The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
J.H., by next friend BETTY HARRIS )
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 3:14-cv-02356
v. ) District Judge Trauger
) Magistrate Judge Frensley
WILLIAMSON COUNTY, ET AL., )
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff J.H. was a minor when he brought this action through his mother, Betty Harris
(“Ms. Harris”), alleging that Williamson County and several County employees, including Juan
Cruz (“Mr. Cruz”), violated the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act related to J.H.’s time in the Williamson County Juvenile Detention Center.
Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 1-16. At this time, all Defendants have been dismissed except Mr. Cruz. Docket
Nos. 384, 385.
This matter is now before the Court upon a Motion for Sanctions filed by Mr. Cruz. Docket
No. 437. Mr. Cruz simultaneously filed a Memorandum Supporting Motion for Sanctions. Docket
No. 438. Connie Reguli (“Ms. Reguli”) was representing Plaintiff in this case, but the Tennessee
Board of Professional Responsibility has suspended Ms. Reguli’s law license. Docket No. 437-5.
Larry Crain was also representing Plaintiff, but Judge Trauger granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Withdraw as Counsel with regards to Mr. Crain. Docket No. 443. Judge Trauger gave Plaintiff
until June 27, 2022, to have new counsel enter an appearance of record on Plaintiff’s behalf. Id.
On June 28, 2022, Mr. Blackburn entered an appearance of record on Plaintiff’s behalf.1 Docket
1 Mr. Blackburn attempted to enter an appearance of record on June 27, but there was a filing error. Docket
No. 445.
No. 446. On July 8, 2022, Mr. Kroll likewise entered an appearance of record on Plaintiff’s behalf.
Docket No. 447. Plaintiff then filed a Response in Opposition to Motion for Sanctions. Docket No.
448. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Mr. Cruz’s Motion for Sanctions
be DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
As stated in this Court’s Order on April 12, 2022:
This case, originally filed in 2014, has a long and tortuous
procedural history that the Court will not attempt to reconstruct
here.2 Simultaneously, a parallel case (J.H. v. Williamson County,
Case No. 2014-588) has been proceeding in Williamson County
Circuit Court. Additionally, Mr. Cruz faced criminal charges
stemming from the conduct alleged in the civil cases.3 Throughout
this time, Connie Reguli has represented J.H. and has regularly
made public comments about the lawsuits, including on social
media. See, e.g., Docket No. 169-3. It appears that Williamson
County has been funding the civil (but not criminal) legal defense
for Mr. Cruz, as a Williamson County employee. Docket No. 421-
1, p. 24-28. This fact has been the subject of some of Ms. Reguli’s
public comments. See, e.g., Docket No. 414-2.
Docket No. 426, p. 2.
In that Order, the Court admonished Ms. Reguli for her extrajudicial statements and
ordered Ms. Reguli to abide by LR 83.04. Id. at 10. Specifically, the Court warned Ms. Reguli
against referring to Mr. Cruz as “pedo,” “pedophile,” “rapist,” and “pervert.” Id.
On April 26, 2022, Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris hosted a Facebook Live event together.
Docket No. 437, Ex. A. Within this livestream, Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris stated that Williamson
County has spent over a million taxpayer dollars “defending a pedophile.” Id. at 5:07. Moreover,
2 The procedural history is thoroughly set forth in the opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, filed
in this matter at Docket No. 399.
3 Mr. Cruz was acquitted of all criminal charges and his record was expunged. The entire criminal record,
including the Order of Expunction, has been placed under seal by the Circuit Court of Williamson County.
See Docket Nos. 269, 351.
Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris also discussed how Ms. Reguli made requests to see Williamson County
billing records for defending a “child predator.” Id. at 6:37, 10:24. Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris also
blamed the District Attorney’s Office for messing up an indictment of a “pedophile.” Id. at 28:40.
The following day on April 27, 2022, Ms. Reguli sent out an email through her “Connie
Reguli for Judge” account discussing different pieces of evidence in the criminal trial of Mr. Cruz.4
Docket No. 437-2. In the evening of April 27, 2022, Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris hosted another
Facebook Live event where Ms. Reguli referred to Kelli Haas as the defense attorney for “a
perpetrator of an assault,” referring to Mr. Cruz. Docket No. 437, Ex. C at 20:48.
On May 1, 2022, Ms. Reguli sent out another email from her “Connie Reguli for Judge”
account containing an attached endorsement by Ms. Harris in an article explaining why Craig Huey
supports Ms. Reguli. Docket No. 437-4. In this endorsement, Ms. Harris derided Williamson
County for paying for the criminal defense of a “pedophile.” As a result of these comments, Mr.
Cruz filed this Motion for Sanctions (Docket No. 437) against Ms. Reguli as well as Ms. Harris
for defying the Court Order. (Docket No 426). “Mr. Cruz submits that the sanction of dismissal
under 41(b) is appropriate considering Ms. Reguli’s blatant disregard of a recent [C]ourt [O]rder.”
Docket No. 438, p. 2.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
a. Legal Standards
“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant
may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). When ruling on a
motion to dismiss under 41(b), courts consider the following four factors:
(1) Whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or
fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed
party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that
4 Ms. Reguli has also published this evidence to her campaign website, https://connieforjudge.org/.
failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less
drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was
ordered.
Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005); Knoll v. AT&T, 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th
Cir. 1999). Courts weigh these four factors against each other, and no one factor is outcome
determinative. Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363; Knight v. Systech Int’l, LLC, No. 3-11-1024, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 138933, at *19 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2013) (citing Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d
700 (6th Cir. 2013)). However, these factors are weighed more stringently when the attorney’s
conduct precipitates dismissal. Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 367 (6th Cir. 1997).
In assessing whether a party has acted in bad faith, willfully, or with fault, courts consider
whether the party acted contumaciously. Carter v. Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1978)). In Schafer v.
City of Defiance Police Dep’t, the Sixth Circuit defined contumacious as “perverse in resisting
authority” and “stubbornly disobedient.” 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Contumacious,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986)). Courts consider whether a party
attempted to thwart judicial proceedings or exhibited a reckless disregard for judicial proceedings.
Wu, 420 F.3d at 643; Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Shepard Claims Serv. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1986)).
An adversary is prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct when the adversary must
waste time, money, and effort in pursuing the dismissed party’s cooperation in legally mandated
matters. Harmon, 110 F.3d at 368.
If a party is not on notice that a court is contemplating dismissal for noncompliance, courts
generally may not dismiss a case. Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254, 1256 (6th Cir. 1988).
However, courts can dismiss the case without notice if the offending party has engaged in bad faith
or contumacious conduct. Id.
In weighing appropriate sanctions, courts can, but need not, articulate whether it considered
lesser sanctions than dismissal. Harmon, 110 F.3d at 368. Considering other, lesser sanctions is
but one non-dispositive factor in this balancing test. Id. Moreover, “[d]ismissal is usually
inappropriate where the neglect is solely the fault of the attorney.” Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723
F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Carter, 636 F.2d at 161). In Little v Yeutter, the Sixth
Circuit held that dismissals are harsh sanctions that should be reserved for “extreme situations.”
984 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1993).
b. The Case at Bar
i. Bad Faith, Willfulness, or Fault
Mr. Cruz argues that Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris acted in bad faith by defying the Court’s
Order and repeatedly referring to Mr. Cruz as a “pedophile” and “child predator.” Docket 438, p.
3. Plaintiff responds that he has done nothing to “indicate a stubborn effort to delay trial.” Docket
No. 448, p. 4 (quoting Wu, 420 F.3d at 643 (citation omitted)). Plaintiff deflects the allegations of
sanctionable behavior to Ms. Harris and Ms. Reguli, but Plaintiff maintains that neither Ms. Harris
nor Ms. Reguli engaged in an effort to delay trial. Docket No. 448, p. 4. Finally, Plaintiff contends
that Ms. Harris did not recklessly disregard the Court’s Order because the Court did not specifically
include Ms. Harris in the Order. Id.
On April 12, 2022, the Court warned Ms. Reguli not to make extrajudicial statements about
this case. Docket No. 426, p. 10. The Court specifically ordered Ms. Reguli to refrain from using
words such as “pedo,” “pedophile,” “rapist,” and “pervert” as well as making other extrajudicial
statements about the case. Id. On both April 26 and April 27 of 2022, Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris
referred to Mr. Cruz as a “pedophile,” “child predator,” and “perpetrator of an assault.5” Docket
No. 437-1, Ex. A at 5:07, 6:37, 10:24, 28:40; Docket No. 437-1 Ex. C at 20:48. Ms. Harris again
referred to Mr. Cruz as a “pedophile” in a May 1, 2022, email endorsement sent through the
“Connie Reguli for Judge” account. Docket No. 437-4, p. 3. These comments violate LR
83.04(a)(1) because Ms. Reguli disseminated these comments by public communication via
Facebook Live as well as a campaign email. Docket No. 437-1, Exs. A and C.
Likewise, under LR 83.04(a)(1), there is a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding in the matter” because these comments fall squarely within LR
83.04(a)(2)(B). Ms. Reguli’s and Ms. Harris’s comments go right to the core of the character,
credibility, and criminal record of Mr. Cruz because the term “pedophile” carries prejudicial
connotations that would distort a juror’s perspective. LR 84.03(a)(2)(B). The term is especially
prejudicial when it is broadcast over Facebook Live (Docket No. 437-3, Exs. A and C) and
campaign emails (Docket Nos. 437-2, 437-4) for a candidate running for elected office because of
the potential scope of and influence on the target audience.6 Despite Plaintiff’s argument that any
of these comments are a “quotation from or reference to public records,” neither Ms. Reguli nor
Ms. Harris pointed to any specific place in the public record that calls Mr. Cruz a pedophile when
making these comments. LR 83.04; Docket No. 448, pp. 2-3.
Additionally, the Court warned Ms. Reguli against making comments about any evidence
in the criminal case against Mr. Cruz because such comments would likely have a material
prejudicial effect given that it is “evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.” LR
5 In his brief, Plaintiff posits that these comments were about an unidentified person, but Plaintiff’s
contention that no potential juror would have drawn “the connection that Juan Cruz was the unidentified
individual referenced in the materials” indicates that all of these comments were in fact about Mr. Cruz.
Docket No. 448, p. 5.
6 Ms. Reguli has a following of around 10,000 people between her Facebook and YouTube accounts.
Docket No. 426, p. 8.
83.04(a)(2)(A); see Docket No. 426, p. 10. Ms. Reguli’s April 27, 2022, email through her “Connie
Reguli for Judge” account discussed DNA evidence in the criminal case against Mr. Cruz as well
as potential video evidence against Mr. Cruz. Docket No. 437, pp. 2-3. These comments directly
violate the Court’s Order. Docket No. 426, p. 10.
Regarding Plaintiff’s argument, an effort to delay trial is not the only kind of behavior that
would lead to a finding of bad faith, willful conduct, or fault. Contumacious behavior by itself is
sufficient to warrant such a finding. As exemplified above, the comments Ms. Reguli made despite
being ordered to refrain from making such comments qualifies as contumacious behavior. Ms.
Harris’s comments likewise qualify as contumacious, but because Ms. Harris is not an attorney
and the Court did not specifically order Ms. Harris to refrain from making such comments, the
undersigned finds that Ms. Harris did not violate the Court’s Order (Docket No. 426) or LR 83.04.
Of course, the Court recognizes that J.H. remains blameless in these comments.
Ms. Reguli “stubbornly disobeyed” a Court order by violating LR 83.04. See Schafer, 529
F.3d at 737. Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris both acted in bad faith, willfully, and with fault because
the comments were made contumaciously.
ii. Prejudice
Mr. Cruz argues that Ms. Reguli’s and Ms. Harris’s remarks prejudice Mr. Cruz because
the comments tampered with the jury pool. Docket No. 438, p. 3. Mr. Cruz posits that because Ms.
Reguli was a candidate for judge, her comments influenced the citizens of Williamson County, an
area whose residents may be summoned for jury duty in the Middle District of Tennessee. Id.
Plaintiff responds that there are multiple counties within the Middle District of Tennessee
from which the Court can draw a jury from. Docket No 448, p. 5. Plaintiff continues that there is
a high probability that those selected for jury duty will not have seen Ms. Reguli’s campaign
materials and that any issues from the campaign videos can be addressed during voir dire. Id.
Plaintiff also contends that perspective jurors from Williamson County likely would not have
drawn the connection that the “pedophile” Ms. Harris and Ms. Reguli were referring to was Mr.
Cruz.7 Id.
Mr. Cruz raises a different kind of prejudice than the kind that courts most typically
consider in 41(b) motions.8 Mr. Cruz focuses on how the comments may impact a jury rather than
discuss the time, effort, and money Mr. Cruz invested in drafting his Motion for Sanctions. As
noted above, the Court finds that Ms. Reguli’s and Ms. Harris’s comments could prejudice a jury.
Mr. Cruz did take the time to prepare this motion (Docket No. 437), supporting brief (Docket No.
438), and exhibits (Docket Nos. 437-1, 437-2, 437-3, 437-4). Preparing and filing this motion
required Mr. Cruz’s effort and money and was expended to compel Ms. Reguli, and Ms. Harris for
her involvement, to cooperate with a previous Court Order, and Plaintiff does not contest that fact.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cruz was prejudiced by these comments.
iii. Prior Notice
Mr. Cruz admits that Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris were not specifically warned that the case
would be dismissed for making further extrajudicial comments. Docket No. 438, p. 3. However,
Mr. Cruz avers that after the Court’s recent Order (Docket No. 426), Ms. Reguli would be duly
aware of the consequences of failing to comply with a court order. Docket No. 438, p. 4.
Plaintiff highlights that the Order from April 12, 2022, “did not condition compliance upon
threat of dismissal,” nor did the Order specifically include Ms. Harris. Docket No. 448, p. 6.
7 This argument serves as the tacit admission that Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris were specifically referring to
Mr. Cruz every time they used terms like “pedophile,” despite arguments that suggest that Ms. Reguli and
Harris were talking about some unidentified individual. See Docket No. 448, pp. 2-4, 7; see n.5 supra.
8 The kind of prejudice that both parties appear to argue about is the kind of prejudice the Court would
consider for violation of LR 83.04.
Plaintiff proffers that there is no further risk of extrajudicial comments because Ms. Reguli has
been suspended from the practice of law, has been removed from the case, and has ended her
campaign for juvenile court judge. Id. Plaintiff also argues that his attorneys have instructed Ms.
Harris to refrain from making further comments and delete previous comments that are online. Id.
In the Order from April 12, 2022, the Court did not discuss any specific sanctions that
would be imposed if Ms. Reguli violated the Order. Docket No. 426. At the time Ms. Reguli and
Ms. Harris made these comments, the Court had not warned them of the possibility of dismissal.
However, as established above, the Court finds that Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris acted
contumaciously, and such behavior by itself can be sufficient to warrant dismissal even without
notice. See Harris, 844 F.2d at 1256. Nevertheless, the undersigned did not put Plaintiff on notice
that the case may be dismissed for violation of the Court’s Order, and the undersigned believes
that other factors present in this case do not warrant dismissal.9
iv. Appropriateness of Other Sanctions
Mr. Cruz argues that dismissal of the case is warranted even though dismissal is a drastic
sanction. Docket No. 438, p. 4. Mr. Cruz suggests that because Ms. Harris has joined Ms. Reguli
in a “crusade to publicly defame Mr. Cruz,” the Court would be punishing Ms. Harris for her own
actions, not for “the wrongs of her counsel.” Id.
Plaintiff responds that the comments made by Ms. Reguli and Ms. Harris are not
defamatory because all of their comments are allegations from the public record. Docket No. 448,
pp. 6-7. Plaintiff further contends that Mr. Cruz has not demonstrated that he has been prejudiced
by these comments, and as a result, Plaintiff suggests that these comments do not constitute an
extreme situation that warrants dismissal. Id. at 7.
9 These other factors include the length of litigation, the appointment of new counsel, and most notably,
J.H.’s innocence in his attorney’s actions.
Plaintiff deserves his day in court. Dismissal or other sanctions would inappropriately
punish J.H. for the wrongs of his counsel. The undersigned believes that Plaintiff’s new counsel,
Mr. Blackburn and Mr. Kroll, will adhere to all the rules and orders set forth by the Court and will
help facilitate a resolution of this case on the merits. Should Ms. Harris or Plaintiff’s new counsel
make any further extrajudicial comments on this matter, the Court will consider recommending
sanctions up to and including dismissal for contempt of court or violation of LR 83.04.
Ultimately, the extrajudicial comments do not warrant dismissal or other lesser sanctions
in this matter because Ms. Reguli has already suffered severe consequences (albeit from other
conduct) and is no longer counsel in this action. Ms. Reguli has had her law license suspended and
has been removed from the case. The combination of these consequences assures the Court that
she has been sufficiently sanctioned. Plaintiff’s concern that the jury will be tainted, while
legitimate, is minimal, and the Court is satisfied that these concerns can be addressed at trial. The
Court further has confidence that new counsel with comply with the Court’s order regarding
extrajudicial statements. Finally, the Court gives great weight to the well-established principle
favoring resolution of cases on the merits. Given the nature of the violation, the Court finds that
no further sanctions are required.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that Mr. Cruz’s Motion for
Sanctions (Docket No. 437) be DENIED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report
and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. <2
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
1]