Megan Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

Nos. 23-1660 and 23-1661

MEGAN PASSARELLA and SANDRA DOTTENWHY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ASPIRUS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

Nos. 3:22-cv-00287-jdp & 3:22-cv-00342-jdp

James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 29, 2024

____________________

Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 prohibits employers from failing to accommodate an em-

ployee’s religious beliefs. Megan Passarella and Sandra Dot-

tenwhy worked for Aspirus Health at a hospital in Wisconsin

and sought such an accommodation in the form of an exemp-

tion from the company’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement.

When Aspirus determined that their objections were more

2 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

rooted in safety concerns than religious conviction, Passarella

and Dottenwhy lost their jobs. They sued under Title VII, with

the district court then agreeing with Aspirus and dismissing

the claims on the pleadings. We reverse and, aligned with the

only two circuits to have considered the question, hold that

an employee seeks accommodation because of their religion

when their request, by its terms, is plausibly based at least in

part on some aspect of their religious belief or practice.

I

A

Both plaintiffs worked in a healthcare capacity at Aspirus,

a non-profit hospital system based in Wausau, Wisconsin—

Megan Passarella as a nurse in a medical surgery unit and

Sandra Dottenwhy as a pharmacy technician. In November

2021 Aspirus announced a requirement that all employees re-

ceive COVID vaccination. The mandate brought with it per-

mission to seek a religious exemption.

Passarella does not tell us what she wrote in her initial re-

ligious exemption request (and neither party entered it into

the record). But she did attach to her complaint the five-page

letter (effectively an appeal or request for reconsideration) she

submitted after Aspirus denied her initial request. Invoking

and quoting passages from the Bible, Passarella explained her

Christian belief that her body “is [the Lord’s] dwelling place”

and that “[a]fter prayerful consideration, I don’t feel at peace

about receiving the COVID vaccine” and instead “must trust

God with my body (His temple) and that he will provide for

me and protect me as he has already proven time and time

again during my life.” She likewise stated that “God knows

my body better than anyone because He is the maker of it.”

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 3

Passarella “obey[s] scripture and the divine wisdom and dis-

cernment imparted to me by the Holy Spirit through prayer.”

Her “conscience,” too, “act[s] as a guide to the rightness or

wrongness of one’s behavior” and here “I must follow the

message that God has given me not to receive the vaccine.”

From a safety standpoint, Passarella added that she be-

lieves that “the vaccines could pose a danger to my body in

the form of blood clots or heart inflammation.” This concern,

combined with her religious beliefs, leads to her conviction

that God in the “current scenario” does not want her to re-

ceive the vaccine. She saw her position as consistent with her

broader life pattern of “primarily consum[ing] organic foods

and exercis[ing] to maintain my health” while also

“avoid[ing] prescription and OTC medication, alcohol, and

other consumables that may be toxic to my body.”

For her part, Dottenwhy explained her exemption request

in more abbreviated terms:

I am asserting my rights as a Christian to be ex-

empt from taking this vaccine. I feel it was de-

veloped in a rush. I don’t trust the information

and long-term effects. Therefore I believe this is

not right for me to put this vaccine into my

body. I also feel that it’s my body and no one

has the right to tell me what to do with my per-

sonal being. I have prayed about this and have

asked GOD for guidance, and believe that HE is

with me on this decision.

After Aspirus declined her request, Dottenwhy appealed

and added the following:

4 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

So if it’s my body my choice when it comes to

abortion, WHICH I AM TOTALLY AGAINST.

Why isn’t it my body my choice when it comes

to a vaccine, WHICH I AM TOTALLY

AGAINST. In my opinion this vaccine was de-

veloped too quickly. Not enough time for deep

study. I have prayed long and hard about this

and I am fearful of the effects. The Bible says:

My body is a temple of the Holy Spirit and to

present my body as a living sacrifice, Holy and

acceptable to God. I have read through Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and I pray you

would not go against my rights as a Christian

and employee that has served your organiza-

tion and the community for 18 years.

Aspirus denied Passarella’s and Dottenwhy’s exemption

requests and terminated their employment in December 2021.

Both reacted by filing, as relevant here, claims under Title VII

in separate cases in the Western District of Wisconsin. Aspirus

then moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss both

complaints for failure to state a claim.

B

Without formally consolidating the cases, the district court

issued a single order granting Aspirus’s motions to dismiss.

The district court determined that Passarella’s and Dotten-

why’s Title VII claims fell short at the threshold because their

exemption requests did not advance a religious objection to

Aspirus’s vaccination requirement. In the district court’s

view, neither Passarella nor Dottenwhy “articulate[d] any re-

ligious belief that would prevent [them] from taking the vac-

cine if [they] believed it was safe.” Instead, the “[plaintiffs]

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 5

object to the vaccine mandate as a matter of medical judgment

rather than religious conviction.” The district court further

observed that “the use of religious vocabulary does not ele-

vate a personal medical judgment to a matter of protected re-

ligion.”

Passarella and Dottenwhy appeal the district court’s rul-

ing.

II

A

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or re-

fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-

pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-

cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Congress amended the stat-

ute in 1972 to clarify that “religion” includes “all aspects of

religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an

employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-

commodate [] an employee’s or prospective employee’s reli-

gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the

conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j). We have

described this definition as “blend[ing]” a “broad substantive

definition of religion with an implied duty to accommodate

employees’ religions and an explicit affirmative defense for

failure-to-accommodate claims.” Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweet-

eners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2013).

An employee claiming that her employer failed to accom-

modate her religion must as a threshold matter show that (1)

the observance, practice, or belief conflicting with an employ-

ment requirement is religious in nature; (2) the employee

6 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

called the religious observance, practice, or belief to the em-

ployer’s attention; and (3) the religious observance, practice,

or belief was the basis for the employee’s discriminatory treat-

ment. See Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 449. At that point the employer

can invoke the affirmative defense that accommodation

would result in “undue hardship” or a “substantial” burden

in the “overall context” of the business. Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S.

447, 468 (2023).

B

The language Congress employed in Title VII goes a long

way to supplying a standard to answer the question pre-

sented. At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accom-

modation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s

vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an in-

ference that some “aspect[]” of the request is based on the em-

ployee’s “religious observance and practice” or “belief.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Applying the statutory language necessarily requires an

exercise of judgment: the standard is not amenable to formu-

laic resolution like solving a math equation. To the contrary,

its application requires a holistic assessment of the terms of

the employee’s exemption request, with the controlling in-

quiry at the pleading stage being whether the employee plau-

sibly based her vaccination exemption request at least in part

on an aspect of her religious belief or practice.

Notice a point inherent in our articulation of this standard.

An employee may object to an employer’s vaccine mandate

on both religious and non-religious grounds—for example,

on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a reli-

gious belief and implicate health and safety concerns.

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 7

Congress permitted this, as we see no other way to give effect

to the breadth of its definition of “religion”—as covering “all

aspects” of an employee’s religious observance, practice, and

belief. Id. And, for its part, the Equal Employment Oppor-

tunity Commission, in implementing this same definition, has

likewise emphasized that a religious objection to a workplace

requirement may incorporate both religious and secular rea-

sons. See U.S. EEOC, What You Should Know About COVID-

19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws

(2023).

Passarella’s and Dottenwhy’s exemption requests satisfy

this standard. Passarella’s statement connects her objection to

vaccination with her Christian beliefs regarding the sanctity

of the human body. Although less robust in her articulation,

Dottenwhy makes the same connection, as she expressly

stated her Christian belief that the body is a “temple of the

Holy Spirit” in tandem with concerns about the potentially

harmful effects of the vaccine. In short, both exemption re-

quests are based on their face and at least in part on a dimen-

sion of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. This makes them—at

least at the pleading stage—religious in nature within the

meaning of Title VII.

C

The district court charted a different course, seeing

Passarella’s and Dottenwhy’s requests as 100% secular. But

the fact that an accommodation request also invokes or, as

here, even turns upon secular considerations does not negate

its religious nature. To conclude otherwise fails to give effect

to Congress’s expansive definition of “religion” and, even

more, denies that a matter of personal conviction can root it-

self in both religious and non-religious reasons.

8 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

Recognize the path a contrary approach would take courts

down. We would inevitably face the task of trying to draw

lines between requests that are, for example, “primarily” or

“mostly” or “minimally” or “tangentially”—pick your ad-

verb—based on religion, with the latter categories ostensibly

falling short of the Title VII threshold. Those kinds of distinc-

tions would prove slippery in practice and arbitrary in their

application.

Legal peril also looms. This alternative approach would

take us into territory the Supreme Court has admonished

courts in no uncertain terms not to enter when discerning

whether an individual harbors a religious belief or engages in

religious practice. To be sure, the Court’s decisions have not

interpreted Title VII but, by close analogy, have considered

what constitutes religious practice, observance, and belief un-

der the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and dif-

ferent federal statutes, including the Religious Freedom Res-

toration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institu-

tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). At every turn the Court’s

watchword has been caution.

Consider, for instance, the Court’s admonition in Thomas

v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division that

judges are not to “undertake to dissect religious beliefs … be-

cause [they] are not articulated with the clarity and precision

that a more sophisticated person might employ.” 450 U.S. 707,

715 (1981). Thomas examined what counts as a “religious be-

lief or practice” under the Free Exercise Clause, but the

Court’s fundamental observation applies equally here: “[I]t is

not within the judicial function and judicial competence to in-

quire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 9

correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.

Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.” Id. at 716.

Similar cautionary language resounds across many other

cases. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682,

724 (2014) (emphasizing that “federal courts have no business

addressing [] whether the religious belief asserted in a [Reli-

gious Freedom Restoration Act] case is reasonable”); Frazee v.

Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (warning that the

orthodoxy of a claimant’s belief is “irrelevant” under the Free

Exercise Clause); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)

(observing that “[r]eligious experiences which are as real as

life to some may be incomprehensible to others”).

A more precise takeaway from this body of precedent is

that a “religious” objection can sound in both religious and

non-religious terms. The law in many contexts—whether it be

the Free Exercise Clause or a federal statute like RFRA or

RLUIPA—does not require one or the other. See, e.g., Welsh v.

United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342 (1970) (recognizing that an ob-

jection to the statutory military conscription requirement

need only be “based in part” upon religion to be considered

“religious”); id. (observing that a religious objection may be

based “to a substantial extent” upon other considerations,

such as social, economic, philosophical, or public policy con-

cerns); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965) (exclud-

ing draft exemptions based on a “merely personal moral

code”—one that is “not only personal but which is the sole ba-

sis for the registrant’s belief and is in no way related to a Su-

preme Being” (emphasis added)).

We too have adhered to this same cautionary approach,

including in interpreting Title VII. See Redmond v. GAF Corp.,

574 F.2d 897, 900–01 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that Title VII

10 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

protects “conduct which is ‘religiously motivated,’ i.e., all

forms and aspects of religion, however eccentric” and reject-

ing the contention that a practice must be “per se” prohibited

by religion to warrant Title VII protection); Adeyeye, 721 F.3d

at 452 (highlighting Title VII’s “broad and intentionally

hands-off definition of religion”).

Perhaps above all else, then, one guidepost is clear:

“[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs …

because [they] are not articulated with the clarity and preci-

sion that a more sophisticated person might employ.” Thomas,

450 U.S. at 715. Nor should courts require employees to

choose between the binary alternatives of a religious reason

and non-religious reason to explain their perspective—here,

their reason for seeking an exemption from mandatory

COVID vaccination.

Remember, too, what is being reviewed—not statutory

language debated and refined by lawmakers or letters drafted

by counsel, but instead an employee’s explanation (whether

typed or handwritten on a pre-printed form) for why they

seek an exemption from COVID vaccination. Yes, the expla-

nation must satisfy the standard we have articulated. But, no,

courts should not expect, much less require, exemption re-

quests to sound like they were written by someone with legal

training. If an accommodation request can be read on its face

as plausibly based in part on an aspect of the plaintiff-em-

ployee’s religious belief or practice, that is enough to survive

a motion to dismiss.

No doubt there are limits. Religious accommodation re-

quests rooting themselves entirely in safety considerations

with no plain and express connection to religion will fall out-

side of the statute even at the pleading stage. And so, too, will

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 11

downright “bizarre” reasons having no plausible connection

to religion. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (emphasizing the same

point).

D

Our conclusion aligns with those of the only two other cir-

cuit courts to have considered the issue presented—both on

similar facts.

In Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, the Eighth Circuit

considered religious exemption requests advanced by two

plaintiffs who objected to their employer’s vaccine mandate.

See 102 F.4th 894 (8th Cir. 2024). One employee explained that

because “her body is a temple for the Holy Spirit that she is

duty bound to honor,” “[s]he does not believe in putting un-

necessary vaccines or medications into her body” and the

other that “[s]hifting my faith from my Creator to medicine is

the equivalent of committing idolatry” and violating her faith.

Id. at 902. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dis-

missal of these plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, concluding that

“[b]y connecting their objection to testing to specific religious

principles,” the plaintiffs satisfied their burden at the plead-

ing stage. Id. “[Religious] beliefs,” the court emphasized, “do

not have to be uniform across all members of a religion or ‘ac-

ceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.’” Id.

(quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714).

The Sixth Circuit charted the same course in Lucky v. Land-

mark Medical of Michigan, construing similar factual allega-

tions and concluding that the plaintiff, “as a result of her be-

liefs” and personal prayer, refused vaccination. 103 F.4th

1241, 1243 (6th Cir. 2024). The court emphasized that Title

VII’s language did not, contrary to the district court’s

12 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

conclusion, require the plaintiff to explain in more depth how

any particular tenet or principle of her religion prohibited

vaccination. See id. To the contrary, Title VII, when read

against the federal pleading requirements, required only that

the plaintiff allege “facts supporting an inference that her re-

fusal to be vaccinated for COVID was an ‘aspect’ of her ‘reli-

gious observance’ or ‘practice’ or ‘belief.’” Id. (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

E

Be careful not to overread today’s decision. All we have

decided is that Megan Passarella and Sandra Dottenwhy al-

leged enough in their complaints to support plausible infer-

ences that they sought exemptions from Aspirus’s vaccine

mandate based on some “aspect[]” of their religious “belief”

or “observance.” But what constitutes a “religious” claim is

not the beginning and end of the Title VII inquiry.

These cases will now proceed to discovery, where As-

pirus, like any employer, will be permitted to develop evi-

dence that the beliefs in question are not “sincere” or even

“religious.” See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir.

2013) (describing religiosity and sincerity as “factual inquiries

within the court’s authority and competence”); see also Vin-

ning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing

that “sincerity rather than orthodoxy” is the touchstone of the

accommodation analysis under the federal Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act).

In addition to challenging the plaintiffs’ sincerity, Aspirus

will have the right to make an evidentiary showing that it is

“unable to reasonably accommodate [the employee’s] reli-

gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 13

conduct of [its] business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). And we fully

expect Aspirus to explain that, at least in hospital and other

medical care environments, it has determined that mandatory

vaccination is the best way to protect patients, caregivers, and

its broader staff from a disease that has taken approximately

1.2 million lives within the United States. And, of course,

Passarella and Dottenwhy will have an opportunity to offer

their own perspective on what constitutes a reasonable ac-

commodation of their religious beliefs.

With these closing observations, we REVERSE and

REMAND for further proceedings.

14 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Even applying the gen-

erous standard the court has adopted as to Title VII claims for

a religious accommodation, I am not convinced that either

Passarella (a nurse) or Dottenwhy (a pharmacy technician)

placed Aspirus on fair notice that their accommodation re-

quests were religious rather than secular in nature. I note that

a significant number of our colleagues on the district court

have dismissed comparable claims, as Judge Peterson did

here. See Flores v. Cook Cnty., No. 23 CV 16260, 2024 WL

3398360, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2024) (Daniel, J.) (collecting

cases). I would follow their lead.

Allow me to say at the start that I am relying as much upon

what the two plaintiffs in this case did say about their reasons

for opposing the COVID-19 vaccine as what they did not say.

Neither Dottenwhy nor Passarella is a lawyer, and I agree that

there were no magic words either of them had to say to their

employer in order to make a legitimate request for religious

accommodation under Title VII. But apart from broad refer-

ences to G-d and their religion in their respective requests,

both plaintiffs failed to link their objections to the COVID-19

vaccine to any particular religious belief or practice. As im-

portantly, they both articulated their objections to the

COVID-19 vaccine in such a way as to make clear to Aspirus

that their objections were secular rather than religious in na-

ture. In effect, they wrote themselves out of Title VII’s reli-

gious protections. Aspirus, consequently, was not required to

consider whether an accommodation was possible, and the

district court properly dismissed their complaints. I begin my

analysis with Dottenwhy’s accommodation request.

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 15

I.

In order to qualify for a religious accommodation, “the be-

lief necessitating the accommodation must actually be reli-

gious.” Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448

(7th Cir. 2013). Dottenwhy’s initial request and her subse-

quent appeal both make clear that she did not want to take

the vaccine based on her assessment of its safety and efficacy,

as opposed to a conflict with her religious principles. Alt-

hough her initial request began with an invocation of her

“rights as a Christian,” the objection that Dottenwhy ex-

pressed as to the COVID-19 vaccine was entirely secular: “I

feel it was developed in a rush. I don’t trust the information

and long-term effects. Therefore I believe this is not right for

me to put this vaccine in my body. I also feel that it’s my body

and no one has the right to tell me what to do with my per-

sonal being.” Dottenwhy R. 8-1. Similarly, Dottenwhy’s ap-

peal, after again invoking a right to bodily autonomy (“[I]f it’s

my body my choice when it comes to abortion, … [w]hy isn’t

it my body my choice when it comes to a vaccine[?]”), ex-

pressed a non-religious reason for opposing this particular

vaccine: “In my opinion this vaccine was developed too

quickly. Not enough time for deep study. … I am fearful of

the effects.” Dottenwhy R. 8-2. Dottenwhy’s thinking was no

different from that of any number of Americans who, like her,

believed the COVID-19 vaccine was developed in a hurry and

was not sufficiently proven safe, and/or who opposed vaccine

mandates, but who did not rely on their religion as a ground

for requesting an exemption. More to the point, the basis for

Dottenwhy’s objection to the vaccine would have looked no

different if she practiced no religion and had no religious be-

liefs. See Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of S.E. Penn., 877

F.3d 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2017) (plaintiff’s rejection of scientific

16 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

consensus that flu vaccine is harmless to most people and his

belief that the vaccine may do more harm than good “is a

medical belief, not a religious one”); Brown v. Cook Cnty. Au-

ditor’s Office, No. 23-cv-10452, 2024 WL 3426888, at *5 (N.D. Ill.

July 16, 2024) (Coleman, J.) (“Throughout his Request, Brown

clearly demonstrates that his primary concern about the [vac-

cination] Policy is the potential harms of the vaccine and his

lack of personal autonomy under the mandate, rather than the

religious principles to which he briefly refers.”); U.S. E.E.O.C.,

What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Re-

habilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws § L.2 (last updated May

15, 2023) (“Title VII does not protect social, political, or eco-

nomic views or personal preferences. Thus, objections to a

COVID-19 vaccination requirement that are purely based on

social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, or

any other nonreligious concerns (including about the possible

effects of the vaccine), do not qualify as religious beliefs, prac-

tices, or observances under Title VII.”), available at:

https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-

covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws.

I recognize that Dottenwhy, in the statements she submit-

ted to Aspirus, invoked her rights as a Christian, said she had

prayed about the matter and sought guidance from G-d, and

expressed her conviction that “HE is with me on this deci-

sion.” Dottenwhy R. 8-1. Without more, such statements are

not enough, in my view, to transform an otherwise secular

objection to the vaccine into a religiously-based one. As much

as I genuinely appreciate the importance of prayer in people’s

lives and their belief that G-d is on their side, I am not con-

vinced that Congress meant to compel an employer to grant

any requested accommodation that an employee has prayed

about and has concluded that his or her G-d supports. If that

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 17

were so, there would be almost no limit to the accommoda-

tions that an employer would have to entertain under Title

VII’s ban on religious discrimination. See Finkbeiner v.

Geisinger Clinic, 623 F. Supp. 3d 458, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2022), appeal

dismissed, No. 22-2714, 2023 WL 6057495 (3d Cir. Sept. 18,

2023). The employee must be able to identify a particular reli-

gious belief or practice that demands the accommodation.

Hassett v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 23 C 14592, 2024 WL

1556300, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2024) (Kennelly, J.).

The closest that Dottenwhy’s requests came in this regard

was to say that, according to the Bible, her body is “a temple

of the Holy Spirit.” Dottenwhy R. 8-2. But Dottenwhy

stopped there, without any elaboration as to why becoming

vaccinated against COVID-19 would be inconsistent with

treating her body as G-d’s temple. What Dottenwhy articu-

lated, then, was not a religious belief that proscribes vaccina-

tions or any particular type of medication or medical treat-

ment, but rather a high-level, religiously-inspired goal: treat

one’s body well. But the implementation of that goal with re-

spect to a compulsory vaccine, as she described it, was secu-

lar: evaluate the provenance of a vaccine and avoid it if it is

untested and unproven. Her claim is akin to that of an em-

ployee who seeks a religious exemption from a requirement

that he work late on Thursday evenings, on the ground that

his religion calls on him to be a good father, and Thursday

night is the night he and his family have chosen as “family

night,” because that is the night that best suits the competing

demands of work, school and after-school events, and com-

munity and social obligations. The goal is religiously-moti-

vated—honor one’s G-d and one’s faith by being a good par-

ent—but the rationale for not wanting to work on Thursday

evening is not: he is not religiously forbidden from working

18 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

late on Thursdays or any other night; it is simply that he and

his family have picked Thursday night over others for practi-

cal, secular reasons that are unique to them. In my view, an

employer is no more obligated by Title VII to treat that ex-

emption request as one necessitated by a religious belief than

Aspirus was required to treat Dottenwhy’s objection to the

COVID-19 vaccine as an objection grounded in her religious

beliefs. See Nelson-Godfrey v. Cook Cnty., No. 23 C 16893,

— F. Supp. 3d —, 2024 WL 2722668, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 28,

2024) (Bucklo, J.) (rejecting as insufficient to state a religious

claim plaintiff’s invocation of “vaguely religious themes like

describing her body as a ‘temple of G[-]d’ that she must pro-

tect against ‘unclean’ substances”).

II.

Passarella’s statement came somewhat closer to describ-

ing a religious basis for a vaccine exemption, but in the end, I

believe that Aspirus correctly understood her objection to the

COVID-19 vaccine to be secular rather than religious.

In contrast to Dottenwhy, Passarella said a good deal more

about why her religion deems her body to be a temple of G-d

and how that belief influences her life choices. She noted that

her body “is His dwelling place” (Passarella R. 1-1 at 4), that

it “belongs to the Lord” (id.), and she “must use [her] body to

glorify G[-]d” (id. at 1). She explained that she has a corre-

sponding duty not to defile her body, to preserve her health

rather than endanger it, and “to be watchful and careful re-

garding what I do with my body, how I use my body, and

even what I allow into my body.” Id. at 4. Accordingly, she

“primarily consume[s] organic foods and exercise[s] to main-

tain [her] health. [She is] an avid essential oil user, avoid[s]

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 19

prescription and OTC [over-the-counter] medication, alcohol,

and other consumables that may be toxic to [her] body. …” Id.

Passarella also articulated a belief that it is G-d, rather than

modern medicine, who is primarily responsible for her health

and well-being. She said that “G-d knows [her] body better

than anyone because He is the maker of it,” that “[her] ulti-

mate protection, care, and healing comes from the Lord.” Id.

at 1. She acknowledged that G-d “can choose to use modern

means, methods, and medicines to give [her] protection, and

at times, to bring [her] healing when [she] need[s] it.” Id. at 2.

She emphasized, however, that “as a multi-faceted human be-

ing who possesses a spirt and soul, I recognize that my G[-]d

is the ultimate healer and sustainer of my life.” Id.

As it turns out, however, Passarella does not have a reli-

gious objection to all vaccines, and the explanation she gave

Aspirus for requesting an exemption from the COVID-19 vac-

cine in particular makes clear that her objection to the vaccine,

like Dottenwhy’s, is based on her individual perceptions of

the vaccine’s safety. On the matter of vaccines generally,

Passarella stated:

Although[ ] I have received other vaccines, in

which my ‘sincerely held belief’ might be

brought into question, to which I would re-

spond, I have made shrewd decisions regarding

the vaccines I put into my body. One example

of this is the Gardasil vaccine [for the human

papillomavirus]. I have not received this vac-

cine, as there is plenty of evidence of adverse,

debilitating injuries resulting from receiving the

vaccine. Although it comes highly

20 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

recommended by physicians, it goes against my

conscience to receive it … .

Id. at 3. Passarella’s discussion of her decision to reject the

Gardasil vaccine indicates that her “shrewd” decision-mak-

ing as to vaccines turns on her secular, medical assessments

of each vaccine, rather than any particular religious principle.

Her discussion of the COVID-19 vaccine confirms as much.

“There is … evidence available and worthy of consideration

that the vaccine[ ] could pose a danger to my body in the form

of blood clots or heart inflammation.” Id. at 4. Passarella cited

no religious tenet or practice that would allow her to take

other vaccines, but not this particular vaccine. She thus gave

her employer no reason to believe that her religious beliefs

precluded her from complying with the mandate that she be

vaccinated against COVID-19.

There is one more substantive piece to Passarella’s argu-

ment that her objection to the vaccine is a religious objection:

that it reflects the exercise of her G-d-given conscience. In her

statement, Passarella emphasized that her conscience “comes

from G[-]d” (id. at 1), that “the Holy Spirit dwells within

[her]” (id.), and that she is “obligated to operate under [her]

conscience, which is a G[-]d given message” (id. at 3). Thus:

“[W]hile the ‘science’ states that we should receive the vaccine

for various reasons, we need to lean on G[-]d’s understanding

that has been given to us through our conscience. Accepting

any of the available covid vaccines into my body would place

my trust in Man over my faith in G[-]d, which defiles his tem-

ple.” Id. at 4.

It cannot be enough to state a claim for a religious accom-

modation to assert that because one’s conscience is G-d given,

any decision one reaches in their good conscience is

Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661 21

necessarily inspired and endorsed by G-d, and therefore is re-

ligious in nature. This is comparable to the rationale I dis-

cussed above, that because an employee has prayed about a

matter and believes G-d is with him or her, the employee’s

decision is necessarily a religious one. Again, if this were suf-

ficient to state a prima facie claim for a religious exemption,

there would literally be no end to the types of otherwise-sec-

ular decisions that an employee could characterize as reli-

gious and request an employer to accommodate. See Reed v.

Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n em-

ployee is not permitted to redefine a purely personal prefer-

ence or aversion as a religious belief. Otherwise he could an-

nounce without warning that white walls or venetian blinds

offended his ‘spirituality,’ and the employer would have to

scramble to see whether it is feasible to accommodate him by

repainting the walls or substituting curtains for venetian

blinds.”) (citations omitted). This is far beyond anything that

Congress could have intended when it enacted Title VII.

Passarella’s assertion that her G-d given conscience led her to

conclude that she should not be immunized for COVID-19

vaccine was not sufficient to put Aspirus on notice that her

objection to the vaccine was grounded in religion, such that it

was required to consider whether an accommodation was

reasonable.

III.

Any employer—and especially a healthcare employer like

Aspirus, which operates hospitals and medical clinics—must

be able to make reasoned and timely assessments of whether

the basis for an objection to an important, health- and life-sav-

ing work requirement is religious or not. Given the broad ju-

dicial definition of religious beliefs and practices, an

22 Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661

employer is confronted with as many sets of religious beliefs

as it has employees—and as this case demonstrates, exemp-

tion requests that may vary from one compulsory vaccine to

the next. In order to bring her request within the scope of Title

VII, an employee must draw a discernible link between a par-

ticular religious belief or practice and the workplace obliga-

tion from which she wishes to be excused. I appreciate the

court’s emphasis on the possibility that Aspirus may ulti-

mately be able to show that it would have been unduly bur-

densome, in a healthcare context, to exempt employees like

Dottenwhy and Passarella from the vaccine requirement. But

I am not convinced that Dottenwhy’s and Passarell’s essen-

tially secular objections to the COVID-19 vaccine should suf-

fice to open the door to federal court and force their former

employer to spend significant time and expense in defending

the case through summary judgment and, potentially,

through trial.

I respectfully dissent.