Tubbs v. Long

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

WANDA TUBBS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) NO. 3:20-cv-00477

)

v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

)

JEFF LONG, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Jeff Long and the State

of Tennessee (“State Defendants”). (Doc. No. 19, “Motion to Dismiss”). Also pending before the

Court is a purported motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants Darryl Young,

Brandon Gullett, Brandon King, and Cannon County, Tennessee (“County Defendants”). (Doc.

No. 33, “County Defendants’ Motion”). Plaintiff responded to both Motions. (Doc. Nos. 27 and

35). Each set of Defendants replied separately. (Doc. Nos. 28 and 37). The motions are ripe for

review.

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and will deny

the County Defendants’ Motion.

BACKGROUND1

On May 3, 2017, Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon King visited the residence of Terrance Martin

to serve Martin a civil paper related to child support. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Terrance Martin is the son

1 Except as indicated otherwise, the facts set forth herein are alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.

No. 1) and are accepted as true for purposes of the Motions.

of Plaintiff Wanda Tubbs. (Id.). He rented the residence from Plaintiff and lived there with his

girlfriend, Shaundra Smith. (Id.). When Deputy King returned to the Sheriff’s Headquarters that

day, he reported to Investigator Brandon Gullett (“Gullett”) that the home smelled strongly of

marijuana. (Id). In response, Investigator Gullett sought (and, the Complaint implies, clearly

obtained) a search warrant for the property based on the smell. (Id). In his affidavit in support of

his request for a search warrant, Gullett included the averment that three months earlier he had

uncovered a “large amount” of marijuana in the home. (Id. at 4).

On May 4, 2017, Gullett and Sheriff Darryl Young executed the search warrant at the

residence with the help of other officers. (Id.). Inside the residence, they found various illegal drugs

including prescription medication,2 cocaine, and a small amount of marijuana. (Id.). Prior to the

search, Plaintiff had left her Michael Kors® purse, containing her “life savings,” inside the home.

(Id. at 5). Plaintiff claims that the purse contained between $95,000-$97,000, though official

figures from the police counted $93,740. (Id.). Police seized the purse and money, along with three

other containers of money presumed to be drug proceeds. (Id.). The government sought a forfeiture

warrant on the grounds that the money constituted proceeds traceable to a violation of the

Tennessee Drug Control Act.3 The money in the three other seized containers was forfeited by

Martin and Smith as a part of their plea deals. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff, however, filed a claim with the

2 The Complaint does not say what made the prescription drugs illegal; one surmises that it must

have had something to do with them being possessed by someone other than a patient for whom

they were validly prescribed by a physician.

3 Plaintiff does not allege this fact in her Complaint, but it is stated in the state court decision

Plaintiff references throughout her Complaint. See Tubbs v. Long, 610 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2020) (“Officers seized all currency and sought a forfeiture warrant on the grounds that the money

constituted proceeds considered traceable to a violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act.”).

The reliability of this source as to this fact cannot reasonably be questioned, and so the Court can

and does take judicial notice of this fact.

Tennessee Department of Safety (“Department”) for the return of the purse and the money therein.

(Id.).

On January 30, 2018, the Department held a hearing on Plaintiff’s claim. (Id.). Plaintiff

attempted to file a motion to suppress all evidence gleaned from “the unlawful search” of the

residence.4 (Id.). In response, the Department argued that Plaintiff had no Fourth Amendment

standing to challenge the search,5 as she did not live at the property and was merely a landlord.

(Id. at 7). The administrative judge in charge of the hearing denied the motion to suppress, and

ultimately determined that Plaintiff was not “credible” and that the money/purse did not belong to

her. (Id. at 8-9).

Plaintiff then petitioned the Circuit Court for Davidson County for review of the order. (Id.

at 9). The Circuit Judge deferred to the agency and refused to overturn the result. (Id.). Plaintiff

appealed that ruling to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Judge on April

28, 2020. (Id. at 9-10). In its decision, the Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff was barred by state

law from asserting a claim in a forfeiture proceeding unless she could first prove by a

4 In her motion, Plaintiff argued the search warrant was invalid because “the police fabricated the

strong odor of fresh marijuana as described in the affidavit, and also fabricated having recovered

a large amount of marijuana from the house previously.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6).

5 Importantly, the term “Fourth Amendment standing” is distinguishable from Article III standing.

That is, it has nothing to do with a party having a cognizable “case or controversy” (within the

meaning of Article III) to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a federal court, but rather is a short-

hand term used to mean that the party having such “standing” has a sufficient interest in property

to have a cognizable substantive claim regarding any alleged government invasion related to that

property. In other words, “[i]n the Fourth Amendment context, ‘standing’ is ‘a useful shorthand’

for the requirement ‘that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place

searched’ in order to challenge a search as unconstitutional. Unlike the Article III doctrine that

shares its name, Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ is not jurisdictional[.]” United States v. Calhoun,

834 F. App'x 128, 131 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Byrd v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct.

1518, 1530 (2018)). So a decision about a person’s Fourth Amendment “standing” is a decision

about their interest in the property implicated in the Fourth Amendment issue at hand.

preponderance, without suppressing evidence, that the money was hers. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff sought

a rehearing from the Tennessee Court of Appeals, but this request was denied.6

Plaintiff then filed the instant federal action. Therein, she asserts, against all Defendants,

two claims arising under federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) : Count I for

deprivation of property and liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;

and Count II for taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Additionally,

Plaintiff brings two state-law claims under Tennessee common law: Count III for trespass (against

Defendants King and Gullett); and Count IV for conversion (against Defendants King, Gullett, and

Young).

LEGAL STANDARD

A. State Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction7

In the Motion to Dismiss, State Defendants actually make essentially three different and

alternative motions to dismiss. One of these is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for a lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

6 This fact is not contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint but is attached to State Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. (Doc. 20-2). Plaintiff’s request for rehearing and the Tennessee Court of Appeal’s denial

of said request are public records, so the Court can rely on this information (the fact that the request

was made and was denied) to provide contextual background.

7 In addition to their Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Rooker-

Feldman, State Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed based on sovereign

immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 12(b)(6). The

Court has chosen to consider the argument related to Rooker-Feldman and subject-matter

jurisdiction first because, as noted herein, it is a threshold issue. See Am. Telecom Co., 501 F.3d at

537. While sovereign immunity is “‘jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal

court's judicial power,’ the defense ‘is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in

Article III.’” Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n. 2 (1998)). Additionally, a 12(b)(6) motion, if

successful, results in a dismissal with prejudice, and only a court who is confident it has jurisdiction

A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(h)(3) is analyzed in the same manner

as a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1). The distinction between a Rule

12(h)(3) motion and a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is simply that the former may be

asserted at any time and need not be responsive to any pleading of the other party.

Cohan v. MGM Hospitality, Inc., No. 20-cv-10981, 2021 WL 4478744, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept.

30, 2021) (citing to Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.3d 874, 879 n.3 (3d Cir.

1992)). The Court will thus utilize the standards for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in evaluating State

Defendants’ 12(h)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As noted, Rule

12(b)(1) “provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Cartwright

v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). “Subject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold

determination.” Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: facial and

factual attacks. Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Sherman-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir.

2007). A facial attack questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading. When reviewing a facial

attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. If those allegations establish

federally-cognizable claims, jurisdiction exists. Id. A factual attack instead raises a factual

controversy concerning whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id.

Where there is a factual attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1), no presumptive truthfulness applies to the complaint’s allegations; instead, the

court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter

jurisdiction does or does not exist. Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc., 491 F.3d at 330. “[T]he district

court has considerable discretion in devising procedures for resolving questions going to subject

should dismiss any claims with prejudice. Thus, because the Court determines the Rooker-

Feldman argument is dispositive, it need not set forth the legal standard for the other arguments.

matter jurisdiction[.]” Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1990).

The Sixth Circuit has noted that:

The factual attack, however, differs greatly [from a facial attack] for here the trial

court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Because

at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction—its very power

to hear the case—there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh

the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In

short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the

existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating

for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.

RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1977)). Notably, “the fact

that the court takes evidence for the purpose of deciding the jurisdictional issue does not mean that

factual findings are therefore binding in future proceedings.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592,

598 (6th Cir. 1994).

In making its decision, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents,

and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts.8 Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc.,

491 F.3d at 330; see also Nichols v. Muskingum Coll., 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In

reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve

factual disputes concerning jurisdiction, and both parties are free to supplement the record by

affidavits.”). As always, the party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to prove that

jurisdiction. Global Technology, Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power Steering Sys. Co., 807 F.3d 806,

810 (6th Cir. 2015); Golden v. Gorno Bros., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).

8 Neither party has requested an evidentiary hearing nor pointed the Court to additional evidence

that they might submit at such a hearing. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to rule on the

present Motion without an evidentiary hearing. See e.g., Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States,

922 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1990).

State Defendants argue the Court lacks jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker-Feldman can be either a facial or

factual attack. See Larry E. Parish, P.C. v. Bennett, 3:20-cv-00275, 2021 WL 3895187, *2 (M.D.

Tenn. July 10, 2020) (finding an attack on subject-matter jurisdiction based on Rooker-Feldman

was a facial attack inasmuch as it focused only on the sufficiency of the pleadings); Kings v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-01044, 2011 WL 2970915, *5 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2011) (“The

Court will construe the challenge here as a facial attack. The Rooker–Feldman abstention argument

springs from the complaint itself.”); Gilleylen v. Supreme Ct. Clerk Davis, No. 1:05-CV-271, 2005

WL 2899469, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2005) (“The Defendant has presented a factual attack on

the court's subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”).

Because the success or failure of State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) challenge hinges on factual

matters outside of the Complaint—particularly the contents and circumstances of the state court

proceedings that preceded this action—the present challenge is a factual attack. Therefore, the

Court will exercise its discretion to resolve the Motion to Dismiss by reference to the record outside

of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

B. County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings

County Defendants have filed what they have styled as motion for judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Rule 12(c) provides that after the pleadings are closed, but within

such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(c). There are multiple problems with County Defendants’ Motion. First, the pleadings have

closed as to only County Defendants, who have filed an answer. Defendant Jeff Long and

Defendant State of Tennessee have filed no answer. Accordingly, a 12(c) motion is premature.

When there are “multiple defendants, all defendants must file an answer before a Rule 12(c) motion

can be filed.” Horen v. Board of Educ. of Toledo City School Dist., 594 F.Supp.2d 833, 840 (N.D.

Ohio 2009).9

Second, County Defendants’ motion simply is not in substance a Rule 12(c) motion—

motion for judgment on the pleadings—anyway. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings

essentially constitutes a delayed [i.e., post-answer] motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and is evaluated

under the same standard.” Brack v. Budish, 539 F. Supp. 3d 794, 798 (N.D. Ohio 2021) (citing

Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166, 1174 (6th Cir. 2021), and Holland v. FCA US LLC, 656 F. App'x

232, 236 (6th Cir. 2016)); Stewart v. King, No. 3:09-0021, 2010 WL 883737, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.

Mar. 5, 2010) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is reviewed

under essentially the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6), that is, the motion should not be granted unless, taking all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded

material allegations as true, the defendant is nevertheless ‘clearly entitled’ to judgment.” (quoting

Fritz v. Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)). But after acknowledging this, County

Defendants’ Motion set forth no argument related to the applicable 12(b)(6) standard, but instead

asserted that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3).

For that reason, the Court will treat County Defendants’ Motion as if it was brought pursuant to

12(h)(3) and will apply the standard for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction as discussed above.

9 True, the Court would have discretion to treat a premature 12(c) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. See Armatas v. Aultman Health Found., No. 5:19-CV-00349, 2019 WL 8754869, at *3

(N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19CV349, 2020 WL

1650841 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2020) (collecting cases). But the Court declines to do so because,

as noted herein, County Defendants’ Motion is not in substance a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and

because, in light of the Court’s resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, County Defendants’ Motion

is moot anyway.

DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Court from considering Counts I and II

of Plaintiff’s Complaint

In their Motion to Dismiss, State Defendants argue the Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because Counts I and II of the Complaint are “barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (Doc. No. 20 at 8). County Defendants bring an identical argument in

their Motion.10 (Doc. No. 34 at 4). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine originates from two Supreme

Court cases—Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)—which held that “lower federal courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court proceedings.” Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d

593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 390

(6th Cir. 2002)). Under Rooker-Feldman, federal courts should not hear “cases brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). A complaint that

“essentially invite[s] federal courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court

judgments” should be “dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 283–84. That is

because “appellate jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state-court judgment is lodged…exclusively

in” the United States Supreme Court—not a federal district court. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).

The State Defendants and County Defendants contend that Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s

Complaint request the Court to review the decision of a state court and are thus barred by Rooker-

Feldman. Plaintiff argues a variety of reasons why Rooker-Feldman does not apply to her claims.

10 In fact, County Defendants appear to have copied verbatim the portion of State Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss which discusses Rooker-Feldman.

In her Complaint, Plaintiff preemptively argues that Rooker-Feldman will not bar her claims

because she is not challenging a state court ruling, but is in fact “faulting these Defendants for

seizing her property using a state-law procedure which violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Doc.

No. 1 at 15). In her response to State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that there

are three reasons Rooker-Feldman does not bar her claims: 1) the present claims were never raised

in state court; 2) the Sixth Circuit’s rule of thumb is that Rooker-Feldman should only be used

against federal plaintiffs who were state court defendants; and 3) her injury does not stem from the

state court, but from the state government and its actors. (Doc. No. 27 at 2-3). Then, in her

Response to County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,11 Plaintiff argues that

Rooker-Feldman “expressly does not apply to agency decisions,” which is what Plaintiff suggests

her claims are challenging.

In the Court’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s multiple briefings on Rooker-Feldman, there are

three main arguments Plaintiff is raising against application of Rooker-Feldman: 1) Plaintiff’s

current claims are different from the claims asserted in state court; 2) the Sixth Circuit “rule of

thumb” bars the application of Rooker-Feldman in this case; and 3) the source of Plaintiff’s injury

is state actors and a state agency, not the state court.

Plaintiff’s first two arguments are easily rejected. First, it does not matter that the present

claims were not previously brought in state court. “The test is whether the plaintiff's injury stems

from the state-court judgment, not whether the claims are identical.” RLR Investments, LLC v. City

of Pigeon Forge, Tenn., 4 F.4th 380, 388 (6th Cir. 2021) (finding Rooker-Feldman was not

11 As will be discussed later, the Court will deny County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings as moot. Nonetheless, to ensure that Plaintiff’s position is fully heard, the Court has

credited and considered Plaintiff’s arguments related to Rooker-Feldman that were put forth in her

response to the County Defendants’ Motion.

inapplicable to plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims merely because they were not a part of the plaintiff’s

previously filed state case). Second, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Sixth Circuit “rule of thumb” is

misplaced. Plaintiff states the rule of thumb as follows: “‘[I]f the federal plaintiff was the plaintiff

in state court, apply res judicata; if the federal plaintiff was the defendant in state court, apply

Rooker-Feldman.’” (Doc. No. 27 at 6) (quoting Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty., Tenn., 326 F.3d

747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff fails to note that the Hutcherson Court also stated,

“This distinction based upon state-court status as a plaintiff or defendant is a helpful shorthand,

but . . . should not be understood as a per se rule.” Id. The Court must instead examine the

applicability of Rooker-Feldman under the particular circumstances involved here, and not merely

rely blindly on the so-called rule of thumb. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

Plaintiff’s third argument is the most persuasive. As noted, “the pertinent question in

determining whether a federal district court is precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from

exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim ‘is whether the source of the injury upon which

plaintiff bases his [or her] federal claim is the state court judgment.’” In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542,

548 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008)). And “[t]he

source of the plaintiff’s injury may in turn be determined by examining the request for relief.” In

re Isaacs, 895 F.3d 904, 912 (6th Cir. 2018).

If the source of Plaintiff’s injury is not actually the actions or decisions of a state court,

then Rooker-Feldman does not apply to bar a federal court from hearing her claims. To identify

the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury, the Court must review her Complaint.

1. Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by Rooker-Feldman.

Plaintiff’s Count I reads, “By implementing a forfeiture via administrative procedure that

barred the Plaintiff from suppressing evidence for Fourth Amendment violations,

COMMISSIONER JEFF LONG, the STATE OF TENNESSEE, and CANNON COUNTY,

TENNESSEE deprived the Plaintiff of liberty and property without substantive or procedural due

process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .” (Doc. No. 1 at 11). Count I continues, “As

clarified by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, this unconstitutional law has been implemented by

the final policymakers of Tennessee, namely the Tennessee General Assembly. As such, the

STATE OF TENNESSEE is clearly liable.” (Id. at 12).

It is not immediately clear to the Court what exactly Plaintiff is alleging in Count I, and as

a result it is difficult to decipher the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury from the Section 1983

violation alleged in that count. As far as the Court can determine, there are three different theories

that Plaintiff could be attempting to assert in Count I. The first possibility is that Plaintiff is not

challenging the statute at all but is actually suggesting that the Defendants acted unconstitutionally

and outside of the law when they seized her property. The second possibility is that Plaintiff is

making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute governing forfeiture in

cases like hers. The third possibility, and the one the Court finds most likely based on the substance

of the Complaint, is that Plaintiff is making an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the

Tennessee statute governing forfeiture in cases like Plaintiff’s case.

If Count I is attempting to allege that the injury stems, not from the State courts’ decisions

nor from the statute itself, but from Defendants acting unconstitutionally by seizing Plaintiff’s

property and seeking forfeiture then Rooker-Feldman would be inapplicable here. However, if

Plaintiff intended to allege this, she has failed to do so successfully. Plaintiff’s Count I includes

the following phrases: “[b]y implementing a forfeiture via administrative procedure” and “this

unconstitutional law has been implemented . . .” (Doc. No. 1 at 11-12). Nowhere in Count I or in

the preceding facts does Plaintiff allege that any of the Defendants acted outside the confines of

the applicable law; in fact, it seems quite clear that Plaintiff alleges the Defendants acted within

the boundaries of the law, albeit an “unconstitutional law.” Even construing the Complaint in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff as required, the Court cannot conclude that Count I alleges factual

matter (as would be required by Iqbal and Twombly) to plausibly suggest that Defendants engaged

in unconstitutional conduct—and thereby injured Plaintiff—that was outside the boundaries of an

otherwise constitutional law. Indeed, if this is what Plaintiff meant to allege, she needed to do so

more plainly, since, after all, Rule 8 requires a “plain” statement of a plaintiff’s claim. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a).

As to the second possibility, if Plaintiff is making a facial challenge to the constitutionality

of a Tennessee statute, Rooker-Feldman again would be inapplicable. The Sixth Circuit has

previously explained that “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine ‘does not prohibit federal district courts

from exercising jurisdiction where the plaintiff's claim is merely a general [i.e. facial] challenge

to the constitutionality of the state law applied in the state action, rather than a challenge to the

law's application in a particular state case.’” Carter v. Burns, 524 F.3d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Hood, 341 F.3d at 597). In the Sixth Circuit, a facial constitutional challenge entails a

claim that there are no circumstances under which the statute can be applied in a constitutional

manner, such that the law must be relegated in its entirety to the proverbial ash bin of history:

A facial challenge to a law's constitutionality is an effort “to invalidate the

law in each of its applications, to take the law off the books completely.”

Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir.2009) (en banc); see

also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495,

n. 5, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (“a ‘facial’ challenge ... means a claim

that the law is ‘invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid application.’ ”

(quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505

(1974))). In contrast to an as-applied challenge, which argues that a law is

unconstitutional as enforced against the plaintiffs before the court, a facial

challenge “is not an attempt to invalidate the law in a discrete setting but an effort

‘to leave nothing standing[.]’ ” Connection Distributing Co., 557 F.3d at 335 (en

banc) (quoting Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 528 (6th Cir.2008) (en

banc)).

Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 871–72 (6th Cir. 2013).12

With these principles in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s Complaint. As noted above,

Count I makes reference to “this unconstitutional law” that has been implemented in Tennessee.

(Doc. No. 1 at 12). As for what exactly the allegedly unconstitutional “law” is, the Complaint does

not say. The only statute it could possibly be is Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201(f)(1)(A)-(B), which

is the only statute mentioned in the Complaint. That statute (or, to be more precise, portion of a

statute) provides:

(1) Whenever, in any proceeding under this section, a claim is filed for any property

seized, as provided in this section, by an owner or other person asserting the

interest of the owner, the commissioner shall not allow the claim unless and

until the claimant proves that the claimant:

(A) Has an interest in the property, which the claimant acquired in good faith;

and

(B) Had at no time any knowledge or reason to believe that it was being or

would be used in violation of the laws of the United States or of the state relating

to narcotic drugs or marijuana.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201(f)(1)(A)-(B). But that statute is mentioned only in a footer that is

not even tied to any particular text in the Complaint. (Doc. No. 1 at 11). The Complaint makes no

clear identification of this statute as a law that allegedly must be struck down in its entirety because

12 In the specific context of the First Amendment, which naturally raises unique consideration, a

facial challenge can succeed even if the plaintiff cannot show that there is no possible application

of the law that could be constitutional. In such context, “[i]nstead of having to prove that no

circumstances exist in which the enforcement of the statute would be constitutional, the plaintiff

bears a lesser burden: to demonstrate that a substantial number of instances exist in which the law

cannot be applied constitutionally.” Speet, 726 F.3d at 872. But the First Amendment manifestly

is not implicated in this case.

it (supposedly) is not capable of application in a manner that is not unconstitutional.13 Thus, even

construing the Complaint in Plaintiff’s favor so as to maximize Plaintiff’s chances of avoiding the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Count I cannot be said to present a facial challenge to any statute.14

If Plaintiff is neither alleging a facial challenge to the statute nor alleging the Defendants

acted unconstitutionally outside of the law in Count I, the third possibility is that Plaintiff is making

an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 53-11-201(f)(1)(A)-(B).

This strikes the Court as the most likely possibility since much of the Complaint focuses on

Plaintiff’s grievance with the application and/or interpretation of the law by State and County

officials. However, under this interpretation of Count I, Rooker-Feldman poses an obstacle for

Plaintiff.

In Durham v. Haslam, 528 F. App’x 559 (6th Cir. 2013), the Sixth Circuit upheld the

district court’s determination that Rooker-Feldman barred the action from proceeding. In Durham,

the plaintiff, Sherrie Durham, had been fired from her job at the Tennessee Department of Labor.

Id. at 560. As the Sixth Circuit explained the factual background:

[Plaintiff] appealed her discharge to the Tennessee Civil Service Commission and

then to the Davidson County, Tennessee chancery court. During the course of the

chancery court case, Durham moved to strike the administrative record because the

State failed to file it by the date required under Tennessee law. The chancery court

granted the motion, after warning Durham of the consequences that the absence of

the record would have for her case, namely, affirmance of her discharge.

13 Nor would any such allegation be plausible, in the Court’s view; the Court sees no reason why

there would not be at the very least some circumstances under which this statute could be applied

constitutionally.

14 Moreover, Plaintiff suggests in her response to County Defendant’s Motion that she is not

making a facial challenge. See Doc. No. 35 at 5-6 (“Finally, the Defendants' argument about

whether Tubbs has mounted a valid facial challenge is equally beside the point. A facial challenge

is one possible way to avoid Rooker Feldman. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 482-483 (1983). But it is hardly the only way. Exxon, 544 U.S. 280 (2005). Tubbs

is not required to mount a facial challenge.”).

After the inevitable occurred, Durham filed the present action in federal

court alleging that the state violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

free speech and due process, by (1) “interpret[ing] [the Tennessee Administrative

Procedures Act (APA)] in such a way that courts can assess fault and blame a

petitioner for pointing out that the State has failed to timely file the agency record,”

Compl. ¶ 27; and (2) “interpret[ing] [the Act] in such a way that the agency always

wins if the agency does not prepare or file the agency record with the reviewing

court,” Compl. ¶ 28. Among other things, she asked the district court to vacate her

discharge and reinstate her.

Id.15

Durham argued that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to her case because she was not directly

appealing a state court judgment, did not complain of an injury from the state court, and did not

ask the district court to review or reject the state court judgment. Id. at 562-63. Durham also argued

that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to a “general challenge to a state statute” like hers. Id. at 563.

The Sixth Circuit determined that Durham was not making a facial challenge to the Tennessee

APA but was actually challenging the state court’s interpretation of how the APA applied to her

case. Id. at 564.

Durham's entire argument rests on her premise that it was unconstitutional

for the state to dismiss her petition for judicial review where there was no

administrative record to review, whereas the state courts held that it was the

petitioner's burden to point out flaws in the administrative review process, which

she could not do after she successfully caused the record to be stricken. This is

nothing if not a challenge to the judgment of the state court that affirmed her

discharge, because Durham alleges that the state court interpreted the statute and

applied it to her case in an unconstitutional manner. Where the plaintiff alleges that

a state court interpreted and applied a state statute to her case in an unconstitutional

manner, her complaint is an as-applied constitutional challenge and is prohibited

under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.

Id. (citing Carter, 524 F.3d at 799).

15 The brackets and the content within the brackets are set forth here as in the original. Lest there

be any confusion, the Court notes that the Sixth Circuit uses “the Act” synonymously with “APA”;

i.e., each of these terms is shorthand for the Tennessee Administrative Procedures Act.

The Court finds Durham instructive in the present case. It appears to the Court that Count

I actually is alleging an as-applied challenge to the statute, with the source of Plaintiff’s injury

being the Tennessee courts’ interpretation of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 53-11-201, their refusal to hear

her Fourth Amendment suppression arguments, and their affirmation of the Tennessee Department

of Safety’s decision to uphold the forfeiture of the money and purse. Notably, Count I includes the

phrase “[a]s clarified by the Tennessee Court of Appeals,” which suggests that the interpretation

and application of the law by the Tennessee Court of Appeals was essential to the infliction of

Plaintiff’s alleged injury and supports the notion that Plaintiff is making an as-applied challenge.

(Doc. No. 1 at 12). Moreover, the Complaint’s Factual Background section states, “More

importantly for purposes of this lawsuit, the Court of Appeals also found — for the first time ever

— that [Plaintiff] was barred by state law from even asserting the Fourth Amendment in a

forfeiture proceeding.” (Id. at 10). Additionally, in her response to State Defendants’ Motion,

Plaintiff says that her claims “did not become known, until after the state judicial case was already

at the end of the appeal,” which again suggests that the source of Plaintiff’s injury is the state

court’s interpretation of the statute. (Doc. No. 27 at 1).

A review of Plaintiff’s requested relief further supports the Court’s understanding that the

source of Plaintiff’s injury in Count I is the state court’s judgment. See Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d

290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A court cannot determine the source of the injury without reference to

the plaintiff's request for relief.”) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff requests, “[e]quitable injunctive

relief ordering Commissioner Jeff Long and the State of Tennessee to return the ill-gotten purse

and the money inside.” (Doc. No. 1 at 19). This relief, like the relief requested in Durham, cannot

be granted “without overturning the judgment of the state court”; thus Rooker-Feldman is

implicated, barring the Court from considering the claims in Count I. See 528 F. App’x at 564.

2. Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by Rooker-Feldman.

Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint states, “By seizing the Plaintiff's purse and her life savings

without any punitive purpose, without compensation, and for public use, COMMISSIONER

LONG, the STATE OF TENNESSEE, and CANNON COUNTY violated her rights as guaranteed

by the Fifth Amendment.” (Doc. No. 1. at 12-13). Count II also includes a footnote, which states

the following, “[H]ere the Court of Appeals refused to rule on whether the property was even

connected with any crimes, and held that this is standard state procedure.” (Id. at 13).

In Count II, which asserts a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim, Plaintiff suggests the

source of her injury is the Defendant’s conduct of originally seizing the property. However, the

Court believes the more accurate source of Plaintiff’s injury alleged in Count II, considering the

Complaint as a whole and even construed it in Plaintiff’s favor as required is the upholding of the

forfeiture order by Tennessee state courts. This is revealed in part by the fact that an entire section

of Plaintiff’s Complaint focuses on the “judicial review” of the forfeiture proceeding, whereby

Plaintiff petitioned Tennessee courts to “vacate the forfeiture.” (Doc. No. 1 at 9). The Court cannot

allow Count II to avoid application of Rooker-Feldman by construing it in a manner that runs

counter to the whole tenor of the Complaint.

Though it appears at points in her Complaint that Plaintiff has attempted to present her

claims in such a way as to enable them to avoid the application of Rooker-Feldman, no artful

pleading can change the reality—as revealed in other parts of her Complaint—that Plaintiff’s

claims are premised on an injury the source of which places her claims within the scope of Rooker-

Feldman. Plaintiff’s grievance is not solely with the Defendants for allegedly seizing her property

and participating in the forfeiture proceedings, but also (and ultimately more importantly and

consequentially) with the Tennessee trial court and Tennessee Court of Appeals for upholding

such forfeiture.16 Federal case law supports this understanding. The Sixth Circuit has previously

held that a Taking Clause claim was barred by Rooker-Feldman when the question of property

ownership had been “already litigated in state court.” Roch v. Humane Society of Bedford Cnty.,

Tenn., Inc., 134 F. App’x 68, 71 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the ownership of animals removed

from a negligence situation pursuant to a state court order could not be re-litigated in a federal

court via a Takings Clause claim). Here, the question of property ownership has already been

determined in state court. In its decision on Plaintiff’s state court appeal, the Tennessee Court of

Appeals explained,

In his ruling and in his “Final Order,” the ALJ concluded that Ms. Tubbs lacked

standing because she failed to show that she had any ownership interest in the

seized currency. The trial court subsequently affirmed this finding by the ALJ.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the

trial court’s affirmance of this determination.

Tubbs v. Long, 610 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).

In a similar case, a plaintiff brought action against a city alleging a Fifth Amendment just

compensation violation for the seizure (and ultimate forfeiture) of 44 horses. See Campbell v. City

of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012). The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s

application of Rooker-Feldman to bar the plaintiff’s claims, explaining,

Properly understood, [plaintiff’s] claim under the Fifth Amendment is a direct

attack on the state court's judgment because an element of the claim is that the

judgment was wrongful. To be sure, the complaint speaks in terms of actions by the

16 For the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to be applicable to a case, it is not necessary for the state court

judgment to be the sole cause of injury. Rather, the state court must be a “but for” cause of

Plaintiff’s injury, but not necessarily the only cause. See generally Hake v. Simpson, 770 F. App’x

733, 733 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding Rooker-Feldman barred federal review of sheriff’s actions as

directed by a state court judgment); Loriz v. Connaughton, 233 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2007)

(finding that Rooker-Feldman still acted as a bar for plaintiffs’ action challenging a decision of a

state Zoning Department as affirmed by a state court judgment); Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324,

329 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that Rooker-Feldman applied to injures “ostensibly . . . caused by the

actions of third parties” that were supported by a state court’s decision).

defendants. . . . But the deprivation of property that was allegedly without just

compensation or due process was the deprivation ordered by the state court.

Id. at 1284; see also Cardelle v. Miami-Dade Cty., 742 F. App'x 449, 450 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Here,

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives us of subject-matter jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] claims.

We can only grant the relief she is requesting by determining that the state court wrongly decided

the issue of whether she had a proprietary interest in the seized funds.”); Walker v. Abraham, 156

F. App'x 536, 537–38 (3rd Cir. 2005) (holding that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprived the

court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a Section 1983 action claiming that the state forfeiture

proceedings were unconstitutional); Crowe v. Cook, No. 1:13-CV-361, 2013 WL 3761072, at *5

n.1 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2013) (“To the extent that plaintiff intends for this Court to review any

state court forfeiture proceeding, the court is without jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine.”).

Moreover, in Plaintiff’s Response to State Defendants’ Motion, she argues that res judicata

is inapplicable in the present case because “the claims did not [] accrue until the end of the state

court case” when the Tennessee Court of Appeals provided “clarification (or perhaps modification)

of the law.” (Doc No. 27 at 9) (parenthetical in original). As Plaintiff herself acknowledges, the

source of injury for Count II is actually, at least in part, the Tennessee Court of Appeal’s

interpretation and application of state law and ultimate endorsement of the forfeiture. For these

reasons, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim as

outlined in Count II (or her Fourteenth Amendment claim as outlined in Count I) pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

3. If Rooker-Feldman did not prohibit the Court from considering Counts I and II, res

judicata would.

The Court acknowledges that the law surrounding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be

quite nuanced. Unsurprisingly, State Defendants were not content to hang their hats on the

sometimes fickle case law concerning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and so they alternatively

argued that res judicata would bar the Court from considering the claims in Count I and II of

Plaintiff’s Complaint. Accordingly, the Court will briefly discuss the applicability of res judicata

to Count I and Count II. As discussed below, even if Rooker-Feldman were inapplicable to

Plaintiff’s claims, the claims nevertheless would be subject to dismissal based on the doctrine of

res judicata (also referred to as claim preclusion).

Broadly defined, res judicata is “the preclusion of claims that have once been litigated or

could have been litigated” in a previous lawsuit. Sutton v. Parker, No. 3:19-cv-00005, 2019 WL

4220896, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2019) (quoting Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cty., Tenn., 326

F.3d 747, 758 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003)). “Federal courts are required to apply res judicata in a manner

to give the same effect to the Tennessee state court judgment as would another Tennessee state

court.” AT Project, LLC v. Brumfield, No. 16-CV-01966, 2020 WL 6712170, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.

Nov. 16, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-6397, 2021 WL 2376379 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). There

are four elements to establish res judicata under Tennessee law: “(1) that the underlying judgment

was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) that the same parties or their privies were

involved in both suits, (3) that the same claim or cause of action was asserted in both suits, and (4)

that the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.” West v. Parker, 783 F. App’x 506, 512

(6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012)). Here, the parties

dispute only whether the third element is satisfied; it appears undisputed (and indisputable) that

the other elements are satisfied. However, it is clear to the Court that the claims contained in Count

I were fully heard by a state court, and that the claim stated in Count II could have been brought

previously in the state court proceedings.

Count I asserts a claim for due process violations (via a procedure that allegedly did not

allow Plaintiff to raise Fourth Amendment issues) under the Fourteenth Amendment. In her

“Petition to Rehear” to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff argued that she had a right under

the “Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to claim violations against her property, namely the

house, in order to exclude illegal evidence from being used in her forfeiture hearing.” Pl.’s Pet. to

Rehear, M2019-00627-COA-R3-CV, at 8 (May 8, 2020). In its denial of Plaintiff’s request, the

Tennessee Court of Appeals said, “We determine that the issues raised in the petition were fully

argued by Ms. Tubbs in her brief, considered by this Court, and sufficiently addressed in our

Opinion.” Order on Pet. for Reh’g, No. M2019-00627-COA-R3-CV, at 1 (May 14, 2020). Thus,

it is clear that the claims raised by Plaintiff in Count I were previously asserted and heard by the

Tennessee Court of Appeals. Accordingly, res judicata would prohibit this Court from considering

the same claims.

Count II also collides with res judicata. Plaintiff in Count II asserts a Fifth Amendment

Takings Clause claim. Though Plaintiff never directly brought a claim under the Fifth Amendment

in her state court proceedings, res judicata “bars a second suit between the same parties or their

privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been

litigated in the former suit.” Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn. 2009) (emphasis

added). “Tennessee courts deciding whether to apply res judicata to a second suit apply a

‘transactional test,’ under which ‘[t]wo suits . . . shall be deemed the same “cause of action” for

purposes of res judicata where they arise out of the same transaction or a series of connected

transactions.’” Sutton, 2019 WL 4220896, at *8) (quoting Creech, 281 S.W.3d at 380–81). And a

transaction is defined as “a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.” Creech, 281

S.W.3d at 380 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1)).

Here, it is clear that the same “common nucleus of operative facts” underly Plaintiff’s

claims in state court and Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim in federal court. Plaintiff argues that

“res judicata cannot apply . . . because the claims did not even accrue until the end of the state

court case.” However, if this argument were valid then it would be just that much clearer that

Plaintiff’s injury in Count II is sourced, in part, from the Tennessee Court of Appeals judgment

such that Rooker-Feldman would again come into play.

Plaintiff additionally argues that she could not have brought a Fifth Amendment claim in

the state proceedings because there is “no clear mechanism” to combine a tort lawsuit with judicial

review in Tennessee state court. (Doc. No. 27 at 11). In the context of judicial review of a state

agency decision, a claim for a constitutional violation—like Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Takings

Clause claim—can come in the form of a defense to the agency’s action or in a separate affirmative

claim (against the agency or state actors associated with the agency). It is clear Plaintiff could have

raised her Fifth Amendment claim as a defense to the forfeiture proceedings; Tennessee courts

have previously allowed individuals to raise constitutionality challenges in judicial reviews of

administrative forfeiture decisions on many occasions. See Fisher v. Tennessee Dep't of Safety &

Homeland Sec., No. M201802041COAR3CV, 2020 WL 1932487, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21,

2020) (involving a case where an individual whose car had been subjected to forfeiture by the

Tennessee Dept. of Safety petitioned a Tennessee chancery court for judicial review, alleging due

process and Eighth Amendment violations); Jones v. Greene, 946 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1996) (“Mr. Jones filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County

alleging that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional in several particulars and that the

Commissioner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.”). It is less clear that Plaintiff

could have brought her Fifth Amendment claim as a distinct affirmative claim joined to her judicial

review request. Generally, an “original action” should not be joined with an appeal (like a judicial

review). See Poursaied v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, No. M202001235COAR3CV, 2021 WL

4784998, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2021). However, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that

claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be joined to a judicial review, as long as the plaintiff

“did not seek remedies under Section 1983 that were inconsistent with those in [the plaintiff’s]

petition for judicial review.” Wimley v. Rudolph, 931 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tenn. 1996). It appears to

the Court that Plaintiff’s Complaint requests equitable relief under Section 1983 via the “return

[of] the ill-gotten purse and the money inside,” as well as “reasonable attorney’s fees, per 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988.”17 (Doc. No. 1 at 19). Neither of those requests for relief would be inconsistent with her

petition for judicial review, which also sought the return of Plaintiff’s allegedly improperly

forfeited property. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause violation could

have been raised in her state proceeding, either as a defense to the forfeiture or as an independent

claim requesting equitable relief. As Plaintiff could have raised her Fifth Amendment claim in her

state proceedings and the claim originates from the “same transaction” as her state court

proceedings, res judicata forbids this Court from allowing Plaintiff to re-litigate the claim in

federal court.

17 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is the statutory provision granting reasonable attorney’s fees “to the prevailing

party in a federal civil rights act,” including in cases brought under Section 1983. Murrell v. Bd.

of Admin. City of Memphis Pension & Ret. Sys., No. W202000187COAR3CV, 2021 WL 1233500,

at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2021) (citing to Wimley, 931 S.W.2d at 517 for the proposition that

a plaintiff’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees can be coupled with judicial review).

B. Whether Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims should be dismissed

As noted above, Plaintiff brings additional state-law claims for trespass and conversion

under Tennessee common law in Counts III and IV of her Complaint. These additional claims are

only against select members of County Defendants. Though County Defendants’ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings under 12(c) is not clearly intended to be only a partial motion, it fails

to mention Count III or IV at all. This is likely because, as previously discussed, County

Defendants copied word for word State Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument without adding

any substantive arguments of their own. However, County Defendants apparently failed to realize

State Defendants only needed to deal with Counts I and II as no State Defendants were named in

the other two counts. By not adjusting their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to include a

discussion of Counts III and IV, County Defendants have impeded the Court from considering

whether those counts should be dismissed.

Nonetheless, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also

Ford v. Frame, 3 F. App'x 316, 318 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[D]istrict courts possess broad discretion in

determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims once all federal claims

are dismissed.”). The Supreme Court has noted that “in the usual case in which all federal-law

claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728

(6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff's federal-law claims should not

ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law claims.”). Plaintiff does not assert any factual allegations

that would suggest diversity jurisdiction as a possible basis for the Court to exercise subject-matter

jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Because the Court has determined that State Defendants’

motion should be granted as to Plaintiff's only federal claims (the Section 1983 claims contained

in Counts I and II), the Court can decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state-law claims (contained in Counts III and IV); seeing no reason not to exercise such discretion

consistent with federal courts’ usual practice, the Court will dismiss the state-law claims without

prejudice. Plaintiff may seek to refile them in a Tennessee state court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant in whole State Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss. County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be denied as moot.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims (Counts I and I) will be DISMISSED without

prejudice; and, in the Court’s discretion, Plaintiff’s state-law claims (Counts III and IV) will be

DISMISSED without prejudice, so that Plaintiff may file them in Tennessee state court if she

wishes. !®

An appropriate order will be entered.

CLL Rucherdsan _

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

'8 The Court expresses no opinion as to the extent to which such claims should or would be

successful if brought in state court.