finding no materially adverse employment action where the plaintiff was “denied permission to attend one training session, but in fact had permission to and did attend several others”
How later courts described this case
- finding no materially adverse employment action where the plaintiff was “denied permission to attend one training session, but in fact had permission to and did attend several others”
- allegations that a badge lock requirement was designed to publicly identify the plaintiff’s vaccination status and to subject her to scorn and ridicule from her vaccinated co- workers and that plaintiff was reassigned to different patient care areas were sufficient, at the pleadings stage, to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII
- declining to address plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation arguments, and instead analyzing plaintiff’s “allegations in the context of a disparate treatment claim”
- “[The plaintiff] also alleged that she was reassigned to different patient care areas or work settings. Whether these changes resulted in ‘some harm’ to a term or condition of [her] employment requires further factual development. … Dismissal of the complaint on the basis of no adverse action is improper at this stage of the proceedings.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-3050
___________________________
Pamela Cole
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., doing business as HealthPartners, a Minnesota non-profit
corporation
Defendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________
Submitted: March 1, 2024
Filed: June 28, 2024
____________
Before ERICKSON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________
ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Pamela Cole brought religious discrimination claims under Title VII and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) against her employer Group Health Plan,
Inc. d/b/a/ HealthPartners (“HealthPartners”). Cole asserts HealthPartners failed to
reasonably accommodate her religious objections to its vaccine mandate and
subjected her to restrictions that visibly differentiated her from vaccinated
employees. HealthPartners successfully moved to dismiss Cole’s complaint for
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failure to state a claim. Cole timely appealed. Because Cole plausibly pled a claim
of disparate treatment, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
We take the facts from Cole’s complaint. Cole is a physical therapist and
certified wound specialist who has worked for HealthPartners and its predecessor
companies for 25 years. She has received substantial positive feedback on her job
performance from HealthPartners.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, HealthPartners implemented a
vaccine mandate for all employees in August 2021. Employees could request
religious or medical exemptions to the mandate, subject to conditions.
HealthPartners required employees with religious and medical exemptions to always
wear a medical grade mask while working in any HealthPartners facility, wear
additional personal protective equipment as appropriate, and agree to reassignment
to a different patient care area or other work setting. Employees granted religious
exemptions were also required to disclose their vaccination status and the status of
their exemption request to their superiors. In contrast, vaccinated employees were
given orange badge locks that allowed them to remove their masks in administrative
facilities and non-patient care areas of HealthPartners’ hospitals and clinics.
Cole is a member of the Eckankar religion and has sincerely held religious
beliefs that prevent her from getting the COVID-19 vaccination. She requested a
religious accommodation allowing her to continue working unvaccinated as she did
during the prior year and a half of the pandemic. HealthPartners exempted Cole
from the vaccine mandate but rejected her request to be exempt from the conditions.
It also refused to engage in an interactive process with Cole about the conditions.
Cole alleged in her complaint that the orange badge locks constituted a public
indication of vaccination status and together with the masking requirements were
intended to single out the unvaccinated and make them the subject of scorn, ridicule,
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and embarrassment. Cole further alleged that since vaccinated employees could tell
who had an exemption, they frequently criticized their unvaccinated colleagues and
blamed them for having to mask up in their presence. To avoid uncomfortable
situations, Cole attended meetings via Zoom instead of in person.
Cole filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and obtained a right-to-sue letter. She brought the underlying lawsuit,
alleging, in relevant part, religious discrimination under Title VII and the MHRA.
The district court granted HealthPartners’ motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint de novo, accepting the
factual allegations as true and granting all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Norgren v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 96 F.4th 1048, 1054 (8th
Cir. 2024). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Cole appeals the dismissal of her religious discrimination claims arising under
Title VII and the MHRA. Since Minnesota courts have interpreted the MHRA using
Title VII standards, e.g., Sigurdson v. Isanti Cnty., 386 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn.
1986), we follow the same analysis for both claims.
Cole’s complaint asserts two theories of liability: (1) religious discrimination
(also known as “disparate treatment”) and (2) failure to accommodate. A failure to
accommodate, while actionable, is not a freestanding cause of action under Title VII.
See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771-73 (2015)
(explaining the only two causes of action under Title VII are disparate treatment and
disparate impact and analyzing an employee’s failure to accommodate claim as a
disparate treatment claim); see also EEOC v. N. Memorial Health Care, 908 F.3d
1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018). Any inquiry as to whether HealthPartners offered Cole
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a reasonable accommodation or would suffer an undue hardship by accommodating
Cole is generally not appropriately considered at the motion to dismiss stage. For
this reason, we decline to address HealthPartners’ arguments on these issues, and
instead analyze Cole’s allegations in the context of a disparate treatment claim.
“To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must
show: (1) she is a member of a protected class because of her religious beliefs, (2)
she met her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2015).
Although Cole need not allege facts establishing a prima facie case of religious
discrimination at the pleadings phase, the elements are relevant to the plausibility of
her allegations. Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789,
796 (8th Cir. 2021).
With respect to the first element, Cole alleged that she is a practitioner of the
Eckankar religion and has sincerely held religious beliefs that prohibit her from
receiving the COVID-19 vaccination. HealthPartners maintains that Cole has no
religious objection to the accommodation it offered her, but this argument is relevant
to the reasonableness of the accommodation, not to whether she is a member of a
protected class. Cole also alleged that she received positive feedback from
HealthPartners regarding her job performance, which is sufficient to satisfy the
second element of the prima facie case.
The parties dispute the third element—whether Cole sufficiently alleged an
adverse employment action. An adverse employment action is a disadvantageous
change to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See
Muldrow v. St. Louis, 144 S. Ct. 967, 974 (2024); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
The Supreme Court recently obviated the requirement—replete in our case law 1—
1
E.g., Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804
(8th Cir. 2013) (“An adverse employment action is defined as a tangible change in
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that the claimed injury be “significant,” “material,” or “serious.” Muldrow, 144 S.
Ct. at 975 n.2. After Muldrow, Cole is only required to plead “some harm respecting
an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Id. at 974.
Cole alleged that HealthPartners’ badge lock requirement was designed to
publicly identify her vaccination status and to subject her to scorn and ridicule. She
alleged this led to frequent criticism from her vaccinated co-workers and that she
began attending meetings on Zoom instead of in person to avoid uncomfortable
situations. She also alleged that she was reassigned to different patient care areas or
work settings. Whether these changes resulted in “some harm” to a term or condition
of Cole’s employment requires further factual development. In addition, the denial
of a requested religious accommodation absent a showing of undue hardship may
itself constitute an adverse action, 2 and Cole alleged that HealthPartners refused to
consider her request to be exempt from these restrictions despite working
unvaccinated for a year and a half prior to the mandate. Dismissal of the complaint
on the basis of no adverse action is improper at this stage of the proceedings. See
Patrick v. Henderson, 255 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that “adverse
employment action is a fact issue that is rarely appropriate for Rule 12 resolution”).
working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage[.]”); Clegg
v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Minor changes in duties
or working conditions, even unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no
materially significant disadvantage, do not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
See N. Memorial Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103 (explaining that an employee
whose religious accommodation request is denied may bring a disparate treatment
claim under Title VII); Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir.
2004); Billings v. Murphy, No. 22-2010-CV, 2024 WL 444727, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb.
6, 2024); see also EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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With regard to the fourth element, the facts alleged in the complaint plausibly
raise an inference of discrimination. The failure to reasonably accommodate an
employee’s religious practices and singling out religious adherents for inequitable
treatment both constitute religious discrimination under Title VII. Abercrombie, 575
U.S. at 775. While HealthPartners contends that Cole has not alleged she was treated
differently from similarly situated employees who do not share her religious beliefs
since unvaccinated employees with medical exemptions were subject to the same
restrictions, we must grant all reasonable inferences in Cole’s favor and cannot
assume at this early juncture that religious discrimination did not occur because one
subset of potential comparators also faced disparate treatment. See Norgren, 96
F.4th at 1056 (explaining that courts generally do not inquire about comparators until
summary judgment).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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