Henderson v. City of Memphis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

MARC JOSEPH HENDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

)

v. ) No. 2:19-cv-2776-SHM-tmp

)

CITY OF MEMPHIS and COLONEL ) Jury Demanded

DARRELL SHEFFIELD (in his )

individual capacity), )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF MEMPHIS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COLONEL DARRELL

SHEFFIELD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Marc Joseph Henderson (“Henderson”) sues

Defendants City of Memphis (the “City”) and Colonel Darrell

Sheffield (“Sheffield”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of Henderson’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. (D.E. No. 43.) Before the Court are two motions. The

first is the City’s motion for summary judgment. (D.E. No. 101.)

The second is Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment. (D.E. No.

106.) Both motions are ripe for consideration. (See D.E. Nos.

114, 115, 125, 129.) The City’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

On November 12, 2019, Henderson filed his Complaint against

Defendants the City, Sheffield, Lieutenant Cecil Davis, and

Lieutenant Glenn Barber seeking relief under § 1983 for

violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (D.E.

No. 1.) The Amended Complaint was filed on March 25, 2020. (D.E.

No. 43.) The Amended Complaint asserts a failure to supervise

claim against the City. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 19, 24, 33; see D.E. No. 119

at 1080.) It also asserts a claim against Sheffield for the

unconstitutional detention of Henderson for a mental health

assessment. (D.E. No. 43 ¶¶ 9, 14, 16-18, 23-24, 26-28, 32-33;

D.E. No. 119 at 1088.) On August 7, 2020, the Court entered an

Order dismissing Henderson’s claims against Defendants Davis and

Barber. (D.E. No. 71.)

Henderson has been employed by the City as a police officer

since 2011. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Statement of Undisp. Material

Facts, D.E. No. 114-1 at 630.) At all relevant times, Sheffield

was Henderson’s commanding officer at the Appling Farms Precinct.

(Id. at 631.)

Sheffield knew that Henderson was having marital problems

before Henderson was transferred to Appling Farms. (D.E. No.

106-8 at 572-76.) In April 2018, Henderson had been reported as

an officer in crisis and had voluntarily gone to Lakeside

Hospital (“Lakeside”) for mental health treatment. (Id.)

In November 2018, Henderson was still experiencing marital

problems. (Id.) Sheffield became interested in Henderson’s

marriage and ordered Henderson to do what his wife wanted in

their divorce. (Pl.’s Statement of Add. Facts, D.E. No. 114-2 at

644.)

On November 13, 2018, Henderson was working overtime and

took a break to eat breakfast and use the restroom at the home

he shared with his wife. (D.E. No. 114-1 at 631.) His wife told

Sheffield that there was an altercation, and Sheffield ordered

Crisis Intervention Team (“CIT”) trained Officer Samuel Stewart

to investigate. (D.E. No. 114-1 at 632; D.E. No. 114-2 at 646.)

Officer Stewart found Henderson to be calm. Although he was

apparently depressed, Officer Stewart found that Henderson did

not meet the criteria for an emergency commitment. (Stewart Dep.,

D.E. No. 114-4 at 718-20.)

Officer Stewart, recognizing that Sheffield was adamant

that something like an emergency commitment be done, attempted

to convince Henderson to go to Lakeside voluntarily for an

evaluation. (Id. at 720-21.) There is a dispute about whether

Henderson agreed to go to Lakeside voluntarily or whether

Sheffield coerced him. (D.E. No. 114-1 at 632-33.) Henderson’s

badge and gun were taken from him, relieving him of duty. (D.E.

No. 114-4 at 722.) Officer Stewart was shocked that Henderson

was relieved of duty. (Id. at 723.) Officer Stewart took

Henderson to Lakeside. (Id. at 722.) After several hours without

attention at Lakeside, Henderson requested a patrol car to take

him to the Appling Farms Precinct. (D.E. No. 114-1 at 632; D.E.

No. 114-2 at 647.)

When Henderson arrived at the precinct, several officers

surrounded the patrol car. (City’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of

Add. Facts, D.E. No. 128 at 1157-58.) Henderson was detained.

(Id.) The City admits that Sheffield told Henderson that

Sheffield was having Henderson committed because Henderson

refused to accept the divorce, but Sheffield denies it. (Id.)

Officer Nigel Payne transported Henderson to Memphis Mental

Health Institute (“MMHI”). (Id. at 1159.) Henderson was evaluated

there by Dimonah Sims (“Sims”). (Id.) Sims spoke to Henderson

and Henderson’s wife. (Id.) Henderson did not meet the criteria

for involuntary inpatient treatment. (Id.) He was discharged

from MMHI. (Id.)

On March 23, 2021, the Court ordered that all claims against

the City, except the failure to supervise claim, be dismissed

(the “Order”). (D.E. No. 119 at 1083-84.) The Order did not

dismiss any claims against Sheffield. (Id. at 1088.)

On December 31, 2020, the City filed its motion for summary

judgment. (D.E. No. 101.) The City argues that there was no

constitutional violation because there was probable cause for

the detention and that, even if there was a violation, the City’s

policies were not the moving force behind the violation. (Id. at

379-80.) Henderson argues that his rights were violated and that

the City’s failure to supervise Sheffield, based on his pattern

of similar conduct and the incident in question, makes the City

liable for the violation of Henderson’s rights. (D.E. No. 114 at

616-17.)

On January 22, 2021, Sheffield filed his motion for summary

judgment. (D.E. No. 106.) He argues that he did not violate

Henderson’s rights because he had probable cause for the

detention and that he is entitled to qualified immunity from

suit. (D.E. No. 106-1 at 492-93.) Henderson argues that there

are material disputed facts and that a reasonable jury could

find there was no probable cause for Henderson’s detention and

Sheffield’s actions were so egregious he is not entitled to

qualified immunity. (D.E. No. 115 at 844-45.)

II. Jurisdiction

The Court has federal question jurisdiction over

Henderson’s § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. His § 1983

claims arise under the laws of the United States.

III. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on motion of a

party, the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[T]he moving party is entitled to summary

judgment when the nonmoving party ‘fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.’” George v. Youngstown State University, 966

F.3d 446, 458 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).

The non-moving party has the duty to point out specific

evidence in the record sufficient to justify a jury decision in

his favor. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); InterRoyal Corp. v.

Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). When confronted

with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-

moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine dispute for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). There is a

genuine dispute for trial if the evidence is “‘such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”

See Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463, 467 (6th Cir.

2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986)). “[I]n order to survive a summary judgment motion,

the non-moving party ‘must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Lossia v.

Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an

integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed

to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.”

FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

IV. Analysis

A. The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional

violations caused by the municipality’s “policy or custom,” where

that “official policy” is the “moving force” behind the

constitutional injury. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To set forth a cognizable §

1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that

(1) agents of the municipality, while acting under color of state

law, (2) violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (3)

that a municipal policy or policy of inaction was the moving

force behind the violation.” Memphis, Tenn. Area Local, Am.

Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898,

902 (6th Cir. 2004).

1. Fourth Amendment Claim

Henderson claims that the City failed to supervise Sheffield

to keep him from violating his subordinates’ constitutional

rights. A failure to supervise employees adequately can be an

offending policy or custom if the failure to supervise amounts

to “‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom

the [unsupervised employees] come into contact.’” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). “To succeed on a failure

to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must prove the

following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for

the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the

municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy

was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Ellis ex

rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. School Dist., 455 F.3d 690,

700 (6th Cir. 2006)). “[M]unicipal liability under § 1983

attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a

course of action is made from among various alternatives by the

official or officials responsible for establishing final

policy.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84

(1986).

Henderson could show deliberate indifference to establish

a failure to supervise claim if the City had failed to respond

to “‘repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its

officers.’” Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 701 (quoting

Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999)). In the

Order, the Court said Henderson’s allegation that the City knew

or should have known that Sheffield had a history of interfering

in the personal lives of his subordinates and violating his

subordinates’ Fourth Amendment rights was “analogous to a

municipality’s ignoring complaints of unconstitutional behavior

because it states that the City was or should have been on notice

of the unconstitutional conduct.” (D.E. No. 119 at 1082-83.)

The City argues that Henderson cannot establish that

Sheffield had a history of similar conduct and cannot prove that

the City knew or should have known that Sheffield had a history

of similar conduct. (D.E. No. 129 at 1165.) Henderson has not

shown that Sheffield had a history of similar conduct or that

the City knew about that history.

Henderson cites two incidents to establish Sheffield’s

pattern of similar conduct. (D.E. No. 114 at 625-26.) The first

was in 1990 when Sheffield fired his weapon at a vehicle without

probable cause. (Id. at 626; D.E. No. 114-3 at 650-52.) The

second was Sheffield’s interference in Officer Duall Griffin’s

marriage. (D.E. No. 114 at 625; D.E. No. 114-4 at 732-33.)

The two incidents do not demonstrate that there was a

pattern of similar conduct that the City ignored. Two incidents

over an almost thirty-year period do not create a pattern without

additional evidence that two was an excessive number of

incidents. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 701 (“To

establish deliberate indifference through these reports,

Pendergrass would have had to allege and put on some evidence

that two incidents of abuse over two years is an excessive

number.”).

Even if two incidents constituted a pattern that indicated

deliberate indifference, the incidents were not similar. To be

similar, Sheffield must have interfered in a subordinate’s

personal life and must have acted without probable cause. Firing

a weapon without probable cause during a traffic stop is not

similar to interfering in a subordinate’s personal life and

requiring a mental health detention of that subordinate. (See

D.E. No. 129 at 1165.) Interfering in a subordinate’s marriage

without a subsequent mental health detention of that subordinate

does not demonstrate a pattern of violating a subordinate’s

Fourth Amendment rights. There was no action without probable

cause in the prior marriage incident. The conduct in these

incidents was not similar.

For the City to have been put on notice of a pattern of

rights violations, the City must have been aware of the

violations. Although the City was aware of the shooting without

probable cause, (D.E. No. 114-3 at 650-52), Henderson provides

no evidence that the City was aware of Sheffield’s interference

in Officer Duall Griffin’s marriage. (See D.E. No. 114-4 at 732-

33.) That conduct was not similar, and the City did not know

about it.

Henderson argues that a failure to supervise claim can be

established by a single incident of police misconduct where that

incident is not investigated and no one is punished. (D.E. No.

114 at 624.) Under those circumstances, a government entity might

be said to have ratified the unconstitutional conduct. See Leach

v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989)

(“[T]he district court concluded that ‘[t]he record reflects

that Sheriff Barksdale took no action to correct the situation

nor to discipline [the employee responsible] for the

mistreatment.’ Thus, like Marchese, the Sheriff here ratified

the unconstitutional acts.” (alterations in original)); Marchese

v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that, where

an assault by multiple officers on a prisoner did “not engender

either serious investigation to discover the perpetrators or

official sanctions against their conduct,” the Sheriff had

ratified the illegal acts of the unidentified officers).

Leach is distinguishable because there were multiple

incidents that would have put the county on notice of the

unconstitutional conduct. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1248 (“Given the

district court’s finding of deliberate indifference by the

Sheriff in that at least 14 other paraplegics had received

similar deplorable treatment, it is fair to say that the need

for more adequate supervision was so obvious and the likelihood

that the inadequacy would result in the violation of

constitutional rights was so great that the County as an entity

can be held liable here for the extent of Leach’s determined

damages.”). As discussed above, Henderson has been unable to

show that Sheffield engaged in a pattern of violating the

constitutional rights of his subordinates.

Marchese is distinguishable because the Sheriff failed to

investigate and punish the unconstitutional conduct, and an

active coverup ratified that conduct. Marchese, 758 F.2d at 187

(“Not only do the facts show that there was official toleration,

(if not complicity in instigation) of the midnight assault on

the part of the command officers on duty at the station house

that night; but there was also subsequent concealment followed

by a complete failure to initiate and conduct any meaningful

investigation on the part of the Sheriff himself.”). The events

in this case were reported to superiors. There was no attempt at

a coverup that could be said to ratify unconstitutional conduct.

(D.E. No. 115-1 at 860.)

Henderson’s Fourth Amendment claim against the City is

DISMISSED.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

The City argues that Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

should be dismissed on summary judgment because his claim is

properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. (D.E. No. 101-1 at

384.) The City is correct. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.

259, 272 n.7 (1997) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394

(1989)) (“Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim

is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the

Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the

standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the

rubric of substantive due process.”); Alexander v. Beale Street

Blues Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 934, 940-41 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (“All

of plaintiffs’ allegations share the common nucleus that they

are based on the officers’ alleged conduct in seizing Alexander

and their failure to provide medical attention during the

seizure. Such claims are more appropriately analyzed under the

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment rather than under

a substantive due process approach.”). Henderson’s claim must be

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and not the Fourteenth

Amendment. Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against the

City is DISMISSED.

Henderson fails to establish that the City is liable for

any rights violations. The City’s motion for summary judgment on

Henderson’s Fourth Amendment failure to supervise claim is

GRANTED. That claim is DISMISSED. The City’s motion for summary

judgment on Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is GRANTED.

That claim is also DISMISSED.

B. Sheffield’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Sheffield argues that he did not violate Henderson’s rights

because Sheffield acted with probable cause and that, even if

Henderson’s rights were violated, Sheffield is shielded from

suit by qualified immunity if his belief that there was probable

cause was reasonable. (D.E. No. 106-1 at 492-93); see Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986) (“Only where the warrant

application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to

render official belief in its existence unreasonable . . . will

the shield of immunity be lost.” (internal citation omitted)).

“[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983

unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly

established at the time.’” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.

Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,

664 (2012)). Because the Court has decided that the right to be

free from a mental health detention absent probable cause was

clearly established at the time of Henderson’s detention, (D.E.

No. 119 at 1087), both of Sheffield’s arguments depend on the

probable cause determination and whether Sheffield’s

determination was reasonable.

Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Sheffield

must be DISMISSED for the reasons stated above.1

Henderson’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sheffield

presents a jury question. “‘[T]he existence of probable cause in

a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only

one reasonable determination possible.’” Wilson v. Morgan, 477

F.3d 326, 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert,

205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000)) (alterations in original).

Henderson raises questions of material fact sufficient to

demonstrate that more than one reasonable determination is

possible about whether there was probable cause that Henderson

was a danger to himself or others and whether Sheffield

reasonably concluded there was probable cause. See Malley, 475

U.S. at 344-45; Monday v. Oullette, 118 F. 3d 1099, 1102 (6th

Cir. 1997).

Sheffield argues that “[t]he incidents preceding

Henderson’[s] detainment and transport to MMHI, Henderson’[s]

irrationality at the time of the detainment and transport, and

the conclusions of the medical professionals that Henderson did

need to be involuntarily committed together demonstrate that

1 Sheffield does not argue that Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

should be dismissed on the ground that it must be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment. The Court has decided that Henderson’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim against the City must be dismissed for that reason.

Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Sheffield must also be

dismissed for that reason.

probable cause was present.” (D.E. No. 106-1 at 493.) Henderson

presents evidence that creates a jury question about each of

Sheffield’s arguments.

The most relevant incident before Henderson was detained

occurred at his home.2 It was investigated by a trained CIT

officer, Officer Stewart. Officer Stewart found that Henderson

did not meet the criteria for an emergency commitment. Stewart

was shocked that Henderson was relieved of duty. Stewart’s

determination was made only hours before Henderson was detained.

Stewart’s conclusion speaks to Henderson’s mental state at the

time it was made and to Henderson’s mental state when he was

detained. A reasonable jury could conclude that there was no

probable cause and that Sheffield’s probable cause determination

was unreasonable based on his disagreement with Stewart.

Sheffield argues that Henderson had the means to harm

himself because he had his service weapon. (D.E. No. 106-1 at

490, 496.) Officer Stewart testified, however, that Henderson’s

service weapon was taken from him before they went to Lakeside.

2 That Sheffield knew Henderson had been reported as an officer in

crisis seven months earlier may have played a role in Sheffield’s

evaluation of probable cause for the detention. However, the events

of the day in question are more relevant to whether there was probable

cause for a detention because probable cause would be based primarily

on Henderson’s mental state at the time. Otherwise, Sheffield could

have detained Henderson at any point in the seven months between April

and November 2018. Sheffield did not do so.

Henderson’s possession of his service weapon could not have

supported Sheffield’s probable cause determination.

Sheffield seeks to use the testimony of Sims, the medical

professional who evaluated Henderson, to show that Sheffield’s

probable cause determination was reasonable. Sims decided that

Henderson did not qualify for involuntary inpatient treatment.

Sheffield argues, however, that based on several omissions during

the evaluation, the evaluation should have come out the other

way. (See D.E. No. 106-1 at 497.) Notwithstanding the speculative

nature of Sheffield’s exercise, the results of Sims’ evaluation

and the purported omissions from that evaluation are not material

in deciding whether Sheffield was reasonable in concluding there

was probable cause. That information was not available to

Sheffield when he made his probable cause determination. See

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (quoting Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (“Probable cause existed if ‘at the

moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances

within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably

trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man

in believing’ that Bryant had violated 18 U.S.C. § 871.”

(emphasis added)).

Henderson has raised a genuine dispute of material fact

about whether there was probable cause and whether Sheffield’s

probable cause determination was reasonable. Sheffield’s motion

for summary judgment on Henderson’s Fourth Amendment claim

against him is DENIED. Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment

on Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is GRANTED.

Henderson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Sheffield is

DISMISSED.

V. Conclusion

The City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All

claims against the City are DISMISSED.

Sheffield’s motion for summary judgment on the Fourth

Amendment claim against him is DENIED. Sheffield’s motion on the

Fourteenth Amendment claim against him is GRANTED. The Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Sheffield is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED this 22d day of July, 2021.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE