Dalbis v. Pubic Employees of Security and Intelligence Services of France and Europe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LOUIS-ALEXANDRE NOEL ALBERT

DALBIS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 24-cv-1434 (JMC)

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OF SECURITY AND

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF FRANCE

AND EUROPE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Louis-Alexandre Noel Albert Dalbis filed a civil complaint against various

Defendants, including the National Gendarmerie (of France), a group of unnamed “[p]ublic

employees of security and intelligence services” of Europe and France, and an individual named

Laurant Mauve-Cecile. ECF 1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the

complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires civil complaints to include “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It does not demand

“detailed factual allegations,” but it does require enough factual information “to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

These procedural requirements promote fairness in litigation—Rule 8(a) is intended to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are held to less

stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v.

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Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But even pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

Dalbis’s complaint does not satisfy these requirements. The complaint invokes the Torture

Victim Protection Act of 1991 and seeks five billion dollars in damages for “the same crime from

approximately 1996 to 2024.” ECF 1 at 3–4. The alleged “crime” at issue involves “multiple

attempts [on] [Dalbis’s] life” between 1996 and 2005, Dalbis being “approached by a female

person” who “used [intelligence] techniques” on him between 2005 and 2009, and “advanced

psychological manipulation . . . with the potential use of chemical products” between 2009 and

2024. ECF 1 at 7. Yet there are no well-pled factual allegations that describe this multi-decade

streak of unlawful conduct with any degree of detail capable of providing “fair notice” to

Defendants as to the basis of this action. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And although the Court

has also reviewed Dablis’s 148 pages of additional “documents in support of the complaint,” the

allegations therein offer little more than a series of confusing narratives describing, for example,

“a drug dealer . . . want[ing] to sell or give drugs to children” around 1996 or “the use of a female

person” to effect “Phagocytosis” upon Dalbis several years later. ECF 12 at 3, 12, 122. That is to

say, even construing the complaint and accompanying documents liberally, the Court is unable to

identify what cognizable harm Dalbis has suffered, who caused him that harm, and how the law

entitles him to any relief.

Dalbis’s complaint is therefore dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). The

Court acknowledges that dismissing a case sua sponte is an unusual step, but the Court has the

authority to do so when plaintiffs fail to comply with procedural rules. See, e.g., Brown v. WMATA,

164 F. Supp. 3d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing a complaint sua sponte for failing to comply

with Rule 8(a)); Hamrick v. United States, No. 10-cv-857, 2010 WL 3324721, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug.

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24, 2010) (same); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding no

abuse of discretion where a district court dismissed a claim without prejudice for failure to comply

with Rule 8(a)).

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to refile within 30 days (i.e., by August 8, 2024) an

amended complaint that cures the existing deficiencies. If he does not file an amended complaint

within that timeframe, files an amended complaint that recycles the present complaint, or otherwise

fails to comply with Rule 8, this action may be dismissed with prejudice. Brown, 164 F. Supp. 3d

at 35. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________

JIA M. COBB

United States District Judge

Date: July 9, 2024

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