Hnedak v. Memphis Police Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

ABIGAIL HNEDAK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:20-cv-02333-SHM-cgc

)

BRYCE LAINE, an individual, )

the MEMPHIS POLICE )

DEPARTMENT, CITY OF MEMPHIS, )

TENNESSEE, and MEMPHIS POLICE )

SGT. A. JENNINGS, )

individually and in his

official capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING THE CITY OF MEMPHIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Defendants City of Memphis and the City

of Memphis Police Department’s (collectively the “City”)

November 24, 2020 Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”). (D.E. No.

40.) Plaintiff Abigail Hnedak responded on November 24, 2020.

(D.E. No. 41.) The City replied on December 11, 2020. (D.E.

No. 42.) Hnedak’s Memorandum in Support was filed on January

28, 2021. (D.E. No. 43.) For the following reasons, the Motion

is GRANTED.

I. Background

For purposes of the Motion, the facts are taken from the

Complaint.

Hnedak filed her Complaint on May 6, 2020. (D.E. No. 1.)

She brings five claims against the City. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-60.)

The first is a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because

the City deprived Hnedak of her civil rights by encouraging or

permitting employees of the Memphis Police Department (the “MPD”)

to swear falsely to affidavits of complaint without

investigation. (Id. at ¶ 29-32.) The second is a claim for

negligence under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act

(“GTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101, et seq., because the

City’s negligence harmed Hnedak. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.) The third

is a claim for negligent supervision under the GTLA because the

City failed to properly train and supervise Sgt. A. Jennings

(“Jennings”), the police officer who co-signed the affidavit of

complaint against Hnedak. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-39.) The fourth is a

claim for false imprisonment under the GTLA because Hnedak was

arrested without a “valid warrant”. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-41.) The

fifth is a claim for negligent or intentional infliction of

emotional distress under the GTLA1 because the failure to

corroborate Bryce Laine’s false allegations against Hnedak

1 The Complaint purports to bring this claim against “[t]he

County”, but Shelby County, Tennessee, is not a party to the

proceedings. (See D.E. No. 1, ¶ 48.) The parties treat this

claim as a claim against the City. (See e.g., D.E. No. 40-1, 7;

D.E. No. 41, 3.)

caused “the issuance of an invalid warrant”.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 46-

49.)

Hnedak and Laine are parents of a minor child, LH, who was

born on December 31, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 9.) On January 23, 2019,

the Shelby County Juvenile Court entered a Permanent Parenting

Plan Order (“PPPO”) setting child support, parenting time, and

custody arrangements for LH. (Id.) Initially, Laine had

parenting time on Tuesday and Thursday from 4:00 PM to 8:00 PM

on the second and fourth weeks of the month. (Id. at ¶ 10.) On

July 19, 2019, Laine texted Hnedak to change parenting time to

Monday and Wednesday because of Laine’s college schedule. (Id.

at ¶ 11.)

On February 3, 2020, Hnedak learned that LH had said Laine

had hit and kicked LH for misbehaving. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Hnedak

told Laine “she felt it was best, given the circumstances, that

his planned parenting time” for that Monday be rescheduled.

(Id.) Laine did not agree. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Laine went to Jennings of the MPD and told him Hnedak had

violated the PPPO. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Jennings co-signed an

affidavit of complaint against Hnedak relying on Laine’s

statements. (Id. at ¶ 16.) On February 5, 2020, a General

2 Hnedak brings additional claims against Bryce Laine (“Laine”)

and Jennings that are not at issue in the Motion. (See D.E. No.

1, ¶¶ 29-60.)

Sessions Court Judge in Shelby County signed a warrant for

Hnedak’s arrest based on the affidavit of complaint. (Id. at ¶

18.)

On February 10, 2020, Hnedak was arrested in front of LH by

the MPD. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Hnedak was released on receipt of a

citation after being held in jail for seven hours. (Id. at ¶¶

20-21.) The prosecutor did not pursue the charges, and the

General Sessions Court dismissed the case. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Hnedak alleges that Laine’s family members were employed by

the MPD and knew Jennings. (Id. at ¶ 17.) She alleges that the

City failed to train Jennings on the proper procedure for

swearing an affidavit of complaint. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Hnedak

alleges that the City “has a pervasive custom or practice” “of

making warrantless arrests that lack probable cause based upon

the significant number of cases that are dismissed due to

constitutional violations similar to the case at issue.” (Id.

at ¶ 24.) She alleges that this practice “is widespread and

commonly accepted to have the force of law.” (Id. at ¶ 24.)

Hnedak also alleges that the City failed to make rules, policies,

and regulations to protect against civil rights violations by

the MPD. (Id. at ¶ 25.) She alleges that the City’s “conduct

is demonstrative of a persistent pattern of unconstitutional

conduct by its employees and the City has constructive notice of

that pattern.” (Id.)

II. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

The Court has federal question jurisdiction. Under 28

U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have original jurisdiction “of

all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” Hnedak asserts that the City

violated her constitutional rights and seeks relief under § 1983.

(D.E. No. 1, ¶¶ 29-32.)

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Hnedak’s state

law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Those claims derive from

a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Hnedak’s federal claims

against the City. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844

F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

When there is no dispute that a certain state's substantive

law applies, the court need not conduct a choice-of-law analysis

sua sponte. See GBJ Corp. v. E. Ohio Paving Co., 139 F.3d 1080,

1085 (6th Cir. 1998). Hnedak invokes Tennessee law. Both

parties assume that Tennessee law applies. The Court will apply

Tennessee substantive law to Hnedak’s state law claims.

III. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint

that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as

true, are sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Cooper Butt ex rel. Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901,

904 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007)). The factual allegations must be more than

speculative. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level”). The Court considers the plaintiff’s complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ryan v. Blackwell, 979

F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt.,

Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001)). The court accepts as

true all factual allegations, but does not accept legal

conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences as true. Theile

v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 2018). “The plaintiff

must present a facially plausible complaint asserting more than

bare legal conclusions.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009)).

IV. Analysis

A. Section 1983 Claim

A municipality “cannot be held liable under 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis removed). To hold a municipality

liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) agents of

the municipality, while acting under color of state law, (2)

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (3) that a

municipal policy or policy of inaction was the moving force

behind the violation.” Memphis, Tennessee Area Loc., Am. Postal

Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 902

(6th Cir. 2004); See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-695. This is

sometimes called a Monell Claim. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735

F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). A municipal policy can be shown

by: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or

legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision

making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of

a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the

existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal

rights violations.” Direct Constr. Servs., LLC v. City of

Detroit, Michigan, 820 F. App’x 417, 426 (6th Cir. 2020).

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when an official with

final decision-making authority ratifies an illegal policy. See

American Postal Workers Union, 361 F.3d at 902. Hnedak’s

Complaint does not allege that an official policy was ratified

by an official who was a final decision maker.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when it officially

adopts an unconstitutional policy. Id. Hnedak’s Complaint

alleges that “[t]he City implicitly or explicitly adopted and

implemented” a policy of filing false complaints. (D.E. No. 1,

¶ 31.) The Court does not “accept as true legal conclusions or

unwarranted factual inferences” in deciding a motion to dismiss.

Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir.

2000). Hnedak’s Complaint contains no specific factual

allegations showing that the City has an official policy

permitting police officers to swear false affidavits of

complaint.

Hnedak’s Complaint focuses on failure-to-train and custom-

of-tolerance for violations of federal rights to establish the

City’s § 1983 liability3. “A municipality’s culpability for a

deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns

on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61

(2011). A plaintiff must show that: “1) the City’s training

program was inadequate for the tasks that officers must perform;

2) the inadequacy was the result of the City’s deliberate

indifference; and 3) the inadequacy was closely related to or

3 The City argues that “there is no removal of immunity as to

the City for claims arising out of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the United States Constitution, and those claims

should be dismissed[.]” (D.E. No. 40-1, 4-5.) Relying on

Johnson v. City of Memphis, the City appears to assert that the

GTLA establishes municipal immunity from § 1983 claims. 617

F.3d 864 (6th Cir 2010). Any argument that the GTLA provides

immunity from § 1983 claims is not well taken. In Johnson, the

Sixth Circuit held that the trial court did not err when it

denied the plaintiff’s motion to add several state law tort

claims because those GTLA claims were precluded by the civil

rights exception to the GTLA. Id. at 872. The court held that

the exception precluded claims under the GTLA. Id. The court

did not hold that the GTLA precluded independent § 1983 claims.

actually caused the injury.” Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d

461, 469 (6th Cir. 2006). To prove deliberate indifference, a

plaintiff “must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct

demonstrating that the [municipality] has ignored a history of

abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this

particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.”

Miller v. Sanilac Cty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010).

Alternatively “‘a single violation of federal rights,

accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train

its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an

obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal

liability.’” Plinton v. Cty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 464 (6th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).

Hnedak fails to plead facts demonstrating that the City’s

training was inadequate or that the City was deliberately

indifferent. The court does not “accept as true legal

conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences” in deciding a

motion to dismiss. Gregory, 220 F.3d at 446. Conclusory

allegations that recite the elements of the claim are “not

entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-555). Hnedak’s Complaint merely recites

the elements of failure-to-train municipal liability and asserts

that City failed to train its employees “as to the proper

procedure for swearing to an Affidavit of Complaint”. (See D.E.

No. 1, ¶¶ 23-25; ¶ 31.) Hnedak does not provide any factual

allegations specifying the training officers receive or that the

City ignored a history of abuse. Hnedak asserts that a

significant number of cases were dismissed due to similar

violations and that the City’s conduct demonstrated a persistent

pattern of unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) No

cases are cited. Hnedak fails to plead facts that support her

assertions. She fails to state a claim for failure-to-train §

1983 municipal liability.

A “a custom-of-tolerance claim requires a showing that there

was a pattern of inadequately investigating similar claims.”

Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478. The custom-of-tolerance for violations

of civil rights is also known as an “inaction” theory. Doe v.

Claiborne Cty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ.,

103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must establish:

“(1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of

[violations by municipal] employees; (2) notice or constructive

notice on the part of the [municipality]; (3) the

[municipality’s] tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct,

such that their deliberate indifference in their failure to act

can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4)

that the [municipality’s] custom was the ‘moving force’ or direct

causal link in the constitutional deprivation.” Id.

Hnedak’s Complaint fails to allege specific facts to support

her custom-of-tolerance claim. Hnedak alleges that the City

should have known that its officers made “warrantless” arrests

without probable cause “based upon the significant number of

cases that are dismissed due to constitutional violations similar

to the case at issue.” (D.E. No. 1, ¶ 24.) Hnedak alleges that

“the City has failed to make adequate rules, policies and

regulations to protect against civil rights violations by its

law enforcement.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) Hnedak alleges that “[t]he

City’s conduct is demonstrative of a persistent pattern of

unconstitutional conduct by its employees and the City has

constructive notice of that pattern.” (Id.) Conclusory

allegations that recite the elements of the claim are “not

entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-555). No instances are cited. Hnedak

fails to plead facts that support her conclusion that the City

had a custom of unconstitutional conduct because it tolerated

falsely sworn affidavits of complaint.

The City’s Motion is GRANTED. Hnedak’s § 1983 claim is

DISMISSED.

B. Negligence Claims

Tennessee law prohibits suit against “the State” unless the

legislature permits it. Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 17; Davidson v.

Lewis Bros. Bakery, 227 S.W.3d 17 (Tenn. 2007). Municipalities

are part of “the State.” Id. at 19. The GTLA partially waives

the State’s immunity:

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities

is removed for injury proximately caused by a negligent

act or omission of any employee within the scope of

his employment except if the injury arises out of:

****

(2) False imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus

from a court, false arrest, malicious prosecution,

intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel,

slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,

infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of

privacy, or civil rights

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2). The GTLA “civil rights”

exception to waiver of governmental immunity for negligence

“includes claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United

States Constitution.” Johnson, 617 F.3d at 872.

Hnedak concedes that the City is immune from her claims of

false imprisonment and negligent or intentional infliction of

emotional distress. (D.E. No. 41, 3.) The GTLA bars suits

against municipalities for false imprisonment and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

205(2).

The GTLA bars suits against municipalities for negligent

acts or omissions of their employees if the injury arises out of

“civil rights.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2). Civil rights

claims include claims that arise under federal civil rights laws

and the United States Constitution. Cochran v. Town of

Jonesborough, 586 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).

Tennessee and federal courts have concluded that the GTLA

provides immunity to a municipality for negligence claims that

arise out of police misconduct. Siler v. Scott, 591 S.W.3d 84,

97-98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019), appeal denied (Oct. 11, 2019);

Cochran, 586 S.W.3d at 919; Campbell v. Anderson Cty., 695 F.

Supp. 2d 764, 788 (E.D. Tenn. 2010); Howard v. Knox Cty.,

Tennessee, No. 3:15-CV-6-TAV-CCS, 2016 WL 9455169 at *11-12 (E.D.

Tenn. Sept. 7, 2016), aff’d, 695 F. App’x 107 (6th Cir. 2017);

cf. Parker v. Henderson Cty., No. W200900975COAR3CV, 2010 WL

377044 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010)(declining to dismiss

GTLA claim for negligent supervision of law enforcement where

the plaintiff “neither pleaded nor argued in the present

proceeding that the City or its officers violated his federal

civil rights”).

The Parker decision is an outlier. See Cochran, 586 S.W.

3d at 916-919 (opining that other Tennessee cases and federal

precedent weigh against Parker and that, because the plaintiff’s

injuries stemmed from a well-established civil rights violation,

the plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the GTLA); Siler,

591 S.W.3d at 97 (applying Cochran instead of Parker to a claim

based on excessive force by a police officer). Courts have

concluded that, when a plaintiff brings both a negligence claim

and a civil rights claim based on the same conduct, the claim

arises out of civil rights. Cochran, 586 S.W. 3d at 919; Howard,

2016 WL 9455169 at *11.

The GTLA bars Hnedak’s claims of negligence and negligent

supervision. Hnedak’s claim of negligence simply asserts that

the City owed Hnedak a duty to use due care. (D.E. No. 1, ¶

34.) Hnedak’s negligent supervision claim asserts that the City

failed to properly train and outline procedures “causing the

violation of Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process

rights.” (Id. at ¶ 38.) The GTLA does not permit suit if “the

injury arises out of” “civil rights.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

205. A negligence claim is barred “where ‘the same circumstances

giv[e] rise’ to both the negligence and civil rights claims.”

Partee v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 449 F. App’x 444, 448 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2)).

Hnedak argues that that her negligent supervision claim is

distinct from her § 1983 claim because the failure to train and

supervise occurred before her arrest. The court in Howard found

that simultaneous claims for civil rights and negligence

demonstrated that the negligence claims arose out of civil

rights, even if the plaintiff argued that the negligent actions

occurred before the civil rights violation. Howard, 2016 WL

9455169 at * 11. Both Hnedak’s negligence and negligent

supervision claims arise out of her arrest and Jennings’

affidavit of complaint. (See D.E. No. 1, ¶¶ 33-39.) She makes

no other argument that the City was negligent or negligently

supervised Jennings. Hnedak’s negligence and negligent

supervision claims against the City arise out of civil rights

violations, and the City is immune from her claims under the

GTLA.

The City’s Motion is GRANTED. Hnedak’s claims of

negligence, negligent supervision, false imprisonment, and

negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress are

DISMISSED.

V. Conclusion

The City’s Motion is GRANTED. Hnedak’s claims for

violations of § 1983, negligence, negligent supervision, false

imprisonment, and negligent or intentional infliction of

emotional distress are DISMISSED. The City of Memphis and the

City of Memphis Police Department are DISMISSED from the case.

SO ORDERED this 18th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE