The opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
DEREX BROOKS, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, CH-1221-18-0596-W-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: July 3, 2024
AFFAIRS,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Jonay McCall , St. Louis, Missouri, for the appellant.
Beth K. Donovan , St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Member*
*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that the appellant
established that he exhausted his administrative remedies before the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC) and nonfrivolously alleged that he made a protected
disclosure but failed to nonfrivolously allege that his protected disclosure was a
contributing factor in his removal, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
Effective February 13, 2018, the agency removed the appellant from his
Housekeeping Aid position within its Environmental Management Service (EMS)
in St. Louis, Missouri, for failing to abide by the terms of a last chance agreement
(LCA). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 17, 22-23. In the decision letter, the
agency advised the appellant that he was entitled to appeal the removal to the
Board, seek corrective action before OSC, or file a discrimination complaint. Id.
at 23. It also informed him that if his appeal included an allegation of
whistleblowing retaliation, he may elect to file an appeal with the Board or OSC
and that his election would be based on which appeal he filed first. Id.
At some point prior to July 27, 2018, the appellant filed a complaint with
OSC alleging that his removal was taken as a result of his protected
whistleblowing activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 11 at 5. On August 21, 2018, OSC
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issued the appellant a close-out letter with appeal rights to the Board. IAF, Tab 1
at 3. This appeal followed.
The administrative judge issued an order apprising the appellant of the
applicable law and his burden of proof to establish jurisdiction over his claim and
directing him to provide evidence and argument amounting to a nonfrivolous
allegation of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant did not respond.
Thereafter, the agency submitted its response to the appeal, arguing that the
appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 7. After the close
of the record below, the appellant submitted a response to the agency’s pleading
in which he provided a portion of his OSC complaint. IAF, Tab 11. Without
holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 12, Initial
Decision (ID) at 2. She found that the appellant failed to show that he exhausted
his administrative remedies before OSC because he did not prove that he gave
OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation that might lead to corrective
action. ID at 5-6. She further found that the appellant failed to provide sufficient
details to nonfrivolously allege that he made a protected disclosure. ID at 6-9. In
so finding, she considered the appellant’s late-filed submission. ID at 7 n.2.
The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
File, Tab 1. 2 The agency has filed a response in opposition. PFR File, Tab 3.
2
On January 15, 2020, the appellant filed a pleading with the Board seeking to
withdraw his petition for review. PFR File, Tab 7. Thereafter, on January 22, 2020,
and February 21, 2020, the Office of the Clerk of the Board issued orders requiring the
appellant to confirm his intent to withdraw the petition for review and his understanding
that any withdrawal is with prejudice to refiling with the Board. PFR File, Tabs 8-9.
Because the appellant failed to respond, the Office of the Clerk of the Board informed
him that it would take no further action regarding the withdrawal request and the Board
would issue a decision on his petition for review upon restoration of a quorum. PFR
File, Tab 10. The appellant has taken no further action to effect the withdrawal of his
petition, and thus, we address the merits of the petition for review.
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DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW 3
To establish jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, an appellant generally must
show by preponderant evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies
before OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) he made a disclosure
described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity
described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the
disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016),
overruled on other grounds by Requena v. Department of Homeland Security ,
2022 MSPB 39. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found that
in the context of an IRA appeal, a nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its
face.” Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2020). Once an appellant establishes jurisdiction over his IRA appeal,
he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim, which he must prove by
preponderant evidence. Rebstock Consolidation v. Department of Homeland
Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 9 (2015). For the reasons discussed below, we find
that the appellant has shown that he exhausted his administrative remedies before
OSC but failed to nonfrivolously allege that his alleged protected disclosure was
a contributing factor in his removal.
The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to seek corrective
action from OSC before seeking corrective action from the Board. Mason v.
Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011). The Board may
only consider those disclosures of information and personnel actions that the
appellant raised before OSC. Id. To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the
3
We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
and conclude that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
5
appellant must provide to OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation that
might lead to corrective action. Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,
2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10.
Here, the appellant submitted a portion of his OSC complaint in which he
stated that he believed the EMS department removed him in retaliation for
reporting his supervisor for physically assaulting him. IAF, Tab 11 at 5.
Specifically, he claimed that he reported the assault to the agency police and
provided them a report on the same day that the alleged assault occurred,
October 19, 2017. Id. He also claimed that the altercation with his supervisor
that day formed the grounds on which the agency first proposed his removal and
which resulted in the LCA. Id. at 6, 11-12. Under these circumstances, we find
that the appellant provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation
that might lead to corrective action regarding his removal. See Chambers,
2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 9; see also Swanson v. General Services Administration ,
110 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 8 (2008) (finding that an appellant satisfied the exhaustion
requirement when he informed OSC of the content of his disclosure, the
individual to whom it was made, the nature of the personnel actions allegedly
taken in retaliation, and the individuals responsible for taking those actions).
Accordingly, we find that the appellant demonstrated that he exhausted his
administrative remedies before OSC concerning his removal. See id.
The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made a protected disclosure under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Protected whistleblowing occurs when an appellant makes a disclosure that
he reasonably believes evidences a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health and safety. Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 17.
The proper test for determining whether an employee had a reasonable belief that
his disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge
of the essential facts known to, and readily ascertainable by, the employee could
6
reasonably conclude that the actions evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
regulation, or one of the other conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id.
The appellant alleged that his supervisor physically assaulted him on
October 19, 2017. IAF, Tab 11 at 5. As a result of the alleged assault, the
appellant claimed that he filed a report with the agency police on the same day.
Id. He further claimed that he went to the emergency room as a result of his
injuries from the assault. Id. The Board has held that an assault is a violation of
criminal law, and a disclosure that an assault occurred is a disclosure of a
violation of law, rule, or regulation. Lewis v. Department of Commerce,
101 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 11 (2005). Under these circumstances, we find that the
appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made a protected disclosure under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) when he reported the alleged assault by his supervisor to
the agency police on October 19, 2017. See id. (explaining that there is no de
minimis exception for the violation-of-law aspect of the protected disclosure
standard).
The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the agency subjected him to a personnel
action.
Here, the appellant claimed that the agency removed him in retaliation for
his whistleblowing activity. IAF, Tab 11 at 5. It is undisputed that the agency
removed the appellant, effective February 13, 2018. IAF, Tab 1 at 17.
Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the agency
subjected him to a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). See Cochran
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 67 M.S.P.R. 167, 174 (1995) (finding that a
removal action is a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)).
The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his protected activity was a
contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action against
him.
To satisfy the contributing factor criterion, an appellant need only raise a
nonfrivolous allegation that the fact or content of the protected disclosure or the
7
protected activity was one factor that tended to affect the personnel action in any
way. See Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 13-14
(2016). One way to establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under
which an employee may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a
contributing factor in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as
evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or
activity and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a
contributing factor in the personnel action. See id. An appellant also may meet
his jurisdictional burden by making a nonfrivolous allegation of other evidence,
such as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for
taking the personnel action, whether the protected disclosure or activity was
personally directed at the acting officials, and whether those individuals had a
motive to retaliate against the appellant. See Alarid v. Department of the Army,
122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 13 n.6 (2015); Rumsey v. Department of Justice,
120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 26 (2013).
Here, although the appellant claimed that the agency removed him in
retaliation for his whistleblowing activity, he did not allege that anyone involved
in the decision to remove him had actual or constructive knowledge of that
activity. IAF, Tab 11 at 5. Specifically, he did not allege that either the
proposing or deciding officials had knowledge of his disclosure to the agency
police on October 19, 2017, or that any other agency official was involved in the
decision to remove him. Thus, the appellant’s allegations do not satisfy the
knowledge/timing test. Nor did the appellant make nonfrivolous allegations that
would otherwise establish that his disclosure was a contributing factor in his
removal. Notably, he alleged that the substance of his disclosure to the agency
police pertained only to the October 19, 2017 altercation with his supervisor, and
he did not allege any wrongdoing by either the proposing or deciding official. Id.
at 5-6. Moreover, while the appellant claimed that the supervisor who allegedly
8
assaulted him had a motive to retaliate against him given his disclosure to the
agency police, he did not allege that either the proposing or deciding official had
a motive to retaliate against him. While the appellant generally challenges the
merits of his removal, we find that he failed to nonfrivolously allege that his
protected disclosure was a contributing factor in that action.
The appellant’s arguments on review provide no basis to disturb the
administrative judge’s ultimate conclusion that the Board lacks jurisdiction over
his IRA appeal.
In his brief petition for review, the appellant claims to possess new
evidence of defamation and breach of contract regarding the LCA. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 1. These arguments, however, relate to the merits of the removal action
as opposed to his claims of whistleblower retaliation. Because the administrative
judge properly found that the appellant knowingly elected to pursue a complaint
with OSC in lieu of a direct appeal to the Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701, the
Board lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of his removal pursuant to the LCA.
ID at 2 n.1; see Brooks v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. CH-
0714-18-0598-I-1, Initial Decision (Oct. 16, 2018); see also Agoranos v.
Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶¶ 14-16 (2013).
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
4
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
9
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
10
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
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with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
5
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
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petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.