“In Colvin, we held that it was clearly established in the First Amendment context that ‘prison administrators must provide an adequate diet without violating the inmate's religious dietary restrictions.’”
How later courts described this case
- “In Colvin, we held that it was clearly established in the First Amendment context that ‘prison administrators must provide an adequate diet without violating the inmate's religious dietary restrictions.’”
- finding that “prisons need not respond to particularized religious dietary requests to comply with the First Amendment.”
- holding that “inmates . . . have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.”
- finding that prisoners have a clearly established right to a diet consistent with their religious beliefs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
BOAZ PLEASANT-BEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 2:11-cv-02138-TLP-tmp
v. )
)
MARK H. LUTTRELL, JR., Shelby County )
Mayor, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE
MAGISRATE COURT’S ORDER, AND AMENDING SCHEDULING ORDER
Plaintiff sued the Shelby County Jail (“Jail) and various individual officers1 for violating
his religious rights. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants now move for summary judgment (ECF No. 129),
and Plaintiff responded in opposition. (ECF No. 141.)
For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES the motion
in part. The Court finds that Defendants had a legitimate, penological interest in having Gang
Intelligence Unit (“GIU”) officers monitor Muslim services. There are, however, genuine issues
of material fact about whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Free Exercise and Equal Protection
rights by: (1) limiting the length of Muslim service; (2) only allowing nine inmates2 to attend
1 These officers are Roy Rodgers (deceased), Julius Hawkins, James Coleman (deceased), Robert
Moore, Rod Bowers, and Charlene McGhee (“Individual Defendants”). (See ECF No. 1 at
PageID 1.) The Sixth Circuit affirmed this district court’s dismissal of Defendants Mark Luttrell
and William Oldham. (See ECF No. 49 at PageID 473.)
2 It is not clear to the Court whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or an inmate at the time of
the alleged constitutional violations. But because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ violated the
Muslim services; (3) not providing nutritious meals during Ramadan; and (4) not providing the
Id Ul Fitr feast. And the Court finds that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity on these claims.
Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Court’s order denying his motion to compel
discovery. (ECF No. 138.) And he further moves to amend his response to Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 140.)
The Court finds that the Magistrate Court’s order was not clearly erroneous and DENIES
Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Court’s order. But even so, Defendants did present new
evidence with their motion for summary judgment. For that reason, the Court finds that further
discovery is necessary before trial. The Court, therefore, AMENDS the scheduling order to
allow for additional discovery.
BACKGROUND
In 2011, Plaintiff sued the Shelby County Jail (“Jail”) and various individual officers
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his religious rights. (ECF No. 1.) These alleged violations
mainly occurred in late 2010. (Id. at PageID 1, 8–9.)
Defendants moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 24.) The district court granted
Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 37), and Plaintiff appealed (ECF No. 39). In 2013, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court in part and remanded for further proceedings. (ECF No. 49.)
Both parties then moved for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 54 & 59.) This Court found
that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and so granted Defendants’
rights of Muslim “inmates,” the Court refers to Plaintiff and other persons in the Jail as
“inmates.” (See ECF No. 1.)
motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s. (ECF No. 105.) On that basis, Plaintiff
again appealed. (ECF No. 108.)
The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded three of Plaintiff’s
claims back to this Court. (ECF No. 114.) These three remaining claims are (1) that Defendants
disparately restricted Muslim religious services and had GIU officers attend these services; (2)
that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a satisfactorily nutritious diet during the Ramadan fast; and
(3) that Defendants did not provide an Id Ul Fitr feast at the end of Ramadan. (Id. at PageID
885–88.)
Defendants now, for the third time, move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.
(ECF No. 129.) Defendants argue that the Sixth Circuit’s reversal “was based on its finding that
the record evidence was lacking,” and so Defendants now attach to their motion “the clarifying
evidence that the Sixth Circuit found to be absent.” (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 911–12.) This
new “clarifying evidence” includes a Ramadan Diet sheet from Aramark, the Jail’s food
provider, and declarations from George Askew, Robert Moore, Shirley Hayslett, and Julianna
Croegaert. (Id.; ECF Nos. 129-3, 129-4, 129-5, 129-6 & 129-7.) What is more, Defendants also
argue that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all of Plaintiff’s
claims. (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 921.)
The Court now turns to the legal standard for a motion for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact
would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense.” Bruederle v.
Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751
F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)).
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court construes all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
And “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact.” Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
“Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact.” Id. at 448–49; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. This means that, if “the non-moving party
fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the
burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary
judgment is proper.” Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 914
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. United Auto Workers Loc. 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th
Cir. 2012) (en banc)); see also Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir.
2012).
What is more, “to show that a fact is, or is not, genuinely disputed, both parties are
required to either cite to particular parts of materials in the record or show that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 776 (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see also Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448 (“To support its motion,
the moving party may show ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325)). But, “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge[.]” Martinez, 703 F.3d at 914 (alteration in original) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). As a result, “[t]he court need
consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Ultimately, the “question is whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.’” Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52). “[A] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence in support of the
non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, the non-moving
party must present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor.” Tingle v.
Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251).
Also statements in affidavits that are “nothing more than rumors, conclusory allegations and
subjective beliefs” are insufficient evidence. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 584–85
(6th Cir. 1992)
ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Defendants argue that this Court should grant their motion for summary judgment
because “Plaintiff cannot make out a constitutional violation” against any Defendant. (ECF No.
129-1 at PageID 912.) But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact over whether Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The Court first discusses the standard for bringing a § 1983 claim and alleging a
constitutional violation. Then the Court addresses whether there are genuine issues of material
fact as to Plaintiff’s three remaining claims.
I. Liability Under § 1983
A. Liability of Individual Defendants
Under § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
1983. And so, under § 1983, plaintiffs can hold individual officers liable in their personal
capacities for violating constitutional rights. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
In fact, “Section 1983 creates a ‘species of tort liability’ for constitutional violations.”
Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Manuel v. City of
Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017)). This means that, to be liable under Section 1983, a
defendant must be “personally involved in the unconstitutional action that caused plaintiff’s
injury.” Id. at 491.
B. Liability of Shelby County
Courts will hold municipalities or counties liable under § 1983 only if an unconstitutional
policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691–92 (1978). To show municipal liability, Plaintiff must “(1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). In
essence, “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436
U.S. at 694.
II. Constitutional Violations and the Turner Standard
Courts analyze inmates’ claims of constitutional violations under the framework
set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).3 Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293
(6th Cir. 2010). And under this framework, “prison regulations that impinge on an
inmate’s constitutional rights are valid if they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.’” Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.)
Courts consider four factors when analyzing the reasonableness of a prison regulation.
Turner, 483 U.S. at 89. The Turner test’s four factors are
First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and
the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. If not, the regulation
is unconstitutional, and the other factors do not matter. Unlike the first factor, the
remaining factors are considerations that must be balanced together: (2) whether
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates; (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will
have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally; and (4) whether there are ready alternatives available that fully
accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 293 (quoting Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1999)).
As to the first factor—a rational connection between the regulation and the governmental
interest—“if [it] is not met, the regulation is unconstitutional, and the other factors do not
3 The Turner analysis applies to all inmates’ constitutional claims, including both free exercise
and equal protection claims. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (“We made quite
clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the
needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”).
matter.” Hanrahan v. Mohr, 905 F.3d 947, 955 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted).
“‘The first Turner factor is multifold,’ and requires that ‘the governmental objective underlying
the regulations at issue is [1] legitimate and [2] neutral, and that [3] the regulations are
rationally related to that objective.’” Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414
(1989)). And “a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the
regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.
The Court now considers Plaintiff’s claims and whether Defendants’ actions were
rationally related to legitimate penological interests.
A. Whether Defendants’ Disparate Worship Restrictions Violated Plaintiff’s
Constitutional Rights
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by
restricting Islamic services. 4 (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4, 8–9.) He alleges that (1) GIU officers
attended Islamic services but not Christian ones; (2) only nine inmates could attend Muslim
services on the Fourth Floor; and (3) the Jail allowed less than ten minutes for Muslim services,
while Christian services lasted over an hour. (Id.) Plaintiff also filed affidavits from other
inmates at the Jail, who affirmed these allegations. (See ECF Nos. 28-4 at PageID 296; 28-5 at
297–98.)
4 Plaintiff here alleges that Defendants’ actions violated both his Free Exercise and Equal
Protection rights. “[T]he Free Exercise Clause protects against ‘indirect coercion or penalties
on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.’” Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2015 (2017) (quoting Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988)). And the Equal Protection Clause “protects against arbitrary
classifications, and requires that similarly situated people be treated equally.” Jackson v.
Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Nichols, 278
F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2002)).
In its opinion considering Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment, the Sixth
Circuit found that “material fact disputes preclude summary judgment on these claims” because
Defendants did “not explain the alleged disparate treatment of Islam, namely, the more onerous
restrictions allegedly placed on Islamic but not Christian services.” (ECF No. 114 at PageID
886.) That court also held that, “if these allegations are proven to be true—and absent adequate
justification for the restrictions and the alleged difference in treatment—such disfavored
treatment would likely violate both Free Exercise and Equal Protection.” (Id. at PageID 886.)
The question here, then, is whether Defendants had an adequate reason for restricting Muslim
services.
Defendants argue that “any difference in treatment was not based on the religious make-
up of Plaintiff or anyone else; it was purely a result of staffing and organizational circumstances
in the Jail. And those differences were rationally related to the goals of security and order in the
Jail.” (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 914.) They also attach a declaration from George Askew, a
Unit Manager in the Jail during the relevant time. (ECF No. 129-3.)
The Court now turns to Defendants’ legitimate penological interest in having GIU
officers attend Muslim services.
i. Analysis of Defendants’ Legitimate Penological Interest in Having
GIU Officers Monitor Muslim Services
The Court finds that Defendants had a legitimate penological interest in having GIU
officers monitor Muslim services. Mr. Askew explains that most inmates in the Jail identified
as Christian, and that “the majority of inmates in any given Pod” attended the Jail’s Christian
services. (ECF No. 129-3 at PageID 938.) And “[b]ecause the majority of detainees in any
given Pod identified as Christian, the Pod’s hall security officer would routinely accompany the
Pod to Christian religious services.” (Id.) He says that, “from a security standpoint, this was
the most practical way” to regulate the services, “because the hall security officer of a given
area or floor was in the best position to monitor the individuals in that Pod; he or she would be
more likely to know about any rivalries between detainees in that Pod, or any other disciplinary
issues that may arise from that particular Pod during transport or the services themselves.” (Id.)
He further explains that, “because there was no single Muslim Pod, nor was there a Pod
that was majority Muslim,” hall security officers could not accompany Muslim inmates to their
services. (Id. at PageID 939.) Thus, “Muslim services were monitored by GIU rather than Pod
officers for staffing and logistical reasons,” not because of any animus. (Id.)
Mr. Askew also states that, because inmates from different Pods attended Muslim
services, “the likelihood of having unpredictable altercations during Muslim services was
heightened,” and so the Jail needed “extra security” at Muslim services. (Id. at PageID 939–
40.) This is because inmates from different Pods may have rivalries with inmates staying in
other Pods in the facility. “Jail personnel had no knowledge of what rivalries may have existed
between the detainees from different Pods.” (Id. at PageID 939.)
Plaintiff disputes Mr. Askew’s declaration. First, he argues that Defendants did not keep
track of inmates’ religious preferences. (ECF No. 141 at 1006.) And he swears that pod
officers did not monitor Christian services.5 (ECF No. 141-1 at 1024.) Plaintiff further says
that he never saw any fights, arguments, or disruptions in the Fourth Floor Jumu’ah services
that would create heightened security concerns. (Id.)
The Court finds here that Defendants had a legitimate penological interest in having GIU
officers monitor Muslim services. First, the Court asks whether there is a “valid, rational
5 The Court cites Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but he also
swears to these facts in an attached affidavit. (See ECF Nos. 141 & 141-1.)
connection” between this restriction and Defendants’ asserted interests. See Turner, 482 U.S. at
89. Relying on Mr. Askew’s declaration, Defendants explain that GIU officers monitored
Muslim services for security reasons.
“Maintaining security constitutes a legitimate penological interest.” Thompson v.
Campbell, 81 F. App’x 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2003). Plus, “[w]hen determining whether a
particular restriction is reasonably related to prison security, the court should give considerable
deference to prison administrators’ expertise.” Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 930 (6th Cir.
1985); Hayes v. Tennessee, 424 F. App’x 546, 550 (6th Cir. 2011) (“As maintaining security,
order, and discipline are essential goals of a corrections system, prison officials are accorded
wide latitude in the adoption and application of prison policies and procedures.”).
Mr. Askew’s affidavit asserts that GIU officers monitored Muslim services because the
inmates in attendance were from different pods. And this posed a heightened security risk and a
manpower issue because there were no hall security officers familiar with all the inmates
attending the Muslim services. Mr. Askew explains, “[s]ecurity and safety are paramount in a
Jail environment, and one of the most helpful tools a Corrections Deputy can have is
information regarding any feuds or rivalries between inmates. Without that information,
additional security measures are necessary to allow Jail personnel to swiftly respond to any
altercations between detainees.” (ECF No. 129-3 at PageID 940.)
By contrast, Defendants explain that GIU officers did not need to monitor Christian
services because they did not pose the same risk. Inmates attended Christian services by pods,
and a hall security officer—familiar with those inmates—monitored the services. Considering
this evidence, there is a “logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal” of
maintaining security, and that connection is not “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational.” See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. All in all, the Court finds that Defendants’ security
concerns are a rational, neutral reason for GIU officers to monitor Muslim services and not
Christian services.
The other Turner factors also weigh in favor of Defendants here. First, the regulation
does not deprive Muslim inmates of all alternative ways to exercise their religious rights. Even
with GIU officers in attendance, Muslim inmates may still participate in the services without
interference from the officers. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987)
(finding that a prison policy that prevented inmates from attending Jumu’ah services did not
violate the inmates’ free exercise rights, partly because the prison did not “deprive[] [the
plaintiffs] of all forms of religious exercise.”).
Next, Defendants have also shown that having GIU officers attend Muslim services is
necessary, not only to combat the heightened security risk, but also for staffing and logistical
reasons. (ECF No. 129-3 at PageID 939.) Finally, Defendants say they cannot “segregate all
Muslim detainees into a single ‘Muslim Pod,’” and that no single hall security officer can
monitor all Muslim inmates because “they were scattered throughout the Jail.” (Id. at PageID
938–99). As a result, it is unclear that there were other feasible ways to address the security
risks posed by having inmates from different pods attend Muslim services.
In sum, the Court finds that, under the Turner factors, Defendants’ security and logistical
concerns are legitimate reasons for having GIU officers attend Muslim services. And so the
Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
ii. Analysis of Defendants’ allegedly Legitimate Penological Interest in
Limiting Muslim Services to Nine Inmates for Less than Ten Minutes
There is a material issue of fact about whether Defendants had a justifiable reason for (1)
allowing only nine inmates to attend Muslim services; and (2) limiting the length of Muslim
services to between five and seven minutes.
In his declaration, Defendant Askew says that, for the same reasons GIU officers
monitored Muslim services, “any restrictions on the number of detainees in a GIU-monitored
service may have been more limited than the number of inmates allowed in services conducted
per-pod.” (ECF No. 129-3 at PageID 940.) Though he was unaware of any religious services
that the Jail limited to less than an hour, such a limitation “would have been necessary to and
consistent with the goal of limiting the number of inmates from different pods being allowed in
a room at one time.” (Id.)
But Plaintiff points out that thirty-five to forty inmates attended Christian services. (ECF
No. 141 at 1008.) And he claims that those services lasted for at least an hour. (Id.) By
contrast, Plaintiff says that the Jail allowed only nine inmates to attend Friday Jumu’ah services.
(Id.) What is more, GIU Officers ended those services after only five to seven minutes of
prayer. (Id. at PageID 1009.) Plaintiff further claims that he never saw any fights, arguments,
or disruptions in the Fourth Floor Jumu’ah services that would have caused any heightened
security concerns.6 (Id.) The affidavits of other inmates support Plaintiff’s claims that twenty
to thirty inmates attended Christian services; that only nine inmates attended Muslim services;
6 Plaintiff also challenges Mr. Askew’s credibility over these issues. He argues that he never
saw Mr. Askew at any of the Fourth Floor religious services, and notes that Mr. Askew himself
“does not assert that he was present on the 4th Floor of the Jail during the relevant time-frame.”
(Id. at n.1.)
that Christian services lasted an hour; and that the Jail limited the Muslim services to less than
ten minutes. (ECF Nos. 28-4; 28-5; 28-17.)
Based on the record and viewing it in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a
dispute of material fact over whether Defendants restricted the Muslim services as alleged and
whether Defendants’ security interests justified these alleged restrictions. The Court again turns
to the Turner factors.
The first Turner factor—whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it—weighs in favor of
Plaintiff here. This is because Defendants’ explanation of security reasons to justify its need to
limit the length and number in attendance for Muslim services is mostly unsupported. While
the Court gives jail officials deference on security matters, there still must be a “valid, rational
connection” between the security concern and the alleged restriction. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
What is more, the jail “cannot merely assert that its interests require restrictions” on a prisoner’s
constitutional rights; instead, it “must prove the necessity of any restriction it imposes.”
Walker, 771 F.2d at 929. And Defendants fail so far to provide evidence that these restrictions
were necessary here.
The Sixth Circuit has often found that there must be evidence supporting the
government’s proposed penological interest in an unconstitutional policy or practice. See Am.
Civ. Liberties Union Fund v. Livingston Cnty., 796 F.3d 636, 647 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that
defendants lacked a legitimate penological interest for regulating legal mail when “[n]othing in
the record suggests that the parade of horribles advanced by the Defendants would occur if the
Jail is required to deliver properly marked legal mail”); Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 486
(6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the first Turner factor weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiff
because there were no facts on the record supporting defendants’ proposed penological interest);
Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that there must be evidence
on the record supporting defendant’s claim that a policy furthers a legitimate penological
interest).
And here, the evidence fails to eliminate a genuine dispute over whether Defendants
limited the number of inmates in Muslim services and the length of those services and, if they
did so, why. Plaintiff argues persuasively that Defendants have not explained how limiting the
number of Muslim inmates at a service to nine or restricting the length for that service to ten
minutes eliminates a security risk while also allowing thirty inmates to attend a Christian
service for an hour at a time. (ECF No. 141 at PageID 1008 n.7.)
In fact, Mr. Askew stated that “the more detainees in a room at a time (especially with
potential, unknown rivalries), the greater the security threat.” (ECF No. 129-3 at PageID 940.)
To that end, Plaintiff claims that often, Defendants did not monitor Christian services. (ECF
No. 141 at 1009.) He also argues that Defendants never cited any specific incidents in Muslim
(or Christian) services that would justify limiting the length of Muslim services or the number
of inmates who could attend. (Id. at PageID 1009.) Nor did Mr. Askew swear in his declaration
that he personally attended any of the Fourth Floor services during the relevant time. Or, that
he knew of any incidents that had occurred which justified limiting Muslim services in this way.
Besides, Defendants addressed any increased security risks by having GIU officers monitor
those services. So based on the evidence on the record, there is a genuine dispute about the
legitimacy of these restrictions on Muslim services.
Plus, the other Turner factors also weigh in favor of Plaintiff here. There is no evidence
that Plaintiff had alternative ways to exercise his religious rights. By allowing so few inmates
to attend, it is not clear that every Muslim inmate on the Fourth Floor had a chance to attend
services. And a service that lasts only ten minutes is not a reasonable alternative to a service
that normally lasts an hour. (See ECF No. 28-7 at PageID 309.)
Nor is there compelling evidence that accommodating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
would have damaged the guards, other inmates, or prison resources. And there were also plenty
of reasonable alternatives—an extra GIU officer could have attended the services. Or the Jail
could have held smaller services that lasted longer.
In the end, Plaintiff presents evidence disputing Defendants’ reasons for restricting the
length of Muslim services and the number of inmates allowed to attend. And, the “question is
whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Johnson, 777 F.3d at
843. The Court finds that the evidence is not “so one-sided” here.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are material fact
disputes about whether the Jail had a policy or practice of restricting the attendance and length
of Muslim services without reasonable justification, and whether they acted with discriminatory
intent by treating Muslims differently from Christians. And so the Court DENIES summary
judgment on these claims.
B. Whether Defendants Violated Plaintiff’s Right to a Nutritious Religious Diet
The Court also finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact over whether
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to a nutritious religious diet. Plaintiff claims that
Defendants failed to provide nutritionally adequate Ramadan meals. (ECF Nos. 1 at PageID 5;
59 at PageID 569). He alleges that the meals were smaller, he lost ten pounds during Ramadan,
and that the meals caused abnormal stomach aches. (ECF No. 59-2 at PageID 585–86.)
The Sixth Circuit has found that inmates have a right to an adequate diet that does not
violate their religious dietary restrictions. Welch v. Spaulding, 627 F. App’x 479, 482 (6th Cir.
2015); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010); Alexander v. Carrick, 31 F. App’x
176, 179 (6th Cir. 2002). What is more, on appeal of this case, the Sixth Circuit found that “[a]
prisoner has a right under the Free Exercise Clause to a nutritious diet during Ramadan.” (ECF
No. 114 at PageID 887 (citing Welch, 627 F. App’x at 483 (6th Cir. 2015)).
In their original motions for summary judgment, Defendants did not argue that the Jail’s
Ramadan meals were nutritionally adequate—instead, they showed that a nutritionist approved
the meals. (Id.) The Sixth Circuit found that was not enough and that “a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether [Plaintiff] received a nutritionally adequate diet during
Ramadan.” (ECF No. 114 at PageID 887.)
Defendants now attach a Ramadan Diet Guide that they argue shows the nutritional
adequacy of the meals. (ECF No. 129-6.) And they attach declarations from Aramark Senior
Food Director Shirley Hayslett and Aramark Dietitian Julianna Croegaert. (ECD Nos. 129-5 &
129-7.) Ms. Hayslett explains that the Ramadan Diet Guide “serves as a reference guide for
meal preparation for inmates during 2010 and 2011 in the Shelby County Jail who were
observing the Ramadan fast.” (ECF No. 129-5 at PageID 945.) And Ms. Croegaert states that
the meals listed on the meal guide “are sufficient to provide for the nutritional health and
wellbeing of any inmates who only receive” two daily meals during Ramadan. (ECF No. 129-7
at PageID 948.) As a result, Defendants argue that the Court should grant them summary
judgment on this claim. (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 921.)
That said, Plaintiff disputes that the Jail followed this Ramadan Diet Guide. (ECF No.
141 at PageID 1011.) He says that “he [has] never been fed that menu during any year he was
housed at the Jail.” (Id.) And that the Ramadan breakfast and dinner meals “were the exact
same meals fed to the general population” of the Jail. (Id.) Plus, while Defendants say they
used the Ramadan diet sheet as a “reference guide” during the relevant timeframe, they do not
provide evidence that, in practice, they followed the Ramadan Diet Guide.
Based on this evidence, there is a question of material fact about whether Defendants
followed the Ramadan Diet Guide and gave Plaintiff nutritious meals during Ramadan. And
“the question of whether a prison official has knowingly provided a nutritionally inadequate diet
is a fact-specific inquiry that requires consideration of, inter alia, daily caloric content, duration
of the diet, and the nutritional needs of the prisoner.” Welch, 627 F. App’x at 483.
In the end, the new evidence Defendants attach to their motion for summary judgment is
not “so one-sided that [Defendants] must prevail as a matter of law.” See Johnson, 777 F.3d at
843. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there remains a genuine issue of
material fact over whether he received a nutritionally adequate diet during Ramadan and
whether Defendants acted with discriminatory intent. With that in mind, the Court DENIES
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Ramadan diet claim.
C. Whether Defendants Violated Plaintiff’s Right to an Id Ul Fitr Feast
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by
refusing to provide the Id Ul Fitr feast. (ECF Nos. 1 at PageID 5; 59 at PageID 569). And the
Sixth Circuit found that, “[a]bsent a legitimate penological justification, the lack of opportunity
to participate in Id Ul Fitr could violate a Muslim prisoner’s Free Exercise rights.” (ECF No.
114 at PageID 886.)
Defendants now provide an allegedly legitimate penological justification for not
providing the feast. First, they argue that there were no funds for the feast. (ECF No. 129-1 at
PageID 918.) Second, that the Jail spent funds on other accommodations for Muslims. (Id.) To
that end, Defendants argue that “[t]he Jail was not required to treat populations of different
sizes, each of which had unique accommodation requests, identically in every way, especially in
light of limited funds.” (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 919.)
But Plaintiff disputes this. He argues that Defendants paid for every inmate to eat a
Christmas meal that included turkey, dressing, sweet potatoes, cranberry sauce, sweet potato
pie, and juice.7 (ECF No. 59-2 at PageID 586.) And he says Defendants decorated every wall
in every Pod for Christmas. (Id.) What is more, he claims that Defendants held a three-day
revival with food for Christian inmates only. (Id.; see also ECF No. 114 at PageID 886.) He
therefore argues that Defendants had enough resources to provide the feast for Muslim inmates.
In like manner, Plaintiff disputes that Defendants spent more money and resources
accommodating Muslim inmates. (ECF No. 141 at PageID 1011.) Indeed, Defendants only list
two ways they accommodated Muslim inmates—by creating a special pork-free diet at the Jail
and accommodating Muslims during the Ramadan fast. (ECF No. 129-4 at PageID 943.) But
Plaintiff argues that Defendants created a pork-free diet for the Jail before the relevant time
frame of this case. (ECF No. 141 at PageID 1011.) And he argues that Defendants did not
spend extra money or resources on Ramadan. He claims that the Ramadan breakfast and dinner
meals “were the exact same meals fed to the general population” of the Jail. (Id.) Also Plaintiff
claims that he served Muslim inmates their breakfast meals and dinner meals, not the Jail’s
staff. (Id.)
7 The food served at the Christmas meal is like the food Plaintiff says he traditionally eats at the
Id Ul Fitr feast—turkey, lamb, chicken, rice, dates, and vegetables. (ECF No. 59-2 at PageID
587.)
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered Defendants’ arguments about its lack of funds,
and still found that “genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendants had a
legitimate penological justification for not offering an Id Ul Fitr meal and whether they acted
with discriminatory intent by treating Muslims differently from Christians.” (ECF No. 114 at
887.) The Court finds that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion still controls here because Defendants do
not present any new evidence about its funding that changes the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.8
And, in any event, Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of Defendants’ claim that they spent money
accommodating Muslims.
All in all, taking the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine
issues of material fact on whether Defendants had a legitimate penological justification for not
offering the Id Ul Fitr Feast, and whether Defendants acted with discriminatory intent. The
Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.
ANALYSIS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CLAIMS
The Individual Defendants argue first that they did not violate Plaintiff’s religious rights
because their actions were “at least reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
(ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 916.) And even if they did violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
the Individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did
not violate clearly established law. (Id. at PageID 922–23.) Before addressing the merits of this
argument, the Court first turns to the qualified immunity standard.
8 The Court does not analyze Defendants’ interest under the Turner factors because Defendants
here assert the same legitimate penological interest that the Sixth Circuit considered. And the
Court finds that, because Defendants make the same argument without providing additional
compelling evidence, it has to follow the Sixth Circuit’s finding that there is a genuine issue of
material fact about whether Defendants had a legitimate penological interest here.
I. Qualified Immunity Standard
Government officials “are immune from civil liability, unless, in the course of performing
their discretionary functions, they violate the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional
rights.” Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Messerschmidt v.
Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012)). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a
court must decide (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a
violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right at issue was clearly established at
the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)
(internal references and citations omitted). Under this standard, “[t]he contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
The doctrine allows government officials “breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (per curiam) (citations and quotations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit “has long recognized that the purpose of this doctrine is to protect officers
‘from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.’”
Nelson v. City of Battle Creek, Mich., No. 18-1282, 2020 WL 916966, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 26,
2020) (quoting Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 2005)). “Once the defending
officer raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the officer is not
entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir.
2013); Coble v. City of White House, 634 F.3d 865, 870–71 (6th Cir. 2011)).
II. Whether Defendants Violated Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights
As explained above, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact on
whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by (1) limiting the length of
Muslims services and the number of inmates who could attend; (2) not providing nutritious
Ramadan meals; and (3) not providing the Id Ul Fitr feast. And so, the Court now addresses
whether the law clearly established those rights at the time of the alleged violations.
III. Whether Case Law Clearly Established Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights
Government officials lose their immunity when “in the course of performing their
discretionary functions, they violate the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.”
Mullins, 805 F.3d at 765. A “clearly established right” is one “sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664(2012)). Case law
often defines those established rights.
“There need not be ‘a case directly on point’ for the law to be clearly established, ‘but
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”
Nelson, 2020 WL 916966, at *3 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “To
violate a plaintiff’s clearly established right, an officer’s conduct must be such that, at the time
of the allegedly-violative conduct, the contours of that right were sufficiently defined that every
‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id.
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
In determining whether a right is clearly established, the Court looks to decisions of the
Supreme Court, then to decisions of the Sixth Circuit, and finally to other courts of appeal, and
asks whether these precedents placed the constitutional question at issue “beyond debate.”
Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741).
District court decisions do not create clearly established law. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S.
692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in
either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a
different case. . . . Otherwise said, district court decisions—unlike those from the courts of
appeals—do not necessarily settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of
qualified immunity.” (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02(1)(d), p.
134–36 (3d ed. 2011)).
The Court now considers whether case law clearly established these rights at issue here:
(1) the right of inmates to pursue their faith, as compared to the opportunity given to other
inmates of a different faith;9 (2) the right to a nutritious religious diet; and (3) the right to
celebrate the Id Ul Fitr feast.10
A. Genuine Issue of Material Fact Over Whether Defendants Violated
Plaintiff’s Clearly Established Right to Pursue his Faith
Plaintiff argues that the prison treated Muslim and Christian inmates differently without
reasonable justification. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4, 8–9.) First, Defendants allegedly limited the
number of inmates who could attend Muslim services to nine inmates, but allowed over thirty
9 Neither party addresses how the Court should characterize Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants
restricted Muslim services but not Christian ones.
10 Plaintiff bears the burden to show that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity. Nelson, 2020 WL 916966, at *2. And while he spends most of his response arguing
that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, he does not argue that the law clearly
established those rights. (See ECF No. 141.) His arguments that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights, however, rebuts their qualified immunity claims. Plus, Plaintiff addressed
qualified immunity in his response to Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment,
arguing that “qualified immunity cannot be provided to guilty officials who knowingly deprive
the Plaintiff of clearly established constitutional rights,” and that Defendants “intentionally”
violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 59 at PageID 578.)
inmates to attend Christian services. (Id.) And second, they allegedly limited the length of
Muslim services to five to seven minutes, while allowing Christian services to last an hour.
(Id.) Defendants now argue that “Plaintiff cannot show that such restrictions, in light of the
pragmatic realities Askew lists, fell within clearly established Free Exercise or Equal Protection
jurisprudence at that time.” (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 923.) This Court disagrees.
“Although prisoners obviously do not retain the same freedom to exercise their religion
as they would in the world outside the prison, they may not be denied basic rights of
conscience.” Thompson v. Commonwealth of Ky., 712 F.2d 1078, 1080 (1983). Jail officials
thus cannot deny inmates a reasonable opportunity to practice their religion. See Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964). What is more, the
Supreme Court has found that, if an inmate “was denied reasonable opportunity of pursuing his
faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional
religious precepts, then there was palpable discrimination by the State.” Id. at 1081. It is,
therefore, clearly established that jail officials cannot deny inmates the reasonable opportunity
to pursue their faith, as compared to the opportunity afforded to other prisoners of a different
faith. And this is in essence the right that Plaintiff asserts here.
Even so, prison officials may restrict inmates’ religious opportunities if they have a
legitimate penological interest in doing so. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. And if they have a
legitimate reason, prison officials can treat inmates of different faiths differently. For example,
in Cruz v. Beto, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] special chapel or place of worship need not
be provided for every faith regardless of size.” 405 U.S. at 323 n.2. What is more, in
Thompson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit found that prison officials did not
violate the Free Exercise or Equal Protection clauses when they only allowed Muslim inmates
6.5 hours of Islamic services a week, but provided 23 hours of Christian services. 712 F.2d
1078, 1080–81 (6th Cir. 1983). The court found that plaintiffs “have not been denied a basic
right of conscience” because the prison did, in fact, allow Muslim inmates to have weekly
services. Id. at 1080. And the court emphasized that the Free Exercise Clause “does not insure
that all sects will be treated alike in all respects.” Id. at 1081.
That said, the Court here found that there is a genuine issue of material fact over whether
Defendants had a legitimate penological interest in limiting the attendance and length of
Muslim services. As a result, there is similarly a genuine issue of material fact over whether the
individual Defendants violated clearly established law by denying Muslim inmates a reasonable
chance to pursue their faith as compared to Christian inmates, without a legitimate penological
interest. Of course, Defendants will have a chance to answer these questions of fact at trial.
But on these grounds, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this
claim.
B. Case Law Clearly Established the Right to a Nutritious Religious Diet
Next, the Court turns to whether case law clearly established Plaintiff’s right to a
nutritionally adequate diet. And, for reasons stated below, the Court finds that it did.
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit found that inmates have a right to an adequate diet that does not
violate their religious dietary restrictions. Alexander v. Carrick, 31 F. App’x 176, 179 (6th Cir.
2002)). The court held that, “[i]f the prisoner’s diet, as modified, is sufficient to sustain the
prisoner in good health, no constitutional right has been violated.” Id. And in its 2010 opinion,
Colvin v. Caruso, the Sixth Circuit found that its case law clearly established this right—that is,
an inmate’s right to “an adequate diet” that did not violate the inmate’s religious beliefs. 605
F.3d 282, 290 (2010); see also Welch v. Spaulding, 627 F. App’x 479 (6th Cir. 2015) (“In
Colvin, we held that it was clearly established in the First Amendment context that ‘prison
administrators must provide an adequate diet without violating the inmate's religious dietary
restrictions.’”).
And almost every other circuit court agrees that inmates have a right to a diet consistent
with their religious beliefs. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding it
“clearly established that a prisoner has a right to a diet consistent with his or her religious
scruples”); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that inmates have a right to
a diet that aligns with their sincerely held religious beliefs); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 199
(4th Cir. 2006) (finding that prisoners have a clearly established right to a diet consistent with
their religious beliefs); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that “a
prisoner is entitled to practice his religion insofar as doing so does not unduly burden the
administration of the prison,” and so material issue of fact existed about whether prison officials
violated inmate’s religious rights by giving him meals containing pork); Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d
682, 689 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that “prison inmates are entitled to reasonable accommodation
of their religious dietary needs”); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that “inmates . . . have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in
good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.”); Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr.,
183 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that prison officials violated inmate’s free
exercise rights by not providing Ramadan meals). But see Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112,
122 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that “prisons need not respond to particularized religious dietary
requests to comply with the First Amendment.”)
All in all, the law in the Sixth Circuit clearly established a right to a nutritious religious
diet at the time of the alleged constitutional violations here. Plus, the consensus of the other
circuit courts of appeals also suggests that this right was “beyond debate,” and that a reasonable
officer considering this precedent would have known that Plaintiff had a right to a nutritious
Ramadan diet. See Hearring, 712 F.3d at 280. Defendants, therefore, are not entitled to
qualified immunity on this claim.
C. Case Law Clearly Established the Right to an Id Ul Fitr Feast
The Court now considers whether Plaintiff had a clearly established right to an Id Ul Fitr
Feast in 2010 and 2011. This is a close call, but recent Sixth Circuit precedent provides
guidance. In Maye v. Klee, the Sixth Circuit, considered a qualified immunity claim for
violations in 2013, and found that case law at that time clearly established an inmate’s right to
participate in an Eid al-Fitr feast. 915 F.3d 1076, 1087 (6th Cir. 2019).11 One reason the Court
found a clearly established right is because a district court had ordered the prison to hold the
feast. Id. But, more importantly, the court found that other case law “would also suffice to
show the rights were clearly established in 2013 and 2014.” Id. This case law includes the
following: Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1073–74 (6th Cir. 1989); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89;
Fowler v. State of R.I., 345 U.S. 67, 69–70 (1953); and Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 576
(6th Cir. 2005).
So the Sixth Circuit found that these four cases clearly established the right to the Id Ul
Fitr feast. And courts decided each of these cases—Whitney, Turner, Fowler, and Harbin-
Bey—before 2010. So, in sum, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Maye reveals that case law
11 When deciding whether a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes, courts
look to case law decided before the alleged constitutional violation took place. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This means that, even if a later opinion clearly
establishes a right, the court cannot consider that opinion when deciding whether the right was
clearly established. See id. As a result, the Court here cannot rely on Maye v. Klee to find that
the right was clearly established in 2010. But the Court can still look to the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion for guidance on the state of the law during the relevant timeframe here.
established a right to an Id Ul Fitr feast before 2010.12 With that in mind, this Court follows the
Sixth Circuit opinion in Maye and finds that case law clearly established Plaintiff’s right to an
Id Ul Fitr feast. This means that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity on this issue.
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT MCGHEE
Defendants argue that Plaintiff no longer states a claim against Defendant Charlene
McGhee. (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 923.) This is because Plaintiff’s only remaining claims
relate to Defendants’ restriction of Muslims services; their inadequate Ramadan meals; and their
failure to provide an Id Ul Fitr feast. (Id.) A complaint “must allege that the defendants were
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.
App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008).
But Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint “does not attribute any specific actions to
[Defendant McGhee].” (ECF No. 129-1 at PageID 924.)
The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff does allege Defendant McGhee’s involvement.
First, his complaint alleges that she (along with the other Individual Defendants) restricted
Muslim services and did not provide adequate Ramadan meals or the Id Ul Fitr feast. (ECF No.
1 at PageID 4.) True enough, Plaintiff often alleges that all the Individual Defendants violated
his constitutional rights. (See ECF Nos. 1; 59). That said, in his affidavit, Plaintiff says that
“Defendants Moore, Bowers, Hawkins, McGhee, Davis, Rodgers, and Shelby County”
accommodated Christian holidays but not Muslim ones. (ECF No. 59-2 at PageID 586.) Plus,
12 Also two other circuit courts had found that inmates have a right to attend an Id Ul Fitr feast.
Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding inmates have a clearly established
right to an Eid-ul-Fitr meal); see also Parks-El v. Felming, 212 F. App’x 245, 248 (4th Cir.
2007).
in his first motion for summary judgment, he also states that “McGhee . . . had personal
involvement in the constitutional injuries.” (ECF No. 59 at PageID 578.)
In fact, Defendant McGhee’s own affidavit states that she was the Assistant Chief of
Security of the Jail and was responsible for security at the Jail during the relevant timeframe.
(ECF No. 24-6 a PageID 230.) This lends credibility to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant
McGhee restricted Muslim services. Plus, Defendants do not put up any new evidence to
dispute Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant McGhee for these three claims.
The Court has to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. And, with the
evidence before it, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact on whether
Defendant McGhee was personally involved in the conduct underlying Plaintiff’s three
remaining claims. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as
to Defendant McGhee.
PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE COURT’S ORDER AND HIS
MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiff Boaz Pleasant-Bey (“Plaintiff”) objects to the Magistrate Court’s order on his
motion to compel. (ECF No. 138.) Plaintiff also moves for leave to amend his response to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (See ECF No. 140.)
Before responding to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff moved to
compel evidence from Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). (ECF No.
133.) This Court referred the motion to the Magistrate Court for determination (ECF No. 134),
and it denied the motion. (See ECF No. 136.) Plaintiff then filed a notice of objections to the
Magistrate Court’s order (ECF No. 138), and Defendants responded in opposition. (ECF No.
143.) Plaintiff now requests leave to amend his response to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment because he has “objections pending before this Court to the Magistrate Court’s Order
denying his Motion to Compel.” (ECF No. 140 at PageID 1003.)
I. This Court’s Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the Court may designate a magistrate judge to hear and
determine any pretrial matter. The Court may reconsider a pretrial determination made by a
magistrate judge “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous
or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
The clearly erroneous standard applies to the magistrate judge’s factual findings, while the
contrary to law standard applies to the magistrate’s conclusions of law. United States v.
Hofstetter, 423 F. Supp. 3d 502, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 2019). A factual finding is clearly erroneous
when, “although there is evidence to support it, ‘the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v.
Ayen, 997 F.2d 1150, 1152 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985)); see also Hofstetter, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 505; Cratty v. City of Allen Park, No. 17-
11724, 2018 WL 3983806, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2018). “A decision is contrary to law if it
contradicts or ignores applicable precepts of law, as found in the Constitution, statutes, or case
precedent.” Hoftstetter, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 505 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
II. The Rule 56(d) Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), a nonmovant responding to a motion for
summary judgment may show by affidavit or declaration that, “for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “The [nonmovant’s]
affidavit must ‘indicate to the district court the party’s need for discovery, what material facts it
hopes to uncover, and why it has not previously discovered the information.’” Doe v. City of
Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 490 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d
713, 720 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The nonmovant thus bears the burden of showing “why he could not oppose the summary
judgment motion by affidavit and how postponement of a ruling on the motion would enable
him to rebut [the movant’s] showing of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 1989). If the nonmovant makes this
showing, the Court may either defer or deny the motion for summary judgment; allow time for
discovery; or issue any other appropriate order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1)–(3).
When the Sixth Circuit reviews a district court’s ruling on a Rule 56 motion for
additional discovery, it considers five factors:
(1) when the appellant learned of the issue that is the subject of the desired
discovery; (2) whether the desired discovery would have changed the ruling below;
(3) how long the discovery period had lasted; (4) whether the appellant was dilatory
in its discovery efforts; and (5) whether the appellee was responsive to discovery
requests.
Doe, 928 F.3d at 491 (quoting CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 420 (6th Cir. 2008)). The
Sixth Circuit has suggested that a district court also consider these factors when deciding a Rule
56(d) motion. See id.
The Court now examines whether the Magistrate Court’s order was clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.
III. Analysis of Plaintiff’s 56(d) Motion
A. Plaintiff’s Reasons for the Rule 56(d) Motion
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment includes “new evidence,”
and that “[a]ll of Plaintiff’s [discovery] requests are in response to new assertions made by the
Defendants in their renewed motion for summary judgment . . . .” (ECF Nos. 133 at PageID
956; 138 at PageID 996.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s motion raises three new issues.
First, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Moore’s declaration implies that Defendants created a pork-free
diet for inmates with a religious objection to pork. (ECF No. 133 at PageID 957.) Second, Mr.
Moore’s declaration allegedly raises a new claim that the Jail’s accommodations for Muslim
inmates during the Ramadan Fast required extra staffing at the Jail’s expense. (Id.) Plaintiff
also argues that Mr. Moore’s declaration “implies that the Jail did not have the funding for the
Id Ul Fitr Feast of 2010.” (Id.) And third, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Askew’s declaration
suggests that the Jail kept records of the religious affiliations of its inmates. (Id.)
Plaintiff attached an affidavit swearing that, without further discovery, he “cannot present
facts essential to justify [his] opposition to the pending motion for summary judgment.” (Id. at
PageID 979.) And so Plaintiff tried to subpoena this information
1. The exact year Aramark began feeding a pork-free diet for everyone at the Jail;
2. A list of employees working for both the SCSO as Deputy Jailers and
employees working for Aramark between Feb. 2010 – Feb. 2011;
3. The list of overtime hours worked over any months between Feb. 2010 – Feb.
2011; extra staffing expenses were incurred (if any) for any reason; and who
those extra staff members were during that timeframe;
4. Records of jail expenses of feeding inmates in Intake during the hours of night-
time arrests made between 8:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. between Feb. 2010 – Feb.
2011;
5. A copy of the Federal and State Funding for the SCSO accommodating the
needs and requests of all inmates (religious needs);
6. A copy of the Jail’s budget and expenditures for religious meals (Christmas
meals, revival foods and beverages, etc.), religious decorations (Christmas
decorations, ornaments, lightings, pictures) between the years Feb. 2010 – Feb.
2011;
7. The list of inmates who are Trustee workers in the Jail’s kitchen, preparing the
meals and feeding the entire Jail inmate population between Feb. 2010 – Feb.
2011 (the Annex Department has Pods where inmate Trustee workers are
housed that work in the Jail’s kitchen); and
8. Records of how many inmates were listed as Muslim and Christian (or other)
at the Jail between Feb. 2010 – Feb. 2011.
(ECF No. 133 at PageID 963–64.) His affidavit, however, does not explain why he cannot
respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without this information. (See id. at
PageID 978–79.)
B. Review of the Magistrate Court’s Findings
The Magistrate Court found that Plaintiff’s motion to compel—which he filed after the
discovery deadline—was untimely. The Magistrate Court explained that “Rule 56(d) is
intended to provide a mechanism for the parties and the court to give effect to the well-
established principle that the plaintiff must receive a full opportunity to conduct discovery to be
able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Grange
Mut. Cas. Co., No. 2:07-CV-1285, 2012 WL 1340369, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). And, under Rule 56(d), “it is improper to grant summary judgment if [the
party seeking Rule 56(d) relief] is given an insufficient opportunity for discovery.” Wilson v.
Ebony Constr. LLC, No 2:17-cv-1071, 2018 WL 4743063, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2018)
(quoting Dish Network LLC v. Fun Dish Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1540, 2011 WL 13130841, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2011)).
The Magistrate Court found that, here, “Pleasant-Bey has received a full opportunity to
conduct discovery.” (ECF No. 136 at PageID 990.) The deadline for completing discovery was
October 24, 2014. (See ECF No. 52.) And so, “[t]he period for conducting discovery has long
passed, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that Shelby County was unresponsive to
discovery requests during that time.” (ECF No. 136 at PageID 990–91.) For that reason, the
Magistrate Court found that “Pleasant-Bey cannot now use Rule 56(d) to circumvent the
deadlines of this court’s scheduling order and seek broad requests of discovery from
defendants.” (Id. at PageID 991.)
The Court finds that the Magistrate Court’s decision was not clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff’s affidavit does not include any “specified reasons” that he “cannot present facts
essential to justify” his opposition. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(d). While he explains that
Defendants presented new evidence, he does not explain why he cannot respond to Defendant’s
motion by affidavit or other evidence shared during discovery. (See ECF No. 133 at PageID
978–79.)
Plus, the Doe factors weigh against Plaintiff. Defendants did present new evidence with
their motion—however, some of Plaintiff’s discovery requests related to issues that he knew
about during discovery, such as the Jail’s budget. And the discovery period lasted at least five
months (ECF No. 52 at PageID 480), and there is no evidence that either party “was dilatory” in
its discovery efforts.13 See Doe, 928 F.3d at 491. And most importantly, the Court finds that the
desired discovery would not have changed its analysis of Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion. For the same reasons,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to amend his response.
The Court does find, however, that more discovery is necessary before trial. This is
because of the unique procedural history of this case and the new evidence attached by
Defendants in their motion for summary judgment. The Court discusses both reasons in turn.
13 After the Sixth Circuit remanded the district court’s order on Defendants’ first motion for
summary judgment, the Court entered a new scheduling order that gave another five months of
discovery. (See ECF Nos. 51 & 52.) The record does not show, however, the original
scheduling order.
C. This Case’s Unique Procedural History Warrants Limited Discovery
This Case’s procedural history is unique. First, Plaintiff sued in 2011, and discovery
closed in 2014. And yet, it is 2021 and, given the delay from the appeal, the parties still have
not tried this case.
Second, on appeal of this Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the Sixth Circuit partially reversed and remanded the case because Defendants failed
to show that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to three of Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF
Nos. 105, 108 and 114 at PageID 888.) Even Defendants acknowledge that the Sixth Circuit’s
reversal “was based on its finding that the record evidence was lacking.” (ECF No. 129-1 at
PageID 912.)
On remand, Defendants again moved for summary judgment, and this time attached “the
clarifying evidence that the Sixth Circuit found to be absent.” (Id.) This “clarifying evidence”
includes a Ramadan Diet sheet from Aramark and declarations from George Askew, Robert
Moore, Shirley Hayslett, and Julianna Croegaert. (Id.; ECF Nos. 129-3, 129-4, 129-5, 129-6, &
129-7.) So six years after the original discovery deadline ended, Defendants presented new
evidence in support of their summary judgment motion. Even though the new evidence did not
eliminate the fact issues here, the Court finds it necessary to reopen discovery.
D. Defendants Present New Evidence with their Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court reopens discovery because Defendants present new evidence with their motion
for summary judgment. First, Defendants present new evidence about the Jail’s Ramadan diet
and its accommodation of Muslim inmates. In Mr. Moore’s declaration, he states that “Muslim
inmates received certain accommodations at the Jail/County’s expense.” (ECF No. 129-4 at
PageID 943.) And as an example, he explains that “for a period of time,” the Jail created “a
special pork-free diet” for Muslims and other inmates with religious objections to pork. (Id.)
This differs from their position earlier. For example, in their first motion for summary
judgment, Defendants argued that “no pork or pork based products are served in the Jail.” (ECF
Nos. 24 at PageID 189; 24-1 at PageID 196.) Mr. Moore’s declaration, however, says that the
Jail only had a pork-free diet “for a period of time.” (ECF No. 129-4 at PageID 943.) Plaintiff
points out that it is unclear when this pork-free diet was in place. (ECF No. 133 at PageID 959).
For that reason, Plaintiff seeks the time that Aramark began offering a pork-free diet at the Jail.
(Id. at PageID 957, 963.)
Defendants also attach for the first time a “Ramadan Religious Diet” sheet that describes
the meals served to inmates during Ramadan. (ECF No. 129-6.) The Court thus agrees that the
evidence in Defendants’ latest motion for summary judgment raises new issues about the Jail’s
Ramadan diet and when the Jail had a pork-free diet.
Next, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment includes new claims about the Jail’s
spending on religious accommodations during Ramadan. In Mr. Moore’s declaration, he states
that the Jail accommodated Muslim inmates during Ramadan, and that these accommodations
required “overtime, extra staffing, and other administrative efforts to carry out.” (ECF No. 129-
4 at PageID 943.) This is the first time Defendants argue that they hired extra staff and paid
workers overtime to accommodate Muslim inmates during Ramadan. So Plaintiff first learned
of this issue when Defendants moved for summary judgment a few months ago. Because
Defendants never claimed that they spent extra resources on Ramadan before 2014, Plaintiff had
no reason to seek that evidence.
And finally, Defendants attach new evidence that the Jail recorded the religious
affiliations of its inmates. First, Mr. Askew’s affidavit says that “[t]he majority of the detainees
in the Jail who expressed a religious preference identified as Christian.” (ECF No. 129-3 at
PageID 938.) He also references the small number of Muslim inmates, saying that “there were
not enough Muslim detainees in the Jail to constitute an entire Pod.” (Id.) And second, Mr.
Moore’s declaration says that, on average, fewer than 100 inmates at the Jail identified as
Muslims. (ECF No. 129-4 at PageID 942.) Plaintiff, therefore, requests records of how many
inmates identified as Muslim and Christian at the Jail during the relevant time. (ECF No. 133 at
PageID 959, 963–64.)
In their first motion for summary judgment, Defendants claimed that the Jail houses
about 2,600 pretrial inmates daily. (ECF No. 24-1 at PageID 196.) But Defendants did not say
that they recorded the number of Muslim or Christian inmates. The Court finds that the specific
number of Muslim inmates at the Jail is relevant to whether the Jail had a legitimate penological
reason for restricting Muslim services. And, it may be relevant to Defendants’ new arguments
that it expended additional Jail resources on the Ramadan fast. (See ECF No. 129-4 at PageID
943.)
In the end, although discovery originally closed in 2014, Defendants now present new
evidence with their motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore finds that limited
pretrial discovery is appropriate here. And under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), the
Court can modify a scheduling order for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see also Morgan
v. Gandalf, Ltd., 165 F. App’x 425, 430 (6th Cir. 2006). For the above reasons, the Court finds
that there is good cause to reopen discovery here. The Court will set a scheduling conference to
determine the new discovery deadlines in the coming days.
CONCLUSION
The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. It GRANTS the motion as to Plaintiff’s claims about GIU officers
monitoring services. But it DENIES the motion as to his other claims. Also, the Court
DENIES the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because of qualified
immunity.
The Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Court’s order and
DENIES his motion to amend. The Court does, however, AMEND the scheduling order to
allow for limited discovery before trial.
SO ORDERED, this 1st day of February, 2021.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE