Opinion

In Re Sb

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Filed: Jun 27, 2024
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 29.7%

“The question of jurisdiction is always within the scope of this Court’s review.”

How later courts described this case

“The question of jurisdiction is always within the scope of this Court’s review.”
a defendant preserves a constitutional claim by “presenting [it] to the trial court.”
concluding that trial court’s entry of equitable relief was not unwarranted even though the plaintiff “did not expressly request entry of an injunction or a declaratory order”
“Appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims is for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In re SB. FOR PUBLICATION

No.

June 27,

Circuit

2024 Court

9:05 a.m.

AB,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v No. 367014

Clinton Circuit Court

Family Division

SB, LC No. 2022-030774-PP

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and N. P. HOOD and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent, SB, appeals as of right the trial court’s order finding him guilty of criminal

contempt for violating a domestic personal protection order (PPO) concerning petitioner, AB.

Respondent also appeals the court’s order extending the duration of the PPO. We affirm both

orders.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time of these contempt proceedings, petitioner and respondent were married, but in

the process of divorcing. They do not have children together. Petitioner initiated divorce

proceedings in early August 2022, and she left the marital home later that month. At the time of

the instant proceedings, the parties lived in different houses in the same subdivision on a circular

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road. Respondent’s house was located across the street and one house over from petitioner’s house

(the former marital home) 1; they lived only 140 to 200 feet from each other.

In August 2022, petitioner filed a petition asking the trial court to issue an ex parte PPO

against respondent under MCR 600.2950 (domestic PPO). Petitioner alleged numerous instances

of improper conduct by respondent beginning in May 2022, when he allegedly screamed at her,

falsely accused her of cheating, smashed holes in the walls, kicked a hole in a door, tore down

window treatments, and destroyed bed sheets. She alleged various other threatening, violent, and

harassing behavior by respondent in July and August 2022. Petitioner alleged that she feared

respondent because he frequently used substances, stalked her, and was violent and unpredictable.

The trial court issued an ex parte PPO, prohibiting respondent from (1) “entering onto

property where petitioner lives”; (2) “assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding”

petitioner; (3) “stalking[—]as defined under MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i[—]that includes

but is not limited to . . . following petitioner or appearing within [her] sight,” “sending mail or

other communications to petitioner,” and “approaching or confronting petitioner in a public place

or on private property”; and (4) “interfering with petitioner at [her] place of employment or

education or engaging in conduct that impairs [her] employment or educational relationship or

environment.” The PPO apprised respondent that violating the order would subject him to

immediate arrest, to the criminal contempt powers of the court, and, if found guilty, to

imprisonment for not more than 93 days and a fine of not more than $500. The PPO was

immediately effective for six months, expiring on February 28, 2023.

In November 2022, petitioner filed a show-cause motion, seeking to hold respondent in

contempt.2 Petitioner alleged that respondent was “continuing to stalk me, asking others to relay

messages to me, and interfering with my employment.” After the parties agreed to extend the PPO

an additional six months, the motion did not move forward. The trial court entered an amended

PPO extending the expiration date to August 27, 2023, and prohibiting the same conduct.3

Relevant to this appeal, in March 2023, petitioner filed another show-cause motion, again

seeking to hold respondent in criminal contempt for violating the PPO via continuing stalking and

harassing behavior between November 2022 and March 2023. Petitioner filed a third show-cause

The parties apparently owned both houses and had previously used respondent’s house as a rental

property. The record indicates that before these PPO proceedings began, the court in their divorce

proceedings entered an ex parte order allowing petitioner “exclusive use” of the marital home.

MCR 3.708(B)(1) permits a petitioner to file a motion to have a respondent who violates the PPO

held in contempt.

The amended PPO additionally prohibited respondent from “intentionally causing petitioner

mental distress or exerting control over petitioner by: injuring, killing, torturing, or neglecting, or

threatening to injure, kill, torture, or neglect any animal in which petitioner has an ownership

interest,” removing such animal from her possession, and “retaining or obtaining possession of”

such animal.

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motion in April 2023 seeking the same relief and alleging further harassment by respondent.

Respondent was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to criminal contempt that same month.4

At the conclusion of a hearing, the trial court found respondent guilty of criminal contempt

for violating the PPO. The court initially stated:

So we have had our hearing on these allegations and the burden of proof is beyond

a reasonable doubt. Now in looking at each and every allegation individually all

by themselves I don’t believe a finding could be made. In looking at all of them

together, the totality of the circumstances, that is what I’m going to do. [Emphasis

added.]

The court then provided its factual findings, beginning with petitioner’s allegations involving

surveillance equipment respondent installed facing her home:

So we will start with the video cameras because that that is the first thing that I

wrote down that was of concern to me. [Respondent] testified that there were not

video cameras that were placed at the house that he [previously] lived at with

[petitioner]. . . . [T]here were no surveillance cameras on that home and

[respondent] chose to put surveillance cameras on the home that he lives in now.

One of them is on the front of the garage and the other one is pointed directly at

[petitioner’s] house. . . . Her testimony I found quite compelling. Her demeanor I

found to be compelling . . . [.] [S]he testified to the emotional distress that having

those cameras, at least the one, pointed at her house caused her . . . because she was

told and there’s evidence of that in text messages that [respondent] could see in her

home. I would suffice it to say that even if [respondent] couldn’t see directly in her

home, having a camera pointed directly at someone’s home in this type of situation

where there’s clearly hostility at best, hostility between the two would be very

harassing and very intimidating and does go against the order of the court[. A]nd I

will bring our attention to the order of the court where [respondent] is prohibited

from stalking as defined by MCL 750.411(H) and MCL 750.411(I), which states it

includes but is not limited to and there were certain things that the court marked

off. Now, no, I didn’t put on here you’re not allowed to put security cameras up.

I didn’t do that and I think that’s why this order says it’s including but not limited

to. It is behavior that would cause a reasonable person to feel distressed[. And it

would evoke] emotional distress to have a camera of [sic, on] someone where

there’s hostility[,] whether it’s a soon to be ex-spouse or if it’s a neighbor that

Petitioner filed a fourth show-cause motion concerning an April 12, 2023 incident involving

respondent that is not at issue, though is somewhat relevant, in this appeal. Specifically, the trial

court adjourned a hearing concerning this incident because respondent was criminally charged

with aggravated stalking of petitioner.

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you’re having conflict with. A reasonable person would feel intimidated and

harassed by that . . . .

The court made additional findings concerning a window in respondent’s garage, a sign reading

“Ho Ho Ho” displayed in the car window of respondent’s son, and golf balls allegedly hit into

petitioner’s yard:

That takes me to the window that was placed in [respondent’s] garage. . . . [I]t is

very concerning, at best, to this court that a wall was cut into to put a window that

specifically faces the house of someone [petitioner] that has a PPO on you

[respondent]. By itself[,] could [this] rise to the level [of intimidation or

harassment? N]o, but I think taking [this] in conjunction with other issues . . . , I

absolutely find that as a method used to intimidate and to harass [petitioner]. In

terms of the sign, . . . that was one of those things that could have likely been

avoided and probably should have. . . . [I]s it a criminal offense to put a sign in your

car[? I]t’s not, but the sign went up on March 1st, put in a place not once but twice

in a car and then also in the garage facing [petitioner’s] house with the words ho,

ho, ho. Golf balls in the yard, I don’t know. I’m not using that as one of

my . . . findings because I don’t know. I’m not sure. There was testimony that

there weren’t golf balls before in the yard[,] then there was testimony that there

was. I’m—I’m not sure but I will say that if golf balls are being hit into

[petitioner’s] yard then that would absolutely be a violation of the PPO.

The court also discussed allegations that respondent screamed at petitioner’s therapy dog and

called her a slut:

Screaming at the dog, [petitioner’s] therapy dog. . . . This dog is living with

[petitioner] and if she’s walking down the road and she has her dog and she’s taking

her dog for a walk and that person that has a PPO filed against them yells out to get

the dog’s attention, it absolutely goes towards intimidating and harassing

[petitioner]. . . . Then we have the—the screaming slut[,] and I find this stuff to be

extremely antagonistic, extremely harassing, intimidating. [Petitioner’s] father

testified and I found him to be very credible in his testimony. [“]I heard

[respondent] say it. I know it was him. I know his voice.[”] Of course [petitioner’s

father] knows [respondent’s] voice. It was his son in law. He knows where it came

from. . . . It’s not necessary to stand outside and scream names at someone. I don’t

care that [respondent] didn’t say [petitioner’s name]. He said slut.

Lastly, the court made various findings concerning alleged electronic stalking and/or harassment

by respondent:

Then we talk about LinkedIn. No, there’s nothing in here that says you’re not

allowed to look at people’s profiles but I am familiar with LinkedIn and I know

what happens[,] and when someone clicks on your page and someone starts reading

your information, a notification goes to that person that says hey, so and so is

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looking at your LinkedIn page. It seems to me if someone has a PPO against you,

you don’t go on their LinkedIn page. You don’t go on any of their pages. You

don’t do that. That is stalking. That is continuous pattern of behavior where you’re

interfering in this person’s daily life one way or another. The same with the Bible

app comment. I absolutely believe that [respondent] knew that when he was putting

that comment on that app that it would be directly related to [petitioner]. It’s an

app that they share together. They had used it together in the past[,] and

[respondent] knows what he’s doing. Again, by itself is it—is it all alone something

that I can say is a violation of the PPO[? N]o. [But i]t’s continuous behavior here.

A continuous pattern of behavior.[5]

The trial court concluded as follows:

Those are eight things that I just went through of continuous behavior. A pattern

of violating this personal protection order by way of intimidation and harassment

that . . . a reasonable person would absolutely find to be intimidating and it would

cause them emotional distress. I have—I have no doubts about that. . . . I find that

proof was made beyond a reasonable doubt that [respondent] is guilty of criminal

contempt by violating this personal protection order after going through all of the

items that I did and by the totality of the circumstances showing a clear pattern, a

clear continuous behavior of intimidat[ion] and harassment[.] [Emphasis added.]

The trial court sentenced respondent to serve 93 days in jail. Further, the trial court, on its own

motion, extended the PPO, which was set to expire on August 27, 2023, until June 28, 2024.6 This

appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process of

the law by applying an incorrect standard of proof to find him guilty of criminal contempt for

violating the PPO. Respondent also argues that the trial court violated his due-process right to

present a defense by prohibiting his son from testifying. Lastly, respondent argues that the trial

court abused its discretion by extending the PPO on its own motion.

The parties and other witnesses testified regarding an additional allegation that respondent

harassed petitioner at a school swim meet they both attended. The trial court did not mention this

swim-meet incident, and thus apparently did not rely on it.

The record reveals that upon respondent’s release from jail on September 13, 2023, petitioner

filed another show-cause motion alleging that respondent violated the extended PPO. Specifically,

petitioner alleged that respondent was using his son as a “surrogate” to stalk and intimidate her.

Petitioner also alleged that respondent loudly swore at her friends in her driveway and made a false

police report alleging that she had damaged his window.

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A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court has set forth the following standards for reviewing a trial court’s decision to

hold a party in criminal contempt:

We review a trial court’s decision to hold a party in contempt for an abuse of

discretion. The nature of the contempt order and whether the contempt statute

permitted the sanctions imposed are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.

When examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal-contempt

finding following a bench trial, this Court views the evidence presented in a light

most favorable to the prosecution to determine if the elements of the crime were

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the trial court’s factual findings

in a contempt proceeding are reviewed for clear error, and we must affirm if there

is competent evidence to support them. We do not weigh the evidence or the

credibility of the witnesses in determining whether there is competent evidence to

support the findings. Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences arising

from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements. [In re JCB,

336 Mich App 736, 747-748; 971 NW2d 705 (2021) (citations omitted).]

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of principled

outcomes.” In re KJL, 342 Mich App 283, 293; 995 NW2d 361 (2022) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). “Clear error exists when this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake was made.” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 668; 765 NW2d 44

(2009).

This Court reviews a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich

App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). “Furthermore, where the trial court’s factual findings may

have been influenced by an incorrect view of the law, an appellate court’s review of those findings

is not limited to clear error.” Id. “Whether a party has been afforded due process is a question of

law, subject to review de novo.” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 668.

This Court also reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to exclude

evidence. People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 441; 639 NW2d 291 (2001). “Whether a

defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a defense is a question of law” subject to

review de novo. People v King, 297 Mich App 465, 472; 824 NW2d 258 (2012).

Finally, this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to continue a PPO for an abuse of

discretion. See Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 325-326, 329; 760 NW2d 503 (2008). As

it concerns this issue, this Court reviews de novo the proper interpretation of a court rule. Maki

Estate v Coen, 318 Mich App 532, 538; 899 NW2d 11 (2017). “The interpretation and application

of a court rule is governed by the principles of statutory construction, commencing with an

examination of the plain language of the court rule.” Id. at 540 (quotation marks, citation, and

alteration omitted).

The goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent,

focusing first on the statute’s plain language. When a statute’s language is

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unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed,

and the statute must be enforced as written. In addition, we must give effect to

every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders

nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute. [Id. (quotation marks and citations

omitted).]

However, respondent never preserved his claims of error related to his son’s testimony and

the trial court’s order extending the PPO. Concerning the former, the record shows that the trial

court precluded the son from being present in the courtroom during the proceedings, but

respondent never provided any argument for the son to testify apart from simply naming the son

on his witness list.

Specifically, after the first day of the contempt hearing, the trial court entered an order

stating, “In addition, the Court requested that the minor child of Respondent not be in the

courtroom due to a letter that was provided by the child’s biological mother . . . .”7 At the

beginning of the hearing’s second day, the court reiterated that the son was not permitted to be

present. Respondent’s counsel noted that the son was listed as a witness “in our documents,” but

neither counsel nor respondent made any request or argument for the son to testify at that time.

Indeed, counsel implied that they were deferring to the mother’s preference for the time being

because she and respondent shared joint legal custody over the son.

Thus, nothing in the record shows that respondent ever actually attempted to call his son

as a witness at trial. More importantly, respondent never made any offer of proof regarding the

son’s testimony or raised the instant due-process objection to precluding the son’s testimony.

Because these steps were required to preserve his evidentiary and constitutional claims, respondent

never preserved this issue for appeal. See MRE 103(a)(2) (to preserve a claim of error in the

exclusion of evidence, a party must “inform[] the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless

the substance was apparent from the context”); King, 297 Mich App at 472 (a defendant preserves

a constitutional claim by “presenting [it] to the trial court.”).

Concerning the trial court’s sua sponte order to extend the PPO, we acknowledge that “a

party . . . need not preserve an objection to ‘a finding or decision’ made by the trial court,

MCR 2.517(A)(7) or, at least under some circumstances, to other acts or omissions undertaken

sua sponte by a court.” Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227-228; 964 NW2d

809 (2020), citing In re Gach, 315 Mich App 83, 97; 889 NW2d 707 (2016). Nevertheless, after

the trial court extended the PPO on its own motion, it asked respondent’s counsel, “Is there

anything else that you need to put on the record with regards to today’s hearings . . . ?” Counsel

moved for bond pending appeal, which the trial court denied, but did not raise the issue of the

propriety of the court’s sua sponte extension of the PPO. Nor is there any indication in the record

that respondent otherwise moved to modify or rescind the extended PPO. Accordingly, given

respondent’s opportunity but failure to raise any objection regarding the PPO’s extension, we deem

this issue forfeited and unpreserved. Cf Glaker-Davis, 333 Mich App at 228 (“The purpose of the

appellate preservation requirements is to induce litigants to do what they can in the trial court to

The letter from the mother is included in the lower court record and indicates that she objected

to the son’s presence in the courtroom as a witness or participant.

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prevent error and eliminate its prejudice, or to create a record of the error and its prejudice. [The

p]laintiff clearly did everything reasonable to bring this issue to the trial court’s attention.”)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

This Court reviews unpreserved issues in criminal proceedings8 for plain error. In re

Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 666; see also King, 297 Mich App at 472 (“Appellate review

of unpreserved constitutional claims is for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial

rights.”). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error

must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected

substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To demonstrate

error that affected substantial rights, a defendant must establish “prejudice, i.e., that the error

affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. “Reversal is warranted only when the

plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error

seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent

of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. STANDARD OF PROOF AND FINDING OF CONTEMPT

Respondent contends the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process of the

law by applying an incorrect standard of proof to find him guilty of criminal contempt for violating

the PPO. According to respondent, the court erred by finding him guilty under the totality of the

circumstances where it also said it could not find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any of

the particular, individual allegations at issue. Stated differently, respondent argues that the trial

court did not properly apply the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in finding him guilty of

criminal contempt because it relied on the totality of the circumstances. We conclude that the trial

court did not violate respondent’s right to due process or otherwise abuse its discretion by

considering the totality of the circumstances and determining that his conduct violated the PPO

beyond a reasonable doubt.

“No person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” In

re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 669, citing US Const, Am XIV, § 1; Const 1963, art 1,

§ 17. Thus, “criminal penalties may not be imposed upon an individual who was not afforded the

protections that the Constitution requires in criminal proceedings.” Ferranti v Electrical

Resources Co, 330 Mich App 439, 448; 948 NW2d 596 (2019).

“A person who fails to comply with a domestic PPO issued under MCL 600.2950 is subject

to the criminal-contempt powers of the trial court.” In re KJL, 342 Mich App at 293, citing MCL

600.2950(23). “Criminal contempt is a quasi-crime because it is not intended to punish conduct

proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws, but rather is designed to serve the limited

“Although criminal contempt is really only a ‘quasi-crime,’ criminal contempt proceedings

encompass many of the same due process safeguards available to defendants charged with

traditional crimes.” In re Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 243 Mich App 697, 713; 624 NW2d 443 (2000),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Porter v Porter, 285 Mich App 450, 458-461;

776 NW2d 377 (2009).

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purpose of vindicating the authority of the court.” In re LT, 342 Mich App 126, 134; 992 NW2d

903 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A criminal-contempt proceeding ‘requires

some, but not all, of the due process safeguards of an ordinary criminal trial . . . .’ ” Id., quoting

In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 Mich 81, 91; 413 NW2d 392 (1987). “A party charged with

criminal contempt is presumed innocent, enjoys the right against self-incrimination, and the

contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Porter v Porter, 285 Mich App 450, 456;

776 NW2d 377 (2009) (emphasis added). See also MCR 3.708(H)(3); In re KJL, 342 Mich App

at 293. Thus, “[i]n order to find a defendant guilty of criminal contempt, a willful disregard or

disobedience of a court order must be clearly and unequivocally shown and proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” In re LT, 342 Mich App at 135 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“A trial judge is presumed to know the law,” including the applicable standard of proof.

Demski v Petlick, 309 Mich App 404, 427; 873 NW2d 596 (2015) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Here, the trial court explicitly stated several times that petitioner bore the burden of

proving criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the court stated on the record, “I

find that proof was made beyond a reasonable doubt that [respondent] is guilty of criminal

contempt by violating this personal protection order . . . .” And the court’s written order states,

“By proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the respondent was found guilty of criminal contempt.”

Thus, the trial court was clearly aware that it was required to apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

standard. See MCR 3.708(H)(3); In re KJL, 342 Mich App at 293.

Respondent, however, refers this Court to the following statement from the trial court:

“Now in looking at each and every allegation individually all by themselves I don’t believe a

finding could be made. In looking at all of them together, the totality of the circumstances, that is

what I’m going to do.” But immediately preceding that statement, the trial court said, “So we have

had our hearing on these allegations and the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt,” again

indicating its awareness of the proper standard of proof. The issue therefore becomes whether the

trial court properly applied the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in finding respondent guilty

of criminal contempt for violating the PPO.

“[A] party may be held in criminal contempt for violating the plain, written conditions

delineated in [a] PPO.” In re JCB, 336 Mich App at 738. The PPO issued against respondent

expressly prohibited “stalking as defined under MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i, that includes

but is not limited to:” “following petitioner or appearing within [her] sight,” “sending mail or other

communications to petitioner,” and “approaching or confronting petitioner in a public place or on

private property.” (Emphasis added.) The PPO further prohibited respondent from “engaging in

conduct that impairs [petitioner’s] employment or educational relationship or environment.” The

PPO thus clearly “embodied” petitioner’s “right to be left alone” by respondent. In re KJL, 342

Mich App at 300.9

As discussed, the PPO also prohibited respondent from “entering onto property where petitioner

lives”; from “assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding” her; and from “intentionally

causing petitioner mental distress or exerting control over petitioner” regarding certain conduct

toward her animals. Although petitioner’s allegation regarding respondent placing golf balls in

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Again, the PPO here was premised on, among other things, stalking activity as defined by

statute. “Stalking” is defined in MCL 750.411h(1)(e) and MCL 750.411i(1)(e)10 as “a willful

course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would

cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or

molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,

harassed, or molested.” (Emphasis added.) “Harassment” is defined as “conduct directed toward

a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would

cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to

suffer emotional distress.” MCL 750.411h(1)(e) (emphasis added).11

“Unconsented contact” means any contact with another individual that is

initiated or continued without that individual’s consent or in disregard of that

individual’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.

Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:

(i) Following or appearing within the sight of that individual.

(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on

private property.

(iii) Appearing at that individual’s workplace or residence.

(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by

that individual.

(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.

(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.

(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,

leased, or occupied by that individual. [MCL 750.411h(1)(f) (emphasis added).]

her front and back yard would constitute “entering onto property where petitioner lives,” the trial

court did not rely on that to find respondent in contempt. There are no other allegations at issue

that respondent entered onto petitioner’s property, physically assaulted petitioner, or exerted

control over her dog by injuring or neglecting the dog, threatening to do so, or removing the dog

from her possession.

MCL 750.411h prohibits stalking, and MCL 750.411i prohibits aggravated stalking. The

relevant definitions are the same.

“[H]arassment is not limited to unconsented contact.” Berryman v Mackey, 327 Mich App 711,

723; 935 NW2d 94 (2019).

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“Course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or more separate

noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.” MCL 750.411h(1)(a). “ ‘Emotional

distress’ means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily, require

medical or other professional treatment or counseling.” MCL 750.411h(1)(c).

“Accordingly, under Michigan civil and criminal law, stalking constitutes a willful course

of conduct whereby the victim of repeated or continuous harassment actually is, and a reasonable

person would be, caused to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or

molested.” Nastal v Henderson & Assocs Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 722; 691 NW2d 1

(2005). Stated differently, “stalking entails a course or pattern of conduct that involves continuing

or repeated harassment arising out of separate noncontinuous acts . . . .” In re PF, 336 Mich App

118, 129; 969 NW2d 805 (2021). Further, “MCL 750.411h dictate[s] contemplation of all relevant

present and past incidents arising between the parties.” In re PF, 336 Mich App at 130. This

Court’s application of the stalking statute in In re PF, 336 Mich App at 129, in the context of

issuing a PPO premised on stalking activity, is insightful:

[T]he sixth incident could not be viewed in isolation or a vacuum; rather, the pattern

of conduct between and involving the parties, including the first five incidents, had

to be examined in its entirety. The earlier incidents could give explanation or

context to the sixth incident by providing insight on intent, continuity of purpose,

the reasonableness of beliefs, and states of mind or feelings relative to terror, fright,

intimidation, threats, harassment, and molestation. . . . [S]talking entails a course

or pattern of conduct that involves continuing or repeated harassment arising out of

separate noncontinuous acts, MCL 750.411h(1), thereby justifying the issuance of

a PPO to halt the ongoing conduct. Stated otherwise, multiple acts or a series of

acts are necessarily required to issue a PPO based on stalking conduct, and any one

of the acts can shed light on the other acts. One incident can change the dynamics

and meaning of surrounding incidents.

This Court further noted as follows:

For example, there could be three incidents between parties that outwardly

appeared innocent, but then a fourth incident makes absolutely clear that the earlier

incidents were not innocent and instead involved acts undertaken with a nefarious

intent or purpose. Or the fourth incident, standing alone, could appear entirely

innocent, but when the prior three incidents are considered in conjunction with the

fourth incident, the fourth incident could be construed as entailing unlawful

activity. [Id. at 129 n 5.]

In other words, the trial court “needs to have the ability to examine and consider the totality of the

circumstances when ruling on a PPO petition.” Id. at 130.

Given this authority, it was appropriate for the trial court to employ such an analysis when

evaluating whether respondent violated the PPO by “stalking as defined under MCL 750.411h and

MCL 750.411i that includes but is not limited to” (emphasis added), following petitioner or

appearing within her sight, sending mail or other communications to her, or approaching or

confronting her. That is, in determining whether respondent’s conduct constituted “stalking,”

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conduct plainly prohibited by the PPO, it was appropriate for the trial court to evaluate the

combined effect of respondent’s “repeated or continuing acts” to determine, beyond a reasonable

doubt, whether they rose to the level of a “willful pattern of conduct involving repeated or

continuing harassment” that “would cause a reasonable individual to feel terrorized, frightened,

intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested” and that actually caused petitioner to feel that way.

MCL 750.411h(1)(e).

Respondent argues that while circuit courts “may consider the totality of the circumstances

when determining whether or not to issue a PPO, Michigan law affords no such latitude to trial

courts when determining whether or not a violation of an already extant PPO has taken place.”

We disagree.

In so arguing, respondent relies on this Court’s holding in In re JCB, 336 Mich App at 738,

that “a party may be held in criminal contempt for violating the plain, written conditions delineated

in [a] PPO.” In In re JCB, this Court concluded that it was not necessary for the petitioner “to

demonstrate a pattern of action before seeking to hold the respondent in criminal contempt” for a

PPO violation; instead, it was sufficient that the respondent committed a listed, prohibited act. Id.

at 752. But this Court did not prohibit trial courts from considering the totality of the circumstances

to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether a respondent committed stalking in violation of

a PPO, which necessarily requires evaluation of a respondent’s course of conduct involving

repeated or continuing harassment causing emotional distress.

This Court explained as follows:

[The R]espondent submits that to present sufficient evidence to support criminal

contempt premised on a violation of the PPO, a petitioner must demonstrate again

to the court a course of conduct and harassment causing emotional distress.

Because [the] petitioner alleged “only the one instance of assault throughout all the

hearings,” [the] respondent claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support

the criminal contempt. We disagree. [In re JCB, 336 Mich App at 750.]

The Court elaborated that although the contempt proceeding involved only a single allegation of

assault in violation of the PPO at issue, “[the] petitioner need not allow repeated assaults to occur

to obtain relief.” Id. at 750-751. “Instead, when a PPO is premised on the stalking statute, MCL

750.411h, a course or pattern of conduct is examined, and therefore, all relevant present and past

incidents arising between the parties is pertinent for consideration. Furthermore, the plain

language of the PPO itself instructs on the next course of action.” Id. at 751 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Observing that “[t]he PPO expressly stated that [the] respondent was prohibited

from stalking as defined in MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411[l],” including by “approaching or

confronting the petitioner in a public place or on private property,” the Court concluded as follows:

At the show-cause hearing, [the] petitioner testified that he was mowing the

lawn . . . when he was suddenly punched and scratched by [the] respondent and his

shirt was torn. . . . This conduct violated the court’s PPO because it fell within the

prohibition against approaching or confronting the petitioner in a public place or on

private property. The issuance of the PPO plainly apprised [the] respondent that if

he committed a listed prohibited act, he was subject to immediate arrest and civil

-12-

and criminal contempt. [The r]espondent’s contention that [the] petitioner had to

demonstrate a pattern of action before seeking to hold [the] respondent in criminal

contempt is not supported by the language of the order. [In re JCB, 336 Mich App

at 751-752 (quotation marks and footnote omitted).]

Thus, the Court in In re JCB concluded that a violation of a PPO’s listed, prohibited act of

stalking was sufficient to establish criminal contempt, without demonstrating a new pattern of

continuing harassing conduct. But while there need not be a continuing pattern of action when a

respondent violates a PPO’s listed, prohibited act, this does not mean that the totality of the

circumstances may not be considered in assessing whether conduct in question constitutes stalking.

And here, unlike in In re JCB, the allegations do involve a continuing pattern of conduct under the

stalking statutes. Again, the stalking statutes explicitly referenced in the PPO, MCL 750.411h and

MCL 750.411i, prohibit a course or pattern of harassing conduct causing emotional distress. See

also In re KJL, 342 Mich App at 300 (“while the contact, viewed in isolation, was not particularly

alarming, this was not an isolated contact, as the trial court aptly observed, but instead was part of

a lengthy series of unlawful conduct and contact by [the respondent] that caused ongoing harm to

[the petitioner]”); In re PF, 336 Mich App at 130 (“[W]hen a PPO request is sought on the basis

of stalking conduct, the stalking statute, MCL 750.411h, must be examined and it requires, as

noted, a course or pattern of conduct. MCL 600.2950 and MCL 750.411h dictate contemplation

of all relevant present and past incidents arising between the parties.”).

Accordingly, in adjudicating criminal contempt for violating a PPO based in part on

stalking allegations, it was not improper for the trial court to consider respondent’s pattern of

conduct from a totality-of-the-circumstances perspective in concluding that petitioner established,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that respondent violated the PPO by stalking, or by otherwise engaging

in conduct that impaired petitioner’s environment. Such conduct was plainly prohibited by the

PPO. To hold that respondent could not be held in contempt for his continued stalking activity

because his acts might not fit neatly into the list of specifically prohibited activity, or might not be

harassment if viewed in isolation, would run contrary to the PPO’s plain language and caselaw

governing the stalking statutes at issue. This would also nullify the purpose of a PPO to protect

individuals “who are maliciously followed, harassed, or intimidated by stalkers.” Nastal, 471

Mich at 721.

In sum, the trial court did not adjudicate respondent’s guilt under an incorrect view of the

law by assessing respondent’s conduct from a totality-of-the-circumstances perspective. Nor did

it otherwise err in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt and based on the totality of the

circumstances, that respondent (1) continued to engage in a willful course of conduct involving

repeated or continuing harassment of petitioner that would cause a reasonable person emotional

distress, and did cause petitioner emotional distress, in violation of the PPO’s prohibition of

stalking, or (2) engaged in “a continuous pattern of . . . interfering in [petitioner’s] daily life one

way or another” in violation of the PPO’s prohibition of engaging in conduct that impaired

petitioner’s environment. It was proper for the court to consider respondent’s continued pattern

of harassing and intimidating conduct toward petitioner, i.e., the totality of the circumstances, to

establish that he violated the PPO, particularly where the PPO plainly prohibited such conduct.

Therefore, the trial court did not violate respondent’s right to due process or otherwise abuse its

discretion by considering the totality of the circumstances and determining that his conduct

violated the PPO beyond a reasonable doubt.

-13-

We also conclude that the evidence, viewed as a whole and in context, sufficed to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent violated the PPO. Specifically, the combined effect of

respondent’s acts—including pointing a security camera directly at petitioner’s house, installing a

window that faced her house, yelling to her dog as she was walking on her street, yelling “slut” as

she was entering her house, and displaying or orchestrating display of the “Ho Ho Ho” sign in the

window of a car facing her house—along with petitioner’s testimony regarding the continued

harassment and the emotional distress caused,12 sufficiently established that respondent violated

the PPO’s prohibitions on stalking or engaging in conduct that impaired petitioner’s home

environment.

Although the trial court noted that respondent’s acts if viewed in isolation may not have

constituted a violation of the PPO, which did not explicitly prohibit those specific acts, it was

respondent’s continuing pattern of harassing and intimidating conduct that violated the PPO’s

prohibitions. And although respondent does not challenge any of the trial court’s particular factual

findings, we conclude, deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, that the court’s findings were supported by the

evidence. See In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 668. Because sufficient evidence

established beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent violated “the plain, written conditions

delineated in the PPO,” In re JCB, 336 Mich App at 738, either by his continued stalking conduct

or by engaging in conduct that impaired petitioner’s environment, the court properly held

respondent in criminal contempt. Under these circumstances, we reiterate that the trial court did

not violate respondent’s due process rights or otherwise abuse its discretion by considering the

totality of the circumstances and determining that his conduct violated the PPO beyond a

reasonable doubt.13

Petitioner testified that she did not feel safe in her home, was “scared every day in my house,”

felt uncomfortable walking around her neighborhood, was “anxious and depressed,” and had

difficulty sleeping.

Notably, although the trial court relied on the continued pattern of harassment in finding that

respondent violated the PPO, his conduct in waving his arms and yelling “slut” at petitioner from

his porch arguably constituted “appearing within [petitioner’s] sight” or “confronting” petitioner

in violation of the PPO’s specifically listed prohibited contact. See In re JCB, 336 Mich App at

750-752 (petitioner did not need to demonstrate a pattern of action before seeking to hold

respondent in criminal contempt). This Court, however, has cautioned against “a literal application

of the “appearing within sight” provision to prove criminal contempt where, as here, the petitioner

and the respondent are neighbors and “[the] respondent could be deemed in violation by merely

exiting his home and being viewed by [the] petitioner.” In re JCB, 336 Mich App at 752 n 3.

Nevertheless, this Court further noted that the petitioner in In re JCB “did not assert that [the]

respondent’s sole appearance was problematic, but rather, it was [the] respondent’s presence,

yelling, verbal abuse, and threats of violence.” Id. Similarly here, it was not merely respondent’s

presence within the curtilage of his own residence that petitioner asserted violated the PPO, but

also his screaming and obscenity directed at her.

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C. THE SON’S TESTIMONY

Respondent argues that the trial court violated his due-process right to present a defense by

prohibiting his son from testifying. We conclude that respondent has not shown that the trial court

committed plain, outcome-determinative error—as necessary to grant relief for this unpreserved

claim—by precluding his son from testifying.

“The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a

complete defense.” King, 297 Mich App at 473 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The due-

process right to present a defense includes the right to call witnesses. People v Yost, 278 Mich

App 341, 379; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). Accordingly, “the accused in a contempt proceeding is

entitled to . . . produce witnesses on his or her behalf.” DeGeorge v Warheit, 276 Mich App 587,

593; 741 NW2d 384 (2007). See also MCR 3.708(H)(2) (the respondent has the right to present

evidence and to examine and cross-examine witnesses at a contempt hearing for a violation of a

PPO). Thus, precluding a witness from testifying at a contempt hearing raises due-process

concerns. See DeGeorge, 276 Mich App at 594.

“Although the right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process, it is not

an absolute right.” People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 279; 364 NW2d 635 (1984). “The accused

must still comply with ‘established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both

fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.’ ” Id., quoting Chambers v

Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973).

“The rules of evidence apply to a hearing on a contempt charge.” In re Contempt of Henry,

282 Mich App at 670 n 1. Under MRE 402, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible unless the rules

of evidence, or the United States or Michigan constitutions, provide otherwise.” In re Contempt

of Henry, 282 Mich App at 670 n 1. “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the

existence of a fact that is of consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would

be without the evidence.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 114; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), citing

MRE 401. “Under this broad definition, evidence is admissible if it is helpful in throwing light on

any material point.” Aldrich, 246 Mich App at 114 (citation omitted).

“All witnesses are presumed to be competent to testify.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App

572, 583; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). “ ‘Unless the court finds after questioning a person that the

person does not have sufficient physical or mental capacity or sense of obligation to testify

truthfully and understandably, every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise

provided in these rules.’ ” Watson, 245 Mich App at 583, quoting MRE 601. Thus, a minor—

such as respondent’s 16-year-old son here—is presumed competent to testify so long as he or she

has sufficient capacity to do so truthfully and understandably.14 This Court has found no

impropriety in permitting a minor to testify. See Surman v Surman, 277 Mich App 287, 303-304;

745 NW2d 802 (2007) (11-year-old child competent to testify).

There is no evidence that the trial court evaluated the competency of respondent’s son to testify.

-15-

In People v Miller, 16 Mich App 647, 649; 168 NW2d 408 (1969), the defendant, who was

convicted of the criminal sexual assault of his 13-year-old daughter, argued that neither parent

consented to his 10-year old daughter’s testifying. This Court rejected that argument, stating,

“Although young children should not ordinarily be examined as witnesses to indecent matters,

they are competent witnesses and there is no impropriety in asking them as to the social intimacy

of the parties.” Id.

In this case, the record indicates that respondent’s son, who by all accounts was present

when the “Ho Ho Ho” sign incident occurred, would have had first-hand knowledge of the

circumstances surrounding it. Both parties testified that the sign was in the car that respondent’s

son usually drove, and that the son moved the vehicle and sign after petitioner called the police

and they arrived. Respondent testified that the car was at the edge of the road merely because his

son was playing basketball in the driveway, and that the sign was present because his son was

cleaning his car. Therefore, respondent’s son could likely provide relevant testimony on a material

matter. Because respondent’s son was presumed competent to testify, it would have been improper

to preclude him from testifying solely on the basis that he was a minor, or because his mother

expressed her preference that he not participate in the contempt proceedings.15

Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the record does not show that respondent ever actually

asked the trial court to allow his son to testify at the contempt hearing following the mother’s

desire that the son not participate. Respondent also never provided any offer of proof regarding

the son’s testimony, nor any objection to the purported exclusion. Accordingly, the trial court’s

alleged error in precluding the son from testifying is neither clear nor obvious from the existing

record, i.e., respondent has not shown that the court committed plain error. See Carines, 460 Mich

at 763. Regardless, assuming arguendo that the trial court did preclude respondent’s son from

testifying—a possibility considering the court’s statements prohibiting the son’s presence in the

courtroom—and that it did so in error, respondent has not shown that the error was outcome-

determinative. Id.

Respondent supports his argument as follows:

Upon information and belief, had [respondent’s] son . . . been permitted to

testify, he would have likely stated that his vehicle was at the end of the driveway

because he had recently played basketball in the driveway and that the sign at issue

was—among other items in his vehicle—located in his vehicle because he was in

the process of cleaning out the truck (it was messy).

This purported testimony clearly corroborates respondent’s version of the circumstances

surrounding the sign, which likely would have bolstered his defense to that facet of the alleged

harassment, as well as his credibility. However, there is no evidence, nor other indication in the

record, that respondent’s son would have actually testified in such a manner. Again, there is no

indication in the record that respondent made an offer of proof before the trial court as to what his

As discussed, it does not appear that the trial court ever specifically precluded the son from

testifying, but the court did preclude the son’s general presence in court based on the mother’s

letter objecting to the son’s presence in the courtroom as a witness or participant.

-16-

son would testify to, or that his son’s testimony would have been favorable to respondent. Nor did

respondent present anything on appeal, such as an affidavit by his son, to attempt to establish that

he would have testified in the manner respondent asserts. In short, there is no record support for

respondent’s contention that his son would have corroborated respondent’s testimony regarding

the sign incident.

Further, respondent testified in his own defense regarding the sign incident, and thus was

not precluded from presenting a defense to that allegation. Notably, respondent does not assert in

his brief on appeal that his son would testify that respondent did not place the sign in the window

or direct the son to do so. And the trial court’s contempt finding relied on several other acts of

harassing conduct, making it unlikely that any error in precluding respondent’s son from testifying

about the circumstances surrounding the sign incident was outcome-determinative. See Carines,

460 Mich at 763.

For these reasons, respondent has not shown that the absence of his son’s testimony

affected the outcome of the contempt proceedings, or that he was denied his constitutional right to

present his defense. Therefore, respondent has not established entitlement to appellate relief on

this issue.

D. EXTENSION OF PPO

Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by extending the PPO on its

own motion. We similarly conclude that respondent has not shown that the trial court committed

plain, outcome-determinative error under this issue.

As an initial matter, we must address a potential jurisdictional defect related to this issue

on appeal. See Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 622; 689 NW2d 506 (2004) (“The question

of jurisdiction is always within the scope of this Court’s review.”); MCR 7.216(A)(10) (the Court

of Appeals may, at any time, in its discretion, dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction). This is

because this appeal arises as of right, but respondent’s challenge to the court’s extension of the

PPO is arguably only appealable by leave granted.

“The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is provided by law, and its practice and procedure

are prescribed by the court rules and our Supreme Court.” Walsh, 263 Mich App at 622.

MCL 600.308(1) grants this Court “jurisdiction on appeals from all final judgments and final

orders from the circuit court, court of claims, and probate court, as those terms are defined by law

and supreme court rule . . . .” MCR 3.709(A) provides that, “[e]xcept as provided by this rule,

appeals involving personal protection order matters must comply with subchapter 7.200.” MCR

3.709(B) provides for an appeal from the entry of a PPO as follows:

(1) Either party has an appeal of right from

(a) an order granting or denying a personal protection order after a hearing

under subrule 3.705(B)(6), or

(b) the ruling on respondent’s first motion to rescind or modify the order if

an ex parte order was entered.

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(2) Appeals of all other orders are by leave to appeal.

MCR 3.709(C) provides for an appeal from a finding after a violation hearing as follows:

(1) The respondent has an appeal of right from a sentence for criminal

contempt entered after a contested hearing.

(2) All other appeals concerning violation proceedings are by application

for leave.

The trial court’s order sentencing respondent to 93 days in jail is appealable as of right

under MCR 3.709(C)(1), but the challenge to the order extending the PPO, entered after the

contempt hearing, is arguably not an appeal from a sentence for criminal contempt coming under

MCR 3.709(C)(1). Nevertheless, as elaborated later within the substantive analysis of this issue,

we construe the PPO’s extension as part of the trial court’s sentencing under MCR 3.708(H)(5).

Under this provision, “[i]n addition to such a sentence [for violating a PPO], the court may impose

other conditions to the [PPO].” The trial court here, in addition to entering its separate order

extending the PPO, noted as follows on the criminal-contempt order sentencing respondent: “Other

conditions: Extending the PPO dated 1/9/2023 to 8/27/2023 to 6/8/2024.” Because the court

clearly contemplated the PPO’s extension as a condition of its sentence, respondent’s appeal of

the extension is an appeal from respondent’s sentence for criminal contempt entered after the

contested hearing, which would then be by right. See MCR 3.709(C)(1).

For these reasons, although an extension of a PPO by itself is normally only appealable by

leave granted, the order imposed here as a condition of respondent’s sentence is encompassed in

the instant appeal as of right from this sentence. Having determined that this Court has jurisdiction

over this issue, we now turn to the merits.

Review of the lower-court record indicates that petitioner did not move the trial court to

extend the PPO. Instead, at the contempt hearing, after finding respondent guilty of criminal

contempt for violating the PPO and sentencing him to serve 93 days in jail, the trial court proceeded

to sua sponte extend the PPO, stating as follows:

[O]n the court’s own motion, I’m going to extend this personal protection order,

which has an expiration date of August 27th, 2023. . . . I’m going to extend it to

June 28th, 2024. . . . I have filled out the order after hearing. . . . I’m not changing

any terms or conditions on there. . . . I have filled out the order after today’s hearing

as well as a second order that states order on motion to modify, extend, or terminate,

which is not what were [sic] here for today but it allows the opportunity for the

court to enter that. I have extended the expiration of the PPO to be on June 28th,

2024.

“Except as otherwise provided in MCL 600.2950 and MCL 600.2950a, an action for a PPO

is governed by the Michigan Court Rules, with MCR 3.701 et seq., applying to PPOs against

adults.” Patterson v Beverwyk, 320 Mich App 670, 682; 922 NW2d 904 (2017), citing

MCR 3.701(A). Here, both MCR 3.707(B)(1) and MCR 3.708(H)(5) are relevant to the trial

court’s authority to extend a PPO. We address each in turn.

-18-

1. MCR 3.707(B)(1)

MCR 3.707(B)(1) states as follows:

The petitioner may file an ex parte motion to extend the effectiveness of the

[PPO], without hearing, by requesting a new expiration date. The motion must be

filed with the court that issued the personal protection order no later than 3 days

before the order is to expire. The court must act on the motion within 3 days after

it is filed. Failure to timely file a motion to extend the effectiveness of the order

does not preclude the petitioner from commencing a new personal protection action

regarding the same respondent, as provided in MCR 3.703.

MCR 3.707(B)(1) thus plainly permits a petitioner to file a motion to extend a PPO,

provides the process governing how and when a petitioner may do so, and specifies when the trial

court must act on such a motion. Pertinent here, MCR 3.707(B)(1) does not explicitly provide the

court with any authority to extend a PPO on its own initiative. Had the drafters intended that the

rule permit a court to extend a PPO sua sponte, they could have explicitly said so. See People v

Comer, 500 Mich 278, 296-297; 901 NW2d 553 (2017) (applying similar reasoning in construing

MCR 6.429). Indeed, other court rules contain language permitting the trial court to act on its own

initiative, “demonstrating that actions taken on the court’s ‘own initiative’ are distinct from actions

prompted by motions of any party.” Dawley v Hall, 501 Mich 166, 171; 905 NW2d 863 (2018).16

Our Supreme Court in Dawley, 520 Mich at 171 n 10, cited several court rules specifically

authorizing the trial court to act “on its own initiative” in other contexts:

See, e.g., MCR 2.612(A)(1) (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or

other parts of the record and errors arising from oversight or omission may be

corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on motion of a party and

after notice, if the court orders it.”); MCR 2.402(B) (“[a] court may, on its own

initiative or on the written request of a party, direct that communication equipment

be used”); MCR 2.316(B)(3) (“On motion of a party, or on its own initiative after

notice and hearing, the court may order discovery materials removed at any other

time on a finding that the materials are no longer necessary.”); MCR 2.115(B) (“On

motion by a party or on the court’s own initiative, the court may strike” certain

matters from a pleading); MCR 2.114(E) (“If a document is signed in violation of

this rule, the court, on the motion of a party or on its own initiative, shall impose”

reasonable expenses); MCR 2.207 (“Parties may be added or dropped by order of

the court on motion of a party or on the court’s own initiative . . . .”); MCR

2.509(A)(2) (requiring the court to hold a jury trial unless “the court on motion or

on its own initiative finds that there is no right to trial by jury”).