Robert J. Ambruster, Inc.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

In re §

§ Case No. 20-44289-169

Robert J. Ambruster, Inc., §

§ Chapter 11, Subchapter V

Debtor. §

§ Re: Doc No. 250

§

§ FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER

I. BACKGROUND

Robert J. Ambruster, Inc. (the “Debtor”) commenced its bankruptcy case, docketed as case

number 20-44289-169 (the “Case”), under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the

“Bankruptcy Code” or the “Code”) on September 3, 2020 (“Petition Date”). Doc. No. 1.1 The

Debtor elected to proceed under Subchapter V of the Bankruptcy Code. Doc. No. 4 at 2.

A. The Subchapter V Trustee Fee Order

On September 4, 2020, the Office of the United States Trustee (the “UST”) appointed

Stephen D. Coffin as the Subchapter V Trustee in this Case (the “Trustee”). Doc. No. 3 at 1. The

Notice of Appointment of Subchapter V Trustee designated the Trustee’s appointment “[p]ursuant

to 11 U.S.C. § 1183(a)” of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.

On January 30, 2021, the Trustee filed his “First Interim Fee Application of Subchapter V

Trustee for Order Approving Trustee Fees as a Chapter 11 Administrative Expense” (the “Fee

Application”). Doc. No. 95. In the Fee Application, the Trustee requested that this Court approve

1References to “Doc. No. ___” in this Order are to documents entered upon this Court’s docket in

the Case. References to “D.E. __/__/__” in this Order are to text entries located and dated on this

Court’s docket. This Court uses these references to enhance the clarity of the record in proceedings

before it.

the fees and expenses he incurred while performing his duties as Trustee in the Case between

September 4, 2020 and January 30, 2021. Id. at 1-2, ¶ 4. The Fee Application sought approval of

$3,504.00 in fees for services the Trustee rendered in the Case and $39.60 in expense

reimbursement for postage used to serve the Fee Application for a total of $3,543.60. Id. The Fee

Application stated that the Trustee sought compensation for fees and reimbursement of expenses

under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, Id. at 1, ¶ 3, as well as allowance of those fees and

expenses as a Chapter 11 administrative expense in the Case. Id. at 2.

Exhibit A to the Fee Application comprised a “Time Worksheet” detailing the tasks

performed by the Trustee. Id. at 6-7. Exhibit A contained time entries broken down by service

category; each time entry included the date of the task, a description of the task, the time devoted

to the task reported in tenths of an hour increments, the hourly rate of the person performing the

task, and the charge for each task. Id. Exhibit A showed a total of 14.6 hours spent on all listed

tasks at a rate of $240.00 per hour and calculated the total charges listed as $3,504.00. Id. at 7.

The Trustee noticed the Fee Application out for hearing scheduled on March 9, 2021. Doc.

No. 96 at 1. The Certificate of Service for the hearing notice for the Fee Application shows the

Trustee served that notice on all creditors and parties in interest. Id. at 2-5.

On February 10, 2021, Deborah Drace, a self-represented party in interest (“Ms. Drace”),

filed her “Combined Objection to First Interim Fee Application of Subchapter V Trustee for Order

Approving Trustee Fees as a Chapter 11 Administrative Expense and Objection to Petition,

Schedules, Affidavits, and Plan” (the “Combined Objection”). Doc. No. 102. The Combined

Objection asserted that the UST should have appointed the Trustee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) and

appeared to object to the Trustee’s appointment on that basis. Id. at 3, ¶ 3. The Combined Objection

also asserted that 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) limited the Trustee’s fees to those allowed to a standing

trustee, capped at five percent of payments under a confirmed plan. Id. at 3, ¶ 4.

The Combined Objection also took issue with certain specified charges for tasks the

Trustee performed and listed on Exhibit A to the Fee Application. Those charges included (1) a

charge on January 26, 2021 for $768.00 for 3.2 hours of time spent attending hearings on a motion

for relief from stay and related motions filed by self-represented party Jeffrey Mize (“Mr. Mize”);2

(2) a charge on January 21, 2021 for $240.00 for one hour of time spent researching and drafting

an objection to Mr. Mize’s motion for relief from stay; (3) a charge on November 23, 2020 for

$96.00 for a four-tenths of an hour telephone call with both Ms. Drace and Mr. Mize regarding

their purported claims against the Debtor and Robert Drace, one of its insiders and Ms. Drace’s

sibling; (4) a charge on October 19, 2020 for $72.00 for a three-tenths of an hour telephone call

with the Debtor’s then-counsel regarding the reorganization plan, creditor objections, and claim

issues;3 (5) a charge on October 12, 2020 for $24.00 for a one-tenth of an hour telephone call with

the Debtor’s then-counsel regarding Ms. Drace’s appearance at the meeting of creditors; and (6)

other unspecified time entries charged for communications between the Trustee and the Debtor’s

then-counsel. Doc. No. 102 at 3-6, ¶¶ 5-9; Doc. No. 95, Exh. A at 6-7. Without specifying the

particular time entries at issue, the Combined Objection also objected to any fees associated with

the Trustee’s appearance at the meeting of creditors and objected to the Trustee’s work because he

2 The Combined Objection fails to mention that Mr. Mize is Ms. Drace’s spouse or that Mr. Mize

bases his purported standing and asserted claims in the Case in large part upon their marriage and

his role as the father of children from that marriage. See, e.g., Doc. No. 64 at 2 (alleging that Jeffrey

Mize has a protectible interest in the Case as a result of being “the lawful husband of Deborah L.

Drace-Mize,” who in turn allegedly is a shareholder of the Debtor). The docket in the Case does

not reflect any objections by Ms. Drace to any of Mr. Mize’s motions or other papers.

3 This Court subsequently granted the Debtor’s then-counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for

Debtor, Robert J. Ambruster, Inc. [Doc. No. 162] on April 2, 2021. Doc. No. 212.

had not performed tasks that Ms. Drace deemed necessary, including compelling other creditors

to speak with her, watching a video of one of the Debtor’s board meetings, and compelling the

Debtor to file tax returns. Doc. No. 102 at 6-10, ¶¶ 9-15.

This Court held a hearing on the Fee Application on March 9, 2021. Doc. Nos. 148, 149

(comprising audio recordings of the March 9, 2021 hearings). The Trustee and counsel for the UST

appeared by telephone,4 while Ms. Drace, Mr. Mize, and the Debtor’s then-counsel appeared in

person. Id. The Trustee presented his argument in support of the Fee Application at the hearing.

Id. Neither the Debtor nor the UST objected to allowance of the requested fees or the grant of an

administrative priority for those fees. Id. Ms. Drace argued in support of the Combined Objection.

Id. In addition, Mr. Mize orally objected to the Fee Application and provided argument to this

Court on the record. Id. This Court then took the Fee Application and the Combined Objection

under submission. Id.

This Court entered its “Order Granting First Interim Fee Application of Subchapter V

Trustee for Order Approving Trustee Fees as a Chapter 11 Administrative Expense” (the

“Subchapter V Trustee Fee Order”) on April 29, 2021. Doc. No. 241. The Subchapter V Trustee

Fee Order analyzed the Trustee’s appointment requirements under sections 326, 328, 329, and 330

of the Bankruptcy Code, and the then-available case law on those issues. Id. at 4-8. The Subchapter

V Trustee Fee Order then evaluated the reasonableness of the fees requested in the Fee Application

and this Court found no support for the numerous propositions within the Combined Objection or

the oral objections to the Fee Application. Id. at 8-11. This Court approved the Trustee’s fees and

4 Pursuant to the Order/s of Chief Judge Rodney W. Sippel, Chief United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Missouri regarding Courthouse Operations Due to COVID-19 Response,

this Court permitted telephonic appearances by parties to civil litigation matters at the time of the

March 9, 2021 hearing.

expenses in the total amount of $3,543.60 under section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,

allocated those fees and expenses administrative priority under section 503(b) of the Code, and

explicitly overruled the Combined Objection and oral objections to the Fee Application. Id. at 11-

12.

B. The Dismissal Order

On March 30, 2021, Wasinger Daming LC, a creditor in the Case, filed its “Motion for

Order Converting Case to Chapter 7 by Wasinger Daming, LC” (the “Creditor Motion”). Doc. No.

200. The Creditor Motion sought an order converting the Case to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for

cause under section 1112(b) of the Code. Id. at 1, 3. The Creditor Motion asserted the Debtor had

been and was operating at a loss and lacked a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. Id. at 3, ¶¶

15-16. The Creditor Motion further asserted that conversion of the Case to one under Chapter 7 of

the Bankruptcy Code and liquidation of the Debtor’s assets presented an opportunity for

“substantial, perhaps complete, recovery by the unsecured creditors.” Id. at 3, ¶ 17.

On April 2, 2021, the UST filed its “Motion to Convert Case to Chapter 7, or, In the

Alternative, to Dismiss” (the “UST Motion”). Doc. No. 209. The UST Motion sought an order

under section 1112(b) of the Code converting the Case to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for cause

or, alternatively, dismissing the Case. Id. at 1-2. The UST Motion asserted that the Debtor stood

unable to effectuate a plan of reorganization, failed to file required monthly operating reports,

continued to operate at a loss, and lacked any ability to rehabilitate. Id. at 2-9, ¶¶ 4-34. The UST

Motion further asserted that “no special circumstances” existed to show “dismissal or conversion

would be contrary to the best interests of the Debtor’s creditors.” Id. at 9-10, ¶ 35.

On April 8, 2021, Ms. Drace filed a pleading titled as “Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion

for Extension of Time/Motion for suspension” [sic] (the “Drace Motion to Dismiss”). Doc. No.

221. In part, the Drace Motion to Dismiss sought dismissal of the Case, primarily to avoid the

Case’s conversion to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 1, ¶ 1; at 5, ¶ 15. The

Drace Motion to Dismiss also sought additional time for the Debtor to “regroup” from its prior

counsel’s withdrawal in the Case. Id. at 5, ¶ 16.

On April 28, 2021, Ms. Drace filed a pleading titled as “Combined Motion for

INJUNCTIVE and Emergency Protection Order and relief to terminate Robert Drace and Danka

Brown residence and bank account access and Employment of Danka Brown and Request for

Reimbursement from the Debtor Accounts and Exhibits in Support for Evidence purpose and

Motion for Extension of Time” [sic] (the “Injunction Motion”). Doc. No. 240. On April 30, 2021,

Deborah Drace also filed a pleading entitled “Combined Emergency Request for Temporary

Restraining Order and or Protection Order and for Order to Freeze ALL Debtor Financial Accounts

Motion to Reconsider Courts Decision to Cause Order to Dismiss or Convert to Chapter 7 to allow

a Continuance for Chapter V Reorganization” [sic] (the “TRO Motion”). Doc. No. 243. Both the

Injunction Motion and the TRO Motion comprised motions by a non-debtor seeking injunctive or

other equitable relief against other non-debtors. Doc. Nos. 240, 243. The TRO Motion also

requested an order waiving any required filing fee if the Debtor filed a subsequent bankruptcy

case. Doc. No. 243 at 13.

This Court heard the Creditor Motion and the UST Motion at hearings that commenced on

April 27, 2021 and concluded on April 29, 2021. Doc. Nos. 238, 242 (comprising audio recordings

of hearings). This Court read its ruling on the Creditor Motion and the UST Motion into the record

on May 3, 2021. Doc. No. 247. On May 3, 2021, this Court memorialized the oral rulings made at

the April 27, April 29, and May 3, 2021 hearings and entered its Order Dismissing Bankruptcy

Case (the “Dismissal Order”). Doc. No. 248. The Dismissal Order memorialized the oral rulings’

denial of extensions of time and requests for injunctive or equitable relief contained in the

Injunction Motion and the TRO Motion, oral motions for reconsideration by Ms. Drace and Mr.

Mize, and the Creditor Motion. Id. at 3-4. In the Dismissal Order, this Court denied the Injunction

Motion and the TRO Motion specifically for being brought in procedurally improper formats and

denied the TRO Motion’s request for a fee waiver for being unripe. Id. at 3-4. The Dismissal Order

granted the UST Motion to the extent it requested dismissal of the Case for cause and denied the

UST Motion to the extent it requested conversion of the Case. Id. at 4. The Dismissal Order then

denied all other then-pending matters in this Case as moot. Id.

C. The Motion to Reconsider

On May 27, 2021, Ms. Drace filed a pleading entitled “Motion to Reconsider Order to

Award Trustee to collect Administrative Fees and Motion to reconsider order to Moot all Pending

Motions” [sic] (the “Motion to Reconsider”). Doc. No. 250. The Motion to Reconsider asserts that

Ms. Drace brought the pleading

pursuant to the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Rules under the Federal

Rules of Bankruptcy , Missouri Court Rule, and all rules pertaining to a Trustee in

a Subchapter V Bankruptcy, more specifically under the handbook for Subchapter

V Trustees prepared by the Department of Justice, 11 USC at 326a 326b (first part),

and federal rules for due process violations and 1983 actions [sic].

Id. at 1. The Motion to Reconsider alleges that this Court made various errors or abused its

discretion when it entered the Subchapter V Trustee Fee Order and overruled the Combined

Objection. Id. at 1-2, ¶¶ 1-2. The Motion to Reconsider proceeds to reiterate the same arguments

listed in the Combined Objection and overruled in the Dismissal Order. Id. at 1-4, ¶¶ 2-8; at 5-6.

The Motion to Reconsider also appears to challenge the denial of any remaining matters pending

as of the entry of the Dismissal Order as moot but does not present any new facts or evidence not

previously in the record. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 8. The Motion to Reconsider also attempts to reargue the

Injunction Motion and the TRO Motion, asserting that Ms. Drace’s pro se status warrants this

Court’s “broad discretion.” Id. at 4, ¶ 9. Moreover, the Motion to Reconsider appears to aver that

this Court should make an additional ruling on the Fee Application and the Combined Objection

so that Ms. Drace can appeal them. Id. at 5-6, ¶ 12

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Bankruptcy courts view motions to reconsider as motions seeking to alter or amend a

judgment governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or as motions seeking relief from a

judgment or order governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (each a “Rule”), as respectively

incorporated in bankruptcy proceedings under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023 or 9024

(each a “Bankruptcy Rule”). Sanders v. Clemco Inds., 862 F.2d 161, 168 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988);

Paulson v. United States Trustee (In re Paulson), 560 B.R. 317, 322-23 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2019). In

instances like this one where a litigant fails to identify the authority for a so-called motion to

reconsider, the litigant leaves “the characterization of the motion to the court’s somewhat

unenlightened guess.” Sanders, 862 F.2d at 168. This failure runs the risk that the litigant “may

lose the opportunity to present the merits underlying the motion to an appellate court.” Barger v.

Hayes Cty. Non-Stock Co-op (In re Barger), 219 B.R. 238, 244 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998).

A. Bankruptcy Rule 9023 and Rule 59(e)

Bankruptcy Rule 9023 and Rule 59(e) operate as procedural rules, providing a litigant

twenty-eight days to docket a motion to alter or amend a judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); FED. R.

BANKR. P. 9023. Courts view Rule 59(e)’s relief as a tool to serve the “limited function of

correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Innovative

Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir.

1998) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). A “manifest error” is the wholesale disregard,

misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent, rather than a losing party’s

disappointment. Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedrak v.

Callahan, 987 F.Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).

A litigant may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate old issues, present previously

available evidence, or present new legal theories and argument that a party failed to present before

judgment. Ryan v. Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 507 (8th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Metro. St.

Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 934 (8th Cir. 2006). As a result, a successful Rule 59(e) motion

requires the moving party to satisfy the burden of proof to show (1) evidence discovered after entry

of the court’s prior order; (2) proof that the litigant made every effort to discover the specific

evidence before the entry of the order; (3) demonstration that the specific evidence constitutes

material information and not just cumulative or impeaching information; and (4) analysis that the

court considering the evidence likely would reach a different outcome. Metro. St. Louis Sewer

Dist., 440 F.3d at 933; see also U.S. Xpress Enter. Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809,

815 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing factors a litigant must present to prevail under a motion brought

under Rule 60(b)(2), which are the same as those under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 and Rule 59(e)).

B. Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60

Relief under Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60 may arise in one of two situations. FED.

R. CIV. P. 60; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024. Rule 60(a) offers a litigant relief to correct a clerical error,

while Rule 60(b) offers grounds for a litigant to seek relief from a final order, judgment, or other

proceeding. FED. R. CIV. P. 60; Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 933. A court need not

analyze Rule 60(a) absent an allegation of clerical mistake. FED. R. CIV. P. 60. Rule 60(b) provides

grounds for relief when the evidence shows

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly found evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier

judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer

equitable; or

(6) any other reasons that justifies relief.

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 (stating that Rule 60(b) applies to bankruptcy cases).

In a Rule 60(b) motion, the burden of proof rests on the moving party to show by clear and

convincing evidence that grounds exist to provide relief from a court’s order or judgment. Metro.

St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 933. Relief under Rule 60(b) comprises an extraordinary remedy

that may not substitute for an appeal. Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004).

Failure to identify the grounds for reconsideration or attempts to reargue previously rejected

positions warrant the denial of a motion to reconsider. Sanders, 862 F.2d at 170; see also Rosebud

Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509, 515 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining that a litigant who

reargues positions from earlier motions or that raises argument available in earlier motions cannot

prevail on a motion for reconsideration); Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980)

(affirming denial of a Rule 60(b) motion that failed to identify any reason to reconsider); Kieffer

v. Riske (In re Kieffer-Mickes, Inc.), 226 B.R. 204, 210 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998) (explaining that

mere complaints about the outcome of a matter do not warrant reconsideration).

III. DISCUSSION

This Court first looks to the Motion to Reconsider’s argument that this Court should

provide substantially more latitude to Ms. Drace due to her pro se status. Doc. No. 250 at 4, ¶ 9.

Law in the Eighth Circuit recognizes that this Court “need not act as a clairvoyant, trying to read

the tea leaves of a pro se motion to determine what” relief the Motion to Reconsider seeks. Conway

v. Heyl (In re Heyl), 609 B.R. 194, 202 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2019). After all, “[a] litigant, even a pro

se one, bears some responsibility for advocating” for herself. Heyl, 609 B.R. at 202; see also Dunn

v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining that courts need not “supply additional

facts” or “construct a legal theory” when a pro se litigant fails to assert their own interests

adequately). Although the Motion to Reconsider requests that this Court provide orders explicitly

denoted as appealable, Doc. No. 250 at 5, this Court need not advocate on Ms. Drace’s behalf by

identifying any order as “appealable” as demanded in the Motion to Reconsider. Doc. No. 241 at

12, ¶ 1; see, e.g., In re Heyl, 609 B.R. at 202 (explaining that a court need not declare its orders

“appealable” because pro se litigants may read the federal rules and determine their own appellate

rights). Ms. Drace must advocate for herself—with the assistance of any legal counsel she chooses

to engage—and make determinations regarding her appellate rights without this Court’s directions.

This Court next looks to ascertain what the Motion to Reconsider seeks as relief. The title

of the Motion to Reconsider purports to challenge two orders: (1) the entirety of the Subchapter V

Trustee Fee Order, and (2) the portion of the Dismissal Order that denied all pending matters before

this Court as moot. Doc. No. 250 at 1. However, the body of the Motion to Reconsider

substantively challenges far more, by also addressing the denial of the Injunction Motion and TRO

Motion as mooted by the Dismissal Order. Id. at 4, ¶ 9. The Motion to Reconsider then moves

beyond any request for reconsideration of this Court’s previous orders as it makes substantive

arguments, requests relief for an alleged lack of due process, and appears to request additional

litigation regarding a trust. Doc. No. 250 at 5-6.

This Court must now determine which Rule applies to the Motion to Reconsider. Ms. Drace

filed the Motion to Reconsider twenty-eight days after this Court docketed the Subchapter V

Trustee Fee Order and twenty-four days after this Court docketed the Dismissal Order. Compare

Doc. No. 250 (filed on May 27, 2021), with Doc. No. 241 (docketed on April 29, 2021), and Doc.

No. 248 (docketed on May 3, 2021). Despite the docketing of the Motion to Reconsider within the

timeframe of Rule 59(e), the Motion to Reconsider fails to identify any manifest error regarding

the Subchapter V Trustee Fee Order or the Dismissal Order. Innovative Home Health Care, 141

F.3d at 1286. The Motion to Reconsider also fails to identify the existence of new evidence or how

any new evidence would satisfy the test applied in the Eighth Circuit on a motion to alter or amend

a judgment. See U.S. Xpress, 320 F.3d at 815 (discussing factors a litigant must present to prevail

under a motion brought under Rule 60(b)(2), which are the same under Rule 59(e)). Nothing in the

Motion for Reconsideration provides a basis for relief under Rule 59(e)

As for relief under Rule 60, the Motion to Reconsider fails to plead any of the grounds

found in Rule 60(a) or 60(b), and this omission alone permits the denial of the relief sought.

Ciralsky v. LaBarge (In re Ciralsky), 281 B.R. 915, 917 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the

Motion to Reconsider primarily reiterates the same arguments asserted in the Combined Motion,

the TRO Motion, and the Injunction Motion, and contends that this Court ruled incorrectly on

those arguments. Doc. No. 250. This Court previously ruled on those arguments in the Dismissal

Order, Doc. No. 248, and disposed of those arguments. See Oto, 224 F.3d at 606; see also Ryan,

889 F.3d at 507 (rejecting attempts to relitigate previously adjudicated issues). The Motion to

Reconsider also asserts that Ms. Drace did not receive notice of the Subchapter V Trustee Fee

Order and that this lack of notice somehow entitles her to relief. Doc. No. 250 at 5, ¶ 11. This

argument fails because the record reflects that the Bankruptcy Noticing Center served the

Subchapter V Trustee Fee Order on Ms. Drace at her address of record in accordance with

Bankruptcy Rule 9022(a). Doc. No. 245 at 16; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9022(a); see also Reichel v.

Snyder (In re Reichel), 626 B.R. 34, 35 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2021) (explaining that complaints

Py av VAT

regarding a lack of notice about a docket entry require evidence to contradict the bankruptcy

court’s own docket). Additionally, the Motion to Reconsider broadly argues that this Court

committed a “reversible error” and abused its discretion regarding the Subchapter V Trustee Fee

Order and the Dismissal Order. Doc. No. 250 at 1, ¥ 1; at 3, 9.5; at 5. Those assertions comprise

complaints regarding the outcome of this Case and fail to provide a recognizable basis for any

grant of a motion to reconsider. Design Classics v. Westphal (In re Design Classics), 788 F.2d

1384, 1386 (8th Cir. 1986).

To summarize, this Court denies the Motion to Reconsider for multiple reasons. First, the

Motion to Reconsider fails to present any new evidence or meet the required standard for

presenting new evidence for this Court to consider under Rule 59(e). Ciralsky, 281 B.R. at 917.

Second, the Motion to Reconsider attempts to reargue and relitigate issues already adjudicated.

Sanders, 862 F.2d at 170. Third, the Motion to Reconsider fails to plead any of the grounds

available under Rule 60(a) or 60(b). Ciralsky, 281 B.R. at 917. Finally, the Motion to Reconsider

comprises Ms. Drace’s expression of unhappiness with this Court’s rulings and their effects

without alleging any viable basis for the grant of the relief sought in the Motion to Reconsider.

Design, 788 F.2d at 1386; Kieffer, 226 B.R. at 210.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, this Court now ORDERS that the “Motion to Reconsider

Order to Award Trustee to collect Administrative Fees and Motion to reconsider order to Moot all

Pending Motions” [sic] [Doc. No. 250] is DENIED IN FULL.

DATED: September 1, 2023 CSE

St. Louis, Missouri Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

mtc

13

Copies to:

Robert J. Ambruster, Inc.

6633 Clayton Road

Saint Louis, MO 63117

Debtor

Stephen D. Coffin

2705 St. Peters-Howell Rd

Suite A

St. Peters, MO 63376

Subchapter V Trustee

Deborah Drace

7635 W. Shore Dr

Egg Harbor, WI 54209

Robert Drace

6633 Clayton Road

St Louis Mo 63117

Jeffrey M Mize

7635 W Shore Dr

Egg Harbor, WI 54209

Angela Redden-Jansen

3350 Greenwood Blvd.

Maplewood, MO 63143

Debtor’s Former Counsel

Joseph Richard Schlotzhauer

111 South 10th Street Suite 6.353

Saint Louis, MO 63102

Attorney for US Trustee

Office of US Trustee

111 South 10th Street Suite 6.353

Saint Louis, MO 63102

US Trustee

All other creditors and parties in interest.