The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
TYRONE SMITH Sr., father of Tyrone L. Smith )
Jr., deceased, and T.L.S. (a minor), deceased, )
TAKITA HALE, individually, and as next friend )
and mother of Tyrone L. Smith Jr., deceased, )
CHARMIN SMITH, individually and as next )
friend and mother of T.L.S. (a minor), deceased, )
and FELICIA CURRIE, individually and as next )
friend of Tre’von F. Davis, deceased, )
) Case No. 2:21-cv-02302-JPM-atc
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
JEREMY L. GRANT II, DYER COUNTY, )
TENNESSEE, DYER COUNTY SHERIFF’S )
OFFICE, DYER COUNTY SHERIFF, JEFF )
BOX, individually and in his official capacity, )
THE CITY OF DYERSBURG, TENNESSEE, )
DYERSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
DYERSBURG POLICE CHIEF STEVE )
ISBELL, individually and in his official )
capacity, DYERSBURG POLICE OFFICER )
ALEX McCOMMON, individually and in his )
Official capacity as a Police Officer, )
DYERSBURG POLICE OFFICER PATRICK )
LEAKE, individually and in his official capacity )
as a Police Officer, DYERSBURG POLICE )
OFFICER LOGAN ABBOTT, individually and )
in his capacity as a Police Officer, John and Jane )
Doe law enforcement personnel, individually )
and in their official capacity as law enforcement )
personnel, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING DYER COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is the Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 11,
2022. (ECF No. 43.) Defendants filed an accompanying Memorandum in Support. (ECF No. 43-
1.) Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
an accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support, on March 4, 2022. (ECF Nos. 49, 49-1.) On
March 7, 2022, the Court held a hearing on Defendants’ Motion. (ECF No. 50.) On March 9,
2022, the Dyer County Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF No. 51.) For the reasons set forth below, the Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED, subject to the qualifications detailed below.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
“This is a civil rights, personal injury, and wrongful death action arising from the acts and
omissions, policies, practices, and culture of the Dyersburg Police Department, its officers, and
the actions of Jeremy Grant, II.” (2d Amend. Compl., ECF No. 29 at PageID 1527.) Plaintiffs
allege that “[o]n or about May 17, 2020, at approximately 1:08 a.m., Defendants . . . intentionally
targeted and pursued a vehicle occupied by four (4) young black men in violation of these men’s
constitutional and statutory rights,” because of their race and with “no reasonable suspicion[] [or]
probable cause.” (Id. at PageID 1527, ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs additionally allege that Defendant Officer
Alex McCommon of the Dyersburg Police Department “intentionally initiated a high-speed pursuit
of Defendant Grant’s vehicle under conditions [i.e., in the rain, turning off his emergency lights
and siren, on an unlit roadway,] in which it was foreseeable that he was making the occupants of
the vehicle more vulnerable to an automobile accident.” (Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 34–36.) Plaintiffs allege
that “Defendant McCommon acted with deliberate indifference and a conscious disregard of a
great risk of serious harm.” (Id. ¶ 37.)
During the pursuit, the automobile driven by Defendant Grant “left the roadway[, flipped,]
and crashed,” resulting in the deaths of his passengers Tyrone L. Smith, Jr., T.L.S., and Tre’von
F. Davis (the “Decedents”), on whose behalf Plaintiffs bring this action. (Id. at PageID 1527–28.)
Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n information and belief, Defendant McCommon or other law
enforcement personnel responding to the scene hit or ran over one or more of the Decedents with
his or their patrol cars.” (Id. at PageID 1528; see also id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
McCommon focused on arresting Defendant Grant rather than on rendering aid to the injured
Decedents, and that “[n]o aid was rendered to the dying Passengers until fire and emergency
medical services arrived some time later.” (ECF No. 29 at PageID 1528; see also id. ¶¶ 50–52,
62.) Plaintiffs allege that “the injuries to Tyrone and Tyronzen Smith,” two of the Decedents,
would not have been fatal if aid had been given to them sooner. (ECF No. 29 ¶ 53.)
Plaintiffs allege constitutional violations against the Dyersburg Defendants under the
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Id. ¶¶ 63–79),
as well as negligence and negligence per se, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior, and failure to render aid. (Id. ¶¶
80–135.) The allegations of the complaint relating to the Dyer County Defendants are discussed
in more detail below.
B. Procedural Background
This action was initiated on May 12, 2021. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On the same day,
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7.) On October 11, 2021, the
deadline for filing motions to amend pleadings or join parties (see ECF No. 17 at PageID 168),
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint to Add Parties, which the
Court denied without prejudice on October 15, 2021, for failure to include the required certificate
of consultation. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.) On October 19, 2021, Plaintiffs refiled their Motion. (ECF
No. 27.) Plaintiff sought to add the Dyer County Defendants, noting that when Plaintiffs filed
their First Amended Complaint, “there was confusion as to the roles of the respective officers and
law enforcement agencies involved in the occurrence sub judice” and that “[d]uring the exchange
of initial disclosure materials, it ha[d] become apparent that Plaintiffs likely made an error in
omitting [the Dyer County] Defendants due to a misconception or misunderstanding of the facts.”
(Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) Per Plaintiffs’ Certificate of Consultation, counsel for the Dyersburg Defendants did
not oppose the Motion. (ECF No. 27-2.) The Dyer County Defendants were not consulted, as
they were not yet a party to the suit. On October 22, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion
(ECF No. 28), and on October 26, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint naming the
Dyer County Defendants as defendants for the first time (2d Amend. Compl., ECF No. 29).
The Dyer County Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on February 11, 2022,
along with a Memorandum in Support. (ECF Nos. 43, 43-1.) The same day, the Dyer County
Defendants also filed a Motion to Stay Discovery and Deadlines, requesting a stay of “discovery
and all case deadlines pending the Court’s ruling on their Motion to Dismiss.” (ECF No. 44.) They
also filed a Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order and to Continue the Trial. (ECF No. 45.) On
February 16, 2022, the Court entered an Order Denying Motion to Continue Trial and Requiring
Certain Disclosures by the Parties. (ECF No. 46.) The Court ordered the originally named
Dyersburg Defendants and the Plaintiffs to produce their Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures to the newly
named Dyer County Defendants within 10 business days of the Order. (Id. at PageID 1664.) The
Court granted the Motion to Stay Discovery and Deadlines as to the Dyer County Defendants’
production obligations only, ordering that disclosures from the Dyer County Defendants “shall
await disposition of the Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as shall discovery as to those
Defendants.” (Id. at PageID 1164, 1664 n.2.) The Court then set a hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss for March 7, 2022. (ECF No. 47.)
Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
and an accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support on March 4, 2022. (ECF No. 49.) On
March 7, 2022, the Court held a Video Motion Hearing on Defendants’ Motion. (ECF No. 50.)
On March 9, 2022, the Dyer County Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 51.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint that “fail[s] to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits the “defendant
to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged
in the complaint is true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Nishiyama
v. Dickson Cnty., 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987)). A motion to dismiss only tests whether the
plaintiff has pled a cognizable claim and allows the court to dismiss meritless cases which would
waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery. Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must determine
whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). If a court decides that the claim is not plausible, the case
may be dismissed at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above [a] speculative level.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire
Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). A claim is plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A
plaintiff without facts who is “armed with nothing more than conclusions,” however, cannot
“unlock the doors of discovery.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Green v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No.
10-2487, 2011 WL 112735, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2011), aff’d, 481 F. App’x 252 (6th Cir.
2012). A court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.”
Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs concede in their Response to Defendants’ Motion that
Plaintiffs’ claims against Sheriff Jeff Box and the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office must fail. (ECF
No. 49-1 at PageID 1674.) In particular, “Plaintiff[s] concede[] that the Dyer County Sheriff’s
Office and the suit against Sheriff Box in his official capacity should merge into the claims against
Dyer County.1 Plaintiff[s] further concede[] that there appears to be no viable claim in this matter
against Sheriff Box in his individual capacity.” (Id.) “Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court
1 Defendants assert in their Motion that the “entity named as the ‘Dyer County Sheriff’s Office’ should be dismissed
[as a matter of law] because said Defendant is not a separate, suable entity apart from Dyer County itself either under
state or federal law.” (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1643.) Defendants additionally contend that “where the entity is
named as a defendant, an official-capacity claim against an individual defendant is redundant.” (Id. at PageID 1641–
42.) (internal citations omitted.) Thus, Defendants contend, the claim against Sheriff Box in his official capacity
should be dismissed as redundant to the claims against Dyer County. (Id. at PageID 1642.)
grant the Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in part” with respect to those Defendants.
(Id.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Sheriff Box in both his
official and individual capacities and the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office.
The Dyer County Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1637–43.) Plaintiffs respond that
they “received the cruiser and body cam videos on October 6, 2021, and the deadline to file
motions to add parties was October 11, 2021.” (ECF No. 49-1 at PageID 1673.) “Due to haste
created by these time constraints,” Plaintiffs state, “Plaintiffs’ counsel admits that the Second
Amended Complaint is less than artfully drafted. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not intend to allege civil
rights claims against Dyer County, but to proceed against Dyer County under the theory of
negligent operation of a motor vehicle under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202.” (Id.) Accordingly,
the Court will not consider whether the Second Amended Complaint adequately pleads violations
of § 1983 against Dyer County.2
Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim against the Dyer County Defendants under
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202, their only asserted basis for suit against the Dyer County
Defendants, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Dyer County, as discussed below.
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Allege a GTLA Claim Against the Dyer County Defendants
Plaintiffs contend in their Response that they intended to bring a claim against Dyer County
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202, part of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the
“GTLA”), because “on one of the videos [received in discovery], a vehicle marked Dyer County
Sheriff arrived on the scene of the accident, and someone one the scene can be simultaneously
heard to make an exclamation indicating that the vehicle had run over one of the decedents.” (ECF
2 Likewise, the Court will not consider Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Dyer
County are barred by the statute of limitations. (See ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1633–37.)
No. 49-1 at PageID 1672.)
Defendants assert on Reply that:
Plaintiffs’ contentions of what they ‘intended’ to plead has no bearing on what they actually
pled. Plaintiff[s] did not plead that a Dyer County officer ‘ran over’ one of the decedents
or even that a Dyer County officer injured one of the decedents. In fact, they pled no facts
to support any claims against Dyer County whatsoever. Without such facts asserted,
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim against Dyer County.
(ECF No. 51 at PageID 1677.)
In response to a similar argument during the Video Motion Hearing, Plaintiffs contended
that Dyer County was on notice that it could be brought in as a defendant, as well as that it is clear
from the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint how Dyer County was involved, if it
was involved at all. (ECF No. 50.) Plaintiffs also asserted that, although the video in question
does not actually show a vehicle running over a decedent, the timing of a person saying that “they”
hit someone corresponds with the Dyer County Sheriff’s vehicle arriving and driving over the
median. (Id.) Plaintiffs stated, however, that they are still unsure whether that vehicle “hit a person
or debris” and are waiting to receive the report from the State of Tennessee. (Id.)
“[A]lthough the pleading and amendment of pleadings rules in federal court are to be
liberally construed, the administration of justice is not well served by the filing of premature,
hastily drawn complaints.” Crehan v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, No. 1:11-cv-613, 2012 WL
4340848, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2012) (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 n.13
(1984)). Even pro se litigants, therefore, must “draft pleadings that meet the requirements of the
federal rules,” including those of Twombly and Iqbal. Crehan, 2012 WL 4340848, at *3–4
(quoting West v. Adecco Emp’t Agency, 124 F. App’x 991, 992 (6th Cir. 2005) (further internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)) (“The Court is not convinced . . . that Plaintiffs, by alluding
to facts that they could have alleged, or by suggesting violations that could still be pled, have
revealed any error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that their claims fall short of the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard.”).
The Court understands that the process of obtaining full discovery in this case has been
protracted, through no fault of either Party. (See, e.g., ECF No. 49-1 at PageID 1672.) Plaintiffs’
“hastily drawn complaint[],” however, must still meet the federal pleading requirements with
respect to a GTLA claim. Crehan, 2012 WL 4340848, at *3 (quoting Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50 n.13).
It fails to do so. This is especially true since, while Plaintiffs had only a five-day window between
their receipt of the video footage and the deadline to file motions for joinder/amendments,
Plaintiffs were not confined to the same time constraint in drafting their amended pleading itself.
As Defendants contend, while Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint does assert state law claims
against the Dyersburg Defendants, the pleading appears to allege only § 1983 claims against the
Dyer County Defendants. (See ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 21–135.) (See also ECF No. 51 at PageID 1676.)
(citing ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 70, 75–76, 80–135.) Plaintiffs’ allegations are discussed more fully below.
Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding a decedent being run over and the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle under § 29-20-202, or allegations of negligence regarding any other Tennessee
statute, do not name the Dyer County Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n information and
belief, Defendant McCommon [an Officer with the Dyersburg Police Department] or other law
enforcement personnel responding to the scene hit or ran over one or more of the Decedents with
his or their patrol cars.” (ECF No. 29 at PageID 1528.) Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants
violated . . . laws of the State of Tennessee when . . . an officer or officers hit or drove over one or
more of the Decedents . . . .” (Id. at PageID 1530.) Plaintiffs also allege several times that one or
more of the Decedents was “hit or run over” or “crushed” by Defendant McCommon and/or
“another”/“other” “Defendant Officer[(s)]” in a patrol car. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 47, 51, 58–59.) In a count
for “Negligence” under a section entitled “Causes of Action Against Defendant, City of
Dyersburg,” Plaintiffs allege that “[o]ne or more Defendant Officers was negligent in hitting or
running over one or more of the Decedents with his or her patrol car.” (Id. ¶ 92.) Moreover, in a
count for “Negligence Per Se” under the same section, Plaintiffs allege a violation of § 29-20-202
(among other Tennessee statutes) by “Defendant McCommon, Defendant Officers and by
imputation, and respondeat superior, Defendant City of Dyersburg Police Department and
Defendant City of Dyersburg.” (Id. ¶ 102.) In the same section, under a “False Arrest” count,
Plaintiffs aver, “It shocks the conscience of a civilized society that the Decedents were hit or run
over by police vehicles as part of th[e] seizure [at issue].” (Id. ¶ 109.) Counts for “Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress” and “Failure to Render Aid” in the same section mention only
“Defendant Officers” or “Defendants” and “police vehicles” in relation to this alleged incident.
(Id. ¶¶ 118, 121, 131.) Plaintiffs also explicitly allege, under their “Respondeat Superior” count
in the same section, that “Defendant City of Dyersburg was the owner of the vehicles driven by
Defendant Officer Alex McCommon, and Defendant Officers,” making the City of Dyersburg
“responsible for the damages to Plaintiffs.” (Id. ¶ 125, 127.)
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’ allegations that do name the Dyer County Defendants do not sound
in state-law negligence but rather in § 1983 violations. (See id. ¶ 9 (noting that Jeff Box and the
Dyer County Sheriff’s Office are responsible for “ensuring the establishment and enforcement of”
policies, practices, customs, etc., of the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office, “including training,
supervision, and discipline of police officers”), ¶ 70 (alleging § 1983 and § 1988 violations by
Dyer County under respondeat superior), ¶¶ 75–76 (alleging against Dyer County Sheriff’s Office
the failure to “train, supervise, or control [its] officers regarding their dut[ies] to render aid” and
“to uphold the laws of Tennessee and the United States Constitution equally and with respect to
all citizens, regardless of race”).) Plaintiffs do allege that “[n]either Dyer County nor Sheriff Box
have immunity for violating the civil rights of citizens and has [sic] waived sovereign immunity
for the acts and/or omissions of its employees set forth herein pursuant to the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-10[1], et seq., and Tenn. Code Ann. §
8-8-302.” (Id. ¶ 9.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations have failed to state a negligence claim pursuant
to § 29-20-202 against the Dyer County Defendants. Instead, Plaintiffs appear to allege both
negligence and § 1983 claims against the Dyersburg Defendants but only a § 1983 claim against
the Dyer County Defendants. Even considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these
allegations fail to put the Dyer County Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs intended to bring a
claim against them under § 29-20-202. While Plaintiffs attempt to broaden the target of their claim
by referring to “Defendant Officers” who could have hit or run over a Decedent, Plaintiffs nowhere
plausibly allege that such other officers were associated with Dyer County, as opposed to the City
of Dyersburg, despite having had the opportunity to specify as much after viewing the video
footage which prompted their Second Amended Complaint. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that
“Defendant City of Dyersburg was the owner of the vehicles driven by . . . Defendant Officers,”
making the City of Dyersburg “responsible for the damages to Plaintiffs.” (Id. ¶ 125, 127.)
Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Dyer
County, the only remaining Dyer County Defendant.
B. Other Theories Preclude Plaintiffs’ Ability to Successfully Make Out Their Intended
Claims Against Dyer County
Ordinarily, the Court would consider permitting Plaintiffs to amend their complaint once
more to attempt to properly allege a GTLA claim against Dyer County. Defendants, however,
contend that a GTLA claim against them would have to be summarily dismissed for two additional
reasons: (1) Defendants would be immune from such a claim under that statute (ECF No. 43-1 at
PageID 1644–46) and, in any case, (2) such a claim would be barred by the relevant statute of
limitations (ECF No. 51 at PageID 1677–80). The Court addresses each of these arguments in
turn below.
i. Dyer County Would Likely Be Immune from Such Claims Under the GTLA
Before Plaintiffs filed their Response, clarifying that they intended to bring a GTLA
negligence claim against the Dyer County Defendants, Defendants asserted in their Motion that
“even if Plaintiffs intended to plead state law claims against the Dyer County Defendants, which
they did not, such claims would be barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
(‘GTLA’).” (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1644.) Defendants argue that the GTLA’s “civil-rights
exception” from the statute’s waiver of governmental immunity extends to “[c]laims arising out
of the same set of circumstances as a civil-rights § 1983 claim.” (Id. at PageID 1645.) (quoting
Barbieri v. Knox Cnty., 2016 WL 154098, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing Johnson v. City
of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 872 (6th Cir. 2010)).) Because Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are “based
upon the same facts and circumstances upon which they base their civil rights claims,” Defendants
contend, “to the extent Plaintiffs intended to set forth state law negligence claims against the Dyer
County Defendants, the Dyer County Defendants retain immunity[,] and said claims must be
dismissed.”3 (Id. at PageID 1646.)
Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendants’ argument regarding immunity for state-law
negligence claims. (See generally ECF No. 49-1.) Plaintiffs contend, however, that “the damages
3 Defendants also contend that “[i]t is well-settled that a plaintiff can never hold a governmental entity directly and
vicariously liable for intentional torts,” and so the Dyer County Defendants “cannot be held liable for false arrest,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or any alleged failure to render aid,” nor for any “alleged negligent acts”
leading to such intentional torts. (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1644–45, 1645 n.3.) (internal citations omitted.) Because
Plaintiffs clarify in their Response that they only intended to allege negligent operation of a motor vehicle under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-20-202, the Court does not consider Defendants’ argument as to intentional torts. (See ECF No. 49-
1 at PageID 1673.)
and injuries caused by the negligence of Dyer County were part of the same transaction or
occurrence giving rise to this suit . . . .” (Id. at PageID 1673.) Defendants do not address the issue
of immunity on Reply, but they asserted during the Video Motion Hearing that the civil-rights
protections of the GTLA would provide immunity to any GTLA claims that Plaintiffs were
attempting to bring. (See generally ECF No. 51; see also ECF No. 50.)
The GTLA “codifies the Tennessee common law rule of sovereign immunity for counties,
municipalities, and other governmental entities,” and provides “certain exceptions [to] or waivers”
of such immunity. Campbell v. Anderson Cnty., 695 F. Supp. 2d 764, 776–77 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)
(internal citations omitted). Section 29-20-202 of the GTLA, on which Plaintiffs allegedly intend
to rely, removes “immunity from suit of all governmental entities . . . for injuries resulting from
the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope
of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202(a). The Act also removes immunity “for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his
employment.” Id. § 29-20-205. This latter provision, however, is subject to various enumerated
exceptions, one of which is the “invasion of . . . civil rights,” which includes § 1983 claims. Id. §
29-20-205(2); Partee v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 449 F. App’x 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 872 (6th Cir. 2010)). “A negligence claim falls within
this exception where ‘the same circumstances giv[e] rise’ to both the negligence and civil rights
claims. Stated another way, the GTLA ‘preserves immunity for suits claiming negligent injuries
arising from civil rights violations.’” Partee, 449 F. App’x at 448 (quoting Johnson, 617 F.3d at
872). “The majority of courts to address the []GTLA’s civil-rights exception have done so by
asking whether a plaintiff’s claims ‘are in essence claims for violation of [the plaintiff’s]
constitutional rights.’” Savage v. City of Memphis, 620 F. App’x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Johnson, 617 F.3d at 872). “[A] plaintiff cannot circumvent a defendant’s immunity by couching
its civil rights claim as one of negligence.” Tinkle v. Dyer Cnty., Tenn., No. 18-01124-STA-egb,
2018 WL 6840155, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 31, 2018) (citing Campbell v. Anderson Cnty., 695 F.
Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)).
In Partee, the negligence claims that were dismissed “ar[o]se out of exactly the same
circumstances as the [plaintiffs’] civil rights claims, thus falling within the exception to the waiver
of immunity set forth in the GTLA.” 449 F. App’x at 448 (internal citation omitted) (dismissing
“negligence claims against the City that were based directly on [the officer’s] [allegedly
unconstitutional] conduct while arresting [the plaintiff]”). Accordingly, Defendants’ cited
unpublished district court opinions all involve situations in which courts dismissed plaintiffs’ state-
law claims because the plaintiffs failed to “identify any facts supporting [their] negligence . . .
claims that [did] not also support one of the grounds for [their] § 1983 civil rights claim[s].”
Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., No. 1:19-cv-01174-STA-jay, 2019 WL 6310729, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. Nov. 25, 2019). (See also ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1645–46.) (collecting cases.)
After Partee, however, the Sixth Circuit found immunity under the civil rights exception
where an officer, Nolen, determined a carjacking report not to be genuine but “failed to change the
vehicle’s status in the National Crime Information Center before his shift ended that day,” leading
to a police chase of the reported vehicle by three other officers, one of whom fatally shot the
vehicle’s driver. Savage, 620 F. App’x at 426–27. The driver’s heirs brought § 1983 excessive
force claims for the shooting, as well as negligence claims under the GTLA for Nolen’s actions.
Id. at 429. The Court held that “Nolen’s alleged negligence ar[o]se[] out of the same circumstances
giving rise to [p]laintiffs’ civil-rights claim” and that the City was thus immune from the
negligence claims. Id. at 430. Thus, under Savage, the civil rights exception extends to state-law
negligence claims in which the alleged negligence proximately caused the asserted civil-rights
violations.
Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Dyer County would be barred under Savage. Here, the
causal chain is reversed from that in Savage: The alleged negligence by the Dyer County vehicle
occurred only because of the alleged civil rights violations by the Dyersburg Defendants that
purportedly brought the Dyer County vehicle to the scene of the collision. In that sense, the
“negligent injuries” here seem to “aris[e]” even more concretely “from [the] civil rights
violations.” Partee, 449 F. App’x at 448 (quoting Johnson, 617 F.3d at 872) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges that “the conduct of
Defendant Officers in hitting one or more of the Decedents with a patrol car” was “in violation of
. . . the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . . in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .” (ECF No. 29 ¶ 69.) A negligence claim based on these same facts would
clearly be subject to immunity under the civil-rights exception. Plaintiffs should not be able to
escape immunity by asserting only the negligence portion of this claim against a different
defendant, as the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the GTLA is “to be construed strictly in
favor of the sovereign,” i.e., in favor of retaining immunity. Hughes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty, 340 S.W.3d 352, 361 (Tenn. 2011) (internal citation omitted). While the Parties
have not addressed the interaction between § 29-20-202(a) and § 29-20-205(2), and the Court has
not found case law on that particular issue, it appears that the retention of immunity under the latter
provision would override any waiver of immunity under the former.
Therefore, the Court finds that a further amended complaint by Plaintiffs that managed to
meet the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard for alleging its state-law negligence claim against Dyer
County under the GTLA would likely be futile, as Dyer County appears to maintain its immunity
to such a claim under the GTLA.
ii. The Court Need Not Reach Defendants’ Statute of Limitations Issue with
Respect to Plaintiffs’ Intended Negligence Claims
Defendants additionally contend in their Motion that “Plaintiffs’ claims against the Dyer
County Defendants are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID
1633.) After clarifying that they did not intend to allege civil rights claims against Dyer County
but only negligent operation of a motor vehicle under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202, Plaintiffs’
respond, with very limited analysis, that their claims against the Dyer County Defendants are
permitted under the discovery rule and the relation back doctrine. (ECF No. 49-1 at PageID 1673.)
(citing Sutton v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 908, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022), Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d
853, 858 (Tenn. 2001).) The Dyer County Defendants reply that “even if Plaintiff[s] had asserted
a negligence claim against Dyer County, said claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.”
(ECF No. 51 at PageID 1677.) (formatting altered.) As in their Motion, on Reply, Defendants
apply the federal “discovery rule,” contending that “[f]ederal procedural law provides that a
plaintiff need not be aware of every detail or person involved in causing the injury for the
limitations period to commence,” as long as the plaintiff knew of the injury itself. (Id.) (internal
citations omitted.) (alteration in original.)
The Court notes that neither Party has properly addressed the applicable law around the
statute of limitations, which as Plaintiffs’ summarily cited case law articulates, is more plaintiff-
friendly than the federal rule. See Sutton v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 908, 912–13, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2022). “A claim under the GTLA accrues or ‘arises,’ in accordance with Tennessee’s ‘discovery
rule,’ ‘when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered,
that he or she sustained an injury as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Johnson v.
Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sutton v. Barnes,
78 S.W.3d 908, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). In Sutton, the Tennessee Court of Appeals clarified
that a cause of action in tort does not accrue until the plaintiff “discovers, or ‘reasonably should
have discovered . . . the identity of the defendant who breached the duty.’” 78 S.W.3d at 912–13.
The Court, however, finds it unnecessary to address further the issue of whether Plaintiffs’
negligence claim against Dyer County would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as
Plaintiffs’ claim fails on other grounds, as discussed above.
C. The Claims Against “John and Jane Doe Law Enforcement Personnel” Should Be
Dismissed Insofar as Such Officers Are from the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office
Finally, Defendants argue that “the claims against ‘John and Jane Doe law enforcement
officers’ should be dismissed” because “the filing of a complaint against unnamed defendants does
not toll the running of the statute of limitations against those parties” so “any future attempt to
amend the Complaint to substitute properly named individuals for the ‘John and Jane Doe law
enforcement officers’ would be futile.” (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID 1646.) (citing Cox v. Treadway,
75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 821 (1996).) (further internal citation
omitted.) Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. (See generally ECF No. 49-1.) Although a
party ordinarily forfeits “issues not raised in response to [a] dispositive motion[],” Swanigan v.
FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted), the Court will briefly
consider Defendants’ argument.
Plaintiffs allege in their Second Amended Complaint that “Defendants John or Jane Doe[]
. . . were at all relevant times law enforcement officers from various agencies, including, but not
limited to, Dyersburg Police Department, Dyer County Sheriff’s Office, and Tennessee Highway
Patrol . . . .” (ECF No. 29 ¶ 16.) Because Plaintiffs’ intended state-law negligence claim against
the Dyer County Defendants must fail, as discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot later substitute named
Dyer County Sheriffs’ Office employees or other Dyer County personnel for the John or Jane Doe
defendants. Defendants’ Motion as to the John and Jane Doe Defendants is thus GRANTED
insofar as Plaintiffs’ may have intended to substitute such named individuals.
As noted above, the Court has declined to address Defendants’ argument regarding the
interaction of the statute of limitations and any § 1983 claims against the Dyer County Defendants,
as Plaintiffs did not intend to bring such claims. The Court at this time likewise declines to address
Defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument vis-à-vis any intended future substitutions of named
Dyersburg defendants for the John and Jane Doe defendants. The Court will address that issue at
which time, if any, that the Dyersburg Defendants raise it in their own dispositive motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Dyer County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against the Dyer County Defendants.
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of April, 2022.
/s/ Jon P. McCalla
JON P. McCALLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE