Quantel Taylor v. State of Tennessee

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 8, 2013

QUANTEL TAYLOR v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Crockett County

No. 3706 Clayburn Peeples, Judge

No. W2012-00760-CCA-R3-PC - Filed April 29, 2013

Petitioner, Quantel Taylor, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner entered “best interest” guilty pleas to second degree murder, attempted first degree

murder, and especially aggravated robbery, and received agreed upon sentences of 20 years

for each offense to be served concurrently at 100 percent. In this direct appeal, Petitioner

asserts that the trial court erred by denying post-conviction relief because Petitioner’s trial

counsel was ineffective and his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. The post-

conviction court erred by granting the State’s prehearing motion to quash subpoenas and by

refusing to allow Petitioner to present an offer of proof at that hearing. However, in light of

the proof at the post-conviction hearing the error, though flagrant, was harmless. The

judgment is therefore affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;

Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

T HOMAS T. W OODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J ERRY L. S MITH and

D. K ELLY T HOMAS, J R., JJ., joined.

S. Jasper Taylor, IV, Bells, Tennessee, for the appellant, Quantel Taylor.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney

General; Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General; and Hillary Lawler Parham, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Preliminary Proceeding

In his amended post-conviction petition, Petitioner alleged that his guilty pleas were

involuntarily and unknowingly entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Among the

reasons Petitioner asserted in his petition that his counsel was ineffective was counsel’s

failure to investigate the case and discover witnesses. In this appeal, Petitioner contends that

his trial counsel failed to interview his co-defendants, who Petitioner testified at the post-

conviction hearing “would have told [trial counsel] [Petitioner] had no parts of what

happened or whatever.”

Prior to the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner requested the issuance of subpoenas

for his co-defendants Eugene Spivey, Chad Bricco, and Jeffery Allen, who were all

incarcerated, to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The State filed a motion to quash the

subpoenas. The motion states in part:

Compliance with the above referenced subpoenas and requests for transport

orders of the above referenced individuals to be brought to Court on June

20, 2011, by the Crockett County Sheriff’s Department is unreasonable and

oppressive and should be quashed or in the alternative, the above referenced

individuals should be deposed from a secure location.

At a hearing on the State’s motion to quash, the trial court granted the State’s motion

and denied Petitioner’s request to make an offer of proof. The transcript of the hearing reads,

in its entirety, as follows:

This cause came on to be heard before the Honorable Clayburn

Peeples, Judge, in the Circuit Court for Crockett County, Tennessee on the

23rd day of June, 2011 and the following proceedings were had, to-wit:

THE COURT: Now, let’s talk about Quantel Taylor.

What’s the situation here?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: I submitted a subpoena list.

THE COURT: Why would those people’s testimony be

relevant in a Post Conviction Hearing?

I don’t even know at this point what the

State’s position about their presence is.

-2-

[Petitioner’s counsel]: They filed a Motion to Quash.

THE COURT: Well, I know it, but everybody was

going to look into it and see what they

thought.

[Assistant District Attorney]: At this point, I don’t see how any of the

co-defendants would be able to

enlighten us on whether or not

[Petitioner] entered a knowing[ ] and

voluntary plea. In addition to that, the

State feels like that would be a great

burden on the Crockett County Sheriff’s

Department based on –

THE COURT: It would be a great burden on all the

people who had to sit and listen to it.

[Assistant District Attorney]: Yes.

THE COURT: I don’t mean that as flippantly as it

sounded like I did. It is. It’s

tremendously expensive, but there could

be a reason and I’m willing to listen to

it.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: I’d like to have [Petitioner] testify.

THE COURT: I want to know why you think those

witnesses could add anything relevant

to his testimony about his plea.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: I’ve talked to [Petitioner] and based on

what he’s told me what they could –

what he’s told me they could testify to

was he was not involved in the burglary

or the murder.

-3-

THE COURT: I understand him wanting that known,

but what does that have to do with his

entering the plea or not? He’s trying to

shore up the fact that he wasn’t guilty

when he pled guilty. Is that –

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don’t –

[Petitioner’s counsel]: I would like to get on the record his

testimony on what he says those people

will say.

THE COURT: When we have the Hearing I will let

him do that, but I’m not going to let him

do that right now. If you’re telling me

they’re going to say he didn’t have

anything to do with it, then that’s

irrelevant for purposes of this Hearing.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: When you refer to this Hearing, are you

talking about the Post Conviction

Petition?

THE COURT: Post Conviction Hearing.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: So at the time we have the Hearing on

the Post Conviction Relief he’s going to

testify under oath what these people

would have said if they had been here

and not for the purposes of this Motion.

THE COURT: It doesn’t matter what they would have

said about his involvement for purposes

of this Motion that I know of. You may

disabuse me of that, but I don’t think

you’re going to. How could it be

relevant in this case?

-4-

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Well, it may or may not be. The

problem I see is if this is appealed then

the Court of Appeals [sic] is going to

state that, well, you didn’t get in the

record –

THE COURT: You’ve tried to do that and I’ve

denied your request.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Right.

(Emphasis added).

As is shown from the transcript, absolutely no evidence was presented by the State in

support of its motion to quash the subpoenas. The post-conviction court concluded that the

testimony of Petitioner’s co-defendants was irrelevant to a determination as to whether

Petitioner’s guilty pleas were voluntarily and knowingly entered. However, the post-

conviction court completely overlooked Petitioner’s allegation that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to properly investigate and interview those witnesses before trial.

Petitioner’s assertion that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel was given no

consideration by the post-conviction court at the motion hearing. It is well-settled that when

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is predicated upon counsel’s failure to present

potential witnesses, the testimony of those witnesses should be offered at the post-conviction

hearing. Normally, the failure to present such witnesses precludes this court and the

post-conviction court from making a determination of how the petitioner was prejudiced by

trial counsel failing to present their testimony. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Normally, an appellate court cannot decide the issue of whether

trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses was ineffective when a petitioner is denied the

opportunity to present their testimony at the post-conviction hearing.

The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request to make an offer of proof. The

general rule is that “‘assuming an offer of proof has been seasonably made, it is error for the

trial court to refuse to permit counsel to state what evidence he is offering.’” Allen v. State,

882 S.W.2d 810, 815-16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting 89 A.L.R., Offer of Proof-

Ruling-Error, § 2 at 283 (1963)). Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103 provides as follows:

(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling

which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is

affected, and

-5-

(1) Objection. – In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely

objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground

of objection if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or

(2) Offer of Proof. – In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the

substance of the evidence and the specific evidentiary basis supporting

admission were made known to the court by offer or were apparent from the

context. Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting

or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an

objection or offer of proof to preserve claim of error for appeal.

(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. – The court may add any other or further

statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it

was offered, the objection made, and the ruling. It shall permit the making

of an offer in question and answer form. . . .

Tenn. R. Evid. 103 (emphasis added).

In Alley, this court explained, “[c]onsequently, though not explicitly stated [in

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103], it is apparent that courts are required, in appropriate

circumstances, to allow offers of proof when the evidence is excluded so as to enable

consideration of the issue on appeal.” Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 815-16. This court held that it

is error for a trial court to refuse to grant an offer of proof in certain circumstances. Id. at

816. This court stated:

In circumstances in which it is obvious from the record that the proffered

evidence could, under no circumstances, be relevant to the issues, a trial

court’s refusal to grant an offer of proof is not error. However, if the

obvious incompetence or irrelevance is not readily apparent from the

record, it is error to exclude any reasonable offer which demonstrates the

relevance and general import of the excluded evidence.

The reason for such a rule is quite clear. When a party contends that the

trial court erred in excluding testimony, the need for a description of that

testimony is compelling. Absent such a showing, an appellate court cannot

determine whether the exclusion was error, and if error is found, whether

the error is harmless. . . .

If the record of a post-conviction proceeding does not contain all evidence

that this court may find admissible, we cannot determine whether the

-6-

evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Nor can we

determine whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence that may

arguably be relevant to issues raised in the post-conviction proceeding.

Id. at 816-17.

Although Petitioner’s brief fails to state what he believes his co-defendants would

have testified to had the post-conviction court not quashed the subpoenas, we conclude that

the excluded testimony was not obviously incompetent or per se irrelevant at the time of the

motion hearing, because the testimony was directly related to Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance claim. See e.g. Timothy Johns v. State, No. W2003-00677-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL

787146 (Tenn. Crim. App., Apr. 12, 2004), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner contended in his

petition that counsel was ineffective because she advised Petitioner to plead guilty without

conducting a thorough investigation and interviewing key witnesses. Petitioner argued that

his guilty plea was involuntary because of the ineffective assistance of counsel. At the time

of the motion hearing, the testimony of Petitioner’s co-defendants could be relevant to show

what counsel would have discovered had she interviewed these witnesses. Since the

testimony was not obviously incompetent or irrelevant, the post-conviction court should have

allowed counsel to make the requested offers of proof.

The State presented no evidence to support a motion to quash subpoenas for

Petitioner’s co-defendants. Absent any evidence, the motion should have been denied.

However, the error was harmless in light of the record discussed below.

Post-Conviction Hearing Analysis

At the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner testified that his trial counsel failed to

properly investigate the case, failed to interview his co-defendants, failed to explain the

offenses he was charged with, failed to advise him of compulsory process, and failed to

explain to him that an accomplice’s testimony alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

Petitioner testified that counsel should have subpoenaed several witnesses, including his co-

defendants, who would have testified at trial that he “had no parts of what happened or

whatever[;]” however, none of those witnesses testified at the post-conviction hearing.

Petitioner testified that trial counsel “coerced” and “pressured” him into accepting the

State’s plea offer. He testified that counsel told him that the State was seeking the death

penalty and that if he did not accept the plea offer, he would have received a life sentence if

convicted at trial. Petitioner also testified that counsel did not adequately prepare for his

defense and that she only met with him “when she[ ] want[ed] [him] to cop out to something,

telling [him] this [plea offer] is what she wanted [him] to do.” Petitioner testified that he

-7-

received other plea offers from the State before accepting the final plea offer. He testified

that trial counsel “would get mad at [him]” for not accepting the plea offer. Petitioner also

“thought [trial counsel] said [he would serve] nine years.”

Petitioner testified that he did not pay attention to the trial judge’s statement of the

agreed upon sentence at the guilty plea hearing, that he did not remember the plea hearing,

and that he was taking medication prescribed to him by his “mental health doctor” at that

time. Petitioner also did not recall signing the guilty plea form. He testified, “I have no idea.

I don’t know. I probably did.” He did not recall answering any of the trial judge’s questions

at the guilty plea hearing.

Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that she had been employed as an Assistant Public

Defender for 21 years. She was appointed to represent Petitioner. Counsel testified that she

“spent more time on [Petitioner’s] case than any that [she] ever had before.” She “made

numerous trips to the jail to see him, more than once in some weeks.” Counsel hired two

investigators to work on the case. Counsel testified that she was aware Petitioner had

suffered a head injury. Petitioner underwent a “standard mental evaluation,” and it was

determined that he was competent to assist in his defense and that Petitioner’s mental state

did not provide him with a defense in this case. She testified that Petitioner indicated he

understood their discussions, but then he would ask about the same issues repeatedly.

Trial counsel “talked with numerous witnesses.” She testified that she “made

numerous efforts to talk with Jeffrey Allen[,]” one of Petitioner’s co-defendants. After Mr.

Allen was convicted, trial counsel “spent half an afternoon at the jail trying to get permission

to talk with Mr. Allen and his lawyer came back and said, [‘]He doesn’t want to talk with

you.[’]” Trial counsel also had subpoenas issued for witnesses Petitioner wanted her to call

to testify at trial, but that those witnesses would have harmed Petitioner’s case. She testified

that other evidence, including Petitioner’s own statement, contradicted Petitioner’s defense

that he did not know his co-defendants intended to rob the victims. She testified that the

State’s case against Petitioner was strong.

Counsel testified that she read the guilty plea form and an explanation of rights form

to Petitioner and advised him of his sentence and release eligibility and that Petitioner signed

both documents. She also explained the elements of the crimes with which Petitioner was

charged and the legal concept of criminal responsibility. Counsel testified that she was

prepared for trial and was “surprised” when Petitioner agreed to accept the State’s plea offer.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that trial

counsel “went to extraordinary lengths to protect [Petitioner]’s rights.” The court found that

counsel thoroughly investigated the case and “made extensive trial preparations[.]” The court

-8-

also found that “[t]here [wa]s nothing whatsoever in th[e] record that indicates that

[Petitioner’s] plea was coerced.” The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for

post-conviction relief.

The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

During our review of the issues raised, we will afford those findings of fact the weight of a

jury verdict, and this Court is bound by the post-conviction court’s findings unless the

evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d

572, 578 (Tenn. 1997); Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This

Court may not reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence, nor substitute its inferences for those

drawn by the post-conviction court. See State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn.

2001). However, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are reviewed under a purely

de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450,

458 (Tenn. 2001).

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance

of counsel, he must first establish that the services rendered or the advice given were below

the standard range of competence. Second, he must show that the deficiencies “actually had

an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). As to guilty peas, the petitioner must establish a reasonable

probability that, but for the errors of his counsel, he would not have entered the plea. Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). When determining the

knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea, the standard is “whether the plea represents

a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the

defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162

(1970); see also State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999).

In order for a guilty plea to be voluntary, the petitioner must have an understanding

of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, including “the sentence

that he will be forced to serve as the result of his guilty plea and conviction.” Id. at 905. A

petitioner’s solemn declaration in open court that his or her plea is knowing and voluntary

creates a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding because these

declarations “carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74

(1977).

We conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings that trial

counsel more than adequately prepared for trial. Counsel interviewed witnesses, had

subpoenas issued, and thoroughly discussed with Petitioner the issues, trial strategy, and

potential sentences.

-9-

We also conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that but for counsel’s alleged

deficiencies he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Petitioner did not testify that he would not have pleaded guilty had trial counsel not

performed the errors which Petitioner alleged. Absent such testimony, Petitioner is precluded

from showing that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiencies. The transcript of the

guilty plea hearing shows that Petitioner expressed his understanding of his rights and the

effect a guilty plea had on his rights. Petitioner acknowledged that he signed the guilty plea

form. The trial court explained the offenses to which Petitioner was pleading guilty and the

sentence Petitioner was receiving. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood. Petitioner

stated that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. Trial counsel testified at the

post-conviction hearing that she advised Petitioner of the charges against him, the possible

sentences, the strengths, and more applicable, the weaknesses of his case, and counsel

testified that she did not pressure Petitioner to accept the State’s plea offer. The post-

conviction court clearly accredited trial counsel’s testimony and discredited Petitioner’s.

Because we conclude that the record fails to show any prejudice to Petitioner as to any

alleged deficient performance by his attorney, the post-conviction court’s error in quashing

Petitioner’s subpoenas is rendered harmless.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

_________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE

-10-