The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Tequan Brown, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 0:21-cv-2712-TMC
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
Charles Burton; Thomas )
Robertson; Shaereta Allen; Major )
S. Terry; Dion Tameka Gaines; )
and S.C. Dept. of Corrections, )
)
Defendants. )
)
____________________________)
Plaintiff Tequan Brown (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Defendants violated his
constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF Nos. 1 at
1, 17-1). Plaintiff also asserts claims under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to 15-78-220. Id. at 1. The case was referred to a magistrate
judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), (e) (D.S.C.). Before the court now is the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”), (ECF No. 58), recommending that
the court deny Plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction, (ECF No. 24), and
for entry of a default judgment, (ECF No. 46). Plaintiff submitted objections to the
Report, (ECF No. 66), and the matter is ripe for review.
In support of his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff presented
evidence showing that in August 2016, nearly six years ago, Defendant South
Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) placed him in state-wide protective
custody (“SWPC”) after he cooperated in a federal investigation and was identified
in the media as an informant. (ECF No. 24-2 at 4). Plaintiff was informed that after
the investigation was completed, “the issue of protective custody would be
revisited.” Id. at 5. In July 2021, the SWPC board reviewed Plaintiff’s placement
and determined that he should be removed from protective custody “due to continued
disruptions and false allegations in the protective custody unit.” (ECF No. 42-2 at
1). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, claiming he faces an imminent threat of severe
harm or even death by inmates in general population who harbor ill will against him
for his cooperation. (ECF No. 24-1). According to Plaintiff, Defendants knew of
this risk but released him from protective custody anyway. (ECF No. 24 at 2). In
particular, Plaintiff contends that his release from SWPC was in retaliation for his
filing complaints against Defendants Gaines, Terry, and Robertson. Id. Plaintiff
asks the court to order that he be placed back in SWPC or move Defendant Gaines
to a different facility than the one in which Plaintiff is housed. Id. at 1.
Defendants, however, submitted evidence reflecting that Plaintiff was placed
in the Special Concerns Offender Reintegration (“SCOR”) program at Evans
Correctional facility where he is segregated from the general inmate population. Id.
Following completion of this program, Plaintiff would “be transferred to an
institution of his choice (if approved), placed in general population, or placed in the
Adjustment Unit at Evans.” Id. at 2.
Applying the standard set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), the magistrate judge concluded, in pertinent part,
as follows:
[Plaintiff] has not met his burden of showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. As
defendants point out, [Plaintiff] is currently housed in the
Special Concerns Offender Reintegration Program at
Evans Correctional Institution, which is designated for
inmates with safety concerns. Therefore, [Plaintiff] is not
housed in the general prison population where he claims .
. . his life is in danger. Also, [Plaintiff] is not housed in
the same prison as Defendant Gaines; therefore,
[Plaintiff’s] request to have Gaines moved to a different
unit or prison than [Plaintiff] is moot.
(ECF No. 58 at 3). Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that the court
deny Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. The magistrate also
recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment be denied “because the
defendants have filed an answer and otherwise defended this action.” Id. at 3 n.3.
During the time that the magistrate judge was considering Plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff completed the SCOR program, (ECF No. 77-
3 at 1), and was transferred to Ridgeland Correctional Institution. (ECF Nos. 66 at
1; 77 at 1). Plaintiff filed objections to the Report, indicating that he had been placed
in Ridgeland’s general population. (ECF No. 66 at 1). Plaintiff notes that he was
sent to Ridgeland despite requesting that he be placed in Turbeville or MacDougall.
Id. Plaintiff, however, did not specifically identify any error that would undermine
the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he is likely
to succeed on the merits of his underlying claims.
In response, Defendants presented evidence that, at the time Plaintiff
completed the SCOR program, he requested to be transferred to Ridgeland,
MacDougall, or Allendale. (ECF No. 77-3). According to the affidavit of Stacey
Richardson, SCDC’s Director of Classification and Inmate Records, only after
SCDC had processed for his transfer to Ridgeland did Plaintiff request that he be
placed in Turbeville or MacDougall. (ECF No. 77-1 at 1). Since the transfer process
had already begun, SCDC did not honor Plaintiff’s change to his request for a
specific correctional facility. Id. Additionally, according to Richardson’s affidavit,
Plaintiff has not expressed any security concerns or internally requested placement
in protective custody while he has been at Ridgeland. Id. at 2.
The recommendations set forth in the Report have no presumptive weight, and
this court remains responsible for making a final determination in this matter.
Wimmer v. Cook, 774 F.2d 68, 72 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976)). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made,
and the court may accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of
the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). However, the court need only review for clear error “those portions
which are not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and
conclusory’ objections have been made[.]” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas,
LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 654, 662 (D.S.C. 2017). “An objection is specific if it ‘enables
the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at
the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Id. at 662 n.6 (quoting United States v. One Parcel
of Real Prop., With Bldgs., Appurtenances, Improvements, & Contents, Known As:
2121 E. 30th St., Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). On the other
hand, objections which merely restate arguments already presented to and ruled on
by the magistrate judge or the court do not constitute specific objections. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Saul, 408 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (D.S.C. 2019) (noting “[c]ourts will not
find specific objections where parties ‘merely restate word for word or rehash the
same arguments presented in their [earlier] filings’”); Ashworth v. Cartledge, Civ.
A. No. 6:11-cv-01472-JMC, 2012 WL 931084, at *1 (D.S.C. March 19, 2012)
(noting that objections which were “merely almost verbatim restatements of
arguments made in his response in opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment . . . do not alert the court to matters which were erroneously considered
by the Magistrate Judge”). Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the
Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the magistrate
judge’s recommendation. Greenspan v. Brothers Prop. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 3d 734,
737 (D.S.C. 2015) (citing Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199–200 (4th Cir. 1983)).
Additionally, since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court is charged with
construing his filings liberally in order to allow for the development of a potentially
meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). This does not mean, however, that the court can
ignore the Plaintiff’s failure to allege or prove facts that establish a claim currently
cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d
387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
The court concludes that the Report (ECF No. 58) correctly states and applies
the governing legal principles, and the court agrees with the magistrate judge’s
recommended disposition. Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s objections to the
Report, (ECF No. 66), the court finds no reason to deviate from the magistrate
judge’s recommended disposition of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
(ECF No. 24). The court further concludes that Plaintiff’s subsequent completion
of the SCOR program and transfer to Ridgeland does not require a different result.
The court also agrees with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff’s motion for a default
judgment (ECF No. 46) is without merit and should be denied.
Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction (ECF No. 24) and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment by
default (ECF No. 46).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Anderson, South Carolina
August 8, 2022
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
The parties are hereby notified of the right to appeal this order pursuant to
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.