Opinion

Ready Mix, USA, LLC. v. Jefferson County, Tennessee - Dissenting

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jun 9, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

March 8, 2011 Session

READY MIX, USA, LLC. V. JEFFERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Jefferson County

No. 99-113

No. E2010-00547-COA-R3-CV -FILED-JUNE 9, 2011

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., dissenting.

I cannot concur in the majority’s decision – as stated by it – “that Ready Mix was

required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by statute and the ordinance by

appealing the zoning official’s stop work order to the Board of Zoning Appeals.” The

majority relies heavily upon our decision in State ex rel. Moore & Associates v. West, 246

S.W.3d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). In Moore, the plaintiff alleged

that the zoning administrator failed or refused to issue a

certificate of compliance even though the developer had

installed a Category B landscape buffer that complied with the

requirements of the Metro ordinance, giving specifics as to the

materials installed, their spacing, and the dimensions and nature

of the buffer.

Id. at 576-77. The Moore plaintiff asked the court to declare that the buffer it had

established in connection with its newly-constructed hotel “complied with the [buffer]

requirements of the . . . Code [of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson

County].” Id. at 577.

The essence of the dispute in Moore and the one now before us in this case are as

different as night and day. Moore clearly involves a situation where the “experience and

expertise,” see id. at 580, of a board of zoning appeals would be important in looking at the

buffer requirements and then assessing whether the buffer built by the Moore plaintiff is in

compliance. That is the job of a board of zoning appeals. But what we are dealing with in

the instant case is a pure question of law – whether the doctrine of diminishing assets should

by adopted in Tennessee. If it should, then Ready Mix, based upon the past and present use

of its property, is entitled to a finding of a pre-existing and nonconforming use – in other

words, a “grandfathered” use under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b)(1) (Supp. 2010) and

Article 6.2 of the Jefferson County Zoning Resolution.

The issue before us is more akin to a challenge to the validity of an ordinance – a

situation that does not require a prior exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Cherokee

County Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466, 479 (Tenn. 2004). Both involve

issues of law. By contrast, Moore involves a factual determination by a code enforcement

individual as to whether the plaintiff’s buffer is of the type contemplated by the applicable

ordinance. Clearly, the matters in Moore implicate the experience and expertise of such an

individual as well as the talents of a board of zoning appeals. Since the issue before us –

whether Tennessee should adopt the doctrine of diminishing assets – is clearly one of law,

it is more appropriately presented to one experienced in the law, such as the trial judge in this

case.

This case does not involve a statute or ordinance requiring exhaustion of

administrative remedies. In the absence of such an edict, I would hold, under the unique

facts before us, that such exhaustion is not necessary or appropriate. There is an important

legal issue in this case that is at the heart of the resolution of this dispute. I see no need to

require the parties to waste their time dealing with an inquiry that is not important to the

ultimate issue before us. What the Supreme Court said in Cherokee County Club is pertinent

to the facts before us:

. . . [Cherokee] d[oes] not, however, challenge the Building

Official’s discretion in denying a demolition permit based on the

ordinance. As a result, an administrative appeal to the Building

Board of Adjustments and Appeals, which would have been

limited to review of the Building Official’s discretion, would

have afforded no review over the key issues and would have

afforded no possible remedy.

I would affirm the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

_______________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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