finding justifiable reliance when vendor checked 14 credit history but limited damages to initial credit limit
How later courts described this case
- finding justifiable reliance when vendor checked 14 credit history but limited damages to initial credit limit
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
1
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
2 FRESNO DIVISION
3
4 In re ) Case No. 20-12269-B-7
)
5 ANTHONY WILLIAM VILLA, )
)
6 )
Debtor. )
7 )
)
8 )
VOKSHORI LAW GROUP, a ) Adv. Proceeding No. 20-1054-B
9 Professional Law Corporation, )
)
10 Plaintiff, )
)
11 )
v. )
12 )
ANTHONY WILLIAM VILLA, )
13 )
)
14 Defendant. )
)
15 ANTHONY WILLIAM VILLA, )
)
16 )
Counter-Plaintiff,
)
17 )
v. )
18 )
19 VOKSHORI LAW GROUP, a )
)
Professional Law Corporation,
)
20
)
21 Counter-Defendant. )
)
22
23
24 MEMORANDUM DECISION
25
Before: René Lastreto II, Bankruptcy Judge
26 __________________
27
Luke Jackson, VOKSHORI LAW GROUP, APLC, Los Angeles, CA, for
28 Vokshori Law Group, Plaintiff.
Timothy C. Springer, LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY C. SPRINGER, Fresno,
1
CA, for Anthony William Villa, Defendant.
2 _____________________
3
RENÉ LASTRETO II, Bankruptcy Judge:
4
5 INTRODUCTION
6 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge a debt of
7 an individual “for money, property, [or] services . . . to the
8 extent obtained by—(A) false pretenses, a false representation,
9 or actual fraud.”1 A law firm successfully performed services and
10 achieved a favorable loan modification for a debtor and his
11 spouse, but they were not paid for their services when the bill
12 came due. Finding that there was not a preponderance of evidence
13 on the issues of intent and justifiable reliance, the court here
14 finds in favor of the debtor. The debt owed the firm is
15 dischargeable.
16
17 I.
18 A.
19 Anthony Villa (“Anthony”) and his spouse, Maria, found
20 themselves in the throes of financial difficulty in late 2017.2
21 Though Maria was employed, Anthony was on disability. They were
22 eight months behind on their mortgage payments. Their income was
23 not high enough to maintain their expenses. They wanted to save
24
25 1 Future references to Code sections will, unless otherwise indicated,
be referred to by section. Future references to the Federal Rules of Civil
26 Procedure will be to “Civ. Rule” and references to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure will be referred to as “Rule” unless otherwise
27 indicated.
28 to as “2 AT nh tr ho ou ng yh ”o u at n dt h “i Ms a rm ie am ”o r oa rn d “u tm h, e A Vn it lh lo an sy . ”a n Td h eM a cr oi ua r tV i ml el aa n sw i nl ol db ie s rr ee sf pe er cr te d
and makes those references for ease of following the narrative.
1 their Los Banos, California residence at 1636 Maidencane Way
2 from foreclosure.3
3 Anthony learned of Vokshori Law Group (“VLG”). They offered
4 loan modification services. He contacted them in late December
5 and spoke with employees Patsy Chanthavongsor and Ann Okada. He
6 eventually was transferred to a third, Phil Alvarez. Anthony and
7 Maria signed VLG’s Legal Services Agreement (“LSA”). In early
8 conversations, Anthony said he and Maria had filed bankruptcy in
9 2010. VLG employees discussed bankruptcy with Anthony. He was
10 asked to send numerous documents, including pay stubs. A few
11 days later, Anthony emailed documents to VLG. In early January
12 2017, responsibility for Anthony and Maria’s situation was
13 transferred to VLG employee Nadia Sommereyns. Nadia was Anthony
14 and Maria’s primary contact at VLG after that.
15 A word about the LSA. The agreement says VLG would
16 represent the Villas for a loan modification of their first
17 mortgage with Caliber Home Mortgage. Services to be performed
18 are listed. VLG’s compensation consists of both a flat fee and
19 success fee component. The flat fee was $2,800. After 4 months,
20 a monthly maintenance fee of $325 was charged. If VLG
21 successfully negotiated a modification, it would be entitled to
22 $350 for a trial modification. Upon a final modification, VLG
23 would be entitled under the agreement to 3.6 times the monthly
24 savings plus 10% of any amount of principal or arrears deferred,
25 forgiven, or waived. Though VLG did perform bankruptcy services,
26 they were excluded from coverage of the LSA.4
27 3 A few months earlier they qualified for a modification but that was
28 unsucce 4 s Vs Lf Gu ’l s.
principal, Stephen Vokshori, a licensed attorney, testified that
his firm does file chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies.
1 Some confusion about the documents VLG needed arose in
2 early January. Anthony followed up to be sure all documents were
3 sent in. They were. Among those was Anthony and Maria’s monthly
4 household budget; it showed a negative balance at the end of the
5 month. VLG went to work contacting Caliber’s servicer,
6 Shellpoint.
7 But Anthony and Maria received much correspondence about
8 the default under their home loan from third parties. They began
9 to become very concerned. In late January, their mortgage
10 holder, Caliber, recorded a notice of default.
11 In early and mid-February, there were tense communications
12 between VLG and Anthony. Anthony was not satisfied with the
13 speed of VLG’s responsiveness. Anthony expressed a few times
14 that the extent of his unsecured debt (credit cards plus student
15 loan debt) would necessitate a bankruptcy filing. VLG contacted
16 the servicer who confirmed the residence was in foreclosure, but
17 no sale date was set. VLG’s Phil Alvarez again spoke with
18 Anthony about bankruptcy options. By mid-March, Anthony told
19 Nadia that he and Maria were going to consult with a bankruptcy
20 attorney since they were dissatisfied with the modification
21 progress.
22 In late March, Nadia urged Anthony to give the modification
23 route “a try” before “throwing in the towel” and filing
24 bankruptcy.5 In early April, Anthony and Maria’s first mortgage
25 loan owner changed to New Penn Financial. Near the end of April
26 5 Anthony has filed previous bankruptcy cases. Two in the Northern
District of California: a chapter 13, Case No. 00-55016 filed on October 12,
27 2000, which was dismissed in early 2001, and a chapter 7, Case No. 03-55410
28 f Di il se td r iA cu tg ,u s At n t2 h2 o, n y2 0 f0 il2 e, d r ae s cu hl at pi tn eg r i 7n oa n d Si es pc th ea mr bg ee r i 1n 0 ,e a 2r 0l 1y 1 ,2 0 C0 a3 s. e I Nn o .t h 1i 1s -
60203,
resulting in a discharge December 20, 2011.
1 and early May, VLG sent documents to New Penn Financial. Anthony
2 provided additional documents once asked.
3 Shellpoint, who remained the servicer, had received all
4 necessary documents to evaluate the modification request by mid-
5 May. A trial loan modification was then approved. VLG notified
6 Anthony and Maria. The trial modification was for three months
7 and included a principal deferment. Payments were about $460.00
8 less per month than before. The interest rate was 4.25% and the
9 three-month trial period began on July 1, 2018.6 Shellpoint
10 wanted the payments during the trial period by auto pay, which
11 Anthony and Maria agreed to do.
12 The Villas made all three trial payments.
13 Near the end of September, Anthony and Maria told VLG they
14 were going through a divorce. Maria wanted to sell the
15 residence. VLG suggested they wait until the modification was
16 finalized. Shellpoint sent the permanent modification to the
17 Villas at their residence. Anthony requested time to collect all
18 signatures, as well as a delay for the first payment under the
19 permanent modification.7 In early October, Anthony told VLG he
20 and Maria were going to or had signed the permanent
21 modification. But he also mentioned he wanted to file Chapter
22 13. Anthony testified he was living in his car, and he purchased
23 a car since he was using it as a residence at times. Anthony
24 asked how the contract would be affected in a Chapter 13.
25
26 6 In early June, Anthony thought their residence was sold. He contacted
Nadia at VLG, and Nadia found that it had not been sold and reported that to
27 Anthony.
28 modific7 aI tn i of na c wt a, s A nn ot th o yn ey t h ca od m pb le ee tn e t bo yl d O cb te of bo er re 1t ,h a tt o i ef x pt eh ce t p te or m ma an ke en t a
nother
payment provided in the trial modification.
1 The relationship between VLG and the Villas then
2 deteriorated. VLG sent an invoice for their fees totaling
3 $6,346.06 in mid-October.8 By the end of October, New Penn
4 Financial had incorporated the permanent modification for the
5 loan. Anthony told Nadia in a phone conversation he was having
6 surgery, he needed to go to court on the family law issues and
7 wanted three weeks to make payment arrangements. That was not
8 acceptable to VLG who wanted at least an immediate down payment
9 on the balance. Further contact between Anthony, Maria, and VLG
10 was fruitless.
11 Months passed and many voice mails and contact attempts by
12 VLG to Anthony went unheeded. On March 1, 2019, five months
13 after the permanent loan modification was approved, Anthony
14 filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the Northern District of
15 California (19-50435). VLG filed an adversary proceeding
16 contesting the discharge of its debt under § 523(a)(2)(A)
17 (fraud). Adv. Proc. No. 19-05030. But the bankruptcy (and the
18 adversary proceeding) was dismissed six months later before plan
19 confirmation. In January 2020, Maria filed her own bankruptcy
20 case in the Northern District of California (20-50017). VLG
21 filed an adversary proceeding (20-05023) in that case but about
22 a year and one-half after the bankruptcy case was filed, it was
23 dismissed for Maria’s failure to make plan payments. The
24 adversary proceeding was also dismissed.9
25
26
8 California law precludes VLG from collecting fees for loan
27 modification services until it has completed its services. Cal. Civ. Code §
28 2944.7 9 ( TD he ee r ci on ug rs t 2 t0 a2 k2 e) s.
judicial notice of the adjudicative facts about the
bankruptcy proceedings under Fed. R. Evid. 201.
1 On July 4, 2020, Anthony filed this bankruptcy case. VLG
2 timely filed this adversary proceeding contesting the discharge
3 of their debt under § 523(a)(2)(A). Anthony, through counsel,
4 filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees under § 523(d) if he
5 was successful in the litigation. Following discovery and
6 pandemic-related delays, the case was tried on March 31, 2022.
7 The parties have stipulated that the debt at issue here is a
8 consumer debt under § 101(8) and that no payment has been made
9 on the debt.10
10
11 B.
12 VLG offered one witness: Stephen Vokshori, the attorney
13 principal of VLG. The court found Mr. Vokshori knowledgeable,
14 experienced, and very familiar with bankruptcy law and practice.
15 He was forthright in his answers to cross-examination questions,
16 but his testimony suffered from one shortcoming: a lack of
17 personal knowledge of the communications his staff had with
18 Anthony and Maria. He had to rely on an ongoing real time
19 contemporaneous log of the interactions between staff, the loan
20 servicers, and the Villas.11 To be sure, the notes were admitted
21 in evidence since they were relevant and were business records.
22 But Mr. Vokshori had to speculate about the effect of those
23 interactions highlighted by both counsel during the trial.
24 Anthony did not really dispute the contents of contemporaneous
25 notes, but the effect of these entries on the case here is left
26 to speculation.
27
28 1 10 1 A Vm Le Gn ’d se d c oJ uo ni sn et l P ar ne dt r Mi ra .l VO or kd se hr o, r iD o rc e. f e# r9 8 t, o a tt h e5 s. e
contemporaneous notes
as the “ACT database.”
1 Anthony was his only witness. The court found him sincere,
2 but he was not specific on many details when cross-examined by
3 VLG’s counsel. VLG attacked Anthony’s credibility. First, there
4 was a question of whether Anthony was forthright with VLG when
5 he first discussed the extent of his unsecured debt. There was a
6 large discrepancy in the contemporaneous notes. Anthony first
7 stated his unsecured debt was between $10,000.00 and $15,000.00—
8 primarily from credit cards. But his unsecured debt was larger
9 when outstanding student loans were considered. Anthony
10 explained that to him the debts were different. True when one
11 considers the effect of discharge.
12 VLG also contends that Anthony’s testimony was uneven and
13 contradictory on certain points. The one specific example
14 pertained to testimony about who his initial contacts were at
15 VLG. Anthony’s pre-trial declaration stated his initial contact
16 was with Annie Okada. VLG disputed that, relying upon the
17 contemporaneous log. But the log entry on December 19, 2017
18 contained a description of a phone conference with Anthony that
19 was entered by Ann Okada. Patsy Chanthavongsor may have
20 initially spoke to Anthony and then transferred the call.12
21 Anthony did alter his testimony by saying he remembered his
22 first contact was a female. This is a discrepancy, but to the
23 court an insignificant one. Anthony did not remember certain
24 details, but there was little dispute about the accuracy of the
25 log entries.
26 ///
27 ///
28
12 Px 2, at 116.
1 II.
2 A.
3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
4 of California has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C.
5 § 1334(b) since this is a civil proceeding arising under Title
6 11 of the United States Code. The District Court has referred
7 this matter to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). This is a
8 “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). Even if found
9 to be “non-core,” the parties have agreed this court may enter
10 orders finally disposing of this proceeding.13
11
12 B.
13 To exclude a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A), a
14 creditor must establish that:
15 1) The debtor made representations.
16 2) That at the time he knew they were false.
17 3) That he made them with the intention and purpose of
18 deceiving the creditor.
19 4) That the creditor justifiably relied on such
20 representations.
21 5) That the creditor sustained the alleged loss and damage as
22 a proximate result of the representations having been made.
Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re
23
24
Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Turtle
25
Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass’n. v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234
26 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). “[M]ere failure to fulfill [a]
27 promise to pay [a] debt is dischargeable, unless [the] debtor
28
13 Amended Joint Pre-trial Order, Doc. #98, at 6.
1 made [the] promise while not intending to pay or knowing that
2
payment would be impossible.” Kuan v. Lund (In re Lund), 202
3
B.R. 127, 131 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996), citing Citibank (S.D.)
4
N.A. v. Lee (In re Lee), 186 B.R. 695, 699 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
5 1995). “Intent to deceive can be inferred from surrounding
6
circumstances.” Cowen v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015,
7 1018 (9th Cir. 1997).
8 The burden of proof is on VLG here to establish non-
9 dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A), including justifiable
10
reliance. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 66 (1995). “Because a
11 fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Code is to afford debtors a
12 fresh start, ‘exceptions to discharge should be strictly
13 construed against an objecting creditor and in favor of the
14
debtor.’” Scheer v. State Bar (In re Scheer), 819 F.3d 1206,
15
1209 (9th Cir. 2016), quoting Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso), 978
16
F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992); Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re
17
Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1994).
18 The court has considered the direct testimony submitted by
19 declaration, the live testimony presented at trial, the
20 documentary evidence, and stipulated facts. The court is not
21 convinced that VLG has met its burden of proof as to at least
22 two of the elements of its claim: intentional misrepresentation
23 and justifiable reliance. Since the court is compelled to
24 strictly construe discharge exceptions, the burden of proof is
25 critical.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 1.
2 “For purposes of § 523(a)(2) . . . the timing of the fraud
3 and elements to prove fraud focus on the time . . . of the
4 extension of credit to the Debtor . . . Congress’ use of
5 ‘obtained by’ in § 523(a)(2) ‘clearly indicates that fraudulent
6 conduct occurred at the inception of the debt, i.e. the debtor
7 committed a fraudulent act to induce the creditor to part with
8
his money or property.’” New Falls Corp. v. Boyajian (In re
9
Boyajian), 367 B.R. 138, 147 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (internal
10
citation omitted), quoting Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Dobek (In
11
re Dobek), 278 B.R. 496, 508 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002), citing
12
McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F. 3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2000)
13 (Ripple, Circuit Judge concurring). A § 523(a)(2)(A) claim
14 requires that the “target misrepresentation must have existed at
15 the inception of the debt, and the creditor must prove that he
16
or she relied on that misrepresentation.” Bethke v. Shane, 548
17
B.R. 291, 298 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2016), quoting Reingold v.
18
Shaffer (In re Reingold), Nos. CC-12-1112-PaDKi, CC-12-1141-
19 PaDKi, 2013 WL 113646 at *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. March 19, 2013).
20 “[T}he intention not to perform must be present when the
21 agreement is formed; otherwise only a breach of contract is
22
proven.” Yaikian v. Yaikian (In re Yaikian), 508 B.R. 175, 186
23 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2014). Intent to defraud is a factual
24
question. Kennedy, 108 F.3d at 1018.
25 VLG’s theory is that Anthony did not intend to pay when he
26 and Maria signed the LSA. VLG relies on Anthony’s numerous
27 bankruptcies, which pre-dated their relationship as evidence of
28 Anthony’s fraudulent intent. The court is unconvinced.
1 First, there is a six-year gap between Anthony’s last
2 discharge and the beginning of VLG’s services. Anthony and Maria
3 purchased the Los Banos residence during the interim period and
4 over a year before contracting with VLG.14 They were approved for
5 a modification before contacting VLG. This does not suggest an
6 intent to deceive.
7 Second, it is undisputed that Anthony was on disability and
8 he and Maria’s income had been severely impacted. One of the
9 Villas’ primary goals were to save their home. The loan
10 modification process would be a way to do that. This does not
11 suggest Anthony was planning to file bankruptcy and risk the
12 loss of the home to avoid paying VLG.
13 Third, throughout the modification process and document-
14 information gathering phase, Anthony cooperated in obtaining the
15 documents and responding to VLG’s requests. This militates
16 against a finding that Anthony intended to deceive VLG from the
17 outset. Anthony could have been slow in responding or
18 unavailable if he was planning to file bankruptcy anyway. The
19 Villas also paid three trial modification payments and one in
20 October of 2018. The Villas took steps to perform under the
21 contract; not avoid the contract.
22 Fourth, two significant events occurred in the fall of 2018
23 that changed Anthony’s situation. He was having to undergo
24 surgery and he and Maria were going through a divorce. Based on
25 the evidence, Anthony knew neither of these events when VLG
26 began performing services. No evidence was presented that when
27
28
14 Px 2, at 39.
1 the LSA was signed Anthony had no prospective ability to perform
2 the LSA notwithstanding his coexisting financial struggles.
3 VLG contends that Anthony was a demanding and difficult
4 client, which suggests an intention to not pay VLG. The court
5 disagrees. True enough, there were a few tense moments in the
6 first quarter of 2018 coinciding with the recording of the
7 notice of default and some gaps in communication. But even Mr.
8 Vokshori testified that it appeared that Anthony was then
9 wanting to “crack the whip” and be assured VLG was working
10 toward saving the residence.
11 It is also true that in the fall of 2018 and for months
12 thereafter, Anthony and Maria were not responding to
13 communications from VLG to collect the outstanding balance. But
14 that was after the marriage was dissolving, Anthony’s surgery,
15 and the change in Anthony’s living arrangements. Avoiding
16 creditors is not unusual for any debtor who is in financial
17 difficulty.15
18 Finally, Anthony’s bankruptcy filing in the Northern
19 District of California in March 2019 was dismissed before plan
20 confirmation. This does not suggest that Anthony intended to
21 avoid paying VLG over one year earlier.
22 The facts here are inconsistent with the theory that
23 Anthony never intended to pay VLG nor lacked an intent to
24 perform. But even if intent was proven—it was not—the facts are
25 also inconsistent with VLG’s justifiable reliance.
26 15 Anthony’s purchase of a car in the fall of 2018 was explained at
trial. Anthony was having to occasionally live in his car and financed one to
27 accommodate his occasional need to rely on the vehicle for shelter. But the
28 f bi il fi un rg c ao tf i oa n c oh fa p tt he er s1 e3 c ui rm em de d ci la at ie ml .y S eth e er §e a 1f 3t 2e 5r ( aw )o u “l hd a nn go it n gr e ps au rl at g ri an p ha .
” So that
does not suggest an initial intent to avoid paying VLG.
1 2.
2 A creditor’s reliance (upon the representation) need only
3
be justifiable, not reasonable. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. at 74;
4
Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082,
5 1090 (9th Cir. 1996). Justification “is a matter of the
6 qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and
7 the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the
8 application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.”
9
Id., at 71 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 545A cmt. b
10 (1976)). This is a subjective standard in which the court
11
considers the knowledge and relationship of the parties. Sea
12
Win, Inc. v. Tran (In re Tran), 301 B.R. 576, 583 (Bankr. N.D.
13 Cal. 2003) (finding justifiable reliance when vendor checked
14 credit history but limited damages to initial credit limit),
15
citing Tallant v. Kaufman (In re Tallant), 218 B.R. 58, 67
16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
17 VLG is a law firm with considerable experience in loan
18 modifications and bankruptcies. Anthony and Maria came to them
19 for their expertise. There is no evidence VLG checked to
20 determine if any bankruptcies had been filed by Anthony, Maria,
21 or both before their relationship. From the beginning, Anthony
22 mentioned that a bankruptcy would eventually be needed because
23 of his substantial unsecured debt. The budget form that Anthony
24 submitted to VLG showed nearly a $500.00 negative balance.16
25 Anthony was on disability and not regularly employed.17 An
26 experienced bankruptcy and loan modification service firm is in
27 a far better position to determine whether to enter into an
28
16 Dx B-1.
17 Dx C-1.
1 agreement with a prospective client than most. The circumstances
2 of this case establish the lack of justifiable reliance.
3 VLG points to the terms of the LSA as establishing their
4 justifiable reliance. True enough, negligence in failing to
5
discover an intentional misrepresentation is no defense. In re
6
Eashai, 87 F.2d at 1090. But here, there is no intentional
7 misrepresentation. Anthony told VLG that bankruptcy was
8 potentially part of the entire process of reorganizing the
9 Villas’ debts.
10 VLG employees reviewed bankruptcy “options” with Anthony in
11 December 2017. After receiving correspondence concerning the
12 Villas’ default on their home loan Anthony told Nadia he was
13 thinking again about bankruptcy.18 In March 2018, Anthony
14 expressed dissatisfaction with the modification process and said
15 he had an appointment with a bankruptcy attorney within one
16 week.19 In late March, Nadia urged that Anthony and Maria wait on
17 filing bankruptcy, and at least give the modification “a try.”
18 All of this occurred before the approval of the loan
19 modification. VLG had opportunities to stop performing services.
20 They chose not to do that. VLG had the facts before them and
21 continued performing under the contract. Laudable that may be,
22 but it supports the conclusion that VLG did not justifiably rely
23 on the terms of the LSA in performing the continued services.
24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
27
28
18 Px 2, at 90.
19 Px 2, at 84.
1 CONCLUSION
2 VLG performed their services under the LSA. The result was
3 |}favorable to the Villas. Unfortunately, Anthony’s breach of his
4 |}contractual duty to pay for the services rendered by VLG does
5 except the debt owed VLG from discharge in his Chapter 7
6 ||proceeding. VLG did not meet the burden of proof on the issues
7 intentional misrepresentation or justifiable reliance. This
8 |Jis especially true given the court’s duty to narrowly construe
9 |ithe discharge exceptions. For the foregoing reasons, VLG shall
10 |}take nothing by way of its complaint. Should Anthony Villa seek
11 |J|costs and attorneys’ fees under § 523(d) or other provision of
12 it shall be by fully noticed motion filed and served as
13 |}provided in Civ. Rule 54, as applicable to bankruptcy
14 ||proceedings under Rule 7054. VLG may oppose the motion. The
15 }|}court will issue a separate judgment, which may be amended if
16 |J/either costs, attorneys’ fees, or both are awarded. ?°
17
18
19 Dated: Apr 07, 2022 By the Court
20
21 ond.
22 ené Lastreto II, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
23
24
25
26
27
28 ** The above shall be the courts findings of fact and conclusions of law
under Civ. Rule 52. Should any conclusion of law be deemed a finding of fact
the court adopts it as such and vice versa.
16
1
Instructions to Clerk of Court
2 Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment
3
The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment
4 or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the
parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the
5
BNC or, if checked ___, via the U.S. mail.
6
7 Anthony William Villa
1839 Loma Linda Circle
8 Los Banos CA 93635
9
Nima S. Vokshori
10 1010 Wilshire Blvd #1404
Los Angeles CA 90017
11
12 Luke Jackson
1010 Wilshire Blvd #1404
13 Los Angeles CA 90017
14
Timothy C. Springer
15 4905 N West #102
Fresno CA 93705
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