Opinion

Petlechkov v. Stengel

Court
District Court, W.D. Tennessee
Filed
May 8, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.7%

vacating in part the final restitution order, dismissing as meritless Petlechkov’s sanctions and coram nobis claims

How later courts described this case

  • vacating in part the final restitution order, dismissing as meritless Petlechkov’s sanctions and coram nobis claims
  • affirming the denial of Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition
  • directing federal courts to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

DIMITAR PETLECHKOV, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:20-cv-02174-JTF-tmp

)

MICHAEL J. STENGEL d/b/a )

STENGEL LAW FIRM, )

)

Defendant. )

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING AS FUTILE

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND; ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO

SHOW CAUSE

______________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court are two motions. First is Defendant Michael J. Stengel’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff Dimitar Petlechkov’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and

accompanying Memorandum of Law in support thereof, filed on August 1, 2023. (ECF Nos. 46 &

47.) Petlechkov responded on August 8, 2023, and Stengel replied on August 22, 2023. (ECF Nos.

48 & 58.) Petlechkov filed a sur-reply on November 29, 2023. (ECF No. 95.) Second is

Petlechkov’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed on August 8, 2023. (ECF No. 49.)

Stengel responded on August 22, 2023. (ECF No. 57.) For the reasons set forth below,

Petlechkov’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is DENIED AS FUTILE and Stengel’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Petlechkov is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the Court

should not impose a pre-filing restriction subject to the conditions described in Sec. V below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. Criminal Proceedings and Initial Appeals

Petlechkov commenced this malpractice action on March 9, 2020, alleging that his former

criminal defense attorney, Stengel, committed legal malpractice in a federal criminal case before

Judge Jon McCalla, United States v. Petlechkov, No. 17-cr-20344 (W.D. Tenn), involving, inter

alia, mail fraud charges (the “Criminal Case”). (ECF No. 1.) This fraud pertained to Petletchkov’s

procurement of a steep shipping discount that FedEx gives to high-volume customers. Petletchkov

was able to obtain the shipping discount by posing as a vendor for one such customer. He then

used the fraudulently obtained discount to offer shipping services to others at a lesser discount.

Petletchkov then pocketed the difference between what he charged the third parties and what he

paid FedEx. See United States v. Petlechkov, No. 21-5174, 2022 WL 168651, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan.

19, 2022), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2763, 213 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (2022); see also United States v.

Petlechkov, 72 F.4th 699, 703 (6th Cir. 2023), reh'g denied, No. 22-6043, 2023 WL 5498389 (6th

Cir. July 6, 2023).

In April 2018, a jury found Petlechkov guilty in the Criminal Case. (No. 17-20344, ECF No.

64). Stengel filed an appeal on his behalf. (No. 17-20344, ECF No. 136.) On May 1, 2019, the

Sixth Circuit affirmed Petlechkov’s conviction on three counts, dismissed the remaining counts

due to deficiencies in the Government’s proof of venue, vacated his sentence, and remanded for

resentencing. See United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 771 (6th Cir. 2019).

Judge McCalla resentenced Petlechkov and entered the Second Amended Judgment reflecting

the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on July 7, 2020. (No. 17-20344, ECF No. 244.) He was again sentenced

1 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case and provides only the facts relevant to

the Motion to Dismiss. For a more thorough presentation of the facts and history of this case, see the Court’s November

29, 2023 Order Granting Motion to Reinstate Stay of Proceedings. (ECF No. 96.)

to 37-months incarceration as to each of the three counts, to be served concurrently, referred for

deportation proceedings after serving his sentence, and ordered to pay $801,219.02 in restitution

to FedEx. (Id. at 2, 6.) The court also ordered the forfeiture of Petlechkov’s three condominium

units in Georgia to satisfy a $367,099,62 personal money judgment. (No. 17-20344, ECF No. 306.)

B. Habeas Petition

On July 22, 2019, after his conviction was affirmed, Petlechkov filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

petition to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence in Case No. 19-2467. There, he alleged that Stengel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) by failing to impeach a key witness for the

prosecution at trial, Andrew Newborn. Petlechkov v. United States, No. 19-2467 (W.D. Tenn)

(ECF No. 1). Judge McCalla initially dismissed Petlechkov’s petition without prejudice because

he had yet to be resentenced. (No. 19-2467, ECF No. 7 (sealed).) On February 23, 2021, Judge

McCalla denied the § 2255 petition on the merits upon finding that the succinctness of Stengel’s

cross examination of Newborn was a strategic decision, and denied a certificate of appealability.

(No. 19-2467, ECF No. 22.) On March 15, 2021, Petlechkov appealed this decision and sought a

certificate of appealability from the Sixth Circuit. (No. 19-2467, ECF No. 24.) The Sixth Circuit

affirmed the decision and denied Petlechkov a certificate of appealability. Petlechkov v. United

States, No. 21-5263, 2021 WL 7085173, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2021). The Sixth Circuit then

denied his petition for a panel rehearing on September 28, 2021. (ECF No. 47-8, 2.)

C. First and Second Coram Nobis Petitions

On February 22, 2022, Petlechkov brought his first coram nobis petition. (No. 17-20344,

ECF No. 311.) There, he challenged the calculation of the restitution award, arguing that the

district court overestimated the losses his fraud caused, and contending that FedEx is not a “victim”

under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. (Id.) He filed a second coram

nobis petition on June 7, 2022 before Judge McCalla ruled on his first petition. (No. 17-20344,

ECF No. 328.) There, Petlechkov brought two claims for ineffective assistance of counsel: one

related to his resentencing and the other related to his second appeal. (Id.) On November 29, 2022,

Judge McCalla denied both petitions upon finding that Petlechkov had already litigated and lost

these issues on appeal. (No. 17-20344, ECF No. 337.) Petlechkov appealed this decision on

November 29, 2022. (No. 17-20344, ECF No. 339.) The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision,

finding that Petlechkov’s restitution arguments failed because they were previously raised and

rejected on appeal. Petlechkov, 72 F.4th at 708. The Sixth Circuit also held that the two IAC claims

were meritless. Id.

D. Third Coram Nobis Petition

On December 1, 2022, Petlechkov brought his third coram nobis petition. Judge McCalla

summarized the substance of this coram nobis petition as follows:

[Petlechkov’s] central argument is that without the statement of Andrew Newbon, which

he contends is perjured, he would not have been convicted because, in short, there would

have been no evidence that the FedEx employees who signed off on his discount after he

misrepresented himself as a vendor were ordinary, prudent people, and therefore the

government would not have met the materiality element of the crime charged. He argues

that further investigation would have revealed that Newbon’s testimony was perjured and

discovered rebutting witnesses, citing Andrew Newbon’s deposition from his 2015 civil

trial, the 2016 deposition of Olivia Waites, and an undated, unauthenticated report.

(No. 17-20344, ECF No. 458, 8.) On April 24, 2024, Judge McCalla denied Petlechkov’s third

coram nobis petition, finding that the petition reasserts a claim used as defense strategy at trial and

rejected at least twice at the Sixth Circuit, “this time in the guise of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.” (Id. at 11.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In Petlechkov’s initial Complaint dated March 9, 2020, he alleged that Stengel committed

malpractice by “failing to impeach the key government witness at trial whose testimony was the

only evidence presented by the federal government of [his] guilt.” (Id. at 2.) Petlechkov stated that

he did not become aware of Stengel’s “negligent and wrongful conduct” until July 2019. (Id. at 3.)

He claimed that Stengel caused his “wrongful convict[ion] and imprison[ment] for 2 years as well

as an immigration detainer lodged against him.” (Id. at 2.) On March 16, 2020, Petlechkov filed

his First Amended Complaint that is substantively nearly identical to his initial Complaint. (ECF

No. 4.)

On June 26, 2020, Stengel filed an unopposed motion to stay, arguing that such relief was

warranted because Petlechkov had yet to be exonerated, which is required to maintain a

malpractice claim against a criminal defense attorney pursuant to Tennessee’s exoneration rule.

(ECF No. 13, 3-4.) The presiding judge at the time, Judge Mark Norris, granted the motion on July

29, 2020. (ECF No. 14.) Judge Norris extended the stay on December 8, 2022, and February 3,

2023. (ECF Nos. 36 & 39.) He lifted the stay, and then entered a scheduling order on July 14,

2023. (ECF Nos. 40 & 41.)

Stengel filed his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on August 1, 2023, arguing

that this case ought to be dismissed under applicable Tennessee law because Petlechkov has not

been exonerated. (ECF No. 47, 6.) In response, Petlechkov insists that the Motion to Dismiss

should be denied because he still has a pending petition to vacate his conviction. (ECF No. 48, 5.)

Stengel maintains that the pending coram nobis petition is irrelevant because Petlechkov raised

the same issues in his § 2255 petition which was denied on the merits, meaning that he cannot

prevail by relitigating the same issues in his first, second, or third coram nobis petitions. (ECF No.

58, 7-8.) Alternatively, Stengel had requested that the Court grant his August 18, 2023 motion to

reimpose stay of proceedings pending the resolution of Petlechkov’s latest coram nobis petition

(ECF No. 52). (Id. at 8.) In his November 29, 2023 sur-reply, Petlechkov objected to Stengel’s

raising of arguments for the first time in his reply. (ECF No. 95, 2.)

This case was reassigned to the undersigned on September 19, 2023. (ECF No. 70.) On

November 29, 2023, upon finding that Petlechkov had not been exonerated and that such relief

was highly unlikely to come to pass, the Court reimposed the stay until the resolution of his then-

pending coram nobis petition. (ECF No. 96.) The Court also denied Petlechkov’s motion to

reconsider that order on December 28, 2023. (ECF No. 99.) On February 28, 2024, he moved for

an extension of time to appeal these two orders, which the Court denied on March 20, 2024. (ECF

No. 104.) Undeterred, Petlechkov appealed that denial on March 20, 2024. (ECF No. 105.) He also

filed a mandamus petition seeking to lift the stay. (ECF No. 108, 3.) On April 30, 2024, Petlechkov

filed his Motion to Vacate Stay of All Proceedings, arguing that the stay should be lifted now that

Judge McCalla has denied his latest coram nobis petition. (Id. at 1.)

III. GOVERNING LAW AND LEGAL STANDARD

The Court has original jurisdiction to adjudicate Petlechkov’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a)(2), because this action is between the citizen of a State and a citizen of a foreign state and

the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars

($75,000.00). To the extent that Petlechkov has sought relief under state and common law,

Tennessee law governs his claim. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (directing

federal courts to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law).

Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff pursuing a claim of legal malpractice must show (1) that

the accused attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that the attorney breached that duty, (3) that

the plaintiff suffered damages, (4) that the breach was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damages,

and (5) that the attorney’s negligence was the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff's damages.

Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tenn. 2001). In cases in which the plaintiff is a criminal

defendant who is suing the lawyer who represented him in a criminal case, the Tennessee Supreme

Court in Gibson added a sixth requirement “that a plaintiff cannot prevail in a criminal malpractice

case against his defense lawyer unless he proves that he has obtained post-conviction relief.” Id.

at 117.

IV. ANALYSIS

Stengel contends that dismissal is warranted because Petlechkov has failed to obtain post-

conviction relief. (ECF No.47, 6.) He points out that Petlechkov’s IAC claims have been

repeatedly dismissed with prejudice by the Judge McCalla and affirmed on appeal by the Sixth

Circuit. (Id.) This is relevant because Petlechkov must prove that he has obtained post-conviction

relief to prevail on his malpractice claim. Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 117. The Court reviews

Petlechkov’s various filings in search of his answer to the simple question: why should this case

not be dismissed when he has still not obtained post-conviction relief?

Based on Petlechkov’s 5-page response and 6-page sur-reply, his answer is that the case

should proceed because he had a pending coram nobis petition at the time that these briefings were

filed. (ECF Nos. 48, 2 & 95, 2.) In its November Order, the Court agreed that dismissal would be

improper under these circumstances and therefore opted to stay the action until the petition was

resolved. (ECF No. 96.) As Petlechkov acknowledges in his Motion to Vacate, his most recent

coram nobis petition has now been denied, so this argument is no longer relevant. His proposed

amended complaint likewise fails to present any reason why this case should not be dismissed.

(See ECF No. 49.)

In his inevitable motion for reconsideration of this decision, as well as his “Emergency

Motion” seeking some unusual form of relief, petition for writ of mandamus, motion for expedited

relief, and motion for rehearing en banc that have all come to be defining hallmarks of Petlechkov’s

pro se appellate repertoire, he will likely repeat his argument from his opposition to the motion to

reimpose stay that he is entitled to prolong this meritless case to secure exculpatory evidence to

use in his criminal case. (See ECF No. 54, 5.) The Court explained in its November Order that he

is not entitled to drag out meritless cases to secure discovery for other, previously filed meritless

cases or motions, and it finds no reason to change course here. The caselaw is clear that “the

validity of criminal convictions are not designed to be tested in the civil tort arena.” Avery v.

Blackburn, No. M202101482COAR3CV, 2022 WL 3905089, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31,

2022) (quoting Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d at 112-13). Therefore, this answer to the question

similarly fails to persuade.

As explained above, Petlechkov has not presented a viable argument supporting his claim

that this case should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)—and based upon the Court’s own

review of the relevant caselaw, no such argument exists. Because his proposed amended complaint

also fails to withstand a motion to dismiss, leave to amend is DENIED AS FUTILE. This case is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

V. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Following his fraud conviction, Petlechkov has become a prolific pro se plaintiff. He

specializes in (1) collateral challenges to his conviction;2 (2) challenges to the restitutionary and

punitive consequences of his conviction;3 (3) frivolous suits against FedEx, the company he

2 See Petlechkov, 72 F.4th at 707 (affirming the denial of Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition); see also

Petlechkov v. United States of America, No. 19-2467 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 22) (dismissing Petlechkov’s § 2255

petition); Petlechkov v. Giles, No. 21-0006 (M.D. Ga.) (Petlechkov’s § 2241 petition that was dismissed as meritless).

3 See Petlechkov v. FedEx Corporation and Merrick B. Garland, No. 23-2073 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 13)

(dismissing case seeking to, inter alia, enjoin United States Attorney General Merrick Garland from enforcing the

restitution order in his criminal case); see also Petlechkov v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 20-14861, 2023 WL 3013305, at *1

(11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (reviewing a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals related to Petlechkov);

Petlechkov v. United States of America, No. 22-2908 (N.D. Tex.) (Petlechkov’s currently pending Federal Tort Claims

Act case against the United States for denying him good conduct time while incarcerated); Petlechkov v. United States

defrauded;4 and (4) meritless suits against anyone with any connection to his criminal case or the

properties identified in the forfeiture order.5

As described in this Order, Petlechkov has commenced numerous actions that appear to have

no other purpose but to harass parties with any connection to his criminal conviction. Worse yet,

Petlechkov’s cases consume a greater amount of judicial resources (to say nothing of the burden

placed upon the defendants) than the cases of most pro se litigants because he manufactures

complicated legal disputes that necessitate the Court’s reading and consideration of all of his prior

cases, and presents layers of bad faith arguments to cut through. Regardless of whether a pro se

litigant pays the requisite fee or files in forma pauperis, if a party repeatedly files frivolous or

malicious lawsuits, this Court may deem them to be a vexatious litigant, and impose pre-filing

restrictions to reduce the burden that such litigation places on judicial resources. See Stewart v.

Fleet Financial, 229 F.3d 1154, 2000 WL 1176881 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Feathers v. Chevron

U.S.A., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998)).

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also exists as a check on the filing of even a

single frivolous lawsuit. Rule 11(b) applies to pro se litigants and attorneys alike, and states that

of America, No. 23-1789 (Fed. Cl.) (another pending challenge to the forfeiture order); Petlechov v. United States, et

al., No. 22-3200 (N.D. Ga.) (ECF No. 13) (dismissing as meritless Petlechkov’s case seeking relief from the forfeiture

order in the criminal case); Petlechov v. United States, No. 24-0434 (N.D. Ga.) (pending case that appears to be a

duplicate of No. 22-3200); Petlechkov, 72 F.4th at 707 (vacating in part the final restitution order, dismissing as

meritless Petlechkov’s sanctions and coram nobis claims); USA v. Dimitar Petlechkov, et al., No. 23-5803 (6th Cir.)

(pending appeal of the final restitution order).

4 See Petlechkov v. FedEx Corp., No. 23-12259, 2024 WL 729006, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2024) (affirming

the district court’s order dismissing Petlechkov’s Georgia RICO claim against FedEx on a frivolity determination);

see also Petlechkov v. FedEx Corporation and Merrick B. Garland, No. 23-2073 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 13)

(dismissing unjust enrichment claim against FedEx); Petlechkov v. Stengel, No. 20-2174 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 96)

(meritless malpractice case); Petlechkov v. FedEx et al., No. 23-2231 (W.D. Tenn) (ECF No. 27) (R&R addressing

Petlechkov’s attempts to seek declaratory relief that he has a First Amendment right to run a website where he defames

certain FedEx employees that he believes wronged him).

5 See Petleshkova v. Gee, No 22-2411 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 64) (order granting Petlechkov’s mother’s

motion to voluntarily dismiss her malpractice case against the attorney who represented her during the forfeiture

hearing just before the case was going to be dismissed for lack of standing); Petlechkov v. Gilmer et al., No. 24-0658

(N.D. Ga.) (ECF No. 8) (dismissing as frivolous Petlechkov’s RICO case against a condominium association and its

members relating to their decision to not allow him to lease out the condominiums that are subject to the forfeiture

order because he not obtained a leasing permit).

by filing a pleading, the party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and

belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary

delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a

nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for

establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will

likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

discovery....

Id. When a pro se litigant fails to comply with Rule 11, a court “may impose an appropriate

sanction.” Rule 11(c). Under Rule 11(c)(3) a court may impose sanctions on its own initiative,

after directing the party “to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not

violated Rule 11(b).

Here the Court finds that this case appears to violate Rule 11(b)(1) and (b)(2) in that it is

brought to harass Stengel as well as Judge McCalla and FedEx who were dragged into this suit

via third-party subpoenas for no apparent reason, and there exists no current law or nonfrivolous

basis for changing the law that permits this case to move forward. None of these findings should

come as a surprise, as Judge McCalla previously found that “[Petlechkov uses] his filings to imply

that Circuit Judges are unfairly biased towards the insult the prosecutor and others, allege that the

Court is engaged in wrongful conduct, insult other judges in the Western District, warn the Court

and others of continued motion practice and wield presumed favorable future Circuit rulings as a

threat, invoke inflammatory comparisons, and criticize the Court’s management of its docket as a

whole. Filings likewise include unprofessional language.” (United States v. Petlechkov, No. 17-

20344 (W.D. Tenn) (ECF No. 458) (citations omitted).

Following an exhaustive review of Petlechkov’s many legal proceedings, the Court has taken

note of the dismissals predicated on frivolity determinations and prior warnings from the

undersigned, Judge McCalla, and judges in the Northern District of Georgia that have gone

unheeded. In so doing, the Court has reached the conclusion that it must act to prevent Petlechkov

from continuing to monopolize this district court’s recourses and harassing parties through his

vexatious litigation practices. Specifically, the Court intends to bar Petlechkov from filing new

pro se actions in this district court without a certificate from a magistrate judge of this district

court or an attorney who is a member of the bar of this court that the claims asserted therein are

not frivolous, and that the suit is not brought for any improper purpose. Such relief is not unheard

of in the Sixth Circuit. See Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1992); Sawchyn v.

Parma Municipal Court, 114 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 1997) (Table, text available at 1997 WL 321112,

requiring prefiling certification by attorney); May v. Guckenberger, 2001 WL 1842462, *6 (S.D.

Ohio 2001) (requiring prefiling certification by attorney or a magistrate judge).

The Court is convinced that the measures outlined above are an appropriate means of halting

Petlechkov’s abusive litigation, and that this was entirely foreseeable to him based on the many

warnings that he has received from two judges in this district court and multiple judges in the

Northern District of Georgia relating to these practices. However, in the interest of rigorously

clarifying the record for Petlechkov’s inevitable blockbuster appeal of this decision, the Court

ORDERS Petlechkov to SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not impose a pre-filing

restriction on him consistent with the terms outlined above. Within 14 days of this Order’s entry,

Petlechkov shall file a brief NOT EXCEEDING 10 PAGES responsive to that question. Should

Petlechkov fail to file a response, the Court will construe his non-response as a concession. Until

the Court makes its determination on this matter, it will not file a judgment in this case or accept

any new substantive motions from the parties.

VI. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, Petlechkov’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is

DENIED AS FUTILE, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Also, Petlechkov is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the

Court should not impose a pre-filing restriction prohibiting him from commencing any new pro se

lawsuits in this district court without first obtaining a certificate from a magistrate judge of this

district or an attorney who is a member of the bar of this court that the claims asserted therein are

not frivolous, and that the suit is not brought for any improper purpose. Petlechkov is DIRECTED

to file a brief not exceeding 10 pages that is responsive to this request within 14 days of this Order’s

entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 8th day of May, 2024.

s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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