David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 26, 2011 Session

DAVID SCOTT BLACKWELL v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF THE

STATE OF TENNESSEE ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 100739-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2011-00588-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 11, 2012

This is a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-14-

102. The petitioner, who was convicted of three felony drug offenses in Georgia, was granted

a full pardon by the State of Georgia that expressly restored his right to possess a firearm,

now resides in Tennessee and desires to purchase and possess firearms. Tennessee Code

Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony offense for a person, who has

been “convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly

weapon” or who has been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm in

Tennessee. Therefore, Petitioner filed this action seeking a declaration that he would not be

in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) by purchasing or

possessing a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee responded to the petition by filing

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due

Process Clause of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Second

Amendment, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution. The chancery court ruled

that it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the State’s Rule 12.02(1); however, the

chancery court granted the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion finding that the petitioner failed to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him under the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution; article I, section 26 of the Tennessee

Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Full

Faith and Credit Clause. The State raises one issue on appeal, asserting that the chancery

court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed for that

reason. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction. As for

the decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we have determined that the complaint for

declaratory relief states facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy

concerning the matter at issue; therefore, the chancery court erred by granting the State’s

motion pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) instead of rendering a declaratory judgment as the facts and

law require. Accordingly, the complaint for declaratory relief is reinstated and this case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in

Part, Reversed in Part

F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which A NDY D. B ENNETT

and R ICHARD H. D INKINS, JJ., joined.

David L. Raybin and Benjamin K. Raybin, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, David

Scott Blackwell.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor

General; and Frank Borger-Gilligan, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Bill

Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Tennessee Attorney

General, Victor S. Torry Johnson III, District Attorney of Davidson County, Tennessee, Kim

R. Helper, District Attorney of Williamson County, Tennessee, and the State of Tennessee.

Ronald D. Krelstein, Germantown, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Firearms

Association, Inc.

OPINION

David Scott Blackwell, (hereinafter “Petitioner”), was convicted of three felony drug

offenses in the State of Georgia in 1989 and sentenced to nine years of incarceration, serving

five years in prison and four years on probation. In 2003, Petitioner received a full pardon

from the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, which is the entity entitled to grant pardons

under the Georgia Constitution. The pardon expressly provided that Petitioner’s firearm

rights were restored.

When Petitioner moved to Tennessee, he learned that Tennessee Code Annotated §

39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony for a person, who has been “convicted of a

felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon” or who has

been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm as that term is defined in

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Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-11-106.1 In order to determine if his Georgia pardon

exempted him from the application of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B),

and to avoid the risk of being charged with a felony should he possess a firearm in

Tennessee, Petitioner asked his state representative to request a written opinion of the

Attorney General of Tennessee concerning the right of a Tennessee resident who had

received a full pardon of felony drug offenses in another state to purchase and possess a

firearm in Tennessee. On October 29, 2009, the Attorney General issued an opinion that

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) (2007) prohibited a person convicted of

a felony drug offense from possessing a handgun, including a pardoned out-of-state felon.2

On April 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint in the Chancery Court for

Davidson County seeking a declaration that Tennessee law governing the possession of

firearms as applied to him was in violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions

and that he may lawfully purchase and possess firearms and handguns in the State of

Tennessee. The complaint named the Governor, the Tennessee Attorney General, and the

State of Tennessee as defendants in the action. On July 13, 2010, the defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). An amended motion to dismiss was filed on September 28, 2010.

Petitioner subsequently amended his complaint on September 29, 2010, by adding two

additional defendants, the Davidson County District Attorney General and the Williamson

County District Attorney General (hereinafter, we refer to the defendants collectively as “the

State”); however, the motions to dismiss were not withdrawn and were subsequently heard.

Following a hearing on the State’s motions, the chancery court denied the State’s Rule

12.02(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; however, the court granted

the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon

1

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-11-106(11) defines a firearm as “any weapon designed, made or

adapted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use.”

2

It should be noted that the Attorney General opinion requested by Petitioner’s state representative

and referenced by the parties and the trial court, which was dated October 20, 2009, analyzed the issue under

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1) as it read prior to a 2008 amendment. See Tenn. Op. Atty.

Gen. No. 09-168 (Oct. 20, 2009). The previous version of the statute prohibited the possession of

“handguns.” Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1) was amended effective July 1, 2008, and the

amendment replaced the term “handgun” with “firearm.” See 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1044-1045. Thus, the

statute as amended in 2008 should have been the subject of the Attorney General’s 2009 Opinion, not the

prior version.

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which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause

of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.

On December 7, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

contending that the order failed to address the claims asserted against the two district attorney

generals and failed to address the state constitutional claims. On March 3, 2010, the chancery

court issued an order amending its previous order to include the district attorney generals;

the court also ruled that Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

as it pertained to Petitioner’s claim for relief pursuant to article I, section 26 of the Tennessee

Constitution. As a result, all of Petitioner’s claims for a declaratory judgment were dismissed

pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) and (6). This appeal followed.

We begin our analysis by addressing the State’s sole issue on appeal, that of subject

matter jurisdiction.

A NALYSIS

I.

S UBJECT M ATTER J URISDICTION

In its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) motion to dismiss, the State argued

that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to preside over this action. The

chancery court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction, citing Clinton Books, Inc. v. City

of Memphis, 197 S.W.3d 749 (Tenn. 2006), which the court read to permit chancery courts

to rule on the constitutionality of criminal statutes, although the court lacked jurisdiction to

enjoin enforcement of a criminal statute.

The State asserts that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because a

court may only entertain an action for declaratory relief if the court could have entertained

an original action based upon the same subject matter, relying on our Supreme Court’s ruling

in Zirkle v. City of Kingston, 396 S.W.2d 356, 363 (Tenn. 1965). As the chancery courts of

Tennessee do not have original jurisdiction over criminal cases,3 the State argues that the

Chancery Court of Davidson County did not have subject matter jurisdiction to render a

declaratory judgment concerning the application of a criminal statute. We have concluded

that the chancery court has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief

3

Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-10-102 confers exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases upon the

circuit courts, except in counties which have established criminal courts, in which case, exclusive jurisdiction

of criminal matters rests with the criminal courts.

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on the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to

the Petitioner.

Before we examine the Zirkle decision relied upon by the State in support of their

argument, we find it pertinent to discuss the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Erwin

Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 300 S.W. 565 (Tenn. 1927), which also dealt with the issue of

jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action. The petitioners in Buckner, owners of a

billiard parlor, filed suit against the sheriff of Unicoi County, foreman of the grand jury, and

the district attorney general, under the provisions of the then Declaratory Judgments Law,

seeking a declaration that chapter 104 of the 1925 Private Acts of the State of Tennessee, as

amended by chapter 290 of the 1925 Private Acts, which made it unlawful to operate “pool

and billiard rooms for profit and pay in counties of the state having a population of not less

than 10,115, nor more than 10,125, by the federal census of 1920, or any subsequent federal

census,” was unconstitutional.4 Id. at 565-66.

In the complaint, then referred to as the “bill,” the plaintiffs stated they were:

[E]ngaged in the operation of pool and billiard rooms for pay and profit, in

Unicoi county, the population of which county brings it within the application

of said statute, and that complainants have made investments of money in their

said business, so that their property rights would be destroyed by the

enforcement of the statute.

Id. at 566. The complaint further stated that the plaintiffs “had been served with notice by the

sheriff that he would procure warrants against them and close their places of business and

continue to prosecute them for every separate offense committed by them contrary to the

provisions of said statute, etc.” Id. The chancellor dismissed the bill on demurrer, and the

plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the bill on demurrer relying in part on

Lindsey v. Drane, 285 S. W. 705 (Tenn. 1926). The Supreme Court noted that Lindsey

“entertained the bill of the complainants filed against the District Attorney General for a

declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute, penal in its nature, affecting the

property rights of the complainants.” Id. at 566. The court did, however, note that the

jurisdiction of the chancery court to render the declaratory judgment had not been challenged

in Lindsey. Nevertheless, the court went on to state: “This court is committed to a liberal

interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Act so as to make it of real service to the people

4

The complaint stated that Unicoi County had the requisite population at that time to come under the

purview of the act. Buckner, 300 S.W. at 565.

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and to the profession.” Id. (quoting Hodges v. Hamblen County, 277 S. W. 901 (Tenn.

1925)).

Upon the Supreme Court’s determination in Buckner that the plaintiffs had sufficiently

established in the complaint that “they have a special interest in the question of the

constitutionality of the penal statute described in the bill, distinct from the interest of the

public generally, in that their investment and property rights will be directly affected and

injured by its enforcement,” the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to:

Maintain an action for the determination of the proper construction or

constitutionality of such a statute, under the provisions of the Declaratory

Judgments Law, and the bill in the present cause was properly filed against the

sheriff, in view of the averment of the bill that the sheriff had given notice of

his intention to proceed against complainants.

Id. The court noted however that the jurisdiction of the chancery court “did not include the

power to issue an injunction against officers of the state or county charged with the

enforcement of penal laws.” Id. (citing Lindsey, 285 S. W. 705) (emphasis added). The court

therefore reversed the chancery court’s dismissal of the complaint and ordered that “a decree

be entered in this court declaring the said chapter 104 of the Private Acts of 1925 and its

amendatory act unconstitutional and void, in accordance with the prayer of the bill, but the

injunctive relief sought will be denied.” Id. at 567.

In Zirkle, the decision relied upon by the State, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to

restrain the defendant from trespassing on property and maintaining sewer and water lines,

a declaration of rights as to the sewer and water lines, and an award of damages for

conversion under the theories of unjust enrichment or quasi-contract. Zirkle, 396 S.W.2d at

358. When the Chancery Court for Roane County sustained the defendant’s demurrer, the

plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 359. In the 1965 opinion, the court determined that “the complaint

stated no cause of action of which equity had jurisdiction, nor did it state a case of inherent

jurisdiction, and since there was an adequate remedy at law the demurrer was properly

sustained.” Id at 356. The only paragraph in Zirkle in which the court addressed the issue of

jurisdiction stated:

Finally, complainants claim chancery jurisdiction because they seek a

declaration of rights. Apparently, the gist of this prayer is that they seek a

declaratory judgment, as authorized by T.C.A. § 23–1102. A declaratory

judgment is proper in chancery, but only if chancery originally could have

entertained a suit of the same subject matter. Gibson, Suits in Chancery § 36,

n. 62 (5th ed. 1955). Since chancery does not have jurisdiction of the

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complainants’ suit under any of their theories – injunction, unjust enrichment,

conversion – it cannot take jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment.

Id. at 363.

We acknowledge, as the State asserts, that the Supreme Court has not explicitly

overruled Zirkle; nevertheless, we find that the court has clearly departed from the

unequivocal declaration in the foregoing paragraph in at least two cases: Davis-Kidd

Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1993) and Clinton Books, Inc. v.

City of Memphis, 197 S.W.3d 749 (Tenn. 2006).5 Therefore, contrary to the State’s

insistence, we find it appropriate to not only consider, but to rely upon the Supreme Court’s

subsequent determinations that, at least in some cases and with some limitations, the

chancery court has subject matter jurisdiction to rule upon declaratory judgment actions as

they pertain to the application of criminal sanctions to petitioners. The Supreme Court’s

decisions in Davis-Kidd and Clinton Books, pertained to actions for declaratory relief

concerning statutes that assessed criminal penalties for violations thereof, and in none of

these cases did the court find that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

In Davis-Kidd, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute that

prohibited the display of materials deemed harmful to minors and a companion nuisance

statute. Davis-Kidd, 866 S.W.2d at 521. More important to this action than the rulings on the

constitutionality of the statute, however, is the procedural posture of the case, which was

brought as a declaratory judgment action in the Chancery Court of Davidson County seeking

a declaration that the statutes were facially unconstitutional under the federal and state

constitutions. Id. at 522. The statutes at issue made it a criminal offense to display materials

that were harmful to minors as defined in the statute. Id. Thus, Davis-Kidd provides an

example of a declaratory judgment action that was commenced and maintained in a court of

equity wherein the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a criminal statute as applied

and our Supreme Court considered the merits of the case and did not find that the court of

equity lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

In Clinton Books, our Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court had jurisdiction

to issue a temporary injunction barring enforcement of a statute regulating the hours during

which an adult-oriented business could operate, which if violated would result in criminal

penalties. Clinton Books, 197 S.W.3d at 751. The court answered this in the negative holding

that the long-standing rule in this State is that “state courts of equity lack jurisdiction to

enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute that is alleged to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 752

(citing Alexander v. Elkins, 179 S.W. 310, 311 (Tenn. 1915); J.W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner,

5

Notably, Zirkle made no reference to the Supreme Court’s previous decision in Buckner.

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123 S.W. 622, 637 (Tenn. 1909)). In so holding, the court noted that nothing in their

decisions in Planned Parenthood nor Davis-Kidd, which dealt with declaratory actions

seeking relief from statutes that provided for the imposition of criminal penalties if violated,

altered the long-standing rule. Id. at 752-53. The court held that the omission of any

discussion of the trial court’s jurisdiction should not be interpreted as altering the general rule

prohibiting state equity courts from enjoining enforcement of a criminal statute. Id. at 753.6

The court further noted that criminal proceedings had already been instituted for violation

of the statute at issue and that the “issue of validity is not so complex that it cannot be

resolved by a court with criminal jurisdiction if raised as a defense in a criminal action.” Id.

at 754.

The court next addressed whether the trial court erred in consolidating the request for

injunctive relief with the declaratory judgment action and addressing the constitutionality of

the statute. Id. at 755. The court ruled that the trial court erred in addressing the

constitutionality of the statute because it failed to order consolidation or give notice to the

parties that it intended to consolidate the hearings on the declaratory judgment action and the

injunction action. Id. Thus, due to its failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.04(7), the

trial court could not have addressed the constitutionality of the statute at the time of the

hearing, which the parties believed and desired to be only on the issue of injunctive relief

against the enforcement of the statute. Id. The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded

the case to the trial court for a hearing on the merits of the declaratory judgment action. Id.

at 755-56. Had our Supreme Court determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

entertain an action for declaratory relief on the statute, a violation of which would result in

criminal penalties, the court would not have remanded the action for a hearing on the merits

of the declaratory judgment action; instead, the court would have remanded with instruction

to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Cnty. of Shelby v. City of

Memphis, 365 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn.1963) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised

at any time by the parties or by the appellate court sua sponte on appeal).

For the foregoing reasons, we have concluded that the chancery court had subject

matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s complaint for declaratory relief concerning the

constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him.7

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this issue.

6

An exception to this is when the Supreme Court has already found the statute unconstitutional, at

which point “no controversies are required to be settled by a criminal court, and the equity court is not

invading the criminal court’s jurisdiction by issuing an injunction.” Clinton Books, 197 S.W.3d at 753.

7

Nevertheless, as Clinton Books clearly stated, the chancery court “lack[s] jurisdiction to enjoin the

enforcement of a criminal statute that is alleged to be unconstitutional.” Clinton Books, 197 S.W.3d at 752.

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II.

R ULE 12.02(6) M OTIONS TO D ISMISS D ECLARATORY J UDGMENT ACTIONS

Next, we consider whether the trial court erred by granting the State’s Tennessee Rule

of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss instead of denying the motion and, when the

case was in the proper posture, entering a declaratory judgment to afford Petitioner relief

from the uncertainty of whether he may lawfully possess a firearm in Tennessee.

As our Supreme Court explained in Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity,

Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011), when considering a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss:

[C]ourts “‘must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual

allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable

inferences.’” Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007)

(quoting Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 696); see Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87,

92-93 (Tenn. 2004). A trial court should grant a motion to dismiss “only when

it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that

would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78

S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tenn. 2002). We review the trial court’s legal conclusions

regarding the adequacy of the complaint de novo. Brown, 328 S.W.3d at 855;

Stein, 945 S.W.2d at 716.

Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 425-26 (some internal citations omitted).

The foregoing notwithstanding, because this is a declaratory judgment action, as

distinguished from a tort action or a contract action in which the plaintiff is seeking monetary

damages, to recover property, or other affirmative relief, the standard by which we review

a Rule 12 dismissal of the complaint is somewhat different from that applied in most civil

actions. This is because, as this court explained in Cannon Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Wade, 178

S.W.3d 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to

dismiss are seldom appropriate in declaratory judgment actions provided there is an actual

controversy that may be resolved by means of a declaration of the parties’ respective rights.

Id. at 730 (citing Glover v. Glendening, 829 A.2d 532, 539 (Md. 2003)).

When considering a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action it is important

to recognize that the general purpose of a declaratory judgment action is not to award

affirmative relief, but “to resolve a dispute, afford relief from uncertainty with respect to

rights, status, and other legal relations.” Wade, 178 S.W.3d at 730 (emphasis added). In this

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context, the fact that the party seeking declaratory relief is not entitled to a favorable

judgment – that he, she, or it will not prevail on the issue in controversy – does not mean that

the parties are not entitled to the “relief from uncertainty that a declaratory judgment

affords.” Id. at 730. As we explained in Wade:

The prevailing rule is that when a party seeking a declaratory judgment

alleges facts demonstrating the existence of an actual controversy concerning

a matter covered by the declaratory judgment statute, the court should not

grant a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss but, instead, proceed to

render a declaratory judgment as the facts and law require. Hudson v. Jones,

278 S.W.2d 799, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); 1 Walter H. Anderson, [Actions for

Declaratory Judgments] § 318, at 740 (2d ed.1951).

The Tennessee Supreme Court followed this protocol in Frazier v. City of

Chattanooga, 156 Tenn. 346, 1 S.W.2d 786 (1928). A resident of Chattanooga

sought a declaratory judgment concerning whether a private act conferring

powers on the City of Chattanooga had been repealed by implication by

another private act. The City filed a demurrer, being the former equivalent of

today’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Rather than ruling against the resident on the merits of the case, the trial court

sustained the City’s demurrer (dismissed the action). The Tennessee Supreme

Court observed: “It seems to us that the better practice in a case brought

under the Declaratory Judgment Law . . . is to enter a decree, sometimes

referred to as a ‘declaration,’ defining the rights of the parties under the

issues made, even though such decree is adverse to the contentions in the bill.”

Frazier, 1 S.W.2d at 786.

Id. at 730 (emphasis added). Thus, what is essential is that the party seeking the declaratory

judgment state facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy

concerning the matter at issue in the declaratory judgment action. See Hudson, 278 S.W.2d

at 804; see also 1 Walter H. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 318, at 740.

Based upon the prevailing rule, the party seeking a declaratory judgment is not

required to allege facts in its complaint demonstrating that it is entitled to a favorable

decision. Wade, 178 S.W.3d at 730 (citing Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc’y, 146 P.2d

673, 678 (Cal. 1944) (holding a complaint for declaratory relief which recites the dispute

between the parties and prays for a declaration of rights, states facts sufficient to constitute

a cause of action against a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the complaint although it

is on the wrong side of the controversy); State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18

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S.W.3d 186 (Tenn. 2000) (holding the essential element to be that a justiciable controversy

exists)) (emphasis added).

The above principles were applied in Wade, an action in which the Cannon County

School Board filed a Declaratory Judgment action seeking to avoid binding arbitration with

Goldy Wade, a non-tenured teacher, as it pertained to the School Board’s decision to not

extend Ms. Wade’s contract of employment beyond its one-year term. Id. at 726. At issue

were the parties’ respective rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Ms. Wade and

the Cannon County Education Association responded to the complaint by filing a Tennessee

Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial

court dismissed the complaint stating “there was no state of facts the School Board could

prove that would warrant relief.” Id. On appeal, we noted that Rule 12.02(6) motions are

rarely appropriate in declaratory judgment actions and reversed the trial court, reinstated the

complaint for declaratory judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.

It is also significant that the trial court dismissed the complaint for a declaratory

judgment in Wade upon a finding that “the parties had entered into a binding [collective

bargaining] agreement to submit such grievances to arbitration.” Id. That finding, however,

was undermined because the trial court dismissed the complaint instead of declaring the

parties’ rights as the school board had requested. As for the ruling in Wade, we acknowledge

the case was not in the proper posture for the trial court to make such a summary ruling

concerning the parties’ respective rights when the motion to dismiss came on for hearing.

However, had the court denied the motion to dismiss, the parties could have filed motions

for summary judgment, thereby putting the case in the proper posture for a declaration of the

parties’ respective rights as it pertained to the collective bargaining agreement and Ms.

Wade’s employment. As we explained in our remand instructions:

If the trial court, in its discretion, determines that this is an appropriate case for

summary judgment, then it should determine whether and under what

conditions the School Board would be required to submit its decision not to

renew Mr. Wade’s contract to binding arbitration under the collective

bargaining agreement.

Id. at 731.

The foregoing notwithstanding, there are circumstances where a Rule 12.02(6)

dismissal of a declaratory action is appropriate, for example, when the complaint fails to

establish that a justiciable controversy exists. If that is the case, dismissal is appropriate. If

not, the trial court should delve into the merits of the declaratory judgment action and

determine whether it is or is not more appropriate to issue a declaratory judgment on the

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controverted issue, even if the declaration of rights is adverse to the plaintiff, for the end

result is that a controversy is put to rest.

III.

P ETITIONER’S C OMPLAINT FOR A D ECLARATORY J UDGMENT

As Petitioner states in his complaint for declaratory judgment, he seeks to determine

whether he may “lawfully purchase firearms and possess them in his home and to engage in

otherwise lawful hunting activity” in Tennessee.8 Petitioner insists this action is necessary

to remove the uncertainty of whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) may

apply to him because, if it does, he would be committing a felony if he purchased or

possessed a firearm in Tennessee. The factual basis upon which he asserts the statute does

not apply to him is because he received a full pardon from the State of Georgia with the

“Restoration of the Right to Bear Arms” expressly stated in bold letters on the pardon.9 He

insists that Tennessee may not apply Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B)

against him based upon certain constitutional rights, specifically the full faith and credit

clause of the United States Constitution, the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution; the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause of the

United States Constitution, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution.

It is readily apparent from our review of two comprehensive memorandum opinions

rendered by the chancery court that the chancellor concluded that Petitioner had alleged

sufficient facts to demonstrate that an actual controversy concerning the application of

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) to Petitioner exists, and we agree with this

determination. Although not declared by the trial court, the obvious inference from the

chancellor’s rulings is that Petitioner may not lawfully purchase or possess a firearm in

Tennessee. A thorough examination of the chancellor’s analysis makes it clear the court

determined that Petitioner would not be the prevailing party. Nevertheless, as was the case

in Wade, we are hampered by the fact that Petitioner’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment

was dismissed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a

8

Petitioner states in his brief that he only seeks the collective rights of “purchasing and possessing

firearms” and that nothing in his petition addresses “the separate issue of ‘wearing’ of arms as in the case

of carrying a concealed pistol, for example. That is the issue in this appeal. Mr. Blackwell seeks only the

rights to lawfully purchase firearms and possess them in his home and to engage in otherwise lawful hunting

activity. . . .”

9

Petitioner also noted that he received certification from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that his

right to purchase and own a firearm was not obstructed by federal law. This is because under federal law,

a pardoned felon is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), if his civil rights have been restored under federal

law. See Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994).

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claim upon which relief can be granted without an expressed declaration of the parties’

respective rights. See Wade, 178 S.W.3d at 730; see also Frazier, 1 S.W.2d at 786 (stating

“the better practice in a [declaratory judgment action] is to enter a decree, sometimes referred

to as a ‘declaration,’ defining the rights of the parties under the issues made, even though

such decree is adverse to the contentions of the bill.”).

In order to preserve judicial resources, our preference would be to rule on the issues

presented as the Supreme Court did in Lindsey, 285 S. W. 705, and Buckner, 300 S.W. 565.

If we decided the issues without remand, our decision would not infringe upon the rights of

any party provided we affirmed the trial court in all respects. If, however, we were to

disagree with the trial court, in whole or in part, concerning any of the constitutional grounds

and rule in favor of Petitioner, the State would have every reason to complain. This is

because the State has not filed an Answer to the Complaint, a fact that is acknowledged by

Petitioner in his reply brief.10 Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that additional

facts may need to be considered if the case is to be decided on the merits. Even though it is

unlikely that the filing of an Answer or the introduction of additional facts will be of

consequence, we feel compelled to afford the State the opportunity to file an Answer to the

Complaint, and both parties the opportunity to present additional facts, if they so choose.

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of the State’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure

12.02(6) motion to dismiss, reinstate the Complaint, and remand this action to the trial court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I N C ONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this matter is

remanded with costs of appeal assessed against the defendants.

______________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE

10

In the appellant’s brief, Petitioner asked this Court to reverse and remand “with directions to grant

the Petition for Declaratory Relief.” However, in Petitioner’s Reply Brief, he stated: “With the pun only

partially intended, Petitioner believes he has ‘jumped the gun.’ Given that the State had filed a Motion to

Dismiss and not an Answer the requested remedy should, instead, be that this Court reverse the Chancellor’s

Order dismissing the case on the merits and remand for further proceedings.”

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