The opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0305n.06
Case No. 24-1032
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jul 16, 2024
) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
GENE RAYMOND BELL, JR,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CITY OF SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN, ) MICHIGAN
Defendant )
) OPINION
ANTHONIE KORKIS, Officer; ARTHUR )
BRIDGEFORTH, Officer; THOMAS )
LANGEWICZ, II, Officer, )
)
Defendants-Appellants.
)
Before: WHITE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. In police encounters, the parties often dispute who started it.
Gene Bell claims officers used excessive force when they removed him from his car during a traffic
stop. The officers, in turn, allege Bell instigated by physically resisting. Because it’s not our role
to decide “who started it,” we dismiss.
During a traffic stop, Gene Bell refused to provide his license and registration despite
repeated requests from Officer Anthonie Korkis. As Officer Korkis waited for other units to arrive,
he told Bell that if he continued to refuse, he’d be forcibly removed from his car and arrested for
No. 24-1032, Bell v. City of Southfield
obstruction. A few minutes later, Officer Korkis made good on his warning, reaching in to unlock
Bell’s car door.
Here’s where accounts diverge. The officers claim Bell slapped Officer Korkis’s hand
away from the lock. Bell disagrees, claiming he never resisted and the force against him was
unprovoked. Everyone agrees Bell was then pulled from his car, tased, and arrested.
Bell sued, claiming the officers used excessive force when they (1) pulled him from the car
and (2) tased him during arrest. The officers invoked qualified immunity, which we granted on
the latter claim based on video footage that clearly showed Bell was resisting arrest when officers
tased him. Bell v. City of Southfield (Bell I), 37 F.4th 362, 367–68 (6th Cir. 2022); see Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). But because video footage was inconclusive on what happened
inside the car—namely, whether Bell physically resisted by slapping Officer Korkis’s hand
away—we lacked jurisdiction over that factual dispute and dismissed. Bell I, 37 F.4th at 366.
After discovery, the officers again asserted qualified immunity in a motion for summary
judgment. The district court denied the officers’ motion, and the officers once again appealed.
Ordinarily, denials of summary judgment aren’t immediately appealable. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. But when defendants assert and are denied qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction to
review legal questions but not factual ones. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Bell
I, 47 F.4th at 365.
The officers repeat their claim that Bell slapped Officer Korkis’s hand before they used
force against him. Appellant Br. 30 (“Plaintiff slapped Ofc. Korkis’ hand inside the vehicle.”); id.
at 31 (noting “verbal[] and physical[]” resistance (emphasis added)). Bell maintains he didn’t.
The video footage still doesn’t reveal the truth. Bell I, 37 F.4th at 366. Discovery didn’t either.
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No. 24-1032, Bell v. City of Southfield
So at the end of the day, we’re left with the very same factual dispute we declined to address in
Bell I. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to resolve the officers’ claim to immunity.
The officers suggest otherwise, pointing to inconsistencies in Bell’s deposition testimony.
But Bell maintains he didn’t slap Officer Korkis. So any inconsistency merely affects his
credibility; it doesn’t conclusively establish the truth. Cf. United States v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288,
303 (6th Cir. 2019). And Bell’s credibility is a matter for the jury—not us.
Because the officers’ appeal disputes whether Bell physically resisted, we lack jurisdiction
over it.1 We dismiss.
1
The officers never argue their force would’ve been justified even if Bell hadn’t slapped Officer Korkis’s hand. See
Bell I, 37 F.4th at 366 n.1. We therefore do not consider that legal question.
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