Tracy Rose Baker v. State of Tennessee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 30, 2013 Session

TRACY ROSE BAKER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Chancery Court for Sumner County

No. 2011DM168 David E. Durham, Judge, by Interchange

No. M2011-01381-SC-R11-PC - Filed September 6, 2013

We accepted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-

conviction relief from a judgment in a civil case finding her in criminal contempt and

imposing sanctions, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 (2012). We

hold that a criminal contempt adjudication under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-

102 does not amount to a criminal conviction under the general criminal laws for purposes

of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal

Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the

Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed

C ORNELIA A. C LARK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which G ARY R. W ADE, C.J.,

and J ANICE M. H OLDER, W ILLIAM C. K OCH, JR., and S HARON G. L EE, JJ., joined.

William Caldwell Hancock, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tracy Rose Baker.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; William E. Young, Solicitor General;

James E. Gaylord, Assistant Attorney General; Clark B. Thornton, Assistant Attorney

General; Ray Whitley, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Tracy Rose Baker, and Jeffrey D. Baker (“Husband”) were divorced

on January 12, 2009. The relationship between the Bakers remained acrimonious, and a

series of contempt petitions were filed by both parties over the course of the months

following the divorce decree. Husband’s attorney acted as prosecutor on Husband’s petitions

for contempt. On April 16, 2010, while the petitioner was represented by counsel, she signed

an agreed order, drawn up by Husband’s attorney, which was then filed by the trial court.1

By the April 16, 2010 order (“Agreed Order”), the petitioner: (1) agreed that she had been

advised of and waived her constitutional rights as a criminal defendant; (2) acknowledged

her guilt of eighteen acts of criminal contempt, including violations of various orders of

protection and a temporary restraining order; (3) purported to enter a “guilty plea” to eighteen

counts of willful criminal contempt, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section

29-9-102; and (4) agreed to a sentence of ten days on each count, run consecutively, for a

total of 180 days, to be served on probation with various conditions.2 See Baker v. Baker,

No. M2010-01806-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 764918, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2012)

(“Baker I”). The petitioner did not attempt to modify or set aside the Agreed Order. See

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, 60.

On July 20, 2010, Husband filed a petition seeking to revoke the petitioner’s

probation, requesting an ex parte order discontinuing the petitioner’s visitation with the

couple’s minor children, and seeking adjudications of criminal contempt against the

petitioner. Husband’s July 20, 2010 petition alleged numerous violations against the

petitioner, including that the petitioner was continuing to engage in harassing conduct of

Husband, that she had failed to attend counseling appointments, and that she had sent text

messages to the minor children in violation of the Agreed Order.

On July 21, 2010, a temporary restraining order was issued against the petitioner,

enjoining her from exercising any parenting time pending further orders of the court. After

a hearing on August 19, 2010, the trial court signed an order on August 24, 2010, finding the

1

After the judges in Sumner County recused themselves from the case, Judge Carol L. Soloman of

the Twentieth Judicial District was designated to resolve the contempt petitions filed by the parties.

2

The Agreed Order recited that the petitioner was originally charged with criminal contempt under

both Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-5-104 and 29-9-104. However, the findings in the Agreed Order

confirmed that the trial court did not hold the petitioner in contempt under section 36-5-104, but only under

the general contempt provisions of section 29-9-102.

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petitioner in violation of her probation and ordering her to serve a 180-day sentence in the

Sumner County Jail.

The petitioner appealed from the trial court’s August 24, 2010 order to the Court of

Appeals. Baker I, 2012 WL 764918, at *5. In her appeal, the petitioner challenged: (1) the

failure of the trial judge to recuse herself; (2) the propriety of Husband’s attorney acting as

a private prosecutor of the contempt action; (3) the failure of the trial court to follow the

mandatory procedures, as outlined in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), State v.

Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b),

for the original criminal contempt “guilty pleas”; and (4) the length of the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeals denied relief on the first three issues, but granted relief on the fourth

issue, reducing the petitioner’s sentence in confinement to thirty days. Baker I, 2012 WL

764918, at *12. In a separate concurring opinion, one member of the Court of Appeals

opined that the proper procedure for attacking the criminal contempt findings in the Agreed

Order was by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at *13-14 (Cottrell, J.,

concurring). No application for permission to appeal was filed in this Court.

The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 18, 2011, and an

amended petition two days later, challenging the criminal contempt adjudications in the

Agreed Order on three grounds. The petitioner first alleged that the guilty pleas to eighteen

instances of contemptuous conduct should be set aside because the trial court failed to

conduct a hearing to assure the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty pleas, pursuant

to the requirements of Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 & n.5, and Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 344.

The petitioner next alleged that the trial judge was biased against her because Husband’s

attorney was the judge’s personal lawyer, former campaign treasurer, and a substantial donor

to the judge’s re-election campaign. Finally, the petitioner alleged that Husband’s counsel

improperly acted as a private prosecutor and, in that role, abused his prosecutorial discretion

by unlawfully coercing the guilty pleas and sentences and by improperly conditioning the

suspended sentence on the petitioner agreeing to surrender custody of her children and sell

her house to pay his “undocumented” legal fee. The record does not indicate who received

copies of the petition or amended petition. The district attorney general did not respond to

the petition, but Husband’s counsel answered the amended petition.

The trial court3 summarily dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief for failure

to state a colorable claim under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann.

3

All local judges in Sumner County recused themselves from adjudicating the post-conviction

petition. Judge David E. Durham of the Fifteenth Judicial District sat by interchange pursuant to Rule 11,

section VII(c) of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court.

-3-

§ 40-30-106(f) (2012).4 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal based on its

finding that the Agreed Order adjudicated the petitioner in criminal contempt pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102, the general contempt statute, not a general

criminal statute defining contemptuous conduct as a criminal offense. Consequently, the

Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the petitioner was not entitled to seek post-

conviction relief, explaining that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act encompasses only

constitutional challenges to convictions for criminal offenses. Baker v. State, No. M2011-

01381-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 3017727, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2012). We

granted the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal.

Analysis

Standard of Review

The issue in this appeal—whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction

relief from the Agreed Order—is a question of law, involving the interpretation of statutes;

thus, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness attaching to the rulings of the

courts below. See Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009).

The paramount rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent without broadening the statute beyond its intended scope. Id. at 564. We

“must always begin with the words that the General Assembly has chosen” and “give these

words their natural and ordinary meaning.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526

(Tenn. 2010). “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain

meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend

the meaning of the language . . . .” Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564 (citing Overstreet v. TRW

Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Tenn. 2008)). Statutes should be construed

in a reasonable manner “‘which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious

operation of the laws.’” Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 716

(Tenn. 2002) (quoting Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997)).

Post-Conviction Procedure

Prior to 1967, habeas corpus was the primary remedy available in Tennessee for

obtaining post-conviction relief from a criminal conviction. The scope of habeas corpus

relief in Tennessee was, and continues to be, narrow, providing relief only if a judgment of

4

Quotations and citations to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act refer to the statutes currently in

effect. Any differences between the language of the current statute and that in effect when the petition was

filed have no bearing on the issue in this appeal.

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criminal conviction is facially void or a term of imprisonment has expired. See, e.g., Cantrell

v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011) (discussing the history and current status of

habeas corpus in Tennessee); House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1995) (same); Archer

v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1993) (same). Post-conviction remedies available in other

states were also historically narrow in scope. House, 911 S.W.2d at 708-09 (citing Note,

State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 422 (1966)). As a

result, persons convicted in state courts utilized federal habeas corpus petitions as the

primary means of challenging state criminal convictions. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S.

336, 338 (1965) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring). The sheer volume of federal habeas

corpus petitions filed by state inmates, as well as principles of comity, eventually led the

United States Supreme Court to suggest that states enact statutory post-conviction

procedures, which would afford state inmates an avenue to litigate alleged constitutional

errors in state courts, at least in the first instance. See Id. at 339-40.

The Tennessee General Assembly responded to this suggestion in 1967 by enacting

the Post-Conviction Procedure Act (the “Act”). Act of May 26, 1967, ch. 310, 1967 Tenn.

Pub. Acts 801. From its inception, the purpose of the Act has been to provide a procedural

avenue for litigating in Tennessee courts alleged constitutional errors in Tennessee criminal

convictions. The initial draft of the Act provided that to be eligible for relief, a petitioner

must prove “[t]hat he has been convicted of a crime.” Floyd Dennis, A Post Conviction

Procedure Act for Tennessee 6, §105(1) (Tenn. Archives 1965). Despite further revisions

to the draft of the proposed Act, the remedy urged was “to any person convicted of a

crime.” Floyd Dennis, Memorandum to Law Revision Commission, State of Tennessee,

Relating to a Post-Conviction Procedure Act for Tennessee 53 (Tenn. Archives 1966).

The current version of the Act provides persons “in custody under a sentence of a

court of this state” the automatic right to file one petition for post-conviction relief. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a), (c) (2012). With few exceptions, the petition must be filed within

one year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal

is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one year of the date the judgment of conviction

becomes final. Id. § 40-30-102(a)-(c). Additionally, post-conviction petitions must be filed

in the court of conviction, must name the State as the respondent, and district attorneys

general are required to respond to and defend against petitions for post-conviction relief. Id.

§§ 40-30-104(a), -108.

The Act further provides that a “petition for post-conviction relief shall be limited to

the assertion of claims for relief from the judgment or judgments entered in a single trial or

proceeding.” Id. § 40-30-104(c) (emphasis added). Post-conviction relief “shall be granted

when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement of any right

guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Id.

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§ 40-30-103 (emphasis added). Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 2(A), enacted to

supplement the remedies and procedures set forth in the Act, defines a “petition for post-

conviction relief” as “an application to the court, filed by or on behalf of a person convicted

of and sentenced for the commission of a criminal offense, that seeks to have the conviction

or sentence set aside.”5 Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 2(A) (emphasis added). This definition is

also consistent with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which defines a judgment of

conviction as consisting not only of a sentence or a conviction, but also the plea entered, the

verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2)(A)-(c).

Having reviewed briefly the origins of the relevant post-conviction statutes, we turn

now to contempt.

Contempt

This Court has written on contempt on many occasions, yet the subject continues to

stymy the bench and bar both in its definition and in its application. We take this opportunity

to explain again the difference between civil and criminal contempt, the rights afforded

contemnors, and the sanctions available upon an adjudication of contempt.

The power of courts to punish contempts can be traced back to twelfth century English

common law and was incorporated into American common law by the colonists. See Ronald

L. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power 9, 19 (1963). The inherent power of courts to punish

contemptuous conduct has long been regarded as essential to the protection and existence of

the courts. State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. 326, 331 (1868).

The power of courts to punish for contempt is of immemorial

antiquity, and is inherent in all courts as a necessary power

belonging to them in order to enable them to accomplish the

purposes for which they were designed; that is, the orderly trial

and decision of causes, the enforcement of public order, the

prevention of interferences with their proceedings, and the

enforcement of the due respect belonging to them as institutions

of the country.

Graham v. Williamson, 164 S.W. 781, 782 (Tenn. 1914).

5

The General Assembly specifically vested the Tennessee Supreme Court with the authority to

promulgate rules of practice and procedure to aid the post-conviction process. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-118

(2012).

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However, at common law, the power of courts to punish contempts was vast and

undefined, and with such unlimited and undefined discretionary power came the potential for

abuse. Accordingly, in 1831, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted legislation to curb

the contempt power of state judges. See Act of Dec. 19, 1831, ch. 19, 1831 Tenn. Pub. Acts

34; see also State v. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tenn. 2012). The contempt power of

Tennessee courts remains circumscribed by statute. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-

102 provides:

The power of the several courts to issue attachments, and

inflict punishments for contempts of court, shall not be

construed to extend to any except the following cases:

(1) The willful misbehavior of any person in the presence

of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration

of justice;

(2) The willful misbehavior of any of the officers of such

courts, in their official transactions;

(3) The willful disobedience or resistance of any officer

of such courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person, to any

lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of such

courts;

(4) Abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the process

or proceedings of the court;

(5) Willfully conversing with jurors in relation to the

merits of the cause in the trial of which they are engaged, or

otherwise tampering with them; or

(6) Any other act or omission declared a contempt by

law.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102 (2012).

Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are incidental to the case out of which they

arise. Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465, 474 (Tenn. 2003). Although

contempt proceedings are traditionally classified as “civil” or “criminal,” in point of fact,

contempt proceedings are neither wholly civil nor criminal in nature and may partake of the

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characteristics of both. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911);

Bowdon v. Bowdon, 278 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tenn. 1955). “It is not the fact of punishment,

but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes

of cases.” Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. Tennessee courts are vested with the authority to

punish both types of contempt with either a fine, a period of confinement, or both. Tenn.

Code Ann. §§ 29-9-103(a), -104 (2012). However, unless otherwise specified, fines may not

exceed fifty dollars and imprisonment may not exceed ten days. Id. § 29-9-103(b).

Civil contempt is remedial in character and is applied when a person refuses or fails

to comply with a court order. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 520. A civil contempt action is brought

to force compliance with the order and thereby secure private rights established by the order.

Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, 172 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tenn. 2005)

(citing Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co., 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1964)). When a

trial court orders imprisonment after finding civil contempt, the confinement is remedial and

coercive in nature, designed to compel the contemnor to comply with the court’s order.

Consequently, compliance with the order will result in the contemnor’s immediate release

from confinement. Id. at 511. It has long been said that in a civil contempt case, the

contemnor “carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket.” State ex rel. Anderson v.

Daugherty, 191 S.W. 974, 974 (Tenn. 1917).

Criminal contempt, by contrast, is designed “to preserve the power and vindicate the

dignity and authority of the law and the court as an organ of society.” Beeler, 387 S.W.3d

at 520 (quoting Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn. 1996)); Daugherty, 191 S.W.

at 974. Sanctions for criminal contempt are generally both punitive and unconditional in

nature, designed to punish past behavior, not to coerce directly compliance with a court order

or influence future behavior. See Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 520; Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398.

Therefore, when a court imposes a definite term of confinement for conduct constituting

criminal contempt, the contemnor cannot shorten the term by agreeing not to continue in the

behavior that resulted in his confinement. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. “Such imprisonment

operates not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the completed

act of disobedience.” Id. at 442-43.6

Criminal contempt is often regarded as a “crime” because certain substantial rights

and constitutional privileges afforded criminal defendants are also afforded criminal

contemnors. For example, indirect criminal contempt may only be punished after the

6

In an effort to combat the widespread confusion that exists concerning the differences between civil

and criminal contempt, the Oregon Legislature enacted statutes aptly renaming the two types of contempt

“remedial” and “punitive,” depending on the sanction sought. See Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.015(3)-(4)

(West 2013); Dahlem v. Dahlem, 844 P.2d 208, 208-09 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).

-8-

accused contemnor has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegations

at a hearing.7 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925);

State v. Maddux, 571 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tenn. 1978). In addition to the notice requirements,

the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long recognized that an alleged

criminal contemnor, like a person charged with a criminal offense, is presumed to be

innocent, must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to

testify against himself. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444; Daugherty, 191 S.W. at 974. An alleged

contemnor is also entitled to an attorney and may have an attorney appointed to represent him

at no cost if he is not able to afford one. See Cooke, 267 U.S. at 536-37; Cottingham v.

Cottingham, 193 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tenn. 2006); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(d)(1)(B).

Not all rights afforded criminal defendants are available to alleged criminal

contemnors, however. Contemnors are not entitled to a jury trial if the criminal contempt is

not “serious” enough to require the protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial.

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968). Although the Supreme Court has not expressly

defined what constitutes a “serious contempt,” the Court has repeatedly held that a jury trial

is not required if the contempt is punished by confinement of six months or less. See Taylor

v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966);

cf. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211 (concluding that a contempt punished by a two-year term of

imprisonment is a “serious offense” to which the right to trial by jury applies); Int’l Union,

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1994) (holding that a fifty-

two million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except

through a jury trial). Similarly, in this State “[t]he general rule is that a constitutional

guaranty of jury trial does not apply to proceedings to punish for contempt of court whether

in a court of law, a court of equity, a court having criminal jurisdiction, or other court.” Pass

v. State, 184 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. 1944) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ahern v.

Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tenn. 2000).8

7

Beyond the “civil” or “criminal” classification, contempt is also categorized as “direct” or

“indirect.” Direct contempt is based upon acts committed in the presence of the court and may be punished

summarily, whereas indirect contempt occurs outside the presence of the court and requires notice and an

opportunity to be heard. Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398. This appeal involves indirect criminal contempt.

8

The Legislature has enacted other statutes defining certain types of contemptuous conduct as

substantive criminal offenses. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(a)-(b) (2010) (violation of order of

protection); id. § 36-5-104(a)-(c) (failure to pay child support). Because conduct qualifying as contempt

under these provisions constitutes a violation of the general criminal laws, an alleged contemnor charged

under one of these provisions is entitled to a jury trial. See Brown v. Latham, 914 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tenn.

1996); Ahern, 15 S.W.3d at 82.

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Additionally, unlike criminal prosecutions, general contempt proceedings do not

require an indictment and subsequent prosecution by the State. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b)(2);

Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-86 (1958), overruled in part on other grounds by

Bloom, 391 U.S. at 196 n.1, 198; State v. Wood, 91 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)

(recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment).9

Contempt proceedings are often initiated upon the court’s own motion or upon the motion

of a private party. Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398 (quoting Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b)). District

attorneys generally do not prosecute criminal contempt proceedings based on Tennessee

Code Annotated section 29-9-102 and have no mandatory duty to do so. Black, 938 S.W.2d

at 402 (“Tennessee law only requires district attorney generals to conduct prosecutions for

‘conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws.’”). In fact, a court may appoint

a private prosecutor in such proceedings to vindicate its authority. Wilson v. Wilson, 984

S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tenn. 1998). By contrast, district attorneys “[s]hall prosecute in the courts

of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial

functions attendant thereto.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (2011); see also Tenn. Const.

art. VI, § 5; Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs, 998 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tenn. 1999).

Having reviewed the history, purpose, and language of the post-conviction relief and

contempt statutes, we return to the question presented in this appeal: is the petitioner entitled

to seek post-conviction relief from the Agreed Order finding her in criminal contempt

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102? The answer to this question is

no.10

Why Post-Conviction Relief Is Not Available To Criminal Contemnors

The language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 does not define

contempt as a criminal offense or prescribe a conviction for contempt. Though criminal

contempt has been regarded as a “crime” for some purposes, see Black, 938 S.W.2d at 402,

criminal contempt proceedings

are not intended to punish conduct proscribed as harmful by the

general criminal laws. Rather, they are designed to serve the

9

The rights afforded in criminal contempt proceedings stand in stark contrast to those which attach

in a civil contempt proceeding. “[C]ivil contempt sanctions . . . are considered to be coercive and avoidable

through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity

to be heard. Neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827.

10

Because we answer this question in the negative, resolution of the other issues raised by the

petitioner in her petition is pretermitted. We express no opinion about trial court bias, the procedure used

by the trial court during the contempt hearing, or the role of Husband’s lawyer as the private prosecutor.

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limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. In

punishing contempt, the Judiciary is sanctioning conduct that

violates specific duties imposed by the court itself, arising

directly from the parties’ participation in judicial proceedings.

Id. (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 800 (1987)).

Despite imprecise language in prior Tennessee appellate decisions, a person found in

contempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 has not been “convicted”

of a criminal offense for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Rather, section 29-

9-102 defines the circumstances that authorize courts to “inflict punishments” for contempt.

Courts properly “find” or “hold” persons in contempt and impose “sanctions” or

“punishment” for contempt but do not “convict” persons of contempt. See, e.g., Long v.

McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing “sanctions”

available for criminal contempt and recognizing that persons accused of criminal contempt

“may not be found to be in criminal contempt in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt that they have willfully failed to comply with the court’s order” (emphasis added));

State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Grp. Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602, 611-13

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing the “sanctions” available to a court to punish for

contempt).

In contrast, post-conviction relief, by its very nature, presupposes the existence of a

conviction for a criminal offense. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “conviction” as follows:

“The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; . . . [t]he judgment (as

by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 384 (9th ed.

2009). Thus, a “conviction” cannot be based on conduct that does not violate one of the

general criminal laws of this State. Criminal offenses are defined by the General Assembly,

State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996), which has declared that “[c]onduct does

not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance,

or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-102(a)

(2010).

The Legislature’s enactment of other statutes defining certain types of contemptuous

conduct as criminal offenses supports our conclusion that contempt findings pursuant to

section 29-9-102 should not be viewed as criminal convictions for purposes of the Post-

Conviction Procedure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-104; Brown, 914 S.W.2d at 888

(recognizing that the failure to comply with a court order to pay child support is both

contemptuous behavior and a criminal offense under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-

5-104(a)). Similarly, the Legislature has enacted statutes defining jury tampering and failure

to appear as criminal offenses, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-509, -609 (2010), even though

this conduct is also subject to general contempt provisions, id. § 29-9-102(3), (5) (2012).

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These examples indicate that, had the Legislature intended for general criminal contempt to

also constitute a criminal offense for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, it

would have so provided, as it has in other instances.11

Post-conviction relief, by its very definition, is a remedy for seeking relief from

convictions of criminal offenses. It is not available to challenge findings of general criminal

contempt arising from civil cases. Rather, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provide

the avenues for seeking relief from judgments in civil cases. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, 60;

Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 488-89 (Tenn. 2012).

Conclusion

The plain language of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides a mechanism for

seeking relief from criminal convictions. A finding of criminal contempt pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 is not a criminal conviction. Thus, the

petitioner was not entitled to seek post-conviction relief from the criminal contempt findings

in the Agreed Order. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming

the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. Costs of this appeal are

taxed to Tracy Rose Baker, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

CORNELIA A. CLARK, JUSTICE

11

Our conclusion that findings of criminal contempt are different from convictions of general

criminal offenses is further buttressed by the distinction drawn in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate

Procedure between a “final judgment in a criminal contempt” proceeding and “any judgment of conviction”

in criminal actions. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). An appeal as of right is available in both instances; however,

criminal contempt is listed separately from the general category of criminal actions. An important canon of

statutory construction counsels that a statute (or rule in this case) should be interpreted to preclude any part

from being “inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant.” Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676-77

(Tenn. 1975); see also State v. Morrow, 75 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tenn. 2002). If criminal contempt were

considered part of the general category of criminal actions for which a judgment of conviction is entered by

a trial court, then it would be superfluous to list it separately among other collateral, quasi-criminal orders

from which an appeal as of right may be taken.

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