Gold v. Soueidan

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re:

Case No. 23-42109

ZAHRA SOUEIDAN,

Chapter 7

Debtor.

/ Judge Thomas J. Tucker

STUART A. GOLD, TRUSTEE,

Plaintiff,

vs. Adv. Pro. No. 23-4167

ALI H. SOUEIDAN,

Defendant.

/

OPINION REGARDING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION AND RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

I. Introduction

This adversary proceeding is before the Court on the motion by the Defendant, Ali

Soueidan, entitled “Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Pursuant to

F.R.Civ.P. 55(c) and 60(b),” filed on June 19, 2023 (Docket # 12, the “Motion”). The Motion

seeks reconsideration of, and relief from, the Court’s June 14, 2023 default judgment against the

Defendant (Docket # 10, the “Default Judgment”).1 The Plaintiff Trustee filed a response

objecting to the Motion (Docket ## 16, 17). The Court held a telephonic hearing on the Motion

on July 19, 2023, and then took the Motion under advisement.

1 The Motion also seeks relief from the Clerk’s Entry of Default, filed June 14, 2023 (Docket

# 8), based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), which applies in adversary proceedings under Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7052. That part of the Motion only matters if the Court grants relief from the Default Judgment, which

the Court will not do, for the reasons discussed in this Opinion.

The Court has reviewed and considered all of the written and oral arguments of the

parties, all of the papers filed by the parties, and other relevant parts of the record. The Court

will deny the Motion, for the reasons stated below.

II. Background

In this case, the Plaintiff Trustee filed his complaint against the Defendant on April 20,

2023, and then filed an amended complaint on May 30, 2023, seeking to avoid, as a fraudulent

transfer, a transfer of real estate that was done on May 24, 2019 by the Chapter 7 bankruptcy

Debtor, Zahra Soueidan (the “Debtor”).2 The Debtor is the Defendant’s wife, and the transfer

was a transfer of the real estate in which the Debtor and the Defendant live, located at 5734

Middlesex, Dearborn, Michigan (the “Property”). Immediately before the transfer, the Debtor

was the sole owner of the Property. By a quit claim deed recorded on May 24, 2019, the Debtor

transferred the Property to the Defendant and herself, as husband and wife, as a tenancy by the

entireties. The complaint and the amended complaint alleged that the transfer is avoidable under

the combination of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statutes, Mich. Comp.

Laws §§ 566.34(1)(a) and 566.34(1)(b).

It is undisputed that the Defendant failed to timely respond to either the complaint or the

amended complaint. As indicated in the summons served with the complaint,3 and under

applicable rules, the Defendant’s answer to the complaint originally was due no later than 30

days after the date of issuance of the summons. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(a). This meant that

2 Docket ## 1, 6.

3 Docket # 2.

2

the original answer deadline was Monday, May 22, 2023.4 But on May 10, 2023, the Defendant,

through his attorney, Tarek N. Chami, filed a stipulation to extend the deadline to respond to the

complaint, until June 13, 2023.5 That same day the Court entered an order granting the requested

extension of time, but ordering that “additional extensions of this deadline are disallowed.”6

Thus, the Defendant’s deadline to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint was June 13,

2023.

On May 30, 2023, the Plaintiff Trustee filed his amended complaint, which was served on

the Defendant’s attorney the same day, via the Court’s ECF system.7 It is undisputed that under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3), which applies in adversary proceedings under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015,

the deadline for the Defendant to respond to the amended complaint was 14 days after May 30,

2023, i.e., June 13, 2023.8

4 As stated on the summons, the date of issuance of the summons was April 20, 2023. (See

Summons (Docket # 2)). Thirty days after that date was Saturday, May 20, 2023. Under Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 9006(a)(1)(C), this meant that the deadline was Monday, May 22, 2023.

5 Docket # 4.

6 Docket # 5 (bold in original).

7 See Docket ## 6, 7.

8 Civil Rule 15(a)(3) states:

Unless the court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended

pleading must be made within the time remaining to respond to the

original pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended

pleading, whichever is later.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3). Because the amended complaint was served on the Defendant’s attorney

through the Court’s ECF system on the date is was filed, service of the amended complaint was complete

on the date of filing (May 30, 2023), and 14 days after that date was June 13, 2023. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

5(b)(2)(E), which applies in adversary proceedings under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7005; see also ECF

Procedure 12(a)(1) (Bankr. E.D. Mich.). The Court’s ECF Procedures apply in this adversary

3

The Defendant never filed an answer or other response to either the original complaint or

the amended complaint. The day after the June 13, 2023 answer deadline passed, on June 14,

2023, the Clerk entered a default against the Defendant; the Plaintiff Trustee moved for a default

judgment, and the Court entered the Default Judgment.9

The Default Judgment granted the relief sought by the amended complaint. It avoided the

May 24, 2019 transfer of the Property, and adjudged that the Property is owned solely by the

bankruptcy estate in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, free and clear of any interest of the Defendant.

The Defendant’s Motion does not allege that the entry of the Default Judgment was

erroneous in any way. Rather, the Motion seeks relief from that Default Judgment, based on Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), which applies under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. Defendant argues for such

relief based on alleged “mistake . . . or excusable neglect.” In support of the Motion, the

Defendant filed his own affidavit and a declaration of attorney Tarek N. Chami.10 The Defendant

alleges that he did not file a timely answer to the amended complaint because the Defendant’s

attorney, Mr. Chami, mistakenly thought that the Defendant had more time, beyond June 13,

2023, to answer the Plaintiff Trustee’s amended complaint. And, the Defendant alleges, attorney

Chami advised the Defendant of this.

In the Motion and in its supporting documents, neither the Defendant nor attorney Chami

state what the legal basis was for their thinking that the Defendant had additional time beyond

proceeding. See L.B.R. 9029-1(a), 9029-1(c) (E.D. Mich.).

9 Docket ## 8, 9, 10.

10 Docket ## 13-1, 20.

4

June 13, 2023 to answer the amended complaint. Nor do they state how much additional time

they thought they had.

III. Discussion

The Court will deny the Motion, based on the following considerations.

First, to the extent the Motion is a motion for reconsideration, the Court finds that the

Motion fails to demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been

misled, and that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof. See

L.B.R. 9024-1(a)(3) (E.D. Mich.). It is clear, and undisputed, that the Defendant’s deadline to

answer the Plaintiff Trustee’s amended complaint was June 13, 2023, and that the Defendant

failed to file an answer or any other response to the amended complaint. There was no error in

the Court’s entry of the Default Judgment on June 14, 2023.

Second, as further discussed below, the allegations in the Motion, and in the Defendant’s

affidavit and attorney Chami’s declaration, do not establish excusable neglect or mistake under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), or any other valid ground for relief from the Default Judgment.

Third, any neglect or mistake by the Defendant’s attorney, Mr. Chami, is attributable to

the Defendant, for purposes of determining whether there was excusable neglect or mistake

within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1).11 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Abu-hamdan (In re Abu-hamdan),

11 During the hearing on the Motion, the Defendant’s new attorney argued that Mr. Chami did

not represent the Defendant in this adversary proceeding, when Mr. Chami allegedly gave the Defendant

mistaken advice that he had additional time to respond to the Plaintiff Trustee’s amended complaint.

There are at least three flaws in that argument. First, it is belied by the record. The Court’s docket entry

number 4 shows that it was attorney Chami who actually filed the May 10, 2023 stipulation, seeking an

extension of the Defendant’s original deadline to answer the Plaintiff Trustee’s complaint. (Docket # 4).

And in four different places in that stipulation and the proposed order filed with that stipulation, Mr.

Chami was described as the Defendant’s attorney. These four places are highlighted in yellow by the

Court in the attached copy of the stipulation. And on page 2 of the stipulation, Mr. Chami explicitly

5

558 B.R. 191, 193-94 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2016) (citing and quoting Supreme Court and Sixth

Circuit cases); see also McCurry ex. rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d

586, 594-95 (6th Cir. 2002).

Fourth, the allegations in the Motion do not demonstrate a mistake or neglect by the

Defendant or his attorney, Mr. Chami, that is excusable under Rule 60(b)(1). The type of

mistake alleged here, by attorney Chami about the rules and the law governing the Defendant’s

deadline to answer the Plaintiff’s amended complaint, is not excusable, and cannot be the basis

for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Many cases support this conclusion. For example, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that:

[C]laims of attorney error and legal malpractice foreclose an award

of relief under Rule 60(b)(1). In particular, we recognized in FHC

Equities, L.L.C. v. MBL Life Assurance Corp., 188 F.3d 678, 683-

87 (6th Cir. 1999), that neither strategic miscalculation nor

counsel’s misinterpretation of the law warrants relief from a

judgment.

McCurry, 298 F.3d at 593. In citing its prior FHC Equities case with approval, the Sixth Circuit

described FHC Equities, in part, this way:

[In FHC Equities] we considered whether the plaintiff could

invoke Rule 60(b)(1) to overcome its untimely filing of a notice of

appeal. The plaintiff attributed this failure to its counsel’s

signed the stipulation as “Attorney[] for Defendant.” Id. (italics in original).

Second, and in any event, in giving the Defendant legal advice about the deadline for filing an

answer in this adversary proceeding, as attorney Chami’s declaration says he did, attorney Chami clearly

acted as an attorney for the Defendant. (See Decl. of Tarek N. Chami (Docket # 20) at ¶ 8).

Third, if it were true that the Defendant was not represented by Mr. Chami, then the Defendant is

personally guilty of inexcusable neglect, for not filing an answer, while at the same time not having

obtained an attorney to represent him in this adversary proceeding until after the Default Judgment was

entered, 55 days after the complaint was filed.

6

mistaken interpretation of the relevant Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and argued that this constituted “inadvertence,

mistake, or surprise” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1). FHC

Equities, 188 F.3d at 683.

We held otherwise. Initially, we noted that “Plaintiff does not

point us to a single case . . . which holds that attorney

misinterpretation of the law can constitute ‘mistake’ under Rule

60(b)(1).” 188 F.3d at 684. In contrast, we identified several cases

from other circuits “in which the alleged ‘mistake’ was the

attorney’s misinterpretation of the law or a strategy decision,” and

we observed that the courts in those cases had declined to grant

relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 188 F.3d at 685 (collecting cases).

. . . .

As is fairly evident from our ruling in FHC Equities, an attorney's

inaction or strategic error based upon a misreading of the

applicable law cannot be deemed “excusable” neglect, even though

it might well be excusable for the client to rely on the advice of

counsel. Other courts have agreed, recognizing that “the case law

consistently teaches that out-and-out lawyer blunders—the type of

action or inaction that leads to successful malpractice suits by the

injured client—do not qualify as ‘mistake’ or ‘excusable neglect’

within the meaning of [Rule 60(b)(1)].” Helm v. Resolution Trust

Corp., 161 F.R.D. 347, 348 (N.D.Ill.1995), aff’d, 84 F.3d 874 (7th

Cir.1996); see also United States v. Prairie Pharmacy, Inc., 921

F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that an attorney’s “failure to

verify the requirements of the law demonstrates attorney

malpractice, not excusable neglect under the law of this circuit”);

Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 288–89 (5th Cir.1985)

(“Were this Court to make an exception to finality of judgment

each time a hardship was visited upon the unfortunate client of a

negligent or inadvertent attorney, even though the result be

disproportionate to the deficiency, courts would be unable to ever

adequately redraw that line again, and meaningful finality of

judgment would largely disappear.”).

McCurry, 298 F.3d at 593, 595 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit later reiterated its holding in

McCurry, in the case of Broach v. City of Cincinnati, 244 Fed. App’x 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citing McCurry for the proposition that “[n]either strategic miscalculation nor counsel’s

7

misinterpretation of the law warrants relief from a judgment”). “An attorney is charged with

knowing and understanding the rules of the courts in which he practices.” Id. (quoting Rice v.

Consol. Rail Corp., No. 94–3963, 1995 WL 570911, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1995)).

Thus, the alleged mistake by the Defendant’s attorney, Mr. Chami, cannot be deemed

mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). See also In re Peek, 614 B.R. 274, 276-77

(Bank. E.D. Mich. 2020) (citations omitted).

This Court’s opinions in two prior cases further support this conclusion, and place it in

the proper procedural framework under Rule 60(b)(1). Initially, in In re Sharkey, 560 B.R. 470

(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2016), this Court described principles governing Rule 60(b)(1) motions:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a

party or its legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect[.]

“The decision on a motion to set aside a default judgment is

left to the discretion of the trial judge.” Bavely v. Powell (In re

Baskett), 219 B.R. 754, 757 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (relying on

Meganck v. Couts (In re Couts), 188 B.R. 949, 951 (Bankr. E.D.

Mich.1995)). In Waifersong, Ltd. Inc. v. Classic Music Vending,

976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit explained that

a determination of whether to set aside a default judgment under

Civil Rule 60(b)(1) requires a three-step analysis. First, the moving

party must “demonstrate that his default was the product of

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Only after

this threshold requirement has been satisfied may the Court

consider the remaining two steps of the analysis; namely “whether

the [moving party] has a meritorious defense,” and “whether the

8

[non-moving party] will be prejudiced” by relief from judgment.

Id.12

In order to show that relief is appropriate under Rule

60(b)(1) based on “excusable neglect,” Debtor must show both (1)

that his conduct in failing to timely respond to Creditor’s Objection

constituted “neglect” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1); and (2)

that his “neglect” was excusable. In Pioneer Investment Services

Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380,

388 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he ordinary

meaning of ‘neglect’ is ‘to give little attention or respect’ to a

matter, or . . . ‘to leave undone or unattended to esp[ecially]

through carelessness.’” Id. (quoting Webster's Ninth New

Collegiate Dictionary 791 (1983) (emphasis added)). Based on the

ordinary meaning of “neglect,” the Court concluded that the

concept of “neglect” under Civil Rule 60(b)(1) denotes that “a

party is partly to blame” for failing to act, and that “at least for

purposes of Rule 60(b), ‘excusable neglect’ is understood to

encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing

deadline is attributable to negligence.” Id. at 394 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

12 In support of his Rule 60(b)(1) Motion in this case, the Defendant cites the three-factor test

recognized by the Sixth Circuit case of United Coin Meter Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d

839 (6th Cir. 1983). Those three factors are “(1) Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the

default; (2) Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) Whether the plaintiff will be

prejudiced.” Id. at 292. In Waifersong, however, the Sixth Circuit later clarified that these factors are to

be applied differently, and more strictly, when the court is considering whether to grant relief from a

default judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(1), compared to when the court is deciding whether merely to

grant relief from the entry of a default under Civil Rule 55(c), before any default judgment has been

entered. See Waifersong, 976 F.2d at 292. In the context where a default judgment has been entered,

under Rule 60(b)(1), “the culpability factor is framed in terms of ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect.’” Id. In addition,

[Rule 60(b)(1)] mandates that a defendant cannot be relieved of a default

judgment unless he can demonstrate that his default was the product of

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. It is only when the

defendant can carry this burden that he will be permitted to demonstrate

that he also can satisfy the other two factors: the existence of a

meritorious defense and the absence of substantial prejudice to the

plaintiff should relief be granted.

Id. at 292.

9

If Debtor shows “neglect,” the next issue is whether

Debtor’s neglect was excusable. In Pioneer, the Supreme Court

explained that a determination of

whether a party’s neglect of a deadline is excusable

. . . is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of

all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's

omission . . . [including] the danger of prejudice to

the [party opposing relief], the length of the delay

and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the

reason for the delay, including whether it was

within the reasonable control of the movant, and

whether the movant acted in good faith.

Id. at 395.

In determining whether Debtor’s failure to timely respond

to the Creditor’s Objection was “excusable,” the Court must focus

not only on whether Debtor’s failure was excusable, but also on

whether the failure or neglect of his attorney was excusable. The

Supreme Court discussed this point at some length and made this

clear in Pioneer, concluding that “the proper focus is upon whether

the neglect of [the movants] and their counsel was excusable.” Id.

at 396-97 (italics in original.)

560 B.R. at 472-73 (footnote 12 added).

Next, in the Peek case, cited above, this Court applied the Supreme Court’s Pioneer

factors in a way that applies here:

Under the circumstances, the type of mistake or neglect that is

alleged in this case is not “excusable neglect.” See, e.g.,

Symbionics, Inc. v. Ortlieb, 432 Fed. App’x[.] 216, 220 (4th Cir.

2011) (holding “that the district court abused its discretion when it

determined that . . . counsel’s computer calendaring error

constituted excusable neglect”); In re Bonfiglio, No. 18-8004, 2018

WL 5295879, at *5 ([B.A.P. 6th Cir.] Oct. 24, 2018) (holding that

a litigation error (failing to respond to a motion to avoid a lien

which resulted in lien avoidance) was not “excusable neglect”).

In Bonfiglio, for example, the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel held that:

10

“‘case law consistently teaches that out-and-out

lawyer blunders—the type of action or inaction that

leads to successful malpractice suits by the injured

client—do not qualify as ‘mistake’ or ‘excusable

neglect’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1).’”

Barron v. Univ. of Mich., 613 F. App’x[.] 480, 487

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing McCurry ex rel. Turner v.

Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586,

595 (6th Cir. 2002)).

2018 WL 5295879, at *4.

In the Symbionics case, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit discussed in detail the application of the four

Pioneer factors “to be considered in determining whether

excusable neglect exists” in this type of situation. 432 Fed. App’x

at 219. Among other things, Symbionics held that the third Pioneer

factor, which the court phrased as “the untimely party’s reason for

the delay,” and which Pioneer phrased as “the reason for the delay,

including whether it was within the reasonable control of the

movant,” is “the most important to the excusable neglect inquiry.”

Id. (citation omitted). In Symbionics, the Fourth Circuit held that

the attorney’s neglect in that case — a miscalculation of the appeal

deadline allegedly caused by “a quirk in the functionality of

counsel’s computer calendar” — was not excusable neglect. Id. at

218, 220. After noting that “[e]xcusable neglect is not easily

demonstrated, nor was it intended to be,” the Fourth Circuit found

as follows:

We find nothing extraordinary or unusual about

counsel's calendaring error that should relieve

Symbionics of its duty to comply with the time limit

of Rule 4(a)(1). Counsel's total dependence on a

computer application — the operation of which

counsel did not completely comprehend — to

determine the filing deadline for a notice of appeal

is neither “extraneous” to nor “independent” of

counsel’s negligence. Rather, the failure to discover

that the calendar display had reverted to January

2009, and the reliance on the resulting incorrect

deadline computation, are the very essence of

counsel's negligence here. Furthermore, this neglect

is precisely the sort of “run-of-the-mill

11

inattentiveness by counsel” that we have

consistently declined to excuse in the past.

Id. at 220 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal record

citation omitted).

Peek, 614 B.R. at 276-77 (footnote omitted).

In this case, the Court cannot find that there was excusable neglect or mistake under Civil

Rule 60(b)(1). The cases cited above, including the Sixth Circuit cases of McCurry, FHC

Equities, and Broach, foreclose such a finding. And applying the Pioneer factors in the way the

Fourth Circuit did in the Symbionics case, the Court finds that the Pioneer factors weigh against

finding excusable neglect in this case. The “most important” of the Pioneer factors, “the reason

for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant,” weighs

strongly against finding that the Defendant’s neglect is excusable, and outweighs the other

Pioneer factors, assuming that those factors are neutral or weigh in favor of finding excusable

neglect.13

Fifth, the Motion argues that the Defendant has a meritorious defense to the Plaintiff

Trustee’s amended complaint to present, if relief from the Default Judgment is granted. But the

Court need not consider this issue, unless and until the Court first finds that there was neglect or

mistake that is “excusable” under Rule 60(b)(1). See, e.g., In re Peek, 614 B.R. at 277; In re

Sharkey, 560 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2016) (citing Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music

Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992)); Nathan v. Cavendish (In re Cavendish), 608 B.R.

802, 806 n.4 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2019). In this case the Court has serious doubts about whether

13 As noted above, the other Pioneer factors are “the danger of prejudice to the [party opposing

relief], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings,” and “whether the

movant acted in good faith.”

12

the Defendant has shown a meritorious defense, but it is unnecessary for the Court to decide that

issue.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the Court will enter an order denying the

Defendant’s Motion.

Signed on July 24, 2023 Ly ¢ DO, /s/ Thomas J. Tucker

yi ae 4 Lhomas J. Tucker

“yee «=—s«CUnnnited States Bankruptcy Judge

13

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISON

IN RE:

ZAHRA SOUEIDAN,

Debtor, Case No. 23-42109-tjt

Chapter 7

Hon. Thomas J. Tucker

STUART A. GOLD, Trustee Adversary Proceeding

Case No. 23-04167-tjt

Plaintiff

v.

ALI SOUEIDAN

Defendant

GOLD, LANGE, MAJOROS & CHAMI LAW PLLC

SMALARZ, P.C. Tarek N. Chami (P76407)

Elias T. Majoros (P41040) 22000 Michigan Ave, Suite 200

24901 Northwestern Hwy, Ste. 444 Dearborn, MI 48124

Southfield, MI 48075 (313) 444-5029

(248) 350-8220 tarek@chamilawpllc.com

emajoros@glmpc.com Attorneys for Defendant

Attorneys for Plaintiff

STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANT

ALI SOUEIDAN TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT

The parties, through their undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree that

the deadline for Defendant, Ali Soueidan to answer or otherwise respond to

Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be extended to and including June 13, 20203

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of May 2023.

/s/Elias T. Majoros

Elias T. Majoros (P41040)

GOLD, LANGE, MAJOROS &

SMALARZ, P.C.

24901 Northwestern Hwy, Ste. 444

Southfield, MI 48075

(248) 350-8220

emajoros@glmpc.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/Tarek N. Chami

Tarek N. Chami (P76407)

22000 Michigan Ave, Suite 200

Dearborn, MI 48124

(313) 444-5029

tarek@chamilawpllc.com

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISON

IN RE:

ZAHRA SOUEIDAN,

Debtor, Case No. 23-42109-tjt

Chapter 7

Hon. Thomas J. Tucker

STUART A. GOLD, Trustee Adversary Proceeding

Case No. 23-04167-tjt

Plaintiff

v.

ALI SOUEIDAN,

Defendant

GOLD, LANGE, MAJOROS & CHAMI LAW PLLC

SMALARZ, P.C. Tarek N. Chami (P76407)

Elias T. Majoros (P41040) 22000 Michigan Ave, Suite 200

24901 Northwestern Hwy, Ste. 444 Dearborn, MI 48124

Southfield, MI 48075 (313) 444-5029

(248) 350-8220 tarek@chamilawpllc.com

emajoros@glmpc.com Attorneys for Defendant

Attorneys for Plaintiff

[PROPOSED] ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANT

ALI SOUEIDAN TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT

Based on the stipulation of the parties, filed on May 5, 2023 (Docket # ), the

Court finds good cause to enter this Order.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Ali Soueidan’s time to answer or otherwise

respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be extended to and including June 13, 2023.

______________________________

Hon. Thomas J. Tucker

United States Bankruptcy Judge