Ables v. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF TENNESSEE

□ Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT May 13, 2019

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS David J. Bradley, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

NICHOLAS AYALA, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-196

§

WASTE MANAGEMENT §

OF ARIZONA, INC., §

§

Defendant. §

§ .

JAMES BOGDEN, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-198

§

WASTE MANAGEMENT §

OF COLORADO, INC., §

§

Defendant. §

§

MARK ABLES, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-199

§

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. §

OF TENNESSEE, §

§

Defendant. §

§

REYNOLD VICENTE, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-218

§

WASTE MANAGEMENT §

OF CALIFORNIA, INC., §

§

Defendant. §

ERWIN RUEMMELE, §

Plaintiff,

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-220

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. :

OF FLORIDA, §

Defendant. .

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

In June 2018, several truck drivers sued Waste Management, Inc., alleging that they were

not paid for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Docket Entry No. 1). The

court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for nationwide collective-action certification and dismissed the

non-Texas drivers’ claims without prejudice. Drivers in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,

and Tennessee then filed five separate lawsuits in the Southern District of Texas, each alleging

FLSA claims on behalf of drivers working for Waste Management in these five states. These

related cases were transferred to this court in accordance with usual practice. Waste Management

has now moved to transfer these cases to district courts in each of the five plaintiffs’ home state.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Based on a careful review of the complaints; the motions and responses; the record; the

arguments of counsel; and the applicable law, the court grants Waste Management’s motions to

transfer. (Case No. H-19-196, Docket Entry No. 16; Case No. H-19-198, Docket Entry No. 18;

Case No. H-19-199, Docket Entry No. 10; Case No. H-19-218, Docket Entry No. 19; Case No. H-

19-220, Docket Entry No. 20). The reasons are explained in detail below.

1. Background

Waste Management is a waste-collection-service provider with more than 540 facilities

across the country and over 15 facilities in Texas.! In June 2018, Larry Green, Andrew Gutierrez,

Richard Reyes, Erwin Ruemmele, Reed Rogne, Charles Nevius, and James Ivey, on behalf of

similarly situated plaintiffs, sued Waste Management and its local affiliates and subsidiaries in

Arizona, California, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. (Case No. 18-cv-

1841, Docket Entry No. 23 at 2). These plaintiffs are current and former waste-disposal drivers

who have worked for Waste Management and its affiliates and subsidiaries since January 2016.

(Docket Entry No. 1 at 1, 3).

The plaintiffs contended that they routinely worked more than 40 hours each week without

overtime pay. (/d. at 2, 4). They alleged that Waste Management adopted a policy to automatically

deduct 30 minutes from the plaintiffs’ daily worktime as “meal breaks,” even if the plaintiffs did

not take the breaks and continued driving their routes for all or part of the 30-minute period.

According to the plaintiffs, Waste Management violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them

for the two and a half hours or more each week they worked during these meal breaks. (/d. at 5).

The plaintiffs asked for overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (/d. at 8).

In September 2018, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a nationwide collective

action. (Docket Entry No. 47). Waste Management argued that record evidence proved that many

of its regional and local facilities adopted different policies for tracking the drivers’ meal-break

time and for crediting the drivers for the hours they worked rather than taking all or part of the

meal breaks. (Docket Entry No. 50 at 12). The record showed that drivers in some of the states

' At the hearing, counsel of Waste Management stated that the company has more than 2,000 employees

and 39 sites in Arizona; 38 facilities located in 8 areas in Florida; and several dozens of facilities located in

26 areas in California.

were unionized, while others were not; some facilities or regions followed a practice of

compensating drivers for their allowed meal breaks, while others did not; and some facilities

automatically deducted 30 minutes from each driver’s daily worktime, while others required the

drivers to self-report when actual meal breaks began and ended. (/d. at 15). In short, some Waste

Management subsidiaries or affiliates credited drivers toward overtime compensation for their

meal-break time, in whole or in part, and some did not.

Because of the disparate practices followed by Waste Management’s regional affiliates,

subsidiaries, and facilities, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a nationwide collective

action. The court instead conditionally certified a collective action “consisting of similarly situated

employees of Waste Management and its affiliates and subsidiaries within Texas, limited to those

facilities that do not pay for meal beaks ... and. . . automatically deduct[] a certain amount of

time for meal breaks.” (Docket Entry No. 47). The court dismissed the non-Texas plaintiffs and

substituted Waste Management of Texas as the defendant. (Docket Entry No. 64).

Although counsel representing plaintiffs from other states indicated at the conditional

collective-action certification hearing that they would separately file lawsuits in the plaintiffs’

home states, the plaintiffs instead filed five new lawsuits in this district against five of Waste

Management’s non-Texas affiliates and subsidiaries. Each case alleges the same failure to credit

the drivers toward overtime compensation for the work done during their meal breaks. The cases

are:

e Carlos Ayala v. Waste Management of Arizona, Inc., H-19-196;

e James Bogden v. Waste Management of Colorado, Inc., H-19-198;

e Mark Ables v. Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee, H-19-199;

e Reynold F. Vicente v. Waste Management of California, Inc., H-19-218; and

e Erwin Ruemmele v. Waste Management, Inc. of Florida, H-19-220.

(Docket Entry No. 10 at 3-4).

Waste Management and its subsidiaries and affiliates have moved to transfer these cases

to the district courts in the plaintiffs’ five home states and proceed in this district with the case

involving only Texas drivers.* Waste Management argues that transfer is proper on the same

ground this court identified in declining to certify a nationwide collective action—that the

plaintiffs were not similarly situated across the states. Waste Management also argues that the

evidence and witnesses relating to claims the non-Texas drivers asserted are in Waste

Management’s regional offices and facilities where these drivers worked, not in Texas. (Docket

Entry No. 10 at 8).

I. The Legal Standard

A court may transfer a case “to any other district . . . where it might have been brought”

for “the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).3

“The underlying premise of § 1404(a) is that courts should prevent plaintiffs from abusing their

privilege under § 1391 by subjecting defendants to venues that are inconvenient under the terms

of § 1404(a).” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. Volkswagen II), 545 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008).

The movant must demonstrate that its preferred venue is “clearly more convenient than the venue

chosen by the plaintiff.” /d. at 315.

2 See Case No. H-19-196, Docket Entry No. 16; Case No. H-19-198, Docket Entry No. 18; Case

No. H-19-199, Docket Entry No. 10; Case No. H-19-218, Docket Entry No. 19; Case No. H-19-220, Docket

Entry No. 20.

> The defendants moved for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). They do not dispute that venue is

proper in the Southern District and therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) does not apply. See WRIGHT & MILLER,

15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3845 (4th ed. 2016) (“Section 1404(a) applies when the transferor

is a proper venue. Section 1406(a) applies when the transferor is an improper venue.”).

The Fifth Circuit has adopted the private- and public-interest factors set out in Gulf Oil

Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), to determine whether to transfer. See Volkswagen IT, 545

F.3d at 315; Inre Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 288-89 (Sth Cir. 2013). The private-interest factors

are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process

to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all

other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Jn re

Volkswagen AG (Volkswagen I), 371 F.3d 201, 203 (Sth Cir. 2004) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)). The public-interest factors are: “(1) the administrative

difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests

decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4)

the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.”

Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive, and none “can be

said to be of dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340

(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Syndicate 420 at Lloyd’s London v. Early Am. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 821, 827

(5th Cir. 1986)). Transferring venue under § 1404(a) does not require a showing that the Gilbert

factors substantially outweigh the plaintiff's chosen venue. Instead, it is enough to show that the

proposed venue is “clearly more convenient” than the original one. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at

315-17.

The Fifth Circuit has not specified the precise scope of review or other evidentiary rules

governing a § 1404(a) motion. Courts consistently look at evidence in the record beyond the

plaintiff's complaint allegations. See LeBlanc v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 n.1

(N.D. Tex. 2013) (“In considering a motion to transfer venue [under § 1404(a)], the Court may

consider affidavits submitted by either party.”); Volkswagen IT, 545 F.3d 317 (considering the

defendant’s affidavits supporting transfer); see also Brown v. Arkoma Tanks, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-7,

2016 WL 4083060, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2016); Freehold Licensing, Inc. v. Aequitatem Capital

Partners, LLC, No. A-18-cv-413LY, 2018 WL 5539929, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2018). The

court views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V.,

570 F.3d 233, 237 (Sth Cir. 2009).

The plaintiffs’ choice of venue is not entitled to special deference in the § 1404(a) venue-

transfer analysis. Volkswagen IT, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10, 315 (“[W]hile a plaintiff has the privilege

of filing his claims in any judicial division appropriate under the general venue statute, § 1404(a)

tempers the effects of the exercise of this privilege.”). The movant’s burden of showing that the

transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” adequately accounts for a plaintiff's choice of forum.

See id.; Arkoma Tanks, 2016 WL 4083060, at *3. Courts give more weight to the plaintiffs’ choice

of forum when the chosen forum is the plaintiffs’ home state. J&J Sports Produc., Inc. v. Riviera,

No. H-10-1138, 2010 WL 3447719, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010). That deference is limited

here because Texas, the chosen forum, is not the “home state” of the plaintiffs working in Arizona,

California, Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee. /d. The plaintiffs’ choice of forum is also entitled

to less deference because they sought to certify the lawsuits as collective actions on behalf of other

similarly situated drivers. See Mateos v. Select Energy Servs., LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 817, 821

(W.D. Tex. 2013) (courts generally gave less deference to the plaintiff's venue choice when the

plaintiff sought to certify a class action); Webb v. Setton Towing, LLC, No. 3-12-143, 2012 WL

5967962, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2012) (same); Westberry v. GusTech Commc’ns, LLC, No.

3:17-cv-3162-D, 2018 WL 3548869, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July24, 2018) (same).

Analysis

The parties do not dispute that these five cases could have been brought in the plaintiffs’

home states. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 9). The issue is whether district courts in those states are

“clearly more convenient” than the Southern District of Texas.

A. The Private-Interest Factors

1. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

The first private-interest factor considers the ease of access to sources of proof. Waste

Management argues that this factor favors transferring these cases to the plaintiffs’ home states,

Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee. (Case No. H-19-196, Docket Entry No.

16 at 10; Case No. H-19-198, Docket Entry No. 18 at 10; Case No. H-199, Docket Entry No. 10

at 10; Case No. H-19-218, Docket Entry No. 19 at 10; Case No. H-19-220, Docket Entry No. 20

at 10). According to Waste Management, the lead and opt-in plaintiffs reside and worked for the

company in their home states. The putative class members also reside there. Waste Management

contends that material witnesses, “including all managers and non-party coworkers,” reside and

work in the states where Waste Management’s regional and local affiliates and subsidiaries are

located. (/d.). Waste Management argues and presents evidence showing that:

[these witnesses] have knowledge of [the plaintiffs’] and the putative class

members’ employment, the scope of their work, manager and employee training,

routes, schedules, timekeeping, the meal break auto-deduction policy and its

implementation, policies relating to prohibited work during meal breaks, and

policies, procedures, and practices related to pay.

The non-management employees will have knowledge of tracking and monitoring

[the plaintiffs’] and the putative class members’ daily schedules, attendance[,] and

timekeeping in [these states]. All other management and non-management

witnesses ... including those drivers and other administrative personnel who

worked with them, [are] all [located in these states].

(Id.). Waste Management also argues and presents evidence showing that the plaintiffs’ and the

putative class members’ personnel files and other paperwork related to their employment,

including their “route sheets, work schedules, driver vehicle inspection reports, Kronos time detail

reports, and Kronos exception sheets,” are all kept on-site at each of Waste Management subsidiary

or affiliate where the drivers worked. (/d.). Waste Management submitted affidavits of its regional

Human Resources Directors to support these arguments.*

The plaintiffs responded by arguing that the first factor supports denying transfer. (Case

No. H-19-196, Docket Entry No. 21 at 5-6; Case No. H-19-198, Docket Entry No. 20; Case No.

H-19-199, Docket Entry 21 at 3-4; Case No. H-19-218, Docket Entry No. 21; Case No. H-19-220,

Docket Entry No. 26). They contend that regardless of where the documentary evidence is located,

most can be transferred electronically. Front Row Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., No.

3:12-cv-1639-K, 2012 WL 12044383, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2012) (‘[T]echnological

convenience of e-discovery significantly diminishes concerns associated with the location of

evidence.”’).

The plaintiffs anticipate that “a substantial portion of the documentary evidence” and “a

number of critical witnesses” are in Houston, where Waste Management is headquartered. But the

plaintiffs did not identify what the evidence in Texas is, who the witnesses residing in Texas are,

or what these witnesses would testify to. While certain categories of documents are clearly

important—company-wide policy manuals on drivers’ mealtime-break compensation, as well as

‘ These affidavits are from: Shannon Teixeira, for Waste Management Colorado and Arizona,

(Case No. H-19-198, Docket Entry No. 18-11; Case No. H-19-196, Docket Entry No. 16-11); Benjiman

Housel, for Waste Management Tennessee (Case No. H-19-199, Docket Entry No. 10-11); Michael Dory,

for Waste Management California (Case No. H-19-218, Docket Entry No. 19-11); and Latrenia Denise

Bass, for Waste Management Florida (Case No. H-19-220, Docket Entry No. 20-11).

regional or facility-specific documents showing compensation—there is no analysis as to what

documents or which witnesses are key, and why.

One plaintiff explained that:

{b]Jecause the parties have not yet engaged in discovery, [the plaintiffs] cannot

identify by name and title the defense witnesses that reside in this district and

division. However, the burden is not on [the plaintiffs] to do so at this stage of the

litigation. [The plaintiffs] ha[ve] identified a category of individuals who will be

subject to deposition in this matter that are located in and around the greater

Houston area. Further, it is these corporate individuals who were, on information

and belief, responsible for the auto-deduction policy that applies across all of Waste

Management’s subsidiaries and anticipate that their testimony will be of critical

importance in this matter. [The plaintiffs] additionally anticipate[] that relevant

witnesses on [Waste Management’s] affirmative good-faith defense and on the

issue of willfulness are located in Houston, Texas. After discovery, [the plaintiffs]

anticipate[] discover[ing] the identities of other relevant witnesses who reside in

Houston.

(Case No. H-19-1996, Docket Entry No. 21 at 6 n.1). This plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive.

Even if some of Waste Management’s national officers will testify, and even if they are primarily

in Texas, Waste Management’s affidavit evidence shows that there are more critical witnesses

located outside of Texas, whose testimony would bear on the company’s regional meal-break

practices, worktime-calculation methods, and drivers’ pay logs.

Because most of the important evidence and key witnesses are located outside Texas and

in the proposed transferee districts, the first factor weighs strongly in favor of transfer. The

> See Webb, 2012 WL 5967962, at *3—*4 (the first factor weighed in favor of transfer because documents,

contracts, payroll information, and employee schedules were located in Louisiana); McPherson v. Leam

Drilling Sys., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-113, 2014 WL 4063983, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2014) (the first factor

weighed in favor of transfer because “the documentary evidence and a sizeable percentage of the potential

witnesses [were] located in’ the transferee district); Arkoma Tanks, 2016 WL 4083060, at *4 (same). To

the contrary, the plaintiffs did not specify or submit any competent evidence to show that any important

evidence or key witnesses are in Texas or why they are more important than the evidence and witnesses

identified by Waste Management. See Herbert v. Wade, No. 3:13-cv-076, 2013 WL 5551037, at *3 (S.D.

Tex. Oct. 7, 2013) (because the plaintiffs did not identify any evidence located in the forum state, the court

found that the first factor favored transfer); Blake v. Archer Drilling LLC, No. 2:14-cv-120, 2014 WL

3696280, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2014) (allowing transfer because the plaintiff failed to identify

documents available in the forum state that “would undercut even the little weight in favor of transfer”).

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plaintiffs argue that Waste Management’s Houston office made national automatic mealtime-

deduction policies applicable to all drivers in all of Waste Management’s affiliates and subsidiaries.

The key issue, however, is not what national written policies Waste Management allegedly adopted,

but whether these polices are inconsistently applied in practice. Waste Management argues and

presents evidence showing that the automatic meal-break deduction was not consistently applied

to drivers in all Waste Management’s facilities in different states. The record evidence shows that

some Waste Management facilities or regions compensated drivers for their meal breaks; some

facilities automatically deducted the 30-minute meal break from each driver’s workday, reducing

the hours they worked and the hours eligible for overtime compensation; and some facilities

required the driver to self-report their actual meal-break time. (Docket Entry No. 50 at 12, 15).

Whether the drivers were unionized also affected the local practices. The evidence and witnesses

as to the policies applied in Waste Management’s Arizona, Colorado, California, Florida, and

Tennessee facilities are likely to be located in each state.

Because the plaintiffs’ complaints are based on facts requiring proof from witnesses and

documents in the five states, the first private-interest factor weighs in favor of allowing transfer.

2. Availability of Compulsory Process

The second private-interest factor considers the availability of compulsory process over

witnesses. Neither Waste Management nor the plaintiffs identified any specific nonparty witness

who is not willing, and could not be compelled by this court, to testify. See Westberry, 2018 WL

3548869, at *4 (the second private-interest factor is neutral). But Waste Management argues that

the time period involved meant that former Waste Management managers or employees who

worked in Arizona, Colorado, California, Florida, and Tennessee and are knowledgeable about the

local time-deduction practices may have left the company and would not testify voluntarily.

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Because these former managers or employees are more likely to reside the five states where they

worked, compulsory process is more likely to be available in these five states than in this court in

Texas. The second private-interest factor weighs in favor of allowing transfer.

3. The Willing Witnesses’ Costs of Attendance

The relative convenience of the witnesses—especially nonparty witnesses—is often

recognized as the most important factor. Sandbox Logistics LLC v. Grit Energy Sols. LLC, No.

3:16-cv-12, 2016 WL 4400312, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2016); Barnes v. Petroleum

Coordinators, Inc., No. H-12-1332, 2012 WL 4630570, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2012) (citation

omitted). ““When the distance between an existing venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue

under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct

relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 204. The

witnesses “not only suffer monetary costs, but also the personal costs associated with being away

from work, home, family, and community.” Volkswagen IT, 545 F.3d at 318.

As discussed above, key witnesses who would testify to the drivers’ driving routes,

workhours calculation, and the practices of meal-break deduction are in the plaintiffs’ home states

of Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee, all more than 100 miles away from this

court. Most of these witnesses, except perhaps former managerial employees, are party witnesses.

To the extent they are nonparties, they appear to be in each plaintiffs home state. The third factor

favors transfer. See Barnes, 2012 WL 4630570, at *4; Archer Drilling, 2014 WL 3696280, at *3.

B. The Public-Interest Factors

1. Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion

Waste Management submitted evidence comparing the median disposition times for civil

cases in the Southern District of Texas with cases in the Central District of California, a 2.6 month

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difference. This factor is neutral. See Rosemond v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-2190, 2014

WL 1338690, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014) (a difference of 2.1 months between district courts’

median time-interval is neutral); Barnes, 2012 WL 4630570, at *3; Mallory v. Lease Supervisors,

LLC, No. 3:17-cv-3063-D, 2018 WL 1457250, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2018).

The plaintiffs argue that the first public-interest factor weighs in favor of keeping the

plaintiffs’ lawsuits in one Texas court because the six cases involve identical FLSA claims, it is

efficient to have one court decide the issues instead of six, and the Southern District of Texas is

the only appropriate venue for all the cases. The plaintiffs each alleges that he or she worked

during their meal breaks and was not paid for overtime. But the presence of different practices in

compensating the drivers for their meal breaks, which turn on local practices of Waste

Management subsidiaries and facilities, does not require a single court to resolve all these disputes.

Having six different courts and juries resolve these cases based on the evidence located in each

state neither increases administrative difficulty nor risks inconsistent verdicts.

2. The Local Interests

The second public-interest factor evaluates the local interest in the dispute. This factor

generally favors venue where the acts giving rise to the lawsuit occurred. Metromedia Steakhouses

Co. v. BMJ Foods P.R., Inc., 2008 WL 794533, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008) (citing Spiegelberg,

402 F. Supp. 2d at 792)); see also Mateos, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (“There is a local interest in

having localized controversies decided at home.” (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.

443, 448 (1994)).

The plaintiffs’ alleged FLSA violations separately occurred in Arizona, California,

Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee, at Waste Management’s facilities in these different states,

depending on where the drivers worked. See Salinas v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 569,

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573 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (the alleged FLSA violations occurred at the places where each of the

plaintiffs worked and resided); Mallory, 2018 WL 1457250, at *5 (same). These states where the

plaintiffs worked have a stronger interest in these five lawsuits than Texas. Although Waste

Management is headquartered in Texas, most of the putative class members and the key witnesses

in the five cases reside in one of these states. See Volkswagen IT, 545 F.3d at 317-18 (the local

interest was greater where the relevant events occurred and the witnesses were located); Barnes,

2012 WL 4630570, at *4 (even if the defendant’s principal place of business was in Louisiana,

Texas had a stronger local interest in this case, because the plaintiff performed his work in Houston

and because most key witnesses resided in Houston); see also Mateos, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 825

(because the alleged FLSA violations “occurred throughout a number of states,” the district where

the defendant’s headquarters was located did not have the strongest, or even a strong, interest in

the lawsuit).

Because Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee each has a stronger local

interest in the case involving drivers in that state than Texas, this factor favors transfer.

3. Familiarity with the Law and the Avoidance of Unnecessary Problems

of Conflict of Laws

The plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act claims are based on federal law. The proposed

transferee federal courts would be “just as familiar with the FLSA and just as competent to hear

this type .. . claim as this [clourt.” Kervin v. Supreme Serv. & Specialty Co., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-

102, 2015 WL 1540157, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015); Arkoma Tanks, 2016 WL 4083060, at *4.

The plaintiffs in three of the cases asserted state-law claims under Arizona, Colorado, or

California law. (Case No. 19-cv-196, Docket Entry No. 1; Case No. 19-cv-198, Docket Entry No.

1; Case No. 19-cv-218, Docket Entry No. 1). The federal courts located in those states are likely

to be more familiar with those state-law claims than the Southern District of Texas. See e.g.

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Arkoma Tanks, 2016 WL 4083060, at *6 (the Western District of Oklahoma “has likely gained

more familiarity with the Oklahoma Labor Act than the Southern District of Texas”); Kervin, 2015

WL 1540157, at *6 (same); see also Bunnett & Co., Inc. v. Dores, No. A-15-cv-1104, 2016 WL

247669, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2016). This last public-interest factor weighs in favor of

transferring at least the Arizona, Colorado, and California plaintiffs’ cases.

C. The Court’s Order Denying Nationwide Class Certification

In September 2018, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a nationwide collective

action after finding that Waste Management’s subsidiaries and affiliates in the different states

applied different state or facility-specific practices for tracking the drivers’ meal-pbreak time and

for calculating their overtime pay. (Case No. H-18-1841, Docket Entry No. 47). These variations

defeated the nationwide collective-action certification the plaintiffs sought, and subclassifying

drivers from each state would not resolve the lack of similarity or the variations in Waste

Management’s state or regional practices. Keeping all these cases in the Southern District of Texas

and certifying them as separate collective actions would circumvent the court’s September 2018

Order. This factor also favors transferring these five cases.

IV. Conclusion

The four private-interest factors each weighs in favor of allowing transfer. One public-

interest factor favors transfer, one favors transferring three cases, and one is neutral. Waste

Management has shown that district courts in Arizona, Colorado, California, Florida, and

Tennessee are clearly more convenient forums than this court. The court grants Waste

Management’s motions to transfer, (Case No. 19-196, Docket Entry No. 16; Case No. H-19-198,

Docket Entry No. 18; Case No. H-19-199, Docket Entry No. 10; Case No. H-19-218, Docket Entry

No. 19; and Case No. H-19-220, Docket Entry No. 20), and transfers:

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e Carlos Ayala v. Waste Management of Arizona, Inc., No. H-19-196, to the District of

Arizona;

e James Bogden v. Waste Management of Colorado, Inc., No. H-19-198, to the District of

Colorado;

e Mark Ables v. Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee, No. H-19-199, to the Western

District of Tennessee;

e Reynold F. Vicente v. Waste Management of California, Inc., No. H-19-218, to the Central

District of California; and

e Erwin Ruemmele v. Waste Management, Inc. of Florida, No. H-19-220, to the Middle

District of Florida.

SIGNED on May 10, 2019, in Houston, Texas.

Lee H. Rosenthal

Chief United States District Judge

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