The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
AUGUST 4, 2010 Session
JAMES RAINWATER, ET AL. v. SUMNER COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL.
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County
No. 2008-CV-31563-C C. L. Rogers, Judge
No. M2010-00098-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 28, 2010
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a gravel drive running through their property
is a private easement rather than a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants, finding that the drive is a public road. Finding this case
inappropriate for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
and remand for a trial on the merits.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and
Remanded
A LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which H OLLY M. K IRBY,
J., and J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., joined.
Bruce N. Oldham, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellants, James Rainwater, et al
Leah May Dennen, Gallatin, Tennessee, A. Scott Derrick, Nashville, TN, for the appellees,
Sumner County, et al
John A. Beam, III, Kristin Fecteau, Nashville, TN, for the appellees, C. Russell Bridges and
Janet C. Bridges
Mark T. Smith, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellees, William Hardaway and Judy
Hardaway and Dry Fork Creek Cumberland Presbyterian Church
OPINION
I. F ACTS & P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY
In 1982, Janet C. Bridges and her husband C. Russell Bridges acquired unimproved
property in Gallatin, Tennessee, which included the property known as Lot #12 Dry Fork
Creek Road. In September 2001, the Bridges subdivided the property and recorded a plat.
Three months later, the Bridges sold the 8.62 acre Lot #12 (“the Property”) to Howard
Riggan via a Warranty Deed. Mr. Riggan sold the Property to James Rainwater and his wife
Jinger Rainwater in August 2004, executing a Warranty Deed.
The south end of the Property is bordered by Dry Fork Creek Road. Perpendicular to
Dry Fork Creek Road, and running through the middle of the Property, is a gravel drive,
known as Dry Fork Road, leading to Dry Fork Creek Cumberland Presbyterian Church (the
“Church”) and a cemetery north of the Property. The classification of this drive as a public
road or a private easement is at issue in this case.
In May 2008, the Rainwaters filed a complaint in the Sumner County Circuit Court,
seeking a declaratory judgment declaring the drive a private easement. Alternatively, the
Rainwaters sought damages from Sumner County for inverse condemnation and damages
against the Bridges and Mr. Riggan for breach of warranty of title and negligent
misrepresentation.1 The Rainwaters later amended their complaint to allege the additional
claim of trespass against adjoining landowners William L. Hardaway and Judy G. Hardaway
and to resolve a boundary dispute.
The trial was bifurcated to first resolve the issue of whether the drive is a public road
or a private easement. Sumner County then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
that “[t]here is sufficient evidence of implied offer and acceptance of dedication to establish
that [the drive] is a public road.” The Bridges also filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming that the Rainwaters’ claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations,
that the Bridges had no contact or communication with the Rainwaters upon which to base
a breach of contract or misrepresentation claim, and that the Bridges made no
1
The Church was also named as a defendant “solely because the church has a right to use the
driveway, and the church is therefore believed to be a necessary party to this case.”
-2-
misrepresentations in the warranty deed conveying the Property to Mr. Riggan.
Following a hearing on June 26, 2009, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment, finding that the defendants were “entitled to a declaratory judgment
[that] the roadway is public as a matter of law.” The trial court specifically dismissed the
Rainwaters’ claims against Sumner County, the Bridges, the Hardaways, and the Church.
It did not address the Rainwaters’ claims against Mr. Riggan. The judgment was made final
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 on December 10, 2009, and the
Rainwaters timely appealed.
II. I SSUES P RESENTED
Appellants present the following issues for review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by ruling on motion for summary judgment that the
roadway crossing the Plaintiffs’ property is a public road as a matter of law; and
2. In the event that this Court affirms the trial court’s decision that the roadway is a
public road, whether the alternative claims against the other defendants in this case
should be dismissed.
Additionally, the Bridges present the following issue, as summarized, for our review:
1. Whether Appellants’ negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty claims were
properly dismissed.
For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and we
remand for a trial on the merits.
III. D ISCUSSION
“To establish a dedicated public right-of-way, there must be a showing of an offer of
dedication and a public acceptance of the offer. Both the offer of dedication and the public
acceptance may be express or implied.” West Meade Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. WPMC,
Inc., 788 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). In this case, the trial
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding “an implied dedication and
acceptance of the roadway since at least since 1960. . . . [as well as a] formal acceptance of
the roadway by Sumner County as a public road [] at least since 1993.” “When an implied
dedication is claimed, the focus of the inquiry is whether the landowner intended to dedicate
the land to a public use.” Rogers v. Sain, 679 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)
-3-
(citations omitted). “The proof on the issue of intent to dedicate must be unequivocal, but
intent may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances, including the overt acts of
the owner.” Id. Factors indicating an intent to dedicate are: “the landowner opens a road to
public travel; acquiescence in the use of the road as a public road; and the fact the public has
used the road for an extended period of time[.]” Id. “While dedication is not dependent on
duration of the use, extended use is a circumstance tending to show an intent to dedicate.”
Id. “Finally, an intent to dedicate is inferrable when the roadway is repaired and maintained
by the public.” Id.
The resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law, which we review
de novo with no presumption of correctness. Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84. However, “we are
required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to
draw all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Staples v. CBL &
Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)). Summary judgment is appropriate “when the
undisputed facts, as well as the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts,
support only one conclusion–that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Green, v. Green, 293 S.W.3d 493, 513 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Griffis v. Davidson
County Metro. Gov't, 164 S.W.3d 267, 283-84 (Tenn. 2005); Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House
v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2002)).
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. “While summary judgment is an
efficient means of deciding cases dependant solely on questions of law, see Brookins v. The
Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tenn. 1981), [superseded by statute on other
grounds, Tenn. Code Ann. 57-10-101, as recognized in Worley v. Weigels, Inc., 919 S.W.2d
589 (Tenn. 1986),] ‘it should not replace a trial when disputed factual issues exist, because
its purpose is not to weigh the evidence, to resolve factual disputes, or to draw inferences
from the facts.’” Downs ex rel. Downs v. Bush, 263 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting
Rollins v. Winn Dixie, 780 S.W.2d 765, 676 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)) (some internal citations
omitted). “The party seeking the summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that
no genuine disputes of material fact exist and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Green, 293 S.W.3d at 513 (citing Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn.
2008); Amos v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 259 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tenn.
2008)).
When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may make the
required showing and shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by either: (1)
affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) showing
-4-
that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial. Hannan v.
Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tenn. 2008). “[T]o negate an essential element of the
claim, the moving party must point to evidence that tends to disprove an essential factual
claim made by the nonmoving party.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Blair v. W. Town
Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tenn. 2004)). On the other hand, “a plaintiff who files a motion
for partial summary judgment on an element of his or her claim shifts the burden by alleging
undisputed facts that show the existence of that element and entitle the plaintiff to summary
judgment as a matter of law.” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 9, n. 6. “If the moving party makes
a properly supported motion, then the nonmoving party is required to produce evidence of
specific facts establishing that genuine issues of material fact exist.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d
at 84 (citing McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd
v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)).
Assuming that the facts being considered are found in the record and admissible in
evidence, the next inquiry is whether a factual dispute actually exists. Green, 293 S.W.3d
at 514. “If reasonable minds could justifiably reach different conclusions based on the
evidence at hand, then a genuine question of fact exists.” Id. (citing Martin, 271 S.W.3d at
84; Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Austin Co., 868 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). “If, on
the other hand, the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence would
permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion, then no material factual dispute
exists, and the question can be disposed of as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Godfrey v. Ruiz,
90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002); Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, 9 S.W.3d
86, 91 (Tenn. 1999)). Still, not every factual dispute requires the denial of a motion for
summary judgment. Id. To warrant denial of a motion for summary judgment, the factual
dispute must be material, meaning “germane to the claim or defense on which the summary
judgment is predicated.” Id. (citing Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727, 732 (Tenn. 2008);
Luther v. Compton, 5 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tenn. 1999)).
In this case, for purposes of summary judgment, the facts are mostly undisputed: Both
the 1960 and the 1980 Sumner County general highway maps show Dry Fork Road as a
public road. Each year since 1993, the Sumner County Commission has adopted a resolution
approving Dry Fork Road, among others, as a public road. Additionally, Dry Fork Road is
listed on the official Sumner County road list as a public road, and the Sumner County
Highway Department considers it a public road. However, there are no records showing a
formal dedication of Dry Fork Road.
During the time Janet Bridges owned the Property in 1982, there was a locked gate
at the entrance to Dry Fork Road. From the time the Rainwaters purchased the Property in
2004 until July 2007, this gate remained closed except when church services were being held.
Until July 2007, Sumner County never asked the Rainwaters, or their predecessors in title,
-5-
to open or remove the gate. Currently, there is a sign “of the type used for public roads”
listing the Dry Fork Road name at its entrance from Dry Fork Creek Road; however,
according to the Rainwaters, this sign was not erected until July 2007.
The plat referenced in the Rainwaters’ warranty deed describes the drive as a “20'
Ingress/Egress Easement[,]” rather than as a public road. Additionally, the maps used by the
Sumner County Building Codes Department show the drive as an easement, and the Sumner
County Tax Assessor’s tax map does not show a public road known as Dry Fork Road
crossing the Rainwaters’ property. In 2009, the Rainwaters paid property taxes on 8.62 acres,
which included Dry Fork Road.
The parties dispute whether Sumner County maintained Dry Fork Road. Sumner
County claims that its highway department has improved and maintained the road “for many
years” and that it built a bridge on Dry Fork Road; however, the Rainwaters dispute this
allegation, claiming that from 2004 to 2007, they never saw Sumner County employees
repairing or maintaining the road. The Rainwaters further claim that the documents
submitted in support of Sumner County’s maintenance claim are inadmissible based on lack
of trustworthiness, as they include work performed on “Dry Fork Creek Road,” which is a
different road, and “Dry Fork,” which they claim is not a county road at all.
Although the facts in this case are mostly undisputed, the existence of undisputed facts
does not compel a grant of summary judgment. See Price v. Mercury Supply Co., Inc., 682
S.W.2d 924, 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (“Even if the basic facts are not in dispute, this Court
has held that granting a summary judgment is not proper when the parties disagree about the
inferences to be drawn from the facts.”). As we stated above, summary judgment is
appropriate “when the undisputed facts, as well as the inferences reasonably drawn from the
undisputed facts, support only one conclusion–that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Green, 293 S.W.3d at 513 (citing Griffis, 164 S.W.3d at 283-84; Pero’s,
90 S.W.3d at 620) (emphasis added). “[A] trial court is not to ‘weigh’ the evidence when
evaluating a motion for summary judgment.” Lawrence County Educ. Ass’n v. Lawrence
County Bd. of Educ., 244 S.W.3d 302, 320 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211).
“[W]hen there is any dispute regarding the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
undisputed facts . . . a summary judgment motion should not be granted.” Martin, 271
S.W.3d at 89 (citing Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tenn. 2001);
Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tenn. 1997)).
In this case, a dispute exists regarding the proper interpretation of the above-stated
facts: Sumner County and the Bridges contend that the evidence establishes an implied
dedication of Dry Fork Road for public use and an acceptance by Sumner County, while the
Rainwaters submit that it does not. We find that “reasonable minds could justifiably reach
-6-
different conclusions based on the evidence at hand[,]” Green, 293 S.W.3d at 514 (citations
omitted), and that the undisputed, yet competing, facts require a weighing of the evidence,
rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment and we remand for a trial on the merits.2 All remaining issues are
pretermitted.
IV. C ONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment and we remand for a trial on the merits. All remaining issues are pretermitted.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellees, Sumner County, Tennessee, C. Russell Bridges,
Janet Bridges, William L. Hardaway, Judy G. Hardaway, and Dry Fork Creek Cumberland
Presbyterian Church, for which execution may issue if necessary.
_________________________________
ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.
2
As an additional ground for reversing summary judgment, we find that a material factual dispute
exists regarding Sumner County’s repair and maintenance of Dry Creek Road.
-7-