Smith v. CoreCivic, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN SMITH and SOYNIA SMITH, )

as survivors and next of kin of )

ADDISON SMITH, deceased, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00563

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

CORECIVIC, INC. et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Before the court are (1) the plaintiffs’ Revised Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and

Revised Motion to Amend Complaint (“Motion to Amend”), filed with a proposed Second

Amended Complaint (“second SAC”) (Doc. Nos. 102, 102-1), which superseded their original

Motion of the same title and the first version of the proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc.

Nos. 101, 101-1); and (2) the plaintiffs’ Motion Regarding Second Amended Complaint

(“Supplemental Motion”), filed with the third version of the proposed Second Amended Complaint

(“third SAC” or, collectively with the second SAC where it is unnecessary to distinguish between

them, “SAC” or “proposed SAC”) (Doc. Nos. 125, 125-1).

For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend and Supplemental Motion

will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs, John Smith and Soynia Smith, are the parents of Addison Smith, who

committed suicide on August 23, 2019 while incarcerated at South Central Correctional Facility

(“SCCF” or “SCCC”), a facility operated by defendant CoreCivic, Inc. (“CoreCivic”), under a

contract with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). The suicide occurred four days

after Addison was allegedly raped by Marcayus Rose, another inmate at SCCF. The Smiths filed

this lawsuit in June 2020 following the death of their son, essentially seeking to hold the defendants

liable for both the sexual assault and the suicide, as well as for failing, more generally, to provide

necessary mental health care to Addison.

The named defendants in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) were CoreCivic; Damon

T. Hininger, CoreCivic’s Chief Executive Officer; Grady Perry and Eddie Johnson, SCCF Warden

and Assistant Warden, respectively; SCCF Correctional Officers Jason Whitehead, Ashley

Ackerman, Christopher Williams, Logan King, Joshua Ray, Jenny Ratliff,1 and Ledia Avila

(incorrectly named in the plaintiffs’ pleadings as Ledia Alva); mental health counselors William

Lyons and J. Scott Long, assigned to provide mental health services to Addison while he was at

SCCF; Mark Sigler, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist at SCCF assigned to provide care for Addison;

Elena Bloodgood-Grandy, Ph.D. (incorrectly named in the plaintiffs’ pleadings as Elaine

Bloodgood),2 a clinical psychologist charged with “oversee[ing] mental healthcare” at SCCF;

Andrea Steadman, a psychiatric nurse practitioner assigned to care for Addison at SCCF; Kevin

Turner, M.D., a psychiatrist charged with supervising defendant Steadman; and Marcayus Rose,

an inmate formerly incarcerated at SCCF who raped Addison while assigned as his cell mate. (Doc.

No. 16 ¶¶ 5–24.)

1 The plaintiffs spell this plaintiff’s last name “Ratliff.” The defendants sometimes spell it

that way and sometimes as “Ratcliff.” It is unclear which version is correct. The court will continue

to spell it “Ratliff.”

2 It is unclear why the plaintiffs, in even the fifth version of their pleading (i.e., the third

version of the proposed Second Amended Complaint), have made no effort to correct the spelling

of the names of defendants Avila and Bloodgood-Grandy.

In the FAC, the plaintiffs asserted claims against “all of the Defendants except Defendant

Marcayus Rose” (1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating Addison’s Eighth Amendment right to

be free from cruel and unusual punishment by “fail[ing] to protect him from rape and self-harm”

and “fail[ing] to provide adequate treatment for his mental illness” (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 48); and (2)

under state law, for medical malpractice, negligence, and gross negligence. They also asserted a

claim against Rose and CoreCivic for common law assault and a claim against all defendants for

“wrongful death.” (Doc. No. 16 Counts 2 through 6.)

As summarized in the court Memorandum ruling on the defendants’ motions for partial

dismissal, filed on June 25, 2021, the background facts alleged in support of the plaintiffs’ claims

are as follows:

In July 2019, Addison was transferred from [Trousdale Turner Correctional Center]

to SCCC. He had a “documented history” of hallucinations as well as suicide

attempts dating back to childhood. He saw an unidentified mental health counselor

at SCCC on July 23, 2019, at which time he reported that he had been off his

psychiatric medications for two weeks. The counselor referred him to Steadman;

two days later, an unidentified nurse separately referred Addison to Steadman.

However, Steadman did not meet with Addison until August 19, 2019, nearly a

month after he reported being off his medications for two weeks. The plaintiffs

allege that the significant delay in getting his medications refilled caused Addison

“additional, needless suffering, and it likely contributed to his suicide.” ([Doc. No.

16] ¶ 25.) Defendant Turner was “supposed to be overseeing” Steadman, but he

allegedly “failed to prevent her malpractice and gross negligence.” (Id.)

Defendant Rose was transferred to the segregation unit at SCCC in mid-August

2019 because he had reportedly been “harassing” other inmates for sex. (Id. ¶¶ 1,

26.) In the segregation unit, he was assigned to the same cell as Addison. (Id. ¶ 1.)

On or around August 19, 2019, Rose coerced Addison into performing “unwanted

sex acts” by threatening Addison and telling him that he was a high-ranking

member of the Gangster Disciples. Addison reported the sexual assault to a guard

on August 21, 2019, as a result of which he was transported to a local hospital for

evaluation. (Id. ¶ 26; Doc. No. 16-2, at 5.) He returned to the prison on August 22

and was moved to a single-person cell while his claim was being investigated. (Doc.

No. 16-2, at 5; Doc. No. 16-1, at 9.)

Defendant Lyons was supposed to provide mental health services to Addison

related to the alleged rape on August 22, 2019, but he failed to do so. After Addison

died, Lyons fabricated a record to make it appear that he had met with Addison on

August 22, 2019, immediately after Addison returned to the prison following his

evaluation at the hospital. (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 29; see also Doc. No. 16-2, at 12.) After

CoreCivic discovered this falsification, Lyons was permitted to resign from his

employment. (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 29.)

Addison was evaluated by Sigler, a clinical psychologist and mental health

supervisor at SCCC, on August 22, 2019, the same day he should have seen Lyons.

The FAC implies, but does not affirmatively allege, that Sigler should have had

access to the plaintiff’s mental health records, which would have alerted him to

Addison’s documented history of suicidal behavior. (See Doc. No. 16 ¶ 27 (“On the

report form, Defendant Sigler did not answer questions about whether Addison had

a history of suicidal behavior, whether Addison was taking psychiatric medications,

whether Addison had a history of drug abuse, and whether Addison had a history

of psychiatric treatment. Instead, Defendant Sigler put a question mark in between

the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ boxes [on the form].”).) This implication is supported by the

exhibits attached to the pleading. (See Doc. No. 16-1, at 4 (“[TDOC Special Agent

Nicky] Jordan secured a copy of the medical and mental health records of SMITH.

It was noted there were self-reported multiple suicide attempts since age 10. It was

reported in 2018, SMITH was found hanging and cut himself . . . . Multiple suicidal

intentions beginning in 2019. . . .”).) In addition, although Sigler wrote in the notes

section of the form he completed that he had not been able to access Addison’s

medical records, Addison, upon his arrival at SCCC, was evaluated by a different

counselor who, using the same form, correctly answered “yes” to the questions of

whether Addison had a history of suicidal behavior and psychiatric treatment, and

defendants Sigler and Long had both signed that form. The plaintiffs allege that

Sigler and Long did not make an effort to familiarize themselves with Addison’s

mental health history and, therefore, failed to treat his case “with the urgency that

it required.” (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 27.)

Defendant Bloodgood-Grandy was responsible for supervising both Sigler and

Long, but she allegedly failed in this responsibility and failed to recognize that

Sigler and Long were not providing adequate care for Addison, leading to his

“haphazard and grossly inadequate” mental health care at SCCC. (Id. ¶ 28.) Instead

of receiving adequate treatment for his psychiatric conditions, Addison was

“repeatedly put into disciplinary segregation.” (Id.)

On the day Addison died, August 23, 2019, he was in a segregation unit in a single-

person cell. Defendants Whitehead, Ackerman, Williams, King, Avila, Ratliff, and

Ray were all on duty that day; all witnessed Addison’s repeatedly stating that he

was thinking about killing himself or intended to kill himself. None intervened.

Security video from the prison shows that Addison hung a towel over the window

to his cell at 7:17 p.m., as a result of which the correctional officers on duty could

not perform safety checks on Addison, who by then had been threatening suicide

for hours. The defendants allegedly did not discover the towel until 7:52, at which

time Addison did not respond to verbal inquiries. (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 30.) Despite the

lack of response, the correctional officers did not enter Addison’s cell until 8:23

p.m., at which point he was found hanging and could not be revived. (Id.)

In the investigations conducted by Special Agent Jordan and Investigator Jessica

Frakes, the correctional officer defendants allegedly gave “conflicting answers

about what happened on the date of Addison’s death.” (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 31.) Prison

logs reflect that Addison had not been provided any food all day, and the autopsy

report confirmed that there was no food in his stomach. The defendants

acknowledged that Addison was threatening to kill himself if he was not provided

a meal tray. Defendant Ackerman, unit sergeant, believed that Addison was

bluffing and did not take his threats seriously. Ackerman was subsequently fired

for her role in the incident. (Id.)

The plaintiffs allege that Frakes, who is not a defendant, completed a form required

by the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) by answering a number of questions

incorrectly, including questions about whether the rape was motivated by a factor

such as race, ethnicity, gang affiliation, etc.; what could have been done to prevent

the problem from recurring; and whether information was available that should

have alerted staff that the incident might occur. (Doc. No. 16 ¶ 32.) The plaintiffs

allege that Frakes’ report, which “whitewashed” what happened and was signed off

on by defendants Johnson and Perry, is “a clear example of the culture of deliberate

indifference (and cover-up) fostered by Warden Perry at SCCC and CoreCivic

generally.” (Id.) The plaintiffs allege that the form constitutes evidence of Perry’s

and Johnson’s deliberate indifference to prison rape at SCCC. (Id.)

(Doc. No. 67, at 3–7 (footnotes omitted).)

The FAC also alleged that Addison’s death resulted from a CoreCivic policy or practice of

understaffing and inadequate medical care, reflecting deliberate indifference to inmate health and

safety in the interest of maximizing corporate profits. In support of these claims, the FAC included

numerous allegations about lawsuits against CoreCivic based on events at facilities around the

country dating from 2011 through 2020. (Doc. No. 16 ¶¶ 34–44.)

The defendants filed multiple motions for partial dismissal and, in June 2021, the court

granted in part and denied in part these motions. Specifically, the court dismissed the medical

malpractice claims against the correctional officer defendants (Perry, Johnson, Ackerman,

Whitehead, Williams, Avila, Ratliff, and Ray), on the grounds that these individuals were not

alleged to be medical providers and, therefore, could not be liable for medical malpractice. (See

Doc. No. 67, at 33.) In addition, the court dismissed without prejudice the medical malpractice

claims against CoreCivic and the medical professional defendants (Lyons, Sigler, Long, Steadman,

Turner, and Bloodgood-Grandy), on the basis that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the pre-

suit notice requirement set forth in the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”), Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1). (See Doc. No. 67, at 39.) The court also dismissed the § 1983 claims

against CoreCivic, Hininger, Perry, Johnson, Lyons, Long, Sigler, Bloodgood-Grandy, and

Turner, leaving intact the § 1983 claim against defendant Steadman, as well as § 1983 claims

against defendants Whitehead, Ackerman, Williams, King, Ray, Ratliff, and Avila, who had not

moved for their dismissal. The court dismissed all state law claims asserted against Hininger,

Perry, Johnson, Lyons, Sigler, Long, Steadman, Turner, and Bloodgood-Grandy, and the sexual

assault claim against CoreCivic. (Id.; see also Doc. No. 70 (Amended Order).)

In other words, as a result of the court’s ruling on the partial dismissal motions addressed

to the FAC, all claims against defendants Hininger, Perry, Johnson, Lyons, Sigler, Long,

Bloodgood-Grandy, and Turner were dismissed. The only remaining claims were, as best the court

can tell: the § 1983 claim against Steadman; the § 1983 and state law claims against Whitehead,

Ackerman, Williams, King, Ray, Ratliff, and Avila; the state law claims against CoreCivic (except

the assault claim); and the assault and wrongful death claims against Rose.

A year later, in June 2022, the plaintiffs filed a Rule 54 Motion for Reconsideration, asking

for reconsideration of the dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against CoreCivic, Sigler,

Long, Steadman, Turner, Bloodgood-Grandy, and Lyons on the basis of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion

in Albright v. Christensen, 24 F.4th 1039 (6th Cir. 2022), issued in January 2022. The court found

that Albright constituted an intervening change of controlling law and, therefore, granted the

plaintiffs’ motion, insofar as it sought the reinstatement of the medical malpractice claims against

CoreCivic, Sigler, Long, Steadman Turner, and Bloodgood-Grandy. The court declined to reinstate

the claim against Lyons, however, on the basis that the Amended Complaint failed to state a

medical negligence claim against him for which relief could be granted. (Doc. No. 106, at 17.) At

the same time, the court also acknowledged that, after filing their Motion for Reconsideration but

before the court ruled on it, the plaintiffs had filed their Motion to Amend. They stated in a footnote

in their Reply in support of the Motion for Reconsideration that the proposed second SAC filed

with the Motion to Amend did not allege additional facts establishing Lyons’s liability for medical

negligence because they understood that, in light of the court’s ruling on the application of the

THCLA, any such amendment would have been futile. (Doc. No. 99, at 8.) They also asserted that,

if permitted to amend their pleading, they intended to allege additional facts showing medical

negligence, as well as simple negligence, on the part of Lyons. (Id. at 8–9.) The court stated only

that it would address any such new allegations “in the context of ruling on that motion.” (Doc. No.

106, at 17; see also id. at 4 n.4.)

While briefing on the plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend was still underway, the plaintiffs filed

an Unopposed Motion to Set Aside Scheduling Order. Based on the Memorandum and Order

reinstating the medical malpractice claims, the parties recognized that additional discovery would

be required and that, if the court granted the Motion to Amend, “that too would necessitate

additional discovery.” (Doc. No. 111, at 1.) The plaintiffs therefore moved to “set aside the

scheduling order until after the Court has ruled on the July 15, 2022 motion to amend.” (Id.) On

August 18, 2022, the court granted that motion as unopposed, thus effectively suspending any still-

pending deadlines. (Doc. No. 114.)

The Motion to Amend has now been exhaustively briefed: Lyons and the CoreCivic

defendants filed separate Responses (Doc. Nos. 112, 113); the plaintiffs filed a consolidated Reply

(Doc. No. 116), and the CoreCivic defendants, with permission, filed a Surreply (Doc. No. 124).

In addition, in conjunction with their Reply, the plaintiffs filed two sealed exhibits (Doc.

Nos. 119, 120), and a Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal (Doc. No. 118). In the last

paragraph of this motion, the plaintiffs included a single sentence that stated: “Finally, Defendant

Lyons was mistakenly omitted from Paragraph 58(a) [of the second SAC], therefore the Plaintiffs

move the Court to recognize claims against him as if his name was in that subparagraph.” (Doc.

No. 118, at 2.) The court granted the Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal but found

that the request to add Lyons’s name to Paragraph 58(a) had to be made in a separate motion that,

“pursuant to Local Rule 7.01(a)(1), must reflect the position of opposing counsel with regard to

the motion.” (Doc. No. 122.)

Thereafter, in response to that Order, the plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Motion. (Doc.

No. 125.) In this motion, however, they do not simply request to amend the proposed Second

Amended Complaint to add Lyons’s name to paragraph 58(a) of the previous version of the Second

Amended Complaint. Instead, they state that they “wish to correct the SAC in order to more

accurately reflect the contents of those sealed documents” and, separately, “to remove some claims

from the SAC in response to some of the issues raised by the Defendants” in their Responses.

(Doc. No. 125, at 1.) They express hope that this will “simplify the Court’s task” in addressing

their Motion to Amend. (Id.) In the Supplemental Motion, the plaintiffs highlight some of the

changes between the second and third versions of the proposed SAC, as discussed in greater detail

below. In conjunction with this motion, the plaintiffs also filed notice that (1) defendant Lyons did

not oppose it except insofar is it included proposed changes that concern him; and (2) the other

defendants did not oppose dropping claims but opposed the other changes. (Doc. No. 127.) The

defendants filed their own Responses to the Supplemental Motion (Doc. Nos. 128, 129), and the

plaintiffs filed a Reply to Lyons’s Response (Doc. No. 130).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[W]hen a party seeks to amend its pleadings . . . after the expiration of scheduling order

deadlines, it must show good cause under Rule 16(b).” Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853,

879 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 16(b)(4)). “The primary measure of Rule 16’s ‘good cause’ standard is the moving party’s

diligence in attempting to meet” the scheduling order’s requirements, but courts also consider

‘possible prejudice to the party opposing the modification.’” Id. (quoting Inge, 281 F.3d at 625).

To be clear, “[w]hile the absence of prejudice to a non-moving party may be relevant in

determining whether leave to amend should be granted . . . , it does not fulfill the ‘good cause’

requirement of Rule 16(b).” Woodcock v. Ky. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 5:12-CV-00135-GNS-LKK,

2016 WL 3676768, at *1 (W.D. Ky. July 6, 2016) (citation omitted).

Assuming the movant clears the Rule 16 “good cause” hurdle, the court must then consider

whether the proposed amendment is permissible under Rule 15. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888,

909 (6th Cir. 2003). Under that rule, the court should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) “embodies a ‘liberal amendment policy.’”

Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). To determine whether to

grant leave under this liberal policy, courts weigh several factors, including: “[u]ndue delay in

filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of

amendment.” Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

III. MOTION TO AMEND SCHEDULING ORDER

The plaintiffs assert that they have good cause to amend the scheduling order. They also

contend that the defendants cannot plausibly establish that they will suffer prejudice if the

scheduling order is amended to allow the plaintiffs to belatedly amend their pleading again. In

support of their position, the plaintiffs correctly point out that: (1) the granting of the plaintiffs’

Motion for Reconsideration and corresponding reinstatement of the previously dismissed medical

malpractice claims against all of the medical professional defendants (except for Lyons) gave rise

to the need to reopen discovery and to reset discovery-related and other deadlines; and (2) the court

granted the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to set aside the scheduling order as of August 18, 2022,

as a result of which all discovery and trial-related deadlines have been vacated, to be reset

following the resolution of the pending motions.

In addition, the plaintiffs argue that, although the original deadline for amending pleadings

expired on December 4, 2021 (see Doc. No. 81, at 3), they did not learn the information that they

seek to set forth in the SAC, specifically relating to the defendants’ alleged duty to develop

procedures for notifying guard staff about suicidal inmates, until after the defendants responded to

discovery in March through June 2022. On the basis of this new evidence, the plaintiffs seek to

reinstate claims against some of the defendants against whom all claims were previously

dismissed. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants cannot establish prejudice, given that the

scheduling order has to be amended anyway to account for additional discovery and that several

of the medical official defendants against whom all claims were previously dismissed have already

been rejoined to the lawsuit as a result of the court’s ruling on the plaintiffs’ Motion for

Reconsideration.

Neither Lyons nor the CoreCivic defendants expressly address Rule 16 and the “good

cause” standard for moving to amend a pleading after the deadline for doing so has passed. Instead,

they only address the merits of that portion of the plaintiffs’ motion addressed to amending their

pleading again, thereby waiving any objection based on Rule 16. Accord Correa v. Rubin Lublin

TN, PLLC, No. 15-2135, 2015 WL 5232081, at *3 (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 8, 2015 (finding that a

party’s failure to address an argument raised in a motion to dismiss amounted to a waiver of the

issue).

Moreover, the court finds that the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing good

cause to amend the scheduling order, in light of the fact that virtually all of the other deadlines set

in the Initial Case Management Order and the Order setting trial deadlines will have to be

reestablished. In addition, the plaintiffs have shown that they learned information they seek to add

to their pleading in discovery that was not produced until after the expiration of the deadline for

amending pleadings.

The court, therefore, will consider the merits of the Motion to Amend under Rule 15.

IV. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

A. The Proposed Amendments

While the plaintiffs argue that good cause exists to permit amending the scheduling order

and recognize that Rule 15 governs their request to amend their pleading, they do not actually

address Rule 15’s criteria, except to argue that, if permitted to amend in response to “the new

evidence” learned from discovery during the spring of 2022, their “case will be considerably

stronger, and the Plaintiffs will be able to pursue defendants who otherwise would escape liability

for their misconduct.” (Doc. No. 102, at 4–5.) They also assert, in a somewhat conclusory fashion,

that “the existing Defendants would not be prejudiced by the reinstatement of claims against the

defendants who were previously dismissed from this case.” (Id. at 5.)

Regarding the substance of the proposed amendments, the plaintiffs assert that they learned

for the first time, upon receiving the defendants’ discovery answers, that: (1) “the guard staff who

worked in Addison Smith’s unit had never been warned that Addison was at high risk of suicide.

Specifically, the guard staff had not been warned that Addison had a history of suicide attempts or

that he had just returned from a hospital after he was raped by another inmate” (id. at 3); (2)

“Defendants CoreCivic, Perry, Johnson, Bloodgood[-Grandy] and Turner had a legal duty to

develop procedures for notifying guard staff about suicidal inmates” and failed to do so (id.); and

(3) Addison was “placed in the wrong unit for suicidal inmates” (id. at 3–4 n. 2).

The plaintiffs assert that this new information is important, because, if “CoreCivic, Perry,

Johnson, Bloodgood and Turner [had] adopted adequate procedures for dealing with inmates like

Addison, and had Defendants Sigler, Long, and Lyons followed those procedures, then the guard

Defendants almost certainly would not have been so dismissive of Addison’s suicide threats.” (Id.

at 3–4.) They further argue that this information is relevant because, while all claims against Perry,

Johnson, Bloodgood-Grandy, and Turner were previously dismissed, “there is now evidence that

they were negligent (and perhaps deliberately indifferent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)” in failing to

adopt protocols for informing guard staff about inmates at heightened risk of suicide. (Id. at 4.)

They claim that this failure, in addition to making the guards less likely to take Addison’s threats

of self-harm seriously, also led to Addison’s being placed in disciplinary segregation rather than

in a medical unit. The plaintiffs assert that, irrespective of how the court ruled on their motion to

reinstate the medical malpractice claims, which was at that time still pending, these new allegations

establish simple negligence against some of the dismissed medical professional defendants, rather

than medical negligence.

The actual changes to the pleading are more comprehensive than suggested by the

plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend. The court’s own analysis reveals that the second SAC differs from

the FAC in that it:

(1) includes new details regarding Addison’s history of suicide attempts and other

forms of self-harm while incarcerated from 2017 through 2019, as well as new

details regarding how long Addison had been off of his psychiatric medications

both while at TTCC and after his transfer to SCCF, and asserts that “[n]o competent

medical professional” could have looked at his medical history and concluded that

it was a good idea to take him off psychiatric medications “cold turkey.” (Doc. No.

102-1 ¶¶ 24–26);

(2) contains new assertions that, if defendant Turner, who was Steadman’s

supervisor, “had reviewed Addison’s file, as was his duty, then he would have seen

that Addison was receiving grossly inadequate care” (id. ¶ 27);

(3) now alleges that defendant Steadman may have forged Addison’s signature on

a medication consent form and suggests Addison may never have been seen by

Steadman on August 19, 2019 (id. ¶ 28);

(4) alleges that CoreCivic personnel improperly classified defendant Rose and that

he should never have been placed in a cell with Addison(id. ¶ 29);

(5) alleges that Sigler may have forged a form indicating that he saw Addison on

August 22, 2019, the day before his death, and suggests Sigler may never have

provided treatment for Addison on that day (id. ¶ 30);

(6) besides alleging that Lyons never provided mental health services to Addison

related to the rape and fabricating records to make it appear that he had done so,

the SAC includes an assertion that Lyons’s “failure to provide needed mental health

services contributed to Addison’s death” and that he further “contributed to

Addison’s death by failing to notify guard staff that Addison was at heightened risk

of suicide” (id. ¶ 34);

(7) alleges that the plaintiffs learned in April 2022 that none of the defendant

corrections officers had been informed that Addison had a history of suicide

attempts, was at a high risk for suicide, or had recently returned from a hospital

examination for sexual assault (id. ¶ 35);

(8) asserts that the plaintiffs learned on March 30, 2022 that Addison was on the

“wrong unit” for a suicidal inmate and that he “should have been sent to the

facility’s medical unit for monitoring rather than being left in disciplinary

segregation (id.);

(9) alleges that CoreCivic, Perry, Johnson, Bloodgood-Grandy, and Turner failed

to comply with TDOC Policy No. 113.88, requiring all Tennessee prisons to

develop written procedures for “Referral protocol, including communication

procedures, between all health care and correctional staff” and “specific protocol

for managing suicidal inmates . . . to include procedures for suicide risk assessment,

communication with on-call provider, communication with security staff and

documentation,” and that the defendants’ failure to develop adequate procedures

and protocols constituted “deliberate indifference and breach of duty” that

“contributed to Addison’s death because guard staff were never informed about his

heightened risk of suicide” (Doc. No. 102-1 ¶ 36);

(10) alleges that an “unknown medical employee” referred to as “John Doe”3

evaluated Addison the morning of the day he died; that John Doe “knew Addison’s

medical and mental health history” and that he had just been raped and returned

from the hospital the day before; that Sigler and Lyons should have known that

Addison was at a “heightened risk of suicide after his return from the hospital”; and

that, given this knowledge, they had a duty to (a) “notify their superiors and to

initiate efforts to place Addison in the medical unit designated for suicidal inmates”

and (b) “warn the Defendant corrections officers” of the heightened risk of suicide:

and their failure to meet these duties contributed to Addison’s death (id. ¶ 37); and

(11) alleges that, in light of their knowledge of Addison’s history and

circumstances, John Doe, Sigler, Lyons, and Long also had a “common-sense duty”

to notify the guard staff of Addison’s history and that their failure to do so

contributed to Ackerson’s being dismissive of Addison’s suicide threats and to

Addison’s being improperly classified and housed in segregation rather than in the

medical unit (id. ¶ 40).4

In addition, the SAC includes a new paragraph 54 that purports to incorporate by reference

the entirety of the complaint, with its exhibits, filed in Newby v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC, No.

3:22-cv-00093 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2022) (Doc. No. 1); the plaintiffs have also attached a copy

of this complaint to the second SAC. Newby, on its face, “arises from yet another preventable

death”—a murder, in that case—“at CoreCivic’s ‘severely understaffed’ Trousdale Turner

Correctional Center—Tennessee’s most dangerous and notorious prison.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 10, 15.5

3 The plaintiffs have not added John Doe to the case caption or to the list of “Parties” in

the SAC, but the “Claims” section of the SAC incorporates references to him, making it unclear

whether the plaintiffs seek to add him as a new defendant. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 102-1 ¶ 58(c) (“John

Doe and Defendants Sigler, Long, and Lyons failed to notify guard staff that Addison was at high

risk of suicide . . . .”).)

4 Although the plaintiffs nowhere acknowledge this change, the SAC also entirely omits

any claims against inmate Marcayus Rose and removes his name from the case caption. It also

removes the assault claim against CoreCivic that was based on its purported liability for Rose’s

assault on Addison. It clarifies that the negligence claim against CoreCivic is based on respondeat

superior liability for the negligence of its employees and specifically for the negligence leading to

the rape of Addison by Marcayus Rose, with whom Addison never should have been assigned to

share a cell. (Doc. No. 102-1 ¶ 66.)

5 The court takes judicial notice that Newby was dismissed with prejudice on December 2,

2022, pursuant to a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal filed on August 17, 2022.

In addition to the new factual allegations, the second SAC substantially reconfigures the

“Claims” section of the pleading by (1) specifying grounds for the § 1983 claims (Doc. No. 102-1

¶ 58); and (2) clarifying that the medical malpractice claims are asserted only against defendants

CoreCivic, Lyons, Long, Sigler, Bloodgood-Grandy, Steadman, and Turner (id. ¶ 62). It continues

to assert claims against all defendants for wrongful death, gross negligence, and negligence. (Id.

Counts 2, 4, 5.)

In addition, in their Supplemental Motion, the plaintiffs seek to “correct” the second SAC

to “more accurately reflect the contents” of the sealed documents (Doc. Nos. 119, 120). (See Doc.

No. 125, at 1.) Doc. No. 119 is the SCCF Suicide Prevention Plan, dated February 19, 2019.6

Defendant Lyons is identified as “Administrator” in the caption of this document; signatures on

the document indicate that it was “reviewed and approved” by Lyons, Bloodgood-Grandy, Perry,

and Steadman, respectively, as Mental Health Coordinator, Clinical Director, Warden, and APN.

The plaintiff’s other sealed exhibit is an SCCF “Post Order,” which identifies or creates a position

for a correctional officer to staff the SCCF medical department and to be “responsible for the

overall security of the medical department.” (Doc. No. 120, at 1.) It provides, as potentially

relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims, that the medical department correctional officer is to immediately

notify the Shift Supervisor if he is informed that an inmate has been placed on suicide watch. (Id.

6 The Suicide Prevention Plan states that there were no documented deaths ruled as suicides

in 2018 and two serious suicide attempts in 2018. (Doc. No. 119, at 1.) It identifies the “prevention

goal” as “zero in-custody” suicide deaths and attempts in any given year. The Risk Management

section of the Plan states very generally where inmates who are “placed on suicide precautions”

are to be housed, either with or without constant observation, but it says nothing about but how

inmates are placed on “suicide precautions.” (Id. at 2–3.) It does indicate that all inmates have

access to mental health services, that mental health referrals are to be “triaged by one of the Mental

Health Coordinators,” and that the mental health treatment team “meets weekly to review and

discuss cases, complete[] annex evaluations, update treatment plans and make decisions regarding

level of care changes and services needs.” (Id. at 3.) These meetings are to be “documented for

review by TDOC or other auditors [as] required by policy.” (Id.)

at 3.) If an inmate is placed on suicide watch, the Shift Supervisor is to “designate an officer to

continuously monitor and record the inmate’s behavior.” (Id.)

The plaintiffs filed these documents7 in support of their Reply in Support of Motion to

Amend, apparently to illustrate that the documents do not include “guidelines for referring inmates

to the medical unit for purposes of suicide prevention.” (Doc. No. 118, at 1–2.) The plaintiffs seek

to incorporate these documents by reference into their pleading. (Id. at 2.)

In the Supplemental Motion, The plaintiffs further state that the proposed third SAC will

(1) “withdraw all of the civil rights claims found in Paragraph 58(c), and instead

assert them only as common-law tort claims,” thus narrowing the number of

defendants against whom they bring § 1983 claims (Doc. No. 125, at 2);

(2) “withdraw the civil rights claims against Defendant Turner and assert only

medical malpractice claims against him” (id.);

(3) “withdraw all of their claims against Defendant Johnson” (id.);

(4) add Lyons’s name to Paragraph 58(a) but remove defendant Hininger’s name

(id.);

(5) add a sentence to Paragraph 34, as follows: “In his role as the mental health

administrator and coordinator for SCCC, Defendant Lyons knew not later than

August 20, 2022 that Addison had returned from a hospital evaluation for rape, and

that Addison was in need of mental health services as a result” (id.); and

(6) modify Paragraph 36 to allege that “CoreCivic’s procedures do not provide any

guidelines”—instead of providing simply inadequate guidelines—“for assigning

inmates to the medical unit on the basis of heightened suicidal risk.” (Id. at 2–3.)

And they seek to add that the defendants’ deliberate indifference and negligence

thus contributed to causing Addison’s death, not only because guard staff were

never informed of Addison’s heightened risk of suicide, but also because he was

not transferred to the medical unit. (Id. at 3.)

Although the plaintiffs do not highlight this amendment, they also incorporated substantial

changes at Paragraph 62, to identify more specifically that their medical malpractice claim against

7 The plaintiffs obtained permission to file them under seal, because CoreCivic had

designated them as confidential.

Turner is based on his failure to adequately supervise Steadman and that the medical malpractice

claims against Sigler, Long, and Lyons are premised on, among other deficiencies, their failure to

notify guard staff that Addison was at high risk of suicide or to insure that he was housed in the

proper unit.

B. The CoreCivic Defendants’ Objections

The CoreCivic defendants (CoreCivic, Jason Whitehead, Christopher Williams, Joshua

Ray, Jenny Ratliff, Ledia Avila, Angela Steadman, J. Scott Long, Mark Sigler, Elena Bloodgood-

Grandy, and Kevin Turner, and previously dismissed defendants Damon Hininger, Grady Perry,

and Eddie Johnson) argue that the Motion to Amend should be denied (1) pursuant to the law-of-

the-case doctrine, because the plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of “substantially different

evidence” or other “exceptional circumstances” that would justify bringing back into the case

claims that were already dismissed or defendants against whom all claims were previously

dismissed; (2) under Rule 15, because the requested amendment is untimely and “constitutes undue

delay,” would unfairly prejudice the defendants, and would be futile. (Doc. No. 113, at 10, 19–

22).8

1. Law-of-the-Case Doctrine

The Supreme Court characterizes the law-of-the-case doctrine as an “amorphous concept”

that, “[a]s most commonly defined, . . . posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that

decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Arizona

v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). The doctrine “directs a court’s discretion, it does not limit

8 In response to other arguments by the CoreCivic defendants, the plaintiffs clarify that

they do not intend to assert claims against Dr. William Mays or to assert claims against CoreCivic

relating to understaffing.

the tribunal’s power.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“Any order or other decision . . . that

adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does

not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry

of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”). Under this

doctrine and Rule 54, “the district court retains the statutory and inherent discretion to resurrect

previously dismissed claims and previously dismissed parties should later discovered evidence

warrant it.” Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & HOD Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v.

Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 510 (6th Cir. 2013) (Gwin, D.J., concurring) (citing Rodriguez v.

Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004)), vacated and

remanded on other grounds sub nom. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus.

Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015). Such discretion, however, is typically exercised sparingly.

See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (“[A]s a rule courts

should be loathe [sic] to [revisit prior decisions] in the absence of extraordinary circumstances

such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The defendants have cited to one case in which the court applied the law-of-the-case

standard to a motion to amend a complaint seeking to reinstate previously dismissed claims based

on purportedly new evidence. McNulty v. Arctic Glacier, Inc., No. 08-CV-13178, 2016 WL

465490, at *17 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2016) (“The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s proposed

amendments, which seek to reassert the identical antitrust and RICO conspiracy claims that this

Court expressly dismissed in its 2009 Orders, must be analyzed under the law of the case

doctrine.”). Even there, however, the court considered the questions of whether the evidence the

plaintiff proffered was truly “new” and whether it served to resuscitate the previously dismissed

claims, effectively merging the law-of-the-case analysis with its analysis under Rule 15 of whether

the proposed amendment was futile.

In the present case, the court is not persuaded that application of law-of-the-case doctrine

(or Rule 54) is appropriate, at least insofar as the plaintiffs seek to assert (or reassert) claims based

on newly discovered evidence. They do not expressly seek reconsideration of the court’s previous

dismissal of their claims as set forth in the FAC. They already did that, in fact, and the court granted

relief with respect to the medical malpractice claims against all but one of the medical professional

defendants. Insofar as the plaintiffs now seek to allege additional facts in support of the medical

malpractice claims, the law of the case erects no barrier to their doing so, because the court has

never ruled on the question of whether the plaintiffs adequately pleaded facts that, if true, would

state medical malpractice or simple negligence claims.

Insofar as the plaintiffs seek to reinstate their § 1983 claims, they claim to be in possession

of new facts that they purportedly could not have discovered until the defendants responded to

their discovery requests and that they contend are sufficient to support renewed claims under

§ 1983. Under the circumstances presented here, Rule 15 supplies the standard, and the relevant

question is whether the defendants have shown, as they argue, undue delay, undue prejudice, or

futility.

2. Rule 15: Undue Delay and/or Undue Prejudice

Regarding undue delay, the CoreCivic defendants argue that the purportedly “new”

evidence is not really new and that the plaintiffs have offered no excuse for having “delayed for

years asserting the majority” of the new allegations in the proposed SAC, as most of them arise

from medical records that have been in the plaintiffs’ possession since August 2020. (Doc. No.

113, at 20.)

The defendants also assert that, when an amendment is requested at a “later stage of

litigation,” courts often find that such delay alone gives rise to undue prejudice to the non-moving

parties. (Doc. No. 113, at 20 (citing, e.g., Duggins v. Steak ’N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th

Cir. 1999) (“[A]llowing amendment after the close of discovery creates significant prejudice[.]”);

George v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 641 F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend, even where the discovery deadline

had not yet closed, where “much else had occurred by that time” and “allowing the amendment

would have required the parties and the court to backtrack and redo work that had already been

completed”)).)

The CoreCivic defendants argue that the prejudicial effect as to previously dismissed

defendants is “obvious,” when such amendments would permit such defendants to be “dr[agged]

back into litigation for which they have not been parties for over a year.” (Doc. No. 113, at 21.)

They argue that the already participating defendants will be prejudiced, “as they have proceeded

over the past year under the assumption” that the dismissed claims and parties would stay

dismissed. (Id.) They assert that they have altered their defense strategies based on the dismissal

of certain claims and defendants and, therefore, would be prejudiced by the reinstatement of the

previously dismissed claims and defendants. (Id.)

“[O]rdinarily, delay alone will not justify the denial of leave to amend the complaint.

Delay, however, will become ‘undue’ at some point, placing an unwarranted burden on the court,

or ‘prejudicial,’ placing an unfair burden on the opposing party.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.

Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 806 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). In this case, although the defendants assert that the new claims are really premised on

medical records that have long been in the plaintiffs’ possession, the plaintiffs filed their Motion

to Amend within a few months of receiving the discovery that they claim justifies amendment. At

that time, their Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the medical negligence claims was

still pending. The court finds that the delay of a couple of months from their receipt of the

discovery of new facts, in light of the overall posture of the case, is not undue: it will not, as

contemplated by Bridgeport Music, place an unwarranted burden on the court.

Moreover, regarding possible prejudice, this case has not progressed to a “later stage of

litigation,” contrary to the defendants’ suggestion. Although the pleading deadline had already

expired, the court granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Amend the Initial Case Management Order

on March 28, 2022, extending all still extant deadlines by ninety days; at the same time, the court

reset the trial date for June 2023. (Doc. Nos. 90, 91.) Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed their

Unopposed Motion to Set Aside Scheduling Order, which expressly recognized that, if the court

granted their Motion for Reconsideration or the Motion to Amend, additional discovery would be

required. This litigation, in short, is in its early stages, despite having been filed eighteen months

ago and notwithstanding that the parties have exchanged some discovery. Likewise, because not

much has happened in the preceding year except for the reinstatement of the medical malpractice

claims, the previously dismissed defendants have not been left far behind. The CoreCivic

defendants have not shown that they would be unduly prejudiced by the proposed amendment.

3. Futility

An amendment is futile when, after including the proposed changes, the complaint still

“could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut.

of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203

F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000)). The CoreCivic defendants argue very generally that the proposed

amendments would be futile, pointing specifically only to the already dismissed § 1983 claims

against CoreCivic, Hininger and Perry,9 the dismissed § 1983 and common-law negligence claims

against the medical professional defendants, Sigler, Long, Bloodgood-Grandy, and Turner, and

the dismissed negligence claims against Steadman.

a) Count 1: Section 1983 Claim Against CoreCivic

The SAC attempts to reinstate the § 1983 claim against CoreCivic. The only new material

in the SAC potentially pertaining to such a claim consists of the plaintiffs’ allegations that TDOC

policy requires each Tennessee prison to develop written procedures to prevent inmate suicide,

including by developing specific procedures for “suicide risk assessment” and “communication

with security staff.” (Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 36.) The plaintiffs allege that CoreCivic failed to develop

any such procedures for SCCF and specifically failed to “address the need for communications

between health care and correctional staff regarding inmates who are (1) at heightened risk of

suicide, yet (2) have not been transferred to the medical unit” and further failed to “provide any

guidelines for assigning inmates to the medical unit on the basis of heightened suicidal risk.” (Id.)

In addition to these allegations, the SAC still incorporates the paragraphs relating to

lawsuits against CoreCivic arising from incidents at other facilities around the country (id. ¶¶ 43–

53), and the plaintiffs have now added reference to the Complaint filed in Newby v. CoreCivic of

Tenn., LLC, No. 3:22-cv-00093 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2022) (Doc. No. 1), and have gone so far as

to incorporate it by reference and attach a copy of it to the proposed SAC. (Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 54;

Doc. No. 125-1, at 24–51.)

Under Count 1, the § 1983 claim against CoreCivic is premised upon the assertion that

CoreCivic violated Addison’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

9 The plaintiffs have agreed that the claims against Johnson should not be revived, and they

omitted any claims against him from the third SAC. (Doc. No. 125, at 2; Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 10.)

punishment, insofar as it acted with deliberate indifference to the possibility of self-harm and

suicide when it, among other things, “failed to develop adequate procedures for dealing with

inmates at risk for suicide, including procedures for (1) notifying guard staff that an inmate is

suicidal and (2) procedures for placing suicidal inmates in the proper housing unit.” (Id. ¶ 58(a).)

These allegations are substantially different and more concrete than the original allegations

in support of the § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, but they fare no better. The plaintiffs’ argument,

essentially, is that CoreCivic should have developed better policies for identifying potentially

suicidal inmates, as there is no dispute that a policy regarding the placement and monitoring of

suicidal inmates was in place. The problem appears to be that the medical professionals at SCCF

failed to recognize that Addison was suicidal or at high risk for suicide. In particular, because the

allegedly negligent medical providers failed to recognize that Addison was potentially suicidal, it

is not clear how a better policy for referring potentially suicidal inmates would have made a

difference. Moreover, the policy produced by the plaintiffs indicates that there were no inmate

deaths at SCCF ruled as suicide in 2018, and the plaintiffs have not alleged that there were, in fact,

suicides at SCCF that were not ruled as such. Nor have the plaintiffs alleged other facts that, if

true, would establish that CoreCivic was on notice that its policies were insufficient.

To establish liability based on deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs must allege facts

showing that CoreCivic was on notice. CoreCivic cannot be shown to have been deliberately

indifferent, for purposes of a § 1983 claim, to a problem that either did not exist or of which it had

no notice. See Winkler v. Madison Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018) (reiterating that, to

establish the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom, the plaintiff must present proof of,

among other things, “a clear and persistent” pattern of unconstitutional conduct by employees of

which the entity had “actual or constructive notice”).

The new allegations, including the allegations regarding Newby, are not sufficient to state

a deliberate indifference claim against CoreCivic under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

b) Count 1: Section 1983 Claims Against Hininger, Perry, Bloodgood-

Grandy, Lyons, and Turner

The same basic allegations support the claims against CEO Hininger, Warden Perry, and

the medical professionals who, the plaintiffs claim, were responsible for developing the prison’s

suicide prevention protocol. The plaintiffs allege that Hininger “failed to supervise the staff at

SCCF and ensure that they adopted adequate procedures pursuant to TDOC policies” and that

Perry, along with Bloodgood-Grandy, Lyons, and Turner, “failed to develop adequate procedures

for dealing with inmates at risk for suicide, including procedures for (1) notifying guard staff that

an inmate is suicidal and (2) procedures for placing suicidal inmates in the proper housing unit.”

(Doc. No. 125-1 ¶¶ 58(a), 58(b).)

In a not-dissimilar case brought by the next of kin of an individual who had committed

suicide while in pretrial detention, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a jail warden

on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. There, the plaintiff alleged that the warden had

abandoned the duties of his position, in the face of actual knowledge of the risk of

suicide[,] by fail[ing] to establish policies that would protect inmates at risk of

suicide from harm, [fail]ing to train and supervise his staff on how to protect

inmates at risk of suicide from harm, and fail[ing] to act on the recommendation

that would have effectively mitigated the risk posed by the single barred isolation

cells.

Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 487 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The defendants responded that the warden could not be found deliberately

indifferent, because there were no allegations that he had “‘completely abdicated’ any of his

responsibilities but rather merely allegations that he inadequately took steps to mitigate the risk of

detainee suicide.” Id.

The court observed that a supervisor such as the warden may be liable if he “abandon[s]

the specific duties of [his] position . . . in the face of actual knowledge of a breakdown in the proper

workings of the department.” Id. (quoting Winkler, 893 F.3d at 898). The supervisor must have

completely “abdicated his or her job responsibility, and the ‘active performance of the

[supervisor’s] individual job function’ must have directly resulted in the constitutional injury.” Id.

(quoting Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis in original).

Thus, the plaintiff must, at minimum, show that the supervisor “implicitly authorized, approved[,]

or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Id. at 487–

88 (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). While the supervisor does not

have to have “known of the substantial risk to the injured party,” he “must have possessed

knowledge of potential danger to a particular class of persons.” Id. at 488.

The plaintiff in Troutman did not satisfy these requirements. Although she claimed that the

warden performed his duties inadequately, for instance, by “failing to put in writing the policy of

requiring medical clearance before transfer to solitary,” she did not allege that the warden actually

“knew the policy was not working and nonetheless completely abdicated his responsibilities,” that

he “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in

it,” or that he “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. (citations omitted). Insofar as she claimed

merely that he “inadequately performed his duties,” the court found that “such claims are

insufficient for § 1983 supervisory liability.” Id.

Troutman dictates the conclusion here. Although the plaintiffs allege that Perry,

Bloodgood-Grandy, Lyons, and Turner failed to develop adequate policies for dealing with

inmates at risk for suicide and that Hininger failed to supervise SCCF staff and to ensure that they

adopted adequate procedures pursuant to TDOC policies, they do not allege facts suggesting that

these defendants were aware that the existing policy was not working but nonetheless completely

abdicated their responsibilities to implement a more comprehensive policy in the face of such

knowledge. That is, the plaintiffs do not provide any basis for concluding that these defendants

were on notice that the inadequate policy posed a “potential danger to a particular class of

persons”—namely, potentially suicidal inmates.

The proposed SAC, therefore, fails to state a § 1983 claim against Hininger, Perry,

Bloodgood-Grandy, Lyons, or Turner based on the failure to develop adequate policies for dealing

with SCCF inmates at risk for suicide. The Motion to Amend to reinstate the § 1983 claims against

these defendants, therefore, will be denied as futile.

c) Count 1: Other Section 1983 Claims

The plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion notes that, in response to the defendants’ objections

to the second SAC, they omitted from the third SAC any attempt to reinstate § 1983 claims against

“John Doe,” Sigler, Long, and Lyons, based on their failure to notify guard staff that Addison was

at high risk of suicide or to ensure that Addison was housed in the proper unit. They have also

omitted any § 1983 claim against Turner based on his alleged failure to adequately supervise

Steadman. (Compare Doc. No. 102-1 ¶ 58 with Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 58.) The original Motion to

Amend will be denied, insofar as it sought to make these changes.

Further, to be clear: the § 1983 claims against defendants Whitehead, Ackerman, Williams,

King, Ray, Ratliff, Avila, and Steadman were never dismissed and have not substantially changed

in the new iterations of the plaintiffs’ pleading. The defendants do not raise objections to these

claims. Thus, insofar as the proposed SAC clarifies the § 1983 claims against these defendants,

the Motion to Amend will be granted.

d) Common-Law Claims

The CoreCivic defendants object to the “reappearance” of the common-law negligence

claims against defendants Sigler, Long, Bloodgood-Grandy, Tuner, and Steadman. (Doc. No. 113,

at 22.) They assert that the “common law negligence claim[s]” are really medical malpractice

claims based on the defendants’ failure to appropriately diagnose Addison as suicidal (Doc. No.

113, at 18–19) and that the reinstatement of these claims would be futile, since they were already

dismissed.

However, the negligence claims against these defendants were previously dismissed

because, as the plaintiffs recognized, they were subsumed by the medical malpractice claims and,

like the malpractice claims, were subject to dismissal based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply

with the procedural requirements of the THCLA. (See Doc. No. 51, at 13.) The court has now ruled

that the THCLA does not apply, as a result of which the statute no longer creates a barrier to

ordinary negligence claims either. Accordingly, the defendants have not shown that amendment

of the SAC to incorporate additional allegations in support of the common-law negligence claims

against defendants Steadman, Long, Sigler, Bloodgood-Grandy, or Turner would be futile.

The court will grant the plaintiffs leave to amend to restate the medical malpractice claims

(which have already been reinstated), to reinstate the other state law claims, and to allege the

proposed new facts to support these claims.

C. Lyons’ Objections

William Lyons and Ashley Ackerman have filed a separate response. In addition to arguing

that the plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend should be denied under the law-of-the-case doctrine (or

alternatively under Rule 54, which imposes basically the same standard) and on the basis that the

Motion to Amend was unduly delayed—arguments the court has already rejected—Lyons and

Ackerman also argue that the proposed amendment would be futile as to Lyons and unduly

prejudicial to both of them. The court finds that the proposed amendment would be futile and does

not reach the defendants’ other arguments.

The allegations in the third SAC pertaining to Lyons are as follows:

18. Defendant William Lyons was a mental health counselor at SCCC at all

times relevant. He was assigned to care for Addison.

. . . .

34. After Addison was raped by Inmate Rose on August 19, 2019, Defendant

Lyons was supposed to provide mental health services related to the rape. He did

not. After Addison died, Defendant Long caught Defendant Lyons fabricating

records to make it appear that he met with Addison after the rape. Defendant

[Lyons]10 was confronted by CoreCivic’s internal investigators, and he was allowed

to resign. His failure to provide needed mental health services contributed to

Addison’s death. Likewise, he contributed to Addison’s death by failing to notify

guard staff that Addison was at heightened risk of suicide. In his role as the mental

health administrator and coordinator for SCCC, Defendant Lyons knew no later

than August 20, 2022 that Addison had returned from a hospital evaluation for rape,

and that Addison was in need of mental health services as a result.

. . . .

36. Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) Policy No. 113.88 requires

each prison – including private prisons like SCCC – to develop written procedures

to prevent suicide. Those written procedures are, among other things, supposed to

include the following:

Referral protocol, including communication procedures, between all health care

and correctional staff. Specific protocol for managing suicidal inmates during

evening and morning watch and on weekends to include procedures for suicide

risk assessment, communication with on-call provider, communication with

security staff and documentation.

. . . . Lyons [and others] were directly responsible for developing procedures on

behalf of SCCC in response to Policy No. 113.88. They failed to develop adequate

procedures to deal with inmates like Addison, and their . . . breach of duty

contributed to his death because (1) guard staff were never informed about his

heightened risk of suicide and (2) he was not transferred to the medical unit.

37. TDOC Policy No. 113.31 requires corrections facilities to medically

evaluate each inmate who is in administrative segregation (as Addison was) every

day. . . . Lyons should have known that Addison was at heightened risk of suicide

10 The SAC says “Long,” but it is apparent from context that it should say “Lyons” here.

after his return from the hospital. Given the heightened risk of suicide, . . . Lyons

[and others] each had a duty to notify their superiors and initiate efforts to place

Addison in the medical unit designated for suicidal inmates. Likewise, . . . Lyons

[and others] each had a duty to warn the Defendant correction officers in the

segregation unit that Addison was at heightened suicide risk . . . . Lyons [and others]

failed to meet both duties. FN2 This contributed to ... Addison’s death.

FN2: As set forth previously herein, Defendant[] . . . Lyons fabricated documents

indicating that [he] had [a] session[] with Addison. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’

claims against [him] do not arise solely from medical malpractice. . . . Lyons’s

failure to notify guard staff was not the result of a misapprehension of Addison’s

psychological condition, but a failure to meet with Addison at all. Even apart from

the failure to meet with Addison, the entire mental health team failed to notify guard

staff about (1) Addison’s prior mental health history and (2) his recent return from

the hospital. Likewise, . . . Lyons failed to relay information that would allow

classifications staff to properly classify Addison and assign him to the correct unit.

One need not be a mental health professional to know that guard staff and

classifications staff should have been informed.

40. As explained previously, Addison had a long history of self-injury and suicide

attempts, and he had recently alleged that he was sexually assaulted by a cellmate.

. . . Lyons [and others] had a common-sense duty (independent of any statutory or

professional duty) to notify the Defendant guard staff. Any layperson would know

that guard staff and classifications personnel should have been informed of

Addison’s history. Had . . . Lyons [and others] met their respective duties, then

Ackerman likely would not have been so dismissive of Addison’s suicide threats

and (2) Addison would have been classified properly and housed in the medical

unit. Under either scenario, Addison would not have died.

(Doc. No. 125-1 (one footnote omitted).)

Based on these allegations, the SAC asserts a § 1983 claim against Lyons based on his

failure to develop adequate protocols and procedures for identifying and dealing with inmates at

heightened suicide risk, which is futile, as set forth above. In addition, it asserts or reasserts medical

malpractice and negligence claims against Lyons based on the allegations that he

failed to notify guard staff that Addison was at high risk of suicide, and . . . failed

to insure that Addison was housed in the proper unit. Even without a written policy

or procedure, common sense and professional duty required [him] to take these

steps.

(Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 62; see also id. ¶¶ 64, 66.)

Regarding this claim, Lyons argues that, like the FAC, the SAC fails to allege that Lyons

ever actually treated or came into contact with Addison and, as a result, fails to state a claim based

on the negligent provision of medical care or, indeed, any claim based on negligence. (See Doc.

No. 112, at 12.) Likewise, as the court already ruled, falsifying records post facto to make it appear

that he had treated Addison prior to his suicide may have been “morally reprehensible,” but it

cannot be said to have caused his death. (See Doc. No. 67, at 22.)

The plaintiffs respond that the SAC simply states “the obvious”: Lyons’ “failure to provide

mental health services to Addison was a contributing factor in Addison’s death.” (Doc. No. 116,

at 5 (citing Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 34).) They argue that, when an inmate like Addison has a long history

of self-harm and suicide attempts and has just recently returned from a hospital evaluation for

alleged rape, “it is entirely reasonable to infer that the inmate would be experiencing extraordinary

emotional distress[,] . . . would be at heightened risk of self-harm and . . . would need mental health

services to reduce the chances of self-harm.” (Id. at 9–10.) They assert that Lyons’ “neglect of his

client” constituted both a breach of duty and gives rise to a claim for medical malpractice, simple

negligence, or both. They also assert that this “neglect” led to another breach: Lyons’ failure to

notify the guard staff of Addison’s heightened risk of suicide. “Either way,” they conclude, “ jurors

could reasonably conclude that Defendant Lyons’s dereliction was a proximate cause of Addison’s

death.” (Id. at 10.)

Regarding Lyons’ argument that he cannot be held liable, because there are no credible

allegations that he had subjective knowledge that Addison was at risk for suicide, the plaintiffs

respond that the facts that (1) Lyons was “supposed to provide mental health services to Addison”;

(2) he did not; (3) he falsified a record to make it appear that he had; and (4) he resigned when the

falsification was brought to light, together give rise to a reasonable inference that Lyons knew that

he had a duty to Addison and breached that duty—otherwise, why would he have fabricated

evidence to make it appear that he had actually seen Addison? (Doc. No. 116, at 11.)

Under Tennessee law, to plead negligence a plaintiff generally must allege:

(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the

defendant falling below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a breach of

that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal,

causation.

Staples v. CBL & Assocs., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000). Whether the defendant owed the

plaintiff a duty of care is a question of law to be determined by the court. Id.

The Tennessee courts, however, distinguish between “misfeasance” and “nonfeasance”—

that is to say, between active misconduct working positive injury to others and

passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them from harm. The reason for

the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by “misfeasance” the defendant has

created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by “nonfeasance” he has at least

made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in

his affairs.

Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting W. Page

Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts (“Prosser & Keeton”) § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 1984)).

“In general, an individual has a duty to others to refrain from engaging in misfeasance,” defined

as “affirmative acts that a reasonable person ‘should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk

of causing an invasion of an interest of another’ or acts ‘which involve[] an unreasonable risk of

harm to another.’” Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 284, 302 (1965)); see also Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355 (“The

core of negligence is the violation of this requirement [to exercise reasonable care] by engaging in

‘behavior which should be recognized as involving unreasonable danger to others.’” (quoting

Prosser & Keeton § 31, at 169)). However, Tennessee courts generally do not impose an

“affirmative duty to act to prevent another from sustaining harm,” except when a “special

relationship” exists between the defendant and the endangered person, which “creates a

sufficiently significant obligation that there is an enforceable expectation of reasonable action

rather than unreasonable indifference.” Id. at 360, 359 (citations omitted). Such a special

relationship may arise “where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the

defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s welfare.” Kockelman v.

Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (citing (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th

ed.1984) § 56, p. 374)). The relationship between a therapist or psychiatrist and a patient may

qualify as such a “special relationship.” Id. (citations omitted).

Regardless of whether CoreCivic, having custody of Addison, was in such a special

relationship with him, the question here is whether Lyons was in such a special relationship. The

court finds that there are no allegations in the SAC that would support the existence of such a

special relationship. Aside from the plaintiffs’ entirely speculative assertion that Lyons, “[i]n his

role as the mental health administrator and coordinator for SCCC, . . . knew no later than August

20, 2022 that Addison had returned from a hospital evaluation for rape, and that Addison was in

need of mental health services as a result” (Doc. No. 125-1 ¶ 34), the plaintiffs do not allege that

Lyons had established a treatment relationship with Addison or that he had actual knowledge—

whether from speaking with him or reviewing his medical records—that Addison was suicidal,

potentially suicidal, or at some heightened risk of suicide. They have not alleged facts that, if true,

would establish that a patient-clinician relationship had been formed between Lyons and Addison.

As a result, allegations of Lyons’ simple nonfeasance—his failure to see Addison when he was

apparently “supposed to” or to otherwise act to prevent his suicide—do not support a negligence

claim against him. Accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (2006) (“The fact that the actor

realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does

not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”). Quite simply, there was no relationship

between Lyons and Addison and, therefore, no special relationship. See Kockelman, 6 71 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 556–59 (in a case involving a treating psychiatrist and a suicidal patient, recognizing that,

“[u]nder traditional tort law principles, a person is not ordinarily liable for the actions of another

and is under no duty to protect another person from harm” but also that “the requisite special

relationship does exist in the case of a patient under the care of a psychiatrist” and that “a

psychiatrist who knows that his patient is likely to attempt suicide has a duty to take preventive

measures” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). As a matter of law, in the absence of a special

relationship between them, Lyons did not have a duty to act to prevent Addison’s suicide and

cannot be liable under a negligence theory for his failure to take some action.

The same rationale applies to Lyons’ purported duty and breach of duty to notify guard

staff that Addison was at heightened risk of suicide or to insure that Addison was moved to the

appropriate unit for potentially suicidal inmates. As a matter of law, Lyons incurred no such duty.

Aside from the fact that no special relationship existed, the SAC fails to allege facts suggesting

that Lyons ever actually looked at Addison’s medical records or was on notice that Addison was

at a heightened risk of suicide, prior to the event itself. Regardless of whether he might have

incurred a duty to act if he had had such knowledge, to attempt to hold him liable for failing to

warn others of an eventuality of which he himself had no advance notice is a bridge too far.

Likewise, he had no duty to insure that Addison was moved to a different unit when he had no

knowledge of the basis for moving him to a different unit. Amending the complaint to allege

negligence claims against Lyons premised upon the failure to warn and the failure to place Addison

in a different unit would be futile.

34

In sum, the court finds that the proposed SAC fails to state a claim against Lyons for which

relief may be granted based on § 1983, medical malpractice, or negligence. The Motion to Amend

will be denied, insofar as it seeks to reinstate any claims against Lyons.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend and Supplemental Motion

will be granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER

United States District Judge