LaNorris O'Brien Chambers v. State of Tennessee

07/22/2024

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 21, 2024

LANORRIS O’BRIEN CHAMBERS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. CR-220172 Michael W. Binkley, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2023-00106-CCA-R3-PC

___________________________________

Petitioner, LaNorris O’Brien Chambers, appeals as of right from the Williamson County

Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, wherein

he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery and fraudulent use of a credit or

debit card between $1,000 and $2,500 and resulting fifteen-year sentence. After appointed

post-conviction counsel filed a notice that no amended petition would be filed, the post-

conviction court found that Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel; however, the court summarily dismissed the petition, reasoning that Petitioner

had “fail[ed] to demonstrate any actual prejudice whatsoever” because he sought to be

resentenced rather than rescind his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. On appeal, Petitioner

asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based upon his claims of having entered

an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea after receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.

Following our review, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Matthew J. Crigger (on appeal), Brentwood, Tennessee; and Cayley J. Turrin (in post-

conviction proceedings), Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, LaNorris O’Brien

Chambers.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney

General; Stacey Edmondson,1 District Attorney General; and Mary Katharine Evins,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

1

General Kim R. Helper, who was the elected District Attorney General during the pendency of

this case, passed away in March 2023.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

The November 2019 term of the Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner

for robbery and Class E felony fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. The State

subsequently filed a March 11, 2020 Notice of Intent to Use Criminal History and Evidence

of Prior Bad Acts (“the State’s notice”). The State’s notice referenced the following prior

convictions:

Conviction

Case No. Court Offense

Date

Circuit Court for

9/24/01 CC 2001 1017 Jefferson County, Burglary 3rd Degree

Alabama

Circuit Court for

Fraudulent Possession of a

9/24/01 CC 2001 1016 Jefferson County,

Credit Card

Alabama

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

5/16/01 2001-CF-005641 Strong-Arm Robbery

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for Aggravated

5/16/01 2001-CF-005641

Miami-Dade County, Battery/Bodily Harm

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

5/16/01 2001-CF-005642 Strong-Arm Robbery

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

5/16/01 2001-CF-005642 Battery/Elderly

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

Criminal Court for

5/16/01 2001-CF-005640 Miami-Dade County, Strong-Arm Robbery

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

5/16/01 2001-CF-005639 Strong-Arm Robbery

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

-2-

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

2/12/03 2002-CF-020897 Strong-Arm Robbery

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

2/12/03 2002-CF-020897 Battery/Elderly

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for Grand Theft in the 3d

2/12/03 2002-CF-020897

Miami-Dade County, Degree

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for Credit Card/Obtain Goods

2/12/03 2002-CF-020897

Miami-Dade County, valued $300 or more

Florida

Circuit Court for the

11th Judicial Circuit for

2/12/03 2002-CF-025837 Strong-Arm Robbery

Miami-Dade County,

Florida

The State’s notice included that Petitioner’s probation in his 2001 Florida case was revoked

on February 12, 2003, and that he was released from custody on August 17, 2017, when

his sentences expired. The notice also listed Petitioner’s then-pending charges in

Rutherford County Circuit Court Case No. 82166 for two counts of robbery, two counts of

fraudulent use of a credit or debit card, and aggravated assault upon a law enforcement

officer or first responder.

a. Guilty Plea Proceedings

On May 14, 2021, Petitioner entered guilty pleas to the charged offenses in his

Williamson County case, with agreed sentences of fifteen and six years to be served

concurrently as a career offender. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court explained

Petitioner’s rights, and Petitioner affirmed that he understood them and denied that he had

any questions. The State announced the plea agreement, and Petitioner affirmed that he

agreed to its terms.

THE COURT: Sir, you also signed a negotiated plea agreement that

recites exactly what was just announced, but nonetheless, I’m required to go

over this with you in some detail on the record to make sure that this is a

voluntary plea and to essentially make sure you understand everything you

are doing today. So let’s take a look at it. Sir, it’s my understanding as to

-3-

Count 1, you would like for me to accept your plea of guilty to the offense

of robbery, a . . . Class C felony, that you will be sentenced as a career

offender to fifteen years with a release eligibility of 60 percent. That fifteen

years is to serve. Do you understand that?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

....

THE COURT: Now, let’s move over to Count 2 if we can. Count 2,

sir, it’s my understanding you would like for me to accept your plea of guilty

to the felony of fraudulent use of a credit card, [C]lass E felony, that you

would be sentenced as a career offender, for a period of six years to serve

with a release eligibility . . . of 60 percent. Do you understand that?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You sure?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right, now, this six years on this fraudulent use of

a credit card and then the robbery that we just talked about for 15 years, the

agreement is that those are to run concurrent with each other. That means

that you are going to be burning that time on the six years and 15 years at the

same time. Do you understand that?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

Petitioner affirmed that trial counsel had explained the sentencing range for each

offense. Petitioner also affirmed twice that he had no questions about any part of the plea

agreement. He agreed that he had read the guilty plea form and denied that he had any

questions about it.

The State articulated the factual basis for the plea as follows:

Your Honor, a summary of State’s proof had this matter proceeded to

trial would be that on May 28th of 2019, a Katherine Warner was in the

parking lot at . . . 730 Cool Springs Boulevard. She noticed a suspect

walking toward her direction as she exited her car. She was facing the

interior of her car trying to get her items out when someone approached her

and grabbed hold of her and attempted to take her purse and computer bag.

-4-

She fought with the suspect and she was punched and she did sustain injuries

during that time. The suspect was successful in stealing her laptop and purse

and . . . then fled running south towards Cool Springs Boulevard.

She was able to describe the suspect as a black man, wearing a brown

shirt, and tan pants, clean shaven with a natural style hair cut, estimated to

be in his early 30’s. She did give an approximate height and weight and that

would be consistent with the build of [Petitioner].

Several police department detectives responded and began

investigating. The victim . . . did alert law enforcement that she began

receiving fraud alerts from her credit card that had been in her purse,

specifically from Wal[m]art, and a Walgreens. The officer was able to obtain

video footage. The restitution is the amount from the different stores Lowes,

Walgreens, Kroger, Wal[m]art where fraudulent credit card purchases were

made with her credit card.

The officer was able to obtain some video of the purchases from the

businesses. She was able to identify the person as the suspect that had

assaulted her and stole her belongings. Officers were contacted by a

Rutherford County detective to find that other robberies had occurred there

and a purchase was made at Dick[’]s using a reward card belonging to

[Petitioner]. There was an employee discount card used for Wal[m]art for

fraudulent purchases and the employee was known to be an associate of

[Petitioner].

The officers did pull the driver’s license and determined his

photograph to be similar to those . . . from the video surveillance. Detective

Chad Pace took out warrants, and then with Murfreesboro [o]fficials went to

[Petitioner]’s home located in Murfreesboro to arrest him on those warrants.

A search of his vehicle and person revealed that he was in possession

of some of the items that had been taken from [the victim], including her

computer bag, her computer, her driver’s license and her credit cards. And

that would conclude the State’s proof.

Petitioner affirmed that the State’s facts were true and correct. The trial court stated,

“All right. You hesitated, and I want to make sure that this plea is voluntary and that you

have no questions about what you are doing here today.” Petitioner responded, “Yes. Yes,

Your Honor, it’s correct.” Petitioner affirmed again that the factual basis was correct and

that he was guilty of robbery and fraudulent use of a credit card. The trial court accepted

-5-

the guilty pleas and imposed the agreed-upon sentence, and the judgments were entered on

May 14, 2021.

b. Post-Conviction Proceedings

Petitioner subsequently filed a timely March 28, 2022 pro se petition for post-

conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel failed to adequately review the State’s notice with Petitioner or object to the State’s

notice. Petitioner averred that the State’s notice was “misleading and insufficient in that it

did not specify the range of punishment sought in Petitioner’s case[,] ‘career offender’ and

[was] not accompanied by a memorandum of law and facts in support thereof.” Petitioner

stated that he was never provided with proper notice of the State’s intent to seek enhanced

punishment before he pleaded guilty on May 14, 2021.

Petitioner stated that the State’s notice should have contained a citation to Tennessee

Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) and that it did not comply with the corresponding

rule of criminal procedure. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3(a). Petitioner argued that he was

“misinformed and misle[d]” by the State’s notice and that trial counsel’s “omission in

failing to raise the lack of notice defense and object to the enhanced sentence allowed

Petitioner to plea[d] guilty as a ‘career offender.’” Petitioner asserted that, “[d]ue to

counsel’s lack of objection to the statutory notice and errors at the sentencing hearing[,]

Petitioner’s enhanced sentence as a ‘career offender’ [was] VOID and Petitioner [should

be] resentenced as a Range I offender.”

On the post-conviction petition form, in addition to ineffective assistance of counsel,

Petitioner circled as grounds for relief that his convictions were based on an “unlawfully

induced guilty plea or guilty plea involuntarily entered without understanding of the nature

and consequences of the plea,” as well as “other grounds.”

The post-conviction court appointed post-conviction counsel on May 4, 2022,

finding that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was a colorable claim

for relief. Post-conviction counsel subsequently filed a July 8, 2022 “motion for

dismissal,” in which counsel stated that, “[a]fter extensive review of the file, interviews

with counsel and [Petitioner], and case law research, [c]ounsel has concluded that

[Petitioner] does not have a colorable claim.” Post-conviction counsel requested that the

pro se petition be dismissed.

Petitioner subsequently filed an August 8, 2022 pro se motion requesting that

different post-conviction counsel be appointed to represent him because a “fatal conflict of

interest” had arisen, namely “[n]egligence in failing to correspond with . . . Petitioner in

preparation for settlement of the case at hand.”

-6-

The post-conviction court held an August 12, 2022 hearing to discuss the case. Post-

conviction counsel explained that she had done “extensive review” of the State’s discovery

materials, spoken with trial counsel and the prosecutor, had “extensive” telephone

conversations with Petitioner, and performed legal research. Post-conviction counsel noted

that normally she could “come to a resolution” with clients but that she was unable to do

so in this case. Post-conviction counsel stated her opinion that no colorable claim for relief

existed and requested that the post-conviction court dismiss the petition.

Petitioner addressed the post-conviction court and stated that he did not wish to have

the petition dismissed; that he had “come too far” and that post-conviction counsel “doesn’t

know the law and know what she’s doing”; that post-conviction counsel “prejudged” his

case based upon the fact that he pleaded guilty “and at that point I had no issues with merit

regarding my petition”; and that post-conviction counsel had been “rude, disrespectful, and

dismissive of [Petitioner’s] case” in their first telephone call. Petitioner said that post-

conviction counsel had explained that he “voluntarily pled guilty [as] a career offender”

and that she told him certain cases he cited to her were irrelevant. Petitioner averred that

post-conviction counsel did not have his best interests at heart, and he asked to have another

attorney appointed.

The State also addressed the post-conviction court and asserted that Petitioner was

not entitled to choose his post-conviction counsel and that post-conviction counsel was a

competent attorney. The State noted that it did not know if Petitioner could appeal post-

conviction counsel’s statement that no colorable claim existed. The State also noted that

it did not realize that Petitioner had not agreed to dismiss the petition until Petitioner filed

the pro se motion.

The post-conviction court ordered post-conviction counsel to file a memorandum of

law relative to whether post-conviction counsel had the “authority to dismiss a PCR action”

and whether the post-conviction court could appoint Petitioner new counsel.

Post-conviction counsel’s September 6, 2022 memorandum noted that she

“regrettably labeled the motion [stating that Petitioner had no colorable claim] as a motion

to dismiss instead of a written notice that no amended petition will be filed.” Post-

conviction counsel concurrently filed a “notice of no amended petition,” in which she

restated that she had “properly investigated all potential claims and has found that there is

not a reasonable claim and thus will not be filing an amended petition.” The State

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

The post-conviction court entered an order summarily dismissing the post-

conviction petition on January 3, 2023. In the order, the post-conviction court stated that

it had reviewed in detail the pleadings, including the State’s motion to dismiss the petition

and attached exhibits consisting of Petitioner’s signed petition for waiver of trial by jury

-7-

and request for acceptance of the guilty pleas, the signed plea agreement documents, and

the trial court’s order accepting the guilty pleas. The post-conviction court noted that it

had also received a copy of the plea hearing transcript.

The post-conviction court stated that the State “is correct in each and every one of

its responses to [Petitioner’s] allegations in this Petition” and made the following findings

of fact and conclusions of law:

[T]his [c]ourt finds [Petitioner] did not have a sentencing hearing in

Williamson County; he agreed to the fifteen (15) years as a career offender

sentence after having explained to him in detail the terms and conditions of

the Plea Agreement by his counsel, as well as every other document reviewed

and signed by [Petitioner], which the [c]ourt very carefully reviewed with

[Petitioner] as evidenced by the transcript of his plea in this matter . . . .

[T]rial counsel . . . advised [Petitioner] that were he to be found guilty at trial,

the [c]ourt could sentence him to consecutive time. In [Petitioner’s]

[p]etition, he simply second guesses the tactical and strategic choices made

by trial counsel by utilizing “20-20 hindsight,” which is not the function of

post-conviction proceedings . . . .

In this case, [Petitioner] fails to demonstrate any actual prejudice

whatsoever . . . . [Petitioner] does not dispute the accuracy of the convictions

listed in the Notice, and merely attacks the form and asks to be sentenced as

a “Range I offender.”

Based upon the record as a whole, the argument and information

provided by [Petitioner], the [c]ourt concludes the record is insufficient for

the relief as requested by [Petitioner], as he has not alleged the proceedings

would have been any different had he not pled guilty, but chose instead to go

to trial. The State of Tennessee has properly and clearly responded to each

and every allegation, and the [c]ourt has carefully reviewed all of

[Petitioner’s] allegations set forth in his [p]etition and concludes the

allegations are not supported by the [p]etition for [p]ost-[c]onviction [r]elief.

Petitioner subsequently filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.2

2

Afterward, the post-conviction court entered an order permitting post-conviction counsel to

withdraw. This court remanded the case to the post-conviction court for a hearing regarding whether

Petitioner was waiving the right to appellate counsel. The record reflects that, after a hearing, the post-

conviction court appointed appellate post-conviction counsel.

-8-

Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based

upon his claims of having entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea after receiving

ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner repeats his allegation that trial counsel failed

to review the State’s notice with him and to object to the notice “upon the grounds that it

did not provide adequate notice in that it did not specify sentencing as a career offender

and was not accompanied by a memorandum of law and facts in support.” The State

responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition because Petitioner

failed to allege that he would not have pleaded guilty but for trial counsel’s error.

Post-conviction relief “shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A

petition for post-conviction relief “must contain a clear and specific statement of all

grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those

grounds.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(d). A petition must also contain “a description

of how petitioner was prejudiced by the error(s)[.]” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 5(E)(3).

Upon receipt of a petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court

conducts a preliminary review to “determine whether the petition states a colorable claim.”

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(2); Burnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tenn. 2002). “A

colorable claim is a claim, in a petition for post-conviction relief, that, if taken as true, in

the light most favorable to petitioner, would entitle petitioner to relief under the Post-

Conviction Procedure Act.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 2(H). When determining whether a

colorable claim has been presented, pro se petitions are held to a less rigid standard than

formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993).

If the petition does state a colorable claim, the post-conviction court “shall enter a

preliminary order.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-107(a). The order shall appoint counsel for

the petitioner if the petitioner is indigent and requests counsel. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-

107(b)(1); see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a). The preliminary order shall also direct

the petitioner or the petitioner’s counsel to file an amended petition, or a written notice that

no amendment will be filed, within thirty days of the entry of the order. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-30-107(b)(2).

In Burnett, our supreme court laid out the following procedure after post-conviction

counsel files a notice that no amendment will be filed:

In the final stage of the process preceding an evidentiary hearing, the

trial court reviews the entire record, including the petition, the State’s

response, and any other files and records before it. If, on reviewing these

-9-

documents, the court determines conclusively that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief, the petition shall be dismissed.

Burnett, 92 S.W.3d at 407 (citation omitted); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-109(a).

Here, post-conviction counsel mistakenly filed a motion to dismiss rather than a

notice that no amended petition would be filed; however, she eventually corrected the error.

After reviewing the post-conviction petition, the State’s motion to dismiss, the documents

attached to both pleadings, and the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, the post-conviction

court concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to relief and dismissed the petition.

We review a post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of a petition for post-

conviction relief de novo. See Arnold v. State, 143 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tenn. 2004).

In order to prevail in a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance related to a

guilty plea, the petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance fell below the objective

standards of reasonableness and professional norms. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58

(1985); see Dorsey v. State, No. W2021-01135-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 2840738, at *4

(Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2022), perm. app. denied (Dec. 14, 2022). Second, “in order

to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.

In this case, Petitioner’s factual allegation is that trial counsel failed to discuss the

State’s notice in more detail with him and failed to object to the State’s notice; he contends

that trial counsel’s deficient performance in this respect resulted in his guilty plea being

involuntary and unknowing.

Relative to objecting to the State’s notice, we agree with the post-conviction court

that Petitioner has not disputed the accuracy of the convictions listed therein. We note that

Petitioner’s claim that the State’s notice was inadequate based upon its not including the

words “career offender” is meritless. See State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 413 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 2001) (concluding that a notice was adequate when the defendant “failed to show any

prejudice arising from a lack of knowledge as to which particular range the State was

contemplating to seek for purposes of sentencing”); see also State v. Livingston, 197

S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Taylor for the proposition that a “notice does not

have to specify which range—career, persistent, or multiple—applies”). Petitioner has not

alleged any facts that, if taken as true, would establish that trial counsel was deficient in

failing to object to the State’s notice based upon its not including the words “career

offender.”

- 10 -

Relative to the detail in which trial counsel discussed the State’s notice with

Petitioner, Petitioner’s requested relief was to be resentenced as a Range I offender. He

did not assert that, but for trial counsel’s alleged deficiency, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have proceeded to trial. He has, therefore, not alleged that he was

prejudiced in a manner that would entitle him to post-conviction relief.

We note that—in addition to Petitioner’s having signed the plea agreement

documents clearly stating that he was being sentenced as a career offender—the trial court

explained the plea agreement to Petitioner, including his career offender sentencing range,

and that Petitioner repeatedly affirmed that he understood the plea agreement and agreed

sentences. Statements made in open court during a plea colloquy, as well as the findings

made by the trial court in accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings” and carry a strong presumption of truth. Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). In order to overcome such presumption, a petitioner

must present more than “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics.” Id. at 74. The

record reflects that Petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.

As a result, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the

petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the post-

conviction court is affirmed.

_________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

- 11 -