Harown v. Amazon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

MARY AIAD AGAIBY HAROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-01029

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

AMAZON (WAREHOUSE), ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Frensley

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM

Before the court are plaintiff Mary Harown’s Objections (Doc. No. 48) to Magistrate Judge

Jeff Frensley’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. No. 47), which recommends that the

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No 42) filed by defendant Amazon.com Services LLC

(improperly named in the Complaint as “Amazon (Warehouse)”) (“Amazon”) be granted and that

this case be dismissed. For the reasons set forth herein, the court will overrule the plaintiff’s

Objections and grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS

The plaintiff began working as a fulfillment associate for Amazon at a fulfillment center

in Murfreesboro, Tennessee in August 2016. (Doc. No. 42-1, Lott Decl. ¶ 4.) As a fulfillment

associate, the plaintiff was required to lift up to 49 pounds, stand or walk continuously for 10–12

hours per day, and frequently push, pull, squat, bend, and reach. (Doc. No. 42-2, at 11–12, Pl.’s

Dep. 16–17; Doc. No. 42-2, at 45, Job Description.)

After giving birth to a child in late 2016 and taking a couple of months of maternity leave,

the plaintiff returned to work in February 2017 with temporary physical restrictions that Amazon

accommodated by placing the plaintiff on a Transitional Work Assignment (“TWA”). (Lott Decl.

¶ 6.) The plaintiff’s doctor lifted the restrictions in July 2017 but limited her to working 8 hours

per day, which Amazon accommodated by continuing her TWA through February 2018. (Id.)

The plaintiff sought medical attention for back pain beginning sometime in 2017. (Doc.

No. 42-2, at 35, Pl.’s Dep. 65.) The plaintiff’s last day of physically working for Amazon was

February 24, 2018. (Lott Decl. ¶ 8.) She was initially granted a medical leave of absence and short-

term disability benefits from March 2, 2018 through August 30, 2018. (Doc. No. 42-2, at 29, 36,

Pl.’s Dep. 40, 74.) She underwent back surgery in November 2018. (Id. at 35, Pl.’s Dep. 65.) After

her back surgery, her condition did not improve. (Id. at 22, Pl.’s Dep. 30.)

The plaintiff was asked during her deposition about a supplemental pleading she filed on

January 5, 2021, in which she states that she had surgery on her back “hoping it would get better.”

(Doc. No. 7, at 3.) She explained that it did not: “Unfortunately it didn’t get better after the surgery

and the pain was the same. I couldn’t do anything I was just laying on the bed and I couldn’t even

get up, even in my sleep I was having pain. Nothing was helping the pain . . . .” (Id.) She was asked

during her deposition, “And that is how you felt in January of 2020, correct?” (Doc. No. 42-2, at

22, Pl.’s Dep. 30.) The plaintiff responded, “Yes.” (Id.) Asked if she still felt that way, as of the

date of her deposition, the plaintiff again responded, “Yes.” (Id.)

Pursuant to Amazon’s Medical Leave of Absence policy, the plaintiff’s medical leave

expired on August 30, 2018. As an accommodation, Amazon extended it through November 20,

2019. Also in August 2018, the plaintiff transitioned from short-term disability leave to long-term

disability, receiving long-term disability benefits. She continued to receive long-term disability

benefits through August 2020. (Doc. No. 42-2, at 47, Claim Status Summary; id. at 29, Pl.’s Dep.

40.)

On January 9, 2020, the plaintiff had an office visit with Edward Osuigwe, a Physician’s

Assistant (“PA”) in Dr. Victor Isaac’s practice (see Doc. No. 48-1, at 1), specializing in pain

management. According to the Attending Physician’s Statement – Progress Report he filled out on

January 18, 2020 for the plaintiff, as of January 9, 2020, the plaintiff could sit, walk or stand

intermittently for up to one hour at a time, for no more than 4 hours per day; could never bend,

kneel, crouch, climb, or balance; and could lift no more than 5 pounds, whether frequently or

occasionally. (Doc. No. 42-2, at 49–50.) Her “Expected Return to Work” date was “N/A” (id.)—

in other words, Osuigwe did not attempt to project a date by which the plaintiff would be ready to

return to work. The plaintiff conceded in her deposition that, as of January 2020, she was unable

to perform the job duties required of a fulfillment associate, based on Osuigwe’s evaluation. (Doc.

No. 42-2, at 32, Pl.’s Dep. 52.)

Amazon terminated the plaintiff’s employment on February 22, 2020, based on her

inability to return to work after her extended leave expired in November 2019. (Lott Decl. ¶ 9.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2020, the plaintiff filed her pro se Complaint asserting that Amazon violated

her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101. (Doc.

No. 1.) Specifically, she alleges that, by terminating her, Amazon discriminated against her on the

basis of disability and failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation.

In March 2023, the Magistrate Judge granted Amazon’s Motion to Deem Admitted

Requests for Admission Served on Plaintiff, based on the plaintiff’s failure to respond within a

timely fashion to the Requests for Admission (“RFAs”) and her failure to respond to the

defendant’s motion. (Doc. Nos 39, 40.) In granting the motion, the Magistrate Judge reminded the

plaintiff that she was responsible for responding to the defendant’s discovery and for following

the court’s Case Management Order. (See Doc. No. 40, at 3.) The plaintiff filed a Response to the

court’s Order, stating that she had responded to the defendant’s written discovery. The

documentation attached to her Response, however, shows that she responded to the defendant’s

First Requests for Production of Documents (Doc. No. 41, at 6) and First Interrogatories (id. at 22)

but does not establish that she responded to the RFAs.

Just over two months after filing the Motion to Deem Admitted, the defendant filed its

Motion for Summary Judgment, supporting Memorandum of Law, Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts (“SUMF”), and copies of the exhibits cited in its SUMF. (Doc. Nos. 42–44.) It

argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s ADA claims, because the

undisputed facts establish that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job after

her back surgery, with or without a reasonable accommodation, and, therefore, cannot establish a

prima facie case of disability discrimination or a failure to accommodate. It also argues that it went

far beyond what was required by granting the plaintiff two years of leave before terminating her

employment. Several of the facts in the SUMF rely upon the RFAs that have been deemed admitted

and were attached as an exhibit to the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. No.

42-4.) Most notably, the plaintiff is deemed to have admitted that she could not perform any of the

job duties of her position or the job duties of any Amazon warehouse job and that no

accommodation would have permitted her to perform the duties of the job she had at Amazon or

of any other warehouse job at Amazon, from March 2, 2018 through February 23, 2020. (See Doc.

No. 42-4 ¶¶ 4–14.)

The plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 45), but she did not respond to the SUMF or present her own evidentiary material in support

of her position. In her Response, she argues that there are material factual disputes and that her

doctors’ reports establish that she could have returned to work with restrictions, but Amazon

refused to allow her to return to work with the necessary accommodations. Specifically, she claims

that Amazon denied her requests to work in an “ICQA” position, “which requires very little effort

and can be performed standing up or [sitting] down,” and refused her request to work the “big and

light” line rather than the “small and heavy” line. (Doc. No. 45, at 1–2.) She insists that her doctors

never said she could not work and instead indicated that she could work with restrictions, but

Amazon fired her rather than helping her find work within her restrictions. (Id. at 2.)

She also argues very broadly that, although her job called for lifting up to 49 pounds, there

were no scales at Amazon, and she was frequently required to lift weights much heavier than 49

pounds, which is “what exactly put [her] where [she is] today.” (Id.) Her position is essentially

that the conditions at Amazon are “inhuman” [sic] and that the treatment she received from

Amazon is also “inhuman,” causing her great mental distress. (Id.) She also asserts that she has

had many “surgeries and medical procedures to improve since” her initial back injury caused by

working at Amazon, but her “condition keep[s] worsening.” (Id.)1

In its Reply, Amazon points out that the plaintiff did not respond to its SUMF. It argues

that the plaintiff’s assertions in her Response are not supported by the evidentiary record,

contradict her deposition testimony, and are not sufficient to create a material factual dispute as to

her ability to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without an accommodation.

1 The cover letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

accompanying the EEOC’s Notice of Rights, explained to the plaintiff that, as the investigator had

discussed with her during her intake interview, the EEOC “has no jurisdiction over issues related

to worker’s compensation.” (Doc. No. 1-1, at 1.) The same letter explained the EEOC’s finding

that, because she was still on long-term disability at that time, had been “unable to work and [had]

no specific date” projected for her return to work, and remained unable to perform simple

housework or care for her children, the EEOC was “unable to determine that a violation occurred

under the ADA.” (Id.)

The Magistrate Judge recognized that the plaintiff had failed to file a response to the

defendant’s SUMF as required by this court’s Local Rule 56.01(c). Although Local Rule 56.01(f)

states that, if a responding party fails to file a timely response to a moving party’s statement of

undisputed facts, “the asserted facts shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of summary

judgment,” the Magistrate Judge noted that the defendant always has the burden of establishing

that it is entitled to summary judgment. In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

the Magistrate Judge conducted a thorough review of the evidence supporting the defendant’s

factual statements to verify whether that evidence supported a conclusion that there was no genuine

issue of material fact and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. No.

47, at 8–9.)

The R&R sets forth the standards governing ADA claims and notes in particular, as

relevant here, that disability discrimination claims and failure to accommodate claims both require,

as an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, proof that the plaintiff is “otherwise qualified for

the position [she seeks], with or without reasonable accommodation.” (Id. at 12 (citing Monette v.

Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 and 12112);

see also id. at 14 (same) (citing Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir.

2018)).) Based on the materials submitted by the defendant, including the admitted RFAs and

excerpts from the plaintiff’s deposition transcript, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the plaintiff

had not presented proof that she was, in fact, able to perform the essential functions of her job,

with or without a reasonable accommodation. As he explained:

[T]he undisputed facts establish that for the two years between the time Plaintiff

went out on leave until her termination in February 2020, Plaintiff was unable to

perform her job duties or those of any other warehouse position, with or without

accommodation, and it is further undisputed that one physician who was treating

her told Plaintiff she “cannot perform any number of hours” of work. It is

additionally undisputed that Plaintiff’s physician found her condition to be

“unchanged” and he noted that she was unable to return to work, indicating that her

return to work date was “N/A.”

It is also undisputed that Plaintiff has not applied for, or had, any jobs since 2020,

because there is nothing within her limitations, and that, at the time of her

deposition in March 2023, Plaintiff testified that she still could not do anything but

lie in bed, as she was unable to even get up. Thus, Plaintiff’s own testimony

demonstrates that she was not a “qualified individual with a disability” who could

perform the essential functions of any position at Defendant’s warehouse, with or

without accommodation. The law is well-settled that, if a plaintiff cannot show that

she can perform the essential functions of a position, with or without

accommodation, then she is not a “qualified individual with a disability” within the

meaning of the ADA, and she cannot make out the requisite prima facie claim of

discrimination. See, e.g., Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 145 F.3d 846, 850 (6th

Cir. 1998).

Additionally, the undisputed facts further establish that Plaintiff transitioned from

receiving short term disability benefits to receiving long term disability benefits

beginning August 2018, and she continued to receive long term disability benefits

through August 2020. The fact that Plaintiff applied for, and received, long term

disability benefits further demonstrates that she was not a qualified individual with

a disability under the ADA, as an ADA plaintiff claiming to be “qualified” and able

to work “cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises” when they

also have a simultaneous long term disability claim. See Williams v. London Util.

Comm’n, 375 F. 3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2004), quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.

Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999). To survive Amazon’s motion for summary

judgment, the Plaintiff must provide an explanation sufficient to warrant a

reasonable juror finding that, despite her statements that she is unable to work, she

could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable

accommodation. See Cleveland, 526 U. S. at 806-807; see also Griffith v. Walmart

Stores, Inc., 135 F. 3d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1998).

The Plaintiff has not met this burden.

(Doc. No. 47, at12–13 (internal record citations omitted).)

In reaching the determination that the plaintiff could not establish that she was a qualified

individual with a disability able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without

reasonable accommodation, for purposes of either her discrimination claim or her failure to

accommodate claim, the Magistrate Judge specifically refused to credit the plaintiff’s assertions in

her Response that she would have been able to work while she was on short term disability as

“both unsupported by the evidence and contradicted by her deposition testimony.” (Id. at 14.) The

Magistrate Judge noted: “It is Plaintiff’s deposition testimony rather than her current unsupported

assertions that is in fact consistent with statements made in support of her [application for] long-

term disability benefits.” (Id. at 13–14.) Because plaintiff failed to provide an explanation for the

inconsistency, the Magistrate Judge concluded that she could not prove that she was able to

perform the essential functions of her job. (Id. at 14.)

The R&R notified the plaintiff that, if she disagreed with the Magistrate Judge’s

recommended disposition, she had fourteen days within which to file “specific objections.” (Id. at

15.) The plaintiff filed timely Objections in which she again complains about the generally

inhumane working conditions at Amazon, asserts that she would not have been injured if Amazon

had complied with “safety procedures and weigh[t] limits laws,” and claims that Amazon

repeatedly “refused” to acknowledge paperwork provided by her doctors stating that she could

“work with certain restriction[s].” (Doc. No. 48, at 1–3.)

Amazon filed a Response to the plaintiff’s Objections, arguing that the plaintiff’s

Objections are “nothing more than an improper repackaging of Plaintiff’s arguments from her

opposition to Amazon’s Motion for Summary Judgment” and do not trigger de novo review of the

defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 49, at 2.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Within fourteen days after being served with a report and recommendation as to a

dispositive matter, any “party may serve and file specific written objections to [a magistrate

judge’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district court

must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation “that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, the district court “may accept,

reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to

the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.

However, the district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other

standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge’s findings

and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151. “The filing of vague, general, or

conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a

complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Langley

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (issues raised in a “perfunctory

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck

Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))). Likewise, “[a]

general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation has the same

effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,

509 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally, arguments made in an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation that were not first presented to the magistrate judge for consideration are deemed

waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).

Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted

by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not

entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

IV. THE PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS

The plaintiff’s primary objection to the R&R appears to be that Amazon did not treat her

fairly. Pointing to medical records attached to the Objections, she asserts that, (1) as of May 9,

2018, after a hysterectomy, she could have returned to work with no lifting heavier than 20 pounds

and no prolonged standing for more than 3 hours (see Doc. No. 48-1, at 2), but Amazon refused to

accommodate her restrictions;2 (2) as of June 7, 2018, she had a doctor’s note stating she could

not “work for more than 8 hours and/or stand [sic] for more than 1 hour daily” (Doc. No. 48-1, at

1), and another note in September 2018, again stating that she could not work for more than 8

hours “and/or sit and stand for more than 1 hour daily” (id. at 7), but Amazon refused to let her

return to work; (3) after she had spine surgery in November 2018, she had a doctor’s note dated

January 9, 2019 stating that she was released to return to work on January 10, 2019, with

restrictions (lifting no more than 10 pounds with “[n]o continuous bending, lifting or twisting (id.

at 8), but “again Amazon refused” (Doc. No. 48, at 2); (4) the plaintiff underwent two more

surgeries between March 2018 and February 2020, and, although Amazon “sent [her] paper to

fil[l] out at the doctors and take back to [Amazon] and [she] did,” Amazon still refused to let her

return to work, despite her doctors’ reports “clearly stating [she] can work with restrictions,” and

instead terminated her in February 2020. (Id. at 2–3.)

The “paper” to which she refers appears to be Dr. Victor Isaac’s Attending Physician’s

Statement – Progress Report, dated May 23, 2019, on which Dr. Isaac projected an “Expected

Return to Work Date” of August 23, 2019, with restrictions, including sitting for no more than 2

hours at a time and a total of no more than 6 hours per day; standing and walking for less than 1

hour at a time for no more than 2 hours per day; no bending at the waist, kneeling, crouching, or

climbing; only occasional (up to 2.5 hours per day) balancing or driving; occasionally lifting up to

10 pounds and frequently lifting as much as 5 pounds. (Doc. No. 48-1, at 10.) Her current status

at the time of this progress report, however, was “unchanged,” rather than either recovered or

improved. (Id.)

2 The plaintiff states that she had a hysterectomy in March 2018. She does not indicate that

the medical provider prescribing the work-related restrictions in May 2018 had any knowledge of

her restrictions related to back pain.

Finally, the plaintiff attempts to refute specific findings in the R&R, including:

(1) Page 4 states she left work in March 2018 for back pain; the plaintiff states she

actually left to have a hysterectomy (of which there is no evidence in the court’s

record).(Doc. No. 48, at 3.)

(2) Page 5 states that she was absent from work for 26 weeks and that Amazon kept

renewing her “sick time”; she states this was “not by choice” but because Amazon

refused to let her return to work with restrictions. (Id.)

(3) Page 6 states that she was unable to return to any position. The plaintiff

maintains that this is inaccurate, because Amazon could have placed her in an

“ICQ” position, which is a “sit and scan position where you do not even move the

items you [are] scanning, you just scan it sitting down or standing up if you

want.”(Id.) Amazon’s failure to place her in an ICQ position, according to the

plaintiff, just shows “how hateful and abusive Amazon [is] and how [it] did not

want to take me due to my disability. . . . Amazon kept extending my sick leave to

run me out of time and get rid of me, while my disability was a direct result of

working for Amazon at the first place.” (Id.)

(4) On page 12, the R&R states that, after her surgery in November 2018, all the

plaintiff could do was lie on her back. The plaintiff contends now that this finding

mischaracterizes her deposition testimony. She claims that she was only referring

to her “recovery period following the surgery,” as she had a note stating she could

return to work in January 2019. (Id. at 4.)

(5) As for the Magistrate Judge’s finding of a conflict between applying for and

taking LTD leave, the plaintiff explains that it was “simply about the money.” (Id.)

Because Amazon would not let her return to work, she had no “options but to take

the long term disability because I must provide for my family.” (Id.)

V. ANALYSIS

The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual

on the basis of a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The “failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation to a disabled, but otherwise qualified, person in the workplace is deemed unlawful

discrimination under the ADA.” Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 391 (6th

Cir. 2017). The ADA does not require fairness per se.

Rather, to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must

establish, among other things, that she is “disabled and otherwise qualified for the position, either

with or without reasonable accommodation.” Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1038 (6th Cir.

2014) (quoting Keith v. Cty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013)). Likewise, to prove a

claim for failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must establish that, despite her disability, she is

“otherwise qualified” for her position, “either with or without a reasonable accommodation.”

Williams, 847 F.3d at 391.

If an employee seeks to stay in her current job, the term “reasonable accommodation”

means: “Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances

under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with

a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(o)(1)(ii). A suggested accommodation is not reasonable if it requires eliminating an

“essential” function of the job. Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1039). Although a “‘reasonable

accommodation’ under the ADA may include ‘reassignment to a vacant position,’” to overcome

summary judgment, a plaintiff “generally must identify the specific job he seeks and demonstrate

that he is qualified for that position.” Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 869, 870

(6th Cir. 2007).

The Magistrate Judge found that Amazon is entitled to summary judgment in this case,

because the undisputed facts establish that, for the two years prior to her termination in February

2020, the plaintiff was unable to work any job. The plaintiff attempts to refute that finding now by

introducing into evidence doctors’ notes from 2018 and 2019 that, she claims, establish that she

would have been able to return to work if Amazon had been willing to “accommodate” the

restrictions identified in those doctors’ notes.

This attempt is unavailing for several reasons. First is that the plaintiff’s assertions that she

would have been able to work are contradicted by her own supplemental pleading, filed on January

5, 2021, in which she stated that she was in excruciating pain before her surgery and unable to

work even 24 hours per week and, after the surgery, was unable to do anything but lie on the bed.

(Doc. No. 7, at 3) In her deposition, she affirmed the truth of her statements in the supplemental

pleading and also confirmed that her condition remained the same both in January 2020 and as of

the date of her deposition on March 21, 2023. (Doc. No. 42-2, Pl.’s Dep. 30.) Her physician did

not authorize her to return to work after her office visit in January 2020, finding her condition

“unchanged.” (Doc. No. 42-2, at 50.) In other words, as the Magistrate Judge found, the evidence

in the record, including the plaintiff’s own testimony, establishes that she was not a “qualified

individual” who could perform the essential functions of her job, even with a reasonable

accommodation, as of the date she was terminated or at any time during the two years preceding

her termination. (Doc. No. 47, at 12–13.)

In addition, even if the court were inclined to consider the plaintiff’s new evidence that she

claims establishes that she could have worked with restrictions, the plaintiff has not shown that the

doctors’ notes identifying her restrictions in May, June, and September 2018 and January 2019

would have permitted her to perform the essential functions of her position, given the physical

demands of that position. Insofar as the plaintiff claims she could have worked in an ICQ position,

which would have allowed her either to sit or stand at will, the plaintiff has no evidence that such

a job was available. She also does not have competent evidence regarding the essential duties of

that position, so she cannot show that she could perform them, with or without an accommodation.

Moreover, by failing to respond to Amazon’s RFAs, the plaintiff effectively admitted that she was

unable to perform the essential functions of any Amazon warehouse job from March 2018 through

February 2020, with or without a reasonable accommodation.

14

The court has reviewed the plaintiff's Objections de novo, in light of the entire evidentiary

record, and finds them to be without merit.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the court will overrule the plaintiff's Objections (Doc. No.

48), accept the R&R (Doc. No. 47) in its entirety, and grant the defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 42). An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER

United States District Judge