Opinion

Brown v. Barker

Court
District Court, D. South Carolina
Filed
May 16, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.6%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Justin D. Brown, ) Case No.: 2:23-cv-5573-JD

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) ORDER AND OPINION

Karen W. Barker, Assistant Public )

Defender, Stephanie B. Liner, Solicitor, )

)

Defendants. )

)

This matter is before the Court with the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of United

States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) of the District of South Carolina.1 (DE 11.) Plaintiff Justin D. Brown

(“Plaintiff” or “Brown”), proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging Defendant Karen W. Barker, Assistant/Public Defender (“Barker”) violated his

constitutional rights in her representation of Plaintiff.2 (DE 1.) Plaintiff is seeking damages and

to have his charges dismissed.

Generally, Plaintiff alleges that he and Barker disagree on how Barker should represent

Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Barker refuses to file motions that Plaintiff demands she file or to

make arguments to the court that Plaintiff believes she should make. Plaintiff also alleges that

1 The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final

determination remains with the United States District Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71

(1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and

Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

2 Plaintiff also alleges that Barker’s representation of him is a conflict of interest because Barker was

a bridesmaid in the wedding of the solicitor who is prosecuting him, Defendant Stephanie B. Linder

(“Linder”). There are no other substantive allegations against Linder, and therefore, Plaintiff fails to state

a claim against Linder upon which relief can be granted.

Barker’s representation of him is a conflict of interest because Barker was a bridesmaid for Linder.

Plaintiff alleges he has attempted to fire Barker, but the state trial court will not appoint a different

lawyer to represent him. ( DE 1.) Plaintiff claims that Barker’s actions have violated his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, Fifth Amendment right to a bond, Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process.

The Report was issued on November 30, 2023, recommending Plaintiff’s Complaint be

summarily dismissed without issuance of service of process. (DE 11.) On December 18, 2023,

Plaintiff objected to the Report. (DE 15.) However, to be actionable, objections to a report and

recommendation must be specific. Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a

party’s right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is

accepted by the district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.

1984). “The Supreme Court has expressly upheld the validity of such a waiver rule, explaining

that ‘the filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus attention on

those issues -- factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Diamond v.

Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (2005) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985)). “A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate judge’s report is tantamount to a

failure to object.” Tyler v. Wates, 84 F. App’x 289, 290 (4th Cir. 2003). Absent specific objections

to the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, this court is not required to give any

explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.

1983).

Plaintiff’s objections do not address the legal basis for which the Report recommends

dismissal, i.e. that Defendants Barker and Linder are not state actors as a matter of law. Plaintiff

alleges factual reasons for which he believes he should be entitled to relief. For example, he states

on July 19, 2023, Barker did not advise him of a preliminary hearing and stated he could not attend

(DE 15, p. 1). Further, Plaintiff states, “Mrs. Barker is hired by the state, also is drug courts

appointed attorney. She is the reason why I’m facing prison for withholding 3 negative drug tests

from others.” As to Linder, Plaintiff alleges on August 19, 2023, Linder “slandered, telling Judge

I was undermining program, made seem like I was a liar when Judge made me think back of last

use, when I really didn’t know.” (DE 15, p. 3.) Even if any of these allegations are true, there is

no legal basis for the claims to proceed against Barker and Linder under § 1983. Therefore, the

Court overrules the objections.

Accordingly, after a thorough review of the Report and Recommendation and the record,

the Court adopts the Report (DE 11) and incorporates it here.

It is, therefore, ORDERED that Plaintiffs case is dismissed without prejudice and without

issuance of service of process.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Chl cso

Josaph Dawson, HI

United States District Judge

Florence, South Carolina

May 15, 2024

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Plaintiff is hereby notified that he has the right to appeal this order within thirty (30) days

from this date, under Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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