¶ 9} Accordingly, the concerned delivery driver immediately contacted the

Lucas County Coroner’s Office regarding the situation, and they then notified the

Toledo Police Department. A Toledo police detective subsequently went to the site

and discovered the significantly decomposed remains on the table. Given the

public health concerns implicit in both the condition of the body and the cause of

death, the investigating officer directed the Lucas County Coroner’s Office to

immediately retrieve the remains, return the remains to the coroner’s office, and

properly store the remains in the interim.

{¶ 10} In one of the Franklin County cases, appellant had leased a storage

unit in Columbus and had begun operating an unlicensed funeral home in the

storage unit. Appellant placed a table and caskets inside the storage unit and

began conducting death-related services in the storage unit. Upon the facility

owner discovering that appellant had an unrefrigerated, unembalmed, decomposed

body in the storage unit for over two weeks, appellant was evicted from the

storage facility.

{¶ 11} On September 28, 2021, following appellant’s eviction from the

storage facility, appellant began using the back room of a dilapidated, former nail

salon on Livingston Ave., in a near downtown area of Columbus. An eyewitness

reported appellant dragging bodies into the building to the Columbus Police

Department. Upon their arrival, the police discovered that appellant had placed

two bodies inside the building, one body was in a cardboard box, the other was

under a blanket. The bodies were not properly preserved, contained, or stored.

The investigating officers then discovered that appellant had driven one of the

badly decomposing bodies, unrefrigerated, from Colorado to Columbus in the

back of a rental car.

{¶ 12} The investigating officers observed that the mishandled bodies were

exhibiting severe decomposition, discoloration, skin slippage, leakage, and

malodor. The remains of the two persons were so severely deteriorated that the

individuals tasked with collecting them from the former nail salon had to wear

full-body personal protective equipment in order to secure the remains and

transport them for proper storage.

{¶ 13} The officers further learned that appellant had charged for cremation

services for one of the two decedents, and, in addition, had falsely advised the

family members that she had been cremated and that her ashes were available for

pickup. In reality, the uncremated, unrefrigerated, decomposing body had been

left by appellant for four weeks in a cardboard box in the back of the former nail

salon. As a result, the decedent’s body had molded and largely decomposed.

{¶ 14} The record is replete with evidence and testimony reflecting that

appellant’s systematic mishandling of numerous other sets of remains resulted in

severe decomposition, severe swelling, severe deformation, skin slippage, and

fluid leakage of the remains of loved ones who had been placed in appellant’s

care.

{¶ 15} Reports of appellant’s malfeasance in Toledo, Columbus, and Akron

culminated in multiple criminal investigations being launched by law enforcement

agencies throughout Ohio into appellant’s activities.

{¶ 16} On October 14 and December 7, 2021, respectively, following the

conclusion of the investigations, appellant was indicted on one count of engaging

in a pattern of corrupt activity, in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A), a felony of the first

degree, three counts of tampering with records, in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A),

felonies of the third degree, two counts of telecommunications fraud, in violation

of R.C. 2913.05, felonies of the fifth degree, two counts of identity fraud, in

violation of R.C. 2913.49(B), felonies of the fifth degree, one count of operating

an unlicensed funeral home, in violation of R.C. 4717.13(A), an unclassified

misdemeanor, five counts of passing bad checks, in violation of R.C. 2913.11,

felonies of the fifth degree, nine counts of abuse of a corpse, in violation of R.C.

2927.01, felonies of the fifth degree, nine counts of representation as a funeral

director while unlicensed, in violation of R.C. 4717.13(A), unclassified

misdemeanors, one count of possession of criminal tools, in violation of R.C.

2923.24, a felony of the fifth degree, one count of failure to refrigerate a human

body, in violation of R.C. 4717.13(A), an unclassified misdemeanor, two counts of

theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A), felonies of the fifth degree, two counts of

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2913.03(B), felonies of

the fifth degree, five counts of failure to file taxes, in violation of R.C. 5747.19,

felonies of the fifth degree, and one count of intimidation, in violation of R.C.

2921.04(B), a felony of the third degree.

{¶ 17} On July 6, 2022, appellant waived the right to a jury trial and elected

to proceed with a bench trial. On July 11, 2022, the trial commenced.

{¶ 18} Following trial, appellant was convicted on one count of engaging in

a pattern of corrupt activity, three counts of tampering with records, two counts of

telecommunications fraud, one count of operating an unlicensed funeral home, six

counts of abuse of a corpse, one count of possession of criminal tools, eight counts

of representation as a funeral director while unlicensed, two counts of theft, four

counts of passing bad checks, and three counts of failure to file taxes. On August

31, 2022, appellant was sentenced to aggregate term of incarceration on all

convictions ranging from 11 years, 10 months, to 14 years, 10 months. This

appeal ensued.

{¶ 19} In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that his convictions

of engaging in a pattern of criminal activity, tampering with records,

telecommunications fraud, abuse of a corpse, and possession of criminal tools

were against the manifest weight of the evidence and not based upon sufficient

evidence. Appellant did not appeal the balance of the convictions.

{¶ 20} The record clearly shows that extensive, unrefuted testimony was

given at trial from multiple detectives with the Columbus Police Department, a

Lucas County Coroner’s Office detective, a Lucas County Coroner’s Office

mortician, the Lucas County Coroner, a Franklin County Sheriff’s Department

deputy, an Ohio Attorney General’s Office case analyst, an Ohio Bureau of

Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) financial crimes special agent, and an Ohio Board

of Funeral Directors inspector. The trial court then heard extensive, unrefuted

testimony from numerous family members and loved ones of the deceased.

{¶ 21} Conversely, appellant presented the lay testimony of several persons

claiming that appellant possessed the necessary capabilities for the performance of

the death-related services underlying this case. In addition, appellant testified on

his own behalf. While appellant did not dispute the essence of what had occurred,

appellant unpersuasively offered the explanation that he had engaged in these

actions out of a benevolent concern over the excessive cost of death-related

services, offering the services at a lower cost.

{¶ 22} As held by this court in State v. Stevens, 2023-Ohio-343, ¶118, 131

(6th Dist.),

When determining whether a conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, the appellate court must review the record,

weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the

evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses and decide, in

resolving any conflicts in the evidence, whether the trier of fact

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v.

Prescott, 190 Ohio App.3d 702, 2010-Ohio-6048, 943 N.E.2d 1092,

¶ 48 (6th Dist.), citing State v, Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,

678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Fundamental to the analysis is that

judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to

the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by reviewing

court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v.

Gist, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1355, 2014-Ohio-3274, ¶ 26, citing

C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d

578 (1978), syllabus * * * The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated

that the term sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law

as to whether the evidence is legally adequate to support a jury

verdict as to all elements of the crime. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In reviewing a sufficiency

of the evidence claim, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing

the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 23} We shall next examine and consider each of appellant’s contested

convictions in the order set forth by appellant upon appeal.

{¶ 24} With respect to appellant’s engaging in a pattern of criminal activity

conviction, R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) establishes, “No person employed by, or associated with,

any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the

enterprise through pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.”

{¶ 25} In challenging this conviction, appellant specifically argues, “[T]he

trial court did not state with specificity which, if any, of the offenses were done in

furtherance of the criminal enterprise. The trial court merely made a general

finding of guilt.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, appellant now disputes the

form of the trial court’s verdict. However, appellant did not assign error regarding

the form of the trial court’s verdict.

10.

{¶ 26} As held in State v. Harlow, 2014-Ohio-864, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.),

Appellate courts review assignments of error - we sustain or overrule only

assignments of error and not mere arguments. See State v. Gwinn, 196 Ohio

App.3d 296, 2011-Ohio-5457, 963 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.); Dunina v.

Stemple, 2nd Dist. Miami No. 2007 CA 9, 2007-Ohio-4719, ¶ 4.

Accordingly, we will not address the arguments that challenge [appellant’s]

conviction because she did not assign them as error. See Coffman v.

Mansfield Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09-AP-447, 2009-Ohio-5859,

¶ 18.

{¶ 27} Similarly, in the instant case, we decline to address appellant’s generic

challenge to the form of the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity verdict, which was

not assigned as error, and which was unaccompanied by supporting legal authority.

{¶ 28} In conjunction with the above, appellant, “[C]oncedes that the

offenses of tampering with records, passing bad checks, telling communications

fraud, and theft constitute predicate offenses [to engaging in a pattern of criminal

activity] under [R.C.] 2923.31(I).”

{¶ 29} Lastly, we note that the general verdict, which appellant now

disputes upon appeal, is mandated by Crim.R. 23(C), which establishes, “In a case

tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding.” In the instant case, the

record shows that appellant waived the right to trial by jury, and elected to proceed

with a bench trial, triggering the general form verdict requirement by his own

actions.

11.

{¶ 30} Appellant’s claim pertaining to the engaging in a pattern of criminal

activity conviction is without merit.

{¶ 31} With respect to appellant’s tampering with records convictions, R.C.

2913.42(A)(1) establishes that, “No person, knowing the person has no privilege

to do so, and with purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is facilitating a

fraud, shall * * * falsify, destroy, remove, conceal, alter, deface, or mutilate any

writing, computer software, data, or record.”

{¶ 32} In challenging these convictions, which pertain to appellant’s entry

of incorrect and/or false data into Ohio’s electronic death registration system

(“EDRS”), appellant wholly relies upon the unsupported insinuation that other

individuals with whom appellant had dealings in connection to his activities could

conceivably be responsible for the entry of the incorrect and/or false data into the

EDRS system. Appellant generically states that, “[O]thers had access to the same

information.”

{¶ 33} Contrary to this position upon appeal, the record conversely shows

that at trial appellant acknowledged his entry of the data, and in further recognition

of same, appellant offered the affirmative defense that the subject individuals

consented to appellant’s use of their passwords in order for appellant to enter the

information into EDRS, a system to which appellant did not otherwise have

access.

{¶ 34} Accordingly, appellant’s unsupported suggestion that the very same

parties whom he argued at trial were aware of, and consented to, his use of their

12.

passwords in order for appellant to enter the incorrect and/or false information into

the EDRS system were actually the ones who may have entered the incorrect

and/or false information is unsupported by evidence and is abrogated by

appellant’s admission and affirmative defense at trial.

{¶ 35} Appellant’s claim pertaining to the tampering with records

convictions is without merit.

{¶ 36} With respect to appellant’s telecommunications fraud convictions,

appellant incorporates and restates the exact arguments presented above regarding

the tampering with records convictions. Therefore, on the same substantive basis

as set forth above in response to the tampering with records convictions,

appellant’s claim pertaining to the telecommunication fraud convictions is

likewise without merit.

{¶ 37} With respect to appellant’s abuse of a corpse convictions, which are

central to the events underpinning this case, R.C. 2927.01(B) establishes in

relevant part, “No person, except as authorized by law, shall treat a human corpse

in a way that the person knows would outrage reasonable family sensibilities.”

(Emphasis added).

{¶ 38} In challenging these convictions, appellant unilaterally, summarily

concludes that, “There was no evidence that appellant treated the corpses in a way

that would outrage reasonable community standards.”

{¶ 39} The record contains overwhelming, unrefuted evidence showing that

appellant accepted monetary fees from the family members of deceased persons

13.

based upon the false representation that he was a licensed funeral home director

able to perform the range of standard death-related services, such as embalming,

proper body storage and refrigeration, proper body transport, cremation, and all

necessary protocols related to same to properly treat and preserve human remains.

{¶ 40} In conjunction, the record encompasses corresponding

overwhelming, unrefuted evidence showing that after accepting monetary fees

under false pretenses, appellant failed to properly embalm the decedents, failed to

refrigerate the decedents, failed to properly store the decedents, and failed to

properly transport the decedents, culminating in the remains severely

decomposing, severely deforming, molding, experiencing skin slippage and fluid

leakage, and deteriorating to an unrecognizable physical state, contrary to the

wishes of the loved ones and to the dignity of the deceased.

{¶ 41} Appellant has failed to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact

could have found the elements of abuse of a corpse proven beyond a reasonable

doubt or that the convictions caused a manifest miscarriage of justice. Appellant’s

claim regarding the abuse of a corpse convictions is without merit.

{¶ 42} With respect to appellant’s possession of criminal tools conviction,

R.C. 2923.24(A) establishes, in relevant part, “No person shall possess or have

under the person’s control any substance, device, instrument, or article, with

purpose to use it criminally.”

{¶ 43} In challenging this conviction, appellant unilaterally, summarily

concludes, “[Appellee] did not demonstrate that the hearse and van [or rental cars

14.

similarly used by appellant to transport the deceased] were used for improper

purposes.”

{¶ 44} Appellant’s cursory conclusion fails to acknowledge the wealth of

evidence in the record reflecting appellant’s repeated false representations of being

a funeral director while knowing he was unlicensed to do so, appellant’s repeated

acceptance of monetary funds from the survivors of decedents to perform various

death services such as embalming, proper body storage and preservation,

cremation, all of which appellant lacked the licensure, facilities, and skills to do,

resulting in appellant’s use of various vehicles, ranging from rental trucks to lease

cars, to transport numerous decedents to improper, unlawful locations, such as

storage units and the back rooms of defunct businesses, where the unpreserved,

unrefrigerated, exposed bodies were routinely left to fully deteriorate over lengthy

periods of time. Each of the vehicles utilized by appellant when transporting the

decedents facilitated the crimes against the deceased and their families.

{¶ 45} Appellant has failed to demonstrate that no rational trier of facts

could have found the elements of possession of criminal tools proven beyond a

reasonable doubt or that the conviction constituted a manifest miscarriage of

justice. Appellant’s claim pertaining to the possession of criminal tools conviction

is without merit.

{¶ 46} We have reviewed and considered the record of evidence. We find

that the record is devoid of any evidence demonstrative that no rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of appellant’s disputed convictions shown

15.

beyond a reasonable doubt or that the convictions created a manifest miscarriage

of justice. Appellant’s first assignment of error is found not well-taken.

{¶ 47} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant argues that his

abuse of a corpse convictions are void premised upon the claim that Ohio’s abuse

of a corpse statute, R.C. 2927.01, is unconstitutionally vague.

{¶ 48} R.C. 2927.01 establishes that, “(A) No person * * * shall treat a

human corpse in a way that the person knows would outrage reasonable family

sensibilities. (B) No person * * * shall treat a human corpse in a way that would

outrage reasonable community sensibilities.”

{¶ 49} Appellant’s void for vagueness claim regarding R.C. 2927.01 has

been previously presented to, and uniformly rejected by, courts throughout Ohio,

including this court.

{¶ 50} In State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256, (8th Dist. 1984), the Eighth

District Court of Appeals flatly rejected an R.C. 2927.01 void for vagueness

argument, determining that the, “[R.C. 2927.01 language can be] commonly

understood by persons of common intelligence * * * a criminal statute is not void

for vagueness simply because it requires a person to conform to an imprecise but

comprehensible normative standard.” (Emphasis added).

{¶ 51} Subsequently, in State v. Gardner, 65 Ohio App.3d 24, (6th Dist.

1989), this court likewise affirmed that R.C. 2927.01 is not unconstitutionally

vague and held, “We find the reasoning in Glover persuasive. Based upon the

foregoing, we find that the terms of R.C. 2927.01 are sufficiently explicit so as to

16.

provide notice of what conduct is prohibited thereunder without requiring persons

to guess as to its meaning or invoking arbitrary application.” (Emphasis added).

{¶ 52} In similarly rejecting R.C. 2927.01 void for vagueness arguments, in

State v. Condon, 2003-Ohio-2335, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.), the court further elaborated and

held,

The Second and Sixth Appellate Districts, it should be pointed out, have

followed the Glover decision. See State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d

521, 557, 679 N.E.2d 321; State v. Gardner (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 24,

582 N.E.2d 1014. We are also persuaded by its reasoning. Community

mores concerning the proper treatment of a corpse are not, in our view,

esoteric or otherwise difficult to discern. Irrespective of one’s religious

views, and even if one is an atheist or agnostic, it is almost universally

understood that the bodies of the dead are to be treated with the utmost

respect and in a manner that will not inflict any more emotional pain upon

the wounded hearts of friends and mourners. Commonwealth v. Browne

(1976), 74 Pa. D. & C. 2d 724, 730. Indeed, there is in human beings an

ingrained sense that the dead are not to be trifled with.

(Emphasis added).

{¶ 53} This court reiterates its view, as previously set forth in Gardner, and

in accord with the above, that the language of R.C. 2927.01 is not impermissibly

vague. The maltreatment of a corpse, inherently lacking in dignity and decency,

offensive to family members and to the community, is grounded in an imprecise,

17.

but nonetheless comprehensible, standard. Appellant’s claim that R.C. 2927.01 is

unconstitutionally vague is without merit.

{¶ 54} We find appellant’s second assignment of error not well-taken.

{¶ 55} In the third assignment of error, appellant argues that Lucas County

was an improper venue for appellant’s failure to file taxes offenses. We are not

convinced.

{¶ 56} R.C. 2901.12(H) unreservedly establishes, “When an offender, as

part of a course of criminal conduct, commits offenses in different jurisdictions,

the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one

of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses occurred.” (Emphasis

added).

{¶ 57} In support, appellant specifically argues, “[T]here was no significant

nexus between appellant’s duty to file state income taxes and Lucas County * * *

Appellant’s duty to file income taxes derived in Franklin or Summit or Summit

counties * * * which is where he resided at all times relevant.” However,

appellant simultaneously concedes that, “[M]any of the [] offenses related to the

funeral business could be considered continuing courses of conduct in Lucas

County.” (Emphasis added).

{¶ 58} Accordingly, by appellant’s own admission, the R.C. 2901.12(H)

singular threshold that “one of those offenses” be connected to Lucas County in

order for venue to be proper, was not only satisfied, it was exceeded.

18.

{¶ 59} Wherefore, we find, pursuant to R.C. 2901.12(H), that Lucas County

was a proper venue for all of the offenses in this case, including the tax offenses.

Appellant’s claim that Lucas County was not a proper venue on the failure to file

taxes convictions is without merit. We find appellant’s third assignment of error

not well-taken.

{¶ 60} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court

of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.