The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Scotty M. Brown, C/A No. 1:23-CV-00369
Petitioner,
vs.
ORDER
Charles Williams, Warden of Perry
Correctional Institution,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Scotty M. Brown’s (“Petitioner”) pro se Motion
for Reconsideration (ECF No. 33). Having received no Response in Opposition, this matter
is ripe for review.
On October 11, 2023, this Court issued an Order adopting the Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 21) in full and dismissing Petitioner’s petition with prejudice.
(ECF No. 30). This Court reached this conclusion because it found, as did the Magistrate
Judge in the Report, that Petitioner’s petition was time barred. Because Petitioner chose
not to file any appeals, Petitioner’s convictions became final ten days after he pleaded
guilty. As this Court’s previous Order explained, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) specifically provides
a 1-year statute of limitation for habeas petitions following the date on which the conviction
becomes final. The Petition is time barred because Petitioner filed the petition 766 days,
635 days, and 553 days after his conviction became final, respectively. Further, even if his
Petition was not time barred, this Court also found that his claims were without merit.
Accordingly, this Court dismissed the Petition.
Motions under Rule 59 are not to be made lightly: “[R]econsideration of a previous
order is an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of judicial resources.” 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
¶ 59.30[4] (3d ed.); Doe v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Three, 314 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.S.C.
2016) (quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Courts “have recognized three grounds for amending an earlier judgment: (1) to
accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence
not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993).
Rule 59(e) motions “may not be used to make arguments that could have been made
before the judgment was entered.” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002). Nor
are they opportunities to relitigate issues already ruled upon. Pac. Ins. Co., at 403 (4th Cir.
1998) (quoting Wright et al., supra, § 2810.1, at 127–28). Motions to reconsider are not
“opportunities to rehash issues already ruled upon because a litigant is displeased with the
result.” R.E. Goodson Constr. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 4:02-4184-RBH, 2006 WL
1677136, at *1 (D.S.C. June 14, 2006) (citing Tran v. Tran, 166 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
Petitioner’s main qualm with this Court’s Order is its finding regarding Petitioner’s
failure to show he was entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period during which he
had to file his habeas petition.
A federal habeas petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year
statute of limitations established in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) “where—due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct—it would be
unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party *105 and gross injustice
would result.” United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004). To establish
grounds for equitable tolling, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177
L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (emphasis added and cleaned up).
Petitioner asserts he is entitled to equitable tolling because it would have been
impossible for him to discover that his parole projection date was rescinded prior to
February 2, 2017, when he was informed by SCDC. Following this discovery, Petitioner
alleges he acted diligently by filing his application for PCR relief approximately one month
later raising this issue as a ground for relief. Accordingly, Petitioner argues the one-year
statute of limitation should be tolled such that his petition is considered timely.
Unfortunately, Petitioner’s argument amounts to a rehashing of the same argument he
raised in his initial Petition which was addressed by the Magistrate Judge in the Report. In
the Report, the Magistrate Judge considers Petitioner’s “newly discovered evidence”
regarding his parole eligibility, but ultimately, concludes this Court has consistently
rejected arguments such as this one. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (utilizing the date
on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence); Spurgeon v. Warden, McCormick Corr. Inst., C/A No. 0:16-2766-RBH-
PJG, 2017 WL 1232439, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2017) (“Courts have recognized in other,
similar contexts that the failure to appreciate the collateral consequences of a guilty plea
conviction until after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations does not delay the
commencement of a limitations period.”) (collecting cases), report and recommendation
adopted, C/A No. 0:16-02766-RBH, 2017 WL 1214405 (D.S.C. Apr. 3, 2017); see
also McKnight v. Cohen, C/A No. 2:07-0027-DCN-RSC, 2007 WL 2891784, at *9 (D.S.C.
Sept. 28, 2007) (rejecting petitioner's argument that he was “entitled to equitable tolling of
the AEDPA statute of limitations because his attorney misadvised him concerning his
parole eligibility”).
Petitioner’s opportunity to explain the Report’s error in reaching this conclusion
was in his objections. Although Petitioner filed objections to the Report, this Court found
they failed to demonstrate the Report incorrectly determined Petitioner was not entitled to
equitable tolling due to a change in his parole eligibility. Now, Petitioner is before this
Court on a Motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), and as such, Petitioner may not simply rehash
previous arguments. Petitioner is required to show an intervening change in the law,
account for new evidence not available at trial, or correct a clear error of law or prevent a
manifest injustice. Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). Petitioner’s
motion fails on all fronts and does not provide this Court with a legally sound reason to
reconsider its prior Order.
Additionally, Petitioner argues this Court failed to consider his “specific” objections
to the Report which it was required to do. Petitioner asserts this Court only considered the
Report’s finding that the Petition was time barred and failed to address the merits of his
claims. Although Petitioner filed objections to specific portions of the Report, Petitioner’s
objections failed to “direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings
and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). This Court
can imagine that Petitioner’s likely response would be that he did point to specific errors
in the Report’s conclusions, however, the errors must be of importance to the Report’s
overall conclusion. Here, the Report concluded Petitioner’s Petition was time barred, and
he was not entitled to equitable tolling. Even if entitled to equitable tolling, the Report still
concluded that Petitioner’s claims failed. Petitioner’s objections failed to use Fourth Circuit
precedent to demonstrate how these conclusions were in error. Instead, Petitioner lodged
objections such as:
“Specific objection is lodged against the Magistrate because of her
misrepresentation of the facts in light of the evidence submitted by Petitioner.
See page #4, footnote 4. The transcript for Petitioner’s third guilty plea on
November 16, 2015, as submitted by the Respondent, appears to be
incomplete. The Petitioner submitted and presented this Honorable Court
with a accurate and complete record for all three plea hearings…”
(ECF No. 27, p. 2). While this argument is to a specific portion of the Report, it does not
move the needle in convincing this Court to reject the Report and find that Petitioner should
be entitled to equitable tolling such that his Petition is considered timely, or that his claims
have merit.
Therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the factors
required for this Court to grant his Motion for Reconsideration and overrule its prior Order.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 33) is denied.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Daeg Conulerten Gp
January 8, 2024 Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
Columbia, South Carolina United States District Judge