Baxter v. Baxter

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Dated: January 26, 2023 2 Sere

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The following is ORDERED: wo

ONY BAEZ

Janice D. Loyd

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

In re: )

)

Summer D. Baxter, ) Case No. 22-10877-JDL

) Ch. 7

Debtor. )

)

Dustin Baxter, )

)

Plaintiff, )

V. ) Adv. No. 22-1045-JDL

)

Summer D. Baxter, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SUA SPONTE

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Introduction

This is an adversary proceeding brought by the Debtor’s former husband, Dustin

Baxter (“Father”), seeking to determine that a state court judgment awarding him $13,750

in attorney fees in a post divorce decree child custody proceeding is a non-dischargeable

“domestic support obligation” within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and/or non-

dischargeable as being “in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or

other order of a court of record” under § 523(a)(15).1 Contrary to well-established, black-

letter law, Debtor Summer D. Baxter (either “Debtor” or “Mother”) filed a Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint asserting that “the judgment against (her) was not a domestic support

obligation and is not an order arising from a divorce decree.” [Adv. Doc.10, ¶ 11]. On

January 6, 2023, the Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Notice of

Intention to Grant Sua Sponte Summary Judgment (the “Order”) [Adv. Doc. 12]. Finding

that the Debtor’s assertion that the State Divorce Court Judgment was a dischargeable

debt under either § 523(a)(4) or (15) was, as a matter of law, not supportable, the Court

granted the Debtor fourteen days from the date of its Order to present any legal authority,

pertinent material, evidence or argument which she believed precluded the entry of

summary judgment against her. The Debtor has made no submissions to the Court in

response to the Court’s affording her the opportunity to oppose the notice that it intended

to enter summary judgment sua sponte.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054 and 9014, the below constitute the Court’s

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.2

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), and

157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the Western

1 All further references to “Code”, “Section”, and “§” are to the United States Bankruptcy

Code, Title 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., unless otherwise indicated.

2 All future references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

or to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings, unless

otherwise indicated.

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an objection to the dischargeability of a particular debt is a core proceeding under 28

U.S.C.§ 157(a)(2)(I).3 Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

III. Facts

1. Father and Debtor/Mother were husband and wife and are the parents of one

minor child born in 2008. They were divorced by a Decree of Dissolution entered on May

23, 2012, in the case styled, In re The Marriage Dustin Baxter, Petitioner, v. Summer

Baxter, Respondent, Case No. FD-2011-1085, in the District Court of Oklahoma County,

Oklahoma (the “State Domestic Action”). [Adv. Doc. 4, ¶ 6]. Under a Joint Child Custody

Plan entered in the Domestic Action on March 7, 2013, Father and Mother were awarded

joint custody of the minor child.4

2. An eleven-year long, post-divorce decree litigation between Father and Mother

ensued.5 In matters relevant to this adversary proceeding, on March 3, 2021, after a three

3 Both parties in their pleadings have refused to consent to the entry of a final order or

judgment by the Bankruptcy Court. Such an assertion misapprehends the law of bankruptcy court

jurisdiction. “Core” proceedings are those that are either under Title 11 or arise in a bankruptcy

case. As stated by the Supreme Court in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, 573

U.S. 25, 34, 134 S.Ct. 2165 (2014): “Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers the

bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim, subject to appellate review by the District

Court.” The Plaintiff’s claim for determination of non-dischargeability is indisputably core. §

157(b)(2)(I). With rare exceptions not applicable here, consent of the parties is only required in

non-core matters.

4 The Court is entitled to take judicial notice of the docket sheets of other state or federal

courts. United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2007); Hutchinson v. Hahn,

402 Fed. Appx. 391, 394-95 (10th Cir. 2010); Shoulders v. Dinwiddie, 2006 WL 2792671, at *3

(W.D. Okla. 2006) (court may take judicial notice of state court records available on the world-wide

web, including docket sheets in district courts). “[F]acts subject to judicial notice may be considered

in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment. This allows the court to take judicial notice of its own files and records, as well

facts which are a matter of public record.” Stroble v. Rusch, 431 F.Supp.3d 1315, 1324 (D. N.M.

2020); Wildearth Guardians v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 690 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1263 (D. Colo.

2010); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n. 24 (10th Cir. 2006).

5 The Docket Sheet in the State Court Domestic Action consists of 42 pages.

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sought to modify the custody of the minor child by designating Father as the primary

custodial parent with final decision-making authority, granting him primary physical custody

of the child and finding Mother guilty on six counts of contempt relative to child custody.6

3. On April 22, 2021, the State Court entered its Order of Modification,

memorializing and expanding its findings under the March 3, 2021, Court Minute,

approving an Amended Joint Custody Plan and Child Support Computation under which

Father was awarded primary physical custody of the minor child and granting him final

decision-making authority as to the child’s care. [Adv. Doc. 4-1, Ex. A]. In the Order of

Modification, the State Court found Mother to be guilty of six counts of civil contempt,

namely; Count II - unilaterally changing the minor child’s school without conferring with

Father in violation of the Joint Custody Plan; Count III - unilaterally changing the minor

child’s counselor on multiple occasions without conferring with Father in violation of the

Joint Custody Plan; Count V - repeatedly making disparaging remarks concerning Father

to the minor child in violation of the Joint Custody Plan; Count VI - repeatedly discussing

the pending litigation with the minor child in violation of the Joint Custody Plan; Count VII -

repeatedly failing to inform Father when the minor child was receiving medical care in

violation of the Joint Custody Plan, and Count IX - unilaterally terminating the court-ordered

counseling. The issue of attorney fees and litigation costs was reserved for consideration

by the Court upon proper application.

4. On May 21, 2021, Father filed his Petitioner’s Application for Attorney Fees and

Costs seeking a total of $37,252.60 for attorney fees, litigation costs, guardian ad litem

6 Court Minute dated March 3, 2021.

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5. By Journal Entry of February 11, 2022, entered by the State Court on March 10,

2022, Father’s Application for Attorney Fees and Costs was sustained, in part, with the

Court awarding him judgment against Debtor in the sum of $13,700 in fees and costs.

Debtor was ordered to satisfy the judgment obligation by making monthly payments of

$380.55, beginning April 13, 2022 and continuing on the 13th day of each month thereafter

until paid in full. [Adv. Doc. 4-2].

6. On April 29, 2022, Debtor filed a Voluntary Petition for relief under Chapter 7 of

the United States Bankruptcy Code. On August 18, 2022, Father filed his Amended

Complaint seeking to determine that the State Court award for attorney fees and costs was

non-dischargeable as a debt incurred for a “domestic support obligation” under § 523(a)(5)

and/or a debt “incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in

connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of

record”’ under § 523(a)(15).

IV. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and

draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See

McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998). The non-movant

is given "wide berth to prove a factual controversy exists." Jeffries v. Kansas, Dep't of Soc.

& Rehab. Servs., 147 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998). However, the non-moving "party

must identify sufficient evidence that would require submission of the case to a jury."

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It is not enough that the non-movant's evidence be "merely colorable" or anything short of

"significantly probative." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50,

106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)). The non-moving party may not rest upon its pleadings, but its

response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265

(1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To accomplish this, the fact must be identified by

reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein. Adler

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998).

In order to establish that a debt for attorney fees and costs is “in the nature of

alimony, maintenance or support” of a debtor's child, a plaintiff must establish that the

attorney fees and costs were awarded to a parent of the debtor's child in a court order and

that such fees were incurred solely in connection with a child custody and/or child support

action. The undisputed facts in this case establish that the Oklahoma County District Court

ordered Mother to pay $13,700 to Father to reimburse him for attorney fees and costs, and

that the Judgment relates to fees and costs incurred by Father in the child custody and

support litigation between the parties. As shown by the facts and law discussed above, the

Court believes that the undisputed record establishes that the attorney fees awarded to

Father related to child custody and are non-dischargeable.

V. After Notice the Court Can Sua Sponte Enter

Summary Judgment to a Non-Moving Party

Neither party has filed a motion for summary judgment, but that does not preclude

the Court from granting summary judgment sua sponte in favor of a non-moving party.

Rule 56(f)(1) and (3) provide that after giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the

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its own upon finding that the material facts are not genuinely in dispute. Rule 56(f),

enacted in 2010, codifies a court’s long-standing authority that, under the right

circumstances, district courts are entitled to enter summary judgment sua sponte. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Our conclusion is bolstered

by the fact that district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter

summary judgment sua sponte, so long as a losing party was on notice that she had to

come forward with all her evidence.”); Sports Racing Services, Inc. v. Sports Car Club of

America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 892 (10th Cir. 1997) (The court “may grant summary judgment

sua sponte ‘so long as a losing party was on notice that it had to come forward with all of

its evidence.’”). “Rule 56(f) exists largely for the convenience of the court, to save it from

proceeding with trials that it can readily see are unnecessary.” National Exchange Bank

& Trust v. Petro-Chemical Systems, Inc., 2013 WL 1858621, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. 2013).

From the record presented to the Court at the time Debtor filed her Motion to

Dismiss, it appeared that as a matter of law there was no triable issue of fact, and Father

was entitled to have the attorney fees award determined non-dischargeable.

Notwithstanding the Court’s inclination to grant summary judgment at that time, it was only

appropriate that “the party against whom summary judgment is entered must have notice

that the court is considering dropping the ax on him before it actually falls.” California v.

Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP, 2013 WL 314825, at *22 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting

Goldstein v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. 86 F.3d 749, 750 (7th Cir.

1996)). Accordingly, the Court gave Debtor notice that it was considering entering

summary judgment sua sponte, and afforded her fourteen days notice to file any

documents or arguments in opposition. [Adv. Doc. 12]. That time expired on January 20,

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judgment should not be entered.

Father’s Amended Complaint alleges that after a three-day trial in the State

Domestic Action (as confirmed by a review of the State Domestic Action docket sheet), an

Order of Modification awarded him primary physical custody of the minor child, ordered

Mother to pay child support in accordance with Oklahoma law, and found Mother guilty on

six (6) counts of indirect civil contempt for violation of the Court’s previous child

support/custody orders. The Order of Modification is attached to the Amended Complaint.

[Adv. Doc. 4-1]. The Amended Complaint further alleges that the State Court granted

Father’s application for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $13,700. The Journal

Entry for the attorney fee award is attached as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint. [Adv.

Doc. 4-2].

Father alleges that the attorney fees awarded to him constitute both a non-

dischargeable debt under § 523(a)(5) as a debt for a “domestic support obligation” and/or

under § 523(a)(15) as a debt to a “spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not

of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of the

divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or

other order of a court of record....” Accepting the Father’s allegations as true, as they

indisputably are, was not only sufficient to withstand Mother’s Motion to Dismiss, but, as

discussed below, are sufficient to grant Father summary judgment on the issue of non-

dischargeability.

VI. Conversion of Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss to a Motion

For Summary Judgment Is Not Required.

Generally, when documents not attached to the complaint are submitted in regard

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judgment. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10 Cir.

1997). Conversion to a summary judgment motion is not required, however, when the

district court considers (1) documents the complaint incorporates by reference; (2)

documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the plaintiff's claim and whose

authenticity is not challenged; and (3) “matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”

Hartleib v. Weiser Law Firm, P.C., 861 Fed.Appx. 714, 719 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gee

v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because a court may consider facts subject to judicial notice without treating a motion to

dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider documents reflecting

facts that “are a matter of public record” as long as it considers those documents “to show

their contents, not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.” Tal v. Hogan, 453

F.3d 1244, 1264 n. 24 (10th Cir. 2006). This includes another court's publicly filed records

“concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.” United

States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2007); Strobel v. Rusch, 431 F.Supp.

3d 1315, 1324 (D. N.M. 2020) (“[W]hile ordinarily, a motion to dismiss must be converted

to motion for summary judgment when the court considers matters outside the complaint,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), matters that are judicially noticeable do not have that effect....”).

In the present case, the Court has before it exhibits attached to the Amended

Complaint and matters filed in the State Domestic Action which are entitled to judicial

notice. That is all the evidence necessary not only to render a decision on Mother’s Motion

to Dismiss but also to make by way of summary judgment the ultimate determination that

as a matter of law the debt owed by Debtor to Father is non-dischargeable.

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Non-Dischargeable Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

The issues before the Court are (1) whether the obligation to Father constitutes a

“domestic support obligation” under § 523(a)(5), as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. §

101(14)(A) and (2) if not a “domestic support obligation,” is it an obligation nevertheless

non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

The term “domestic support obligation” was added to the Bankruptcy Code by

BAPCPA. Section 101(14)(A) defines, in pertinent part, a “domestic support obligation” as

follows:

The term “domestic support obligation” means a debt that is...

(A) owed to or recoverable by –

(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the

debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian,

or responsible relative;

****

(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support

(including assistance provided by a governmental unit)

of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or

such child’s parent, without regard to whether such debt

is expressly so designated;

****

Whether a court-ordered obligation to pay attorney fees incurred in connection with

a custody dispute falls within the parameters of § 523(a)(5) is an issue of federal law.

Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Jones

(In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1993); Brasher v. Turner (In re Turner), 266 B.R.

491, 496-97 (10th Cir. 2001); Sylvester v. Sylvester (In re Sylvester), 865 F.2d 1164, 1166

(10th Cir. 1989); Will v. Miller and Saxton, P.C. (In re Will) 116 B.R. 254, 256 (D. Colo.

1990).

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observed, federal courts have broadened the meaning of “support” to include virtually any

service performed in connection with child support or custody litigation that enures to the

benefit of a child. In re Peters, 133 B.R. 291, 295 (S.D. N.Y. 1991), aff’d 964 F.2d 166 (2nd

Cir. 1992). In Peters the court gave the following rationale for this view:

The reason for such a policy is clear. In any matrimonial

action, whether it concerns the divorce, maintenance, support,

custody, or post-decree proceedings implicating any of the

foregoing, it is essential that each party be able to adequately

represent its interests; accordingly, attorneys' fees owed to

spouses are deemed to be in the nature of support.

Id., at 295.

For this reason, the vast majority of courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have held

that an award of attorney fees is so inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the

welfare of a child, such as custody or child support litigation, to be deemed “support” within

the meaning of § 523(a)(5). Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), Supra.; Holtz v. Poe (In Re Poe),

118 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.1990); Rogers v. Morin, 189 Fed.Appx. 299, 302 (5th

Cir. 2006); In re Rackley, 502 B.R. 615, 626 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).

In Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth

Circuit held that court ordered attorney fees arising from post-divorce custody actions are

deemed in the nature of support as being incurred on behalf of the child, absent unusual

circumstances. The Court stated as follows:

“We hold that the term `support’ as used in § 523(a)(5) is

entitled to a broad application. Cf. Yeates, 807 F.2d at 878

(debt could be considered in `nature of support’ under federal

bankruptcy law, even though it would not qualify as support

under state law). Generally, custody actions are directed

towards determining which party can provide the best home for

the child and are, therefore, held for the child’s benefit and

support. Therefore, in order that genuine support obligations

are not improperly discharged, we hold that the term ‘support’

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attorney’s fees arising from post-divorce custody actions are

deemed in the nature of support under § 523(a)(5) as being

incurred on behalf of the child. This debt is non-dischargeable”.

(Emphasis added).

In determining whether court-ordered attorney fees in conjunction with a custody

matter are dischargeable, the Bankruptcy Court is not to re-examine or go behind the

judgment as would be the case of alimony or other support. In In re Turner, 266 B.R. 491,

497 (10th Cir. 2001) the Court stated as follows:

“Although Sampson states the general rule with regard to

obligations arising out of divorce action, the Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals has narrowed the creditor’s burden when the

obligations are directly linked to custody proceedings. For

example, in Jones v. Jones (In re Jones) [citation omitted], the

court concluded that professional fees awarded by a court in

conjunction with litigation of child custody were `in the nature

of support’ and therefore excepted from discharge under §

523(a)(5). The presumption under Jones is that attorneys’ fees

incurred and awarded in custody matters are by their nature

related to the best interest of the child and are therefore in the

`nature of support’ under § 523(a)(5).” (Emphasis added).

Likewise, in Lowther v. Lowther (In re Lowther), 266 B.R. 753 (10th Cir. BAP 2001),

the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel found that the 10th Circuit decision in Jones, Supra., did

not allow the court to go behind the attorney’s fee or engage in nuances in determining

whether the award was “support” non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5). It stated:

“The Court in Jones specifically rejected looking to the purpose

of the dispute in determining whether a debt was in the nature

of support. We adhere to this directive in holding that Jones

does not permit the Court to look to the court’s purpose in

ordering the Debtor to pay Lowther’s attorney’s fees incurred

in the custody action. Although there is some indication that

the Court was troubled by debtor’s litigiousness or obstructive

behavior, Jones instructs us not to look behind the award to

determine its nature and purpose. While this factor is relevant

in determining whether a debt to a spouse is support, it is not

relevant to a determination of whether a debt is support in the

context of a custody dispute.”

“All these attorney fees were incurred in litigation over child

custody, and there is no indication of any such extraordinary

circumstances as might take the matter out of the general rule

mentioned above; therefore, all these attorney’s fees take on

the same character of child-custody litigation in which they

were incurred.”

In the present case, the April 22, 2021, Order for Modification granting Father

primary custody of the minor child and finding Mother in contempt also invited Father to

make proper application for attorney fees. Father made such application, and by the

Journal Entry of February 11, 2022, entered by the Court on March 10, 2022, the Court

awarded him $13,700 in fees and costs. To state the obvious, there is no doubt that the

attorney fees are “child support related”. As a matter of law, the award of attorney fees

which Father incurred in the custody proceedings is presumptively regarded as being in the

nature of “support” non-dischargeable. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), Supra.

VIII. Assuming, Arguendo, the Judgment for Attorney Fees

Was Dischargeable Under § 523(a)(5), They Would

Be Non-dischargeable Under § 523(a)(15).

For the reasons stated above, there is no doubt that the attorney fees award was

clearly related to child custody issues and constitutes a non-dischargeable “domestic

support obligation.” The Court should not need to even seriously address whether the fees

are also non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(15); however, since Mother raised the issue in

her Motion to Dismiss, the Court will briefly address it. That section, in pertinent part,

renders non-dischargeable an obligation:

...to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of

the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the

debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection

with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of

a court of record....

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follows:

“Section 215(3) [of the 2005 Act] amends § 523(a)(15) to

provide that obligations to a spouse, former spouse, or a child

of the debtor (not otherwise described in § 523(a)(5)) incurred

in connection with a divorce or separation or related action are

non-dischargeable irrespective of the debtor’s inability to pay

such debts.” (Emphasis added).

House Report No. 109-31, Pt. 1, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (2005).

Thus, even were the award of attorney fees not a domestic support obligation (which

it clearly is), the Mother’s obligation to pay Father’s attorney fees would fall squarely within

the scope of subsection (15) “as an obligation... incurred in connection with a divorce or

separation or other order of a court of record.”

IX. The “Fresh Start” Afforded Debtors Does Not Apply to

Domestic Support Obligations.

Although § 523(a) dischargeability actions are generally construed strictly in favor

of debtors, in order to promote the congressional policies favoring the enforcement of

spousal and child support obligations, proof in § 523(a)(5) actions is strictly construed in

favor of former spouses and children. Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1489

(10th Cir. 1995) (citing Sampson, 997 F.2d at 722) (“The policy underlying § 523(a)(5),

however, favors enforcement of familial support obligations over a ‘fresh start’ for the

debtor.”); In re Hanjora, 276 B.R. 822, 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (stating that §

523(a)(5), “implements the general bankruptcy policy of favoring domestic support

obligations over the debtor’s need for a fresh start”); In re Rouse, 212 B.R. 885, 887

(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997) (noting that although exceptions to discharge are usually

narrowly construed against creditors, § 523(a)(5) is an exception). While Mother in her

Motion to Dismiss argued that she was entitled to a “fresh start” free from the financial

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That Mother has raised the issue of a “fresh start”does not create a factual issue that

precludes summary judgment.

X. Conclusion

As stated above, in order to establish that a debt for attorney fees and costs is “in

the nature of alimony, maintenance or support” of a debtor's child, a plaintiff must establish

that the attorney fees and costs were awarded to a parent of the debtor's child in a court

order and that such fees were incurred solely in connection with a child custody and/or

child support action. The undisputed facts in this case establish that the Oklahoma County

District Court ordered Mother to pay $13,700 to Father to reimburse him for attorney fees

and costs, and that the Judgment relates to fees and costs incurred by Father in the child

custody and support litigation between the parties. As shown by the facts and law

discussed above, the Court finds that the undisputed record establishes that the attorney

fees and costs awarded to Father related to child custody and are non-dischargeable.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of the

Plaintiff Dustin Baxter and against Debtor Summer Baxter determining attorney fees and

costs in the amount of $13,700 awarded him by the District Court of Oklahoma County in

the above referenced litigation are determined to be non-dischargeable. Pursuant to Fed.

R. Bankr. P. 7058(a) a separate judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this

Memorandum Opinion and Order Sua Sponte Granting Summary Judgment.

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