The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
§
VERNARD BROWN, JR., §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Case No. 6:19-CV-332-JDK-JDL
§
LORIE DAVIS, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Vernard Brown, Jr., an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
the above-styled and numbered civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case
was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John D. Love pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
On November 26, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (Docket No.
15), recommending that (1) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for money damages against Defendants in
their official capacities should be dismissed without prejudice; (2) Plaintiff’s § 1983 supervisory
claims against Defendants Davis, Barnett, and Meador in their individual capacities should be
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); (3) Plaintiff’s claims for
monetary damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)
against Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and
(4) Plaintiff’s claims brought under RLUIPA against Defendants in their individual capacities
should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Id. at 10.
The Magistrate Judge also recommended that (1) Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
brought pursuant to RLUIPA should be allowed to proceed against all Defendants in their official
capacities; (2) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Taylor, Sherman, Biscoe, Fite, Gossett,
Morrow, Brasher, Farris, Thompson, Toon, Totty, and Raheem in their individual capacities
should be allowed to proceed; and (3) Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under § 1983 should
be allowed to proceed against all Defendants in their official capacities. Id. Plaintiff filed
objections on December 11, 2019. Docket No. 18.
In his pleadings, Plaintiff states that he is a Modern Taoist and alleges that Defendants have
not provided him with a diet that complies with his Modern Taoist practices. Docket No. 1 at 7;
Docket No. 12 at 3–4. Plaintiff alleges that he has refused the food provided to him on several
occasions because it does not comply with his religious beliefs. Docket No. 12 at 5–7. He
claims that he has sent six requests to the food service manager and filed step-one and step-two
grievances on this matter, but prison staff has not provided him with food that complies with
his religious practices. Docket No. 1 at 7. As a result, he brings this suit against Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA. Docket No. 12 at 10–11.
The Magistrate Judge first recommended that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for money damages
against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed without prejudice because these
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Docket No. 15 at 4–5. Plaintiff did not object to
this recommendation and instead stated that “Plaintiff is not suing any of the defendants for
monetary relief in their official capacities.” Docket No. 18 at 3. The Court therefore dismisses
Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983.
Next, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s § 1983 supervisory claims
brought against Defendants Davis, Barnett, and Meador in their individual capacities should be
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) because Plaintiff did not “allege any facts
detailing the personal involvement of Defendants Davis, Barnett, and Meador in violation of his
constitutional rights.” Docket No. 15 at 6. Plaintiff objects that these supervisory claims should
not be dismissed because Defendants Davis, Barnett, and Meador “were made personally aware
of [the] constitutional violation.” Docket No. 18 at 2–3. Plaintiff also cites Turner v. Safley to
argue that the prison regulations prevented him from receiving a diet in compliance with his
religious tenets and infringed on his constitutional rights. See id.
“[A] supervisor may be held liable if there exists either (1) his personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987).
“Mere knowledge and acquiescence on a supervisor’s part is insufficient to create supervisory
liability under § 1983.” Doe v. Bailey, No. H-14-2985, 2015 WL 5737666, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
30, 2015).
Plaintiff’s objection thus fails because he alleged only “mere knowledge” by Davis,
Barnett, and Meador. Further, Turney v. Safley does not support Plaintiff’s argument
because it does not alter Plaintiff’s burden to plead a supervisor’s personal involvement or a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor and the constitutional violation. See Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Plaintiff’s § 1983 supervisory claims against Defendants Davis,
Barnett, and Meador in their individual capacities are therefore dismissed.
Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims for monetary
damages against Defendants and his RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). Docket No. 15 at 5–6.
In his objections, Plaintiff agrees with the Magistrate Judge that RLUIPA does not “provide for
[monetary] relief” and states that he “only intended to sue all the defendants in both their official
and individual capacities for injunctive relief.” Docket No. 18 at 2. However, “an
action under RLUIPA does not exist for individual-capacity claims.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State
of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 329 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims for monetary damages
and RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their individual capacities are therefore dismissed
with prejudice.
Having made a de novo review of the objections raised by Plaintiff to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report, the Court is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate
Judge are correct and Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. The Court therefore adopts the
findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of the Court.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Docket No.
15) be ADOPTED. It is further
ORDERED that the claims for money damages against Defendants in their official
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s supervisory claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Davis, Barnett, and Meador in their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages under RLUIPA against the
Defendants in their official and individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA against the Defendants in their
individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDCIE pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). It is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff may proceed with his RLUIPA and § 1983 claims against all
Defendants in their official capacities only for prospective injunctive relief. And, finally, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff may proceed with his § 1983 claims against Defendants
Taylor, Sherman, Biscoe, Fite, Gossett, Morrow, Brasher, Farris, Thompson, Toon, Totty, and
Raheem in their individual capacities.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 18th day of December, 2019.
Deicon
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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