PHELPS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEPHANIE PHELPS, )

o/b/o JIMMY THEADOR DAVIDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-175-E

)

MARTIN J. O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 31st day of May, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II2 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

2 Plaintiff originally filed both Title II and Title XVI applications, but he has since passed

away. As he was unmarried, his Title XVI application extinguished upon his death. (Doc. No.

8 at 2); See 20 C.F.R. § 416.542(b)(4) (noting that only in certain circumstances, such as with a

surviving spouse, can an SSI claim continue after the claimant’s death). His minor child brings

his Title II claim on his behalf.

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Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).3

3 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in crafting the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for Claimant Jimmy Theador Davids, on whose

behalf Plaintiff brings this action, because the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical

opinion evidence, did not apply the treating physician rule, and did not reconcile the RFC

with the opinions given great weight. (Doc. No. 8). As explained below, the Court is

unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments and affirms the ALJ’s finding of non-disability.

This case is before the Court after a stipulated remand from the United States

District Court for the Western District of New York and a subsequent Appeals Council

remand. (R. 1012-19, 1015-19; Doc. No. 8 at 2). As noted, the case is brought by

Stephanie Phelps, on behalf of Claimant Davids, who is deceased. (Doc. No. 8 at 1).

The ALJ held a telephone hearing and issued an unfavorable decision on February 13,

2023. (R. 857-78). In that decision, now on appeal, the ALJ crafted the following RFC:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant can

stand and walk for six hours total in an eight hour day. He can sit for six

hours in an eight hour day. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs.

He can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch. He can never

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, or crawl. He must avoid concentrated

cold temperatures. He must avoid moderate respiratory irritants. He

must avoid concentrated exposure to heights. He should have no work

around machinery with external moving parts, or commercial driving. He

can perform occasional near acuity which is defined as being able to avoid

normal hazards, and read normal newsprint, being able to view a computer

screen, being able to distinguish between small objects that have distinctive

colors. He is not able to perform work that involves fine vision such as

sorting small nuts and bolts, threading a needle, examining jewels, using

calipers and measurements, or soldering wires onto chips. He is limited to

the ability to understand and remember simple instructions. He can

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maintain focus to perform simple tasks. He can adapt to occasional

changes to simple tasks. He should have no production paced work. He

should have no work with the general public. He can have occasional

work with coworkers and supervisors but should have no team or tandem

work.

(R. 865-66). The Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to

reconcile this RFC with the weight given to the medical opinions. (Doc. No. 8 at 14-20).

Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision to give the very limiting opinions of

Drs. Rebecca Billings, Ph.D., and Erin Urbanowicz, Psy.D., great weight is at odds with the

less limited RFC. (Id. at 15-17). The Court first notes that the ALJ is not bound to formulate

an RFC based directly on any physician’s opinion, even if she gives that opinion great weight.

See Wilkinson v. Commissioner Social Sec., 558 Fed. Appx. 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted) (explaining that “no rule or regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an

RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives the

source's opinion as a whole ‘significant’ weight”). Rather, an ALJ must adequately explain

the basis for the RFC findings, including discussing the relevant medical opinion evidence.

In this case, the ALJ did not err by giving the opinions of Drs. Billings and

Urbanowicz great weight and yet formulating a less limited RFC. The ALJ explained that

Drs. Billings’ and Urbanowicz’ opinions were consistent with other parts of the record and

were therefore given great weight. (R. 869). Dr. Billings opined, in part, that Mr. Davids

could interact appropriately with the public, supervisors and co-workers with moderate

limitation, and Dr. Urbanowicz opined, in part, that Mr. Davids would be moderately

limited in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public, accept instructions,

and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and get along with co-workers or

peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (R. 152-53, 462).

Taking this into consideration, the ALJ found that Mr. Davids could have no work with the

general public and only occasional work with coworkers and supervisors. (R. 866).

Although this RFC does not align perfectly with these doctors’ opined limitations, it is

supported by substantial evidence as the ALJ crafted this based on the entire record.

Indeed, the ALJ noted that Mr. Davids should have no work with the general public after

analyzing his mental health treatment records, which showed some reports of

hallucinations and hearing voices. (R. 868). Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC is supported

by substantial evidence.

Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to give adequate

explanations for discrediting the opinions of Dr. Michael Rosenberg, M.D., and Courtney

Kuch, LMSW. (Doc. No. 8 at 17-18). The ALJ explained that she gave Dr. Rosenberg’s

opinion limited weight because Mr. Davids’ treatment records supported fewer limitations

than those opined by Dr. Rosenberg. (R. 869). These treatment records revealed that

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Mr. Davids received generally conservative treatment for his back pain and showed that he

had no significant difficulties with ambulation or maneuvering around an examination

room. (Id.). This differed from Dr. Rosenberg’s opined limitations that Mr. Davids

could only stand and walk for 30 minutes without interruption, stand and walk for 2 hours

in an 8 hour workday, and never kneel, crouch, or crawl. (Ex. E6F/6, 8). Further, the

ALJ explained that she gave Ms. Kuch’s opinion little weight because her opinion that Mr.

Davids had no useful ability to function in multiple areas was inconsistent with Mr. Davids’

treatment records, which documented improvement in functionality and generally normal

mental status examinations. (R. 869). Accordingly, the record supports the ALJ’s

decision to assign limited weight to these opinions.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to apply the treating

physician rule to the opinion of Dr. Jeremy Riedesel, M.D. (Doc. No. 8 at 14, 18, 19-20).

The regulations provide that for claims, such as this one, filed before March 27, 2017, a

treating physician’s opinion is to be given “controlling weight” so long as the opinion is

well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and

not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001); Plummer v. Apfel,

186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). As a result, the ALJ may reject a treating physician’s

opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence, and not on the basis

of the ALJ’s own judgment or speculation, although he or she may afford a treating

physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting

explanations are provided. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429.

Here, the ALJ properly applied the treating physician rule to the opinion of Dr.

Riedesel. The ALJ first acknowledged that Dr. Riedesel was Mr. Davids’ treating

physician. (R. 869 (stating Dr. Riedesel was the “treating provider”)). Additionally, the

ALJ stated that she considered the opinion evidence in accordance with 20 C.F.R.

404.1527, which is the regulation detailing the treating physician rule. (R. 866). The

ALJ then explained that she afforded this opinion “limited weight” because Dr. Riedesel’s

opinion was inconsistent with Mr. Davids’ medical record as a whole. (R. 869).

Specifically, Dr. Riedesel’s opinion was inconsistent with Mr. Davids’ medical record

showing “few complaints of musculoskeletal pain in any of his mental health or

neurological treatment records, and [Mr. Davids’] generally conservative treatment for his

physical impairments.” (R. 869-70). This makes logical sense as Dr. Riedesel opined

that Mr. Davids had many postural limitations, including that he could only sit and stand

for 10 minutes at a time, could only stand/walk less than 2 hours in an 8 hour workday, and

could only sit about 2 hours in an 8 hour workday. (R. 1876-77). Accordingly, the

ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Riedesel’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

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