explaining that “the mere memorialization of a 4 claimant’s subjective statements in a medical report does not elevate those statements to a medical opinion.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “the mere memorialization of a 4 claimant’s subjective statements in a medical report does not elevate those statements to a medical opinion.”
- “The presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision.”
- if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, 1 merely because it would have decided the claim differently
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MELANIE SHAFFER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-129-J
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
)
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 31st day of May, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., finds that the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,
1
merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1
1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to properly
evaluate the opinions of Drs. Leah Bielski, Psy.D., and Marja Mattila-Evenden, M.D.,
Ph.D., as these opinions described greater limitations than those found by the ALJ in
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Doc. No. 9). As explained below, the
Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments and affirms the ALJ’s finding of non-
disability.
The ALJ evaluated Drs. Bielski’s and Mattila-Evenden’s opinions and found they
had little persuasive value because they were inconsistent with the record. (R. 28-30).
Both doctors assessed that Plaintiff had disabling limitations, including being absent from
work four or more days per month, having an inability to respond to usual work situations,
and having difficulty interacting with supervisors and co-workers. (Exs. 13F; 20F).
After assessing these opinions, and the record as a whole, the ALJ formulated the
following, less limited, RFC:
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except:
• She is capable of climbing ramps and stairs no more than frequently.
• She is incapable of climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.
• She is capable of stooping no more than frequently.
• She is capable of kneeling and crouching no more than occasionally.
• She is incapable of crawling.
• She cannot be exposed to unprotected heights or work in close proximity
to (within arm’s reach of) dangerous moving mechanical parts.
• She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold.
• She is limited to working in a setting in which the noise level does not
exceed moderate noise.
• She is able to perform simple work-related decisions.
• She is limited to positions with no more than occasional interaction with
supervisors and coworkers.
• She is limited to positions that do not require interaction with the general
public.
• She is able to tolerate few changes in a routine work setting defined as a
stable work environment where workplace and work process remain
generally the same from day to day.
(R. 22). The ALJ went on to explain that, given this RFC, Plaintiff was unable to perform
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any past relevant work, but was capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy. (R. 31-33). Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not
disabled. (R. 33).
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Bielski’s opinion should have been
found persuasive. (Doc. No. 9 at 8-15). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
selectively referred to evidence that supported rejecting Dr. Bielski’s opinion and gave no
reasons why the evidence of abnormal findings, including anxious affect,
anxious/depressed mood, anxiety attacks, impaired attention/concentration, and poor
insight/judgment, were not consistent with and supportive of Dr. Bielski’s opinion. (Id.
at 12-13). However, Plaintiff’s argument ignores the fact that an ALJ “need not mention
every piece of evidence in the record.” Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 Fed.
Appx. 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, the ALJ sufficiently analyzed Dr. Bielski’s opinion, and his decision that this
opinion was of little persuasive value is supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Bielski
opined that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in her ability to respond to usual work
situations and to changes in a routine work setting; that she had marked limitations in her
ability to understand, remember and carry out complex instructions, make judgments on
complex work-related decisions, and interact appropriately with the public, supervisors,
and coworkers; and that she had moderate limitations in her ability to understand,
remember, and carry out simple instructions and make judgments on simple work related
decisions. (R. 29; Ex. 13F). The ALJ found Dr. Bielski’s opinion was supported by her
examination findings, but not consistent with the record because it was “markedly different
than the other mental status examination findings of record.” (R. 29). Indeed, Plaintiff’s
treating psychiatrist opined that Plaintiff had anxious and depressed moods, but grossly
intact cognition and good insight and judgment, among other findings. (R. 29).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s other examinations showed generally normal findings with some
anxiety. (R. 29-30). While Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not expressly reference
all evidence of abnormal findings, including anxious affect, the ALJ sufficiently analyzed
the evidence as a whole. (R. 29-30). Plaintiff ultimately points to contrary evidence in
the record in an effort to persuade this Court to reweigh the evidence. The Court declines
Plaintiff’s invitation and finds the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Bielski’s opinion is supported by
substantial evidence. Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir.
2009) (“The presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does
not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for
that decision.”).
The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s opinion
should have been found persuasive. Plaintiff states that the ALJ incorrectly rejected this
opinion for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ inappropriately considered that Dr. Mattila-
Evenden evaluated Plaintiff via telemedicine; (2) the ALJ stated Plaintiff was able to move
3
a few months before the hearing and was living alone, but ignored that Plaintiff was
stressed during her move; (3) the ALJ cited Exhibit 16F in support of the assertion that this
opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s report of feeling more stable with a reduction in
symptoms even though this exhibit shows that Plaintiff’s Cymbalta was increased three
times due to symptoms; (4) the ALJ incorrectly stated that this opinion was inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s denial of depressive symptoms as shown on negative PHQ screenings; (5)
the ALJ inaccurately stated that this opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s PHQ-9 and
GAD-7 scores and Plaintiff’s reports during these assessments; (6) the ALJ ignored
findings that Plaintiff had impaired attention and concentration; and (7) the ALJ stated this
opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ability to maintain family relationships, spend
time with old friends, and a variety of Plaintiff’s other merely sporadic daily activities.
The Court finds that these arguments are of little merit and affirms the Commissioner’s
decision, as the ALJ sufficiently analyzed Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s opinion.
Dr. Mattila-Evenden was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, and she opined that
Plaintiff was limited in her ability to adapt to changes in her environment, would have
difficulty interacting with supervisors and coworkers, would have difficulty managing
even a low stress work environment, would have difficulty maintaining concentration, and
would have more than four “bad days” per month during which she could not complete an
8-hour shift. (R. 28; Ex. 20F/3). The ALJ noted that this opinion had little persuasive
value because it was inconsistent with other evidence of record and was not supported by
Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s own records, which showed generally normal mental status
examination findings. (R. 28-29). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Mattila-Evenden
evaluated Plaintiff “every two to three months via telemedicine for approximately 10 to 15
minutes at a time.” (R. 28). However, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not
cite this as a reason to find the opinion less persuasive but instead stated this as a fact to
give context to the assessments. (R. 28 (stating “Dr. Mattila-Evenden only saw the
claimant every two to three months via telemedicine for approximately 10 to 15 minutes at
a time.”)). Absent evidence to the contrary, which Plaintiff fails to point out, the Court
takes “the ALJ at his word[.]” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 297 Fed. Appx. 117, 120
(3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument on this point.
Further, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ ignored
evidence that Plaintiff was stressed during her move and that Plaintiff had impaired
attention and concentration. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored this evidence, which
she reported to her doctors during appointments. In his decision, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff moved “a few months before [her] hearing and was living alone . . . [and s]he was
able to adjust to that change without significant issue.” (R. 28 (citing Hearing
Testimony)). In doing so, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and
appropriately concluded that they were not entirely credible. (R. 26-27); Schaudeck v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Morris v. Barnhart, 78
Fed. Appx. 820, 824-25 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “the mere memorialization of a
4
claimant’s subjective statements in a medical report does not elevate those statements to a
medical opinion.”). Moreover, the ALJ expressly noted Plaintiff’s impaired attention and
concentration when analyzing Plaintiff’s consultative examination, which showed
impaired attention and concentration. (R. 26 (citing Ex. 13F)). However, the ALJ found
that this finding was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s earlier consultative examination and with
records from Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. (R. 26).
Additionally, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ
inappropriately cited Exhibit 16F in support of the assertion that Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s
opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s report of feeling more stable with a reduction of
symptoms, as this exhibit showed that Plaintiff’s Cymbalta was increased three times due
to ongoing symptoms. (Doc. No. 9 at 16). Plaintiff’s argument holds no weight as the
record shows that Plaintiff reported to Dr. Mattila-Evenden that Cymbalta was helping her
and that she “fe[lt] more stable” on April 29, 2022, just a few months before Dr. Mattila-
Evenden rendered her opinion on September 28, 2022. (Exs. 16F/18; 20F).
Accordingly, the ALJ correctly stated that Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s opinion that Plaintiff was
very limited due to mental impairments was not supported by “records showing generally
normal mental status examination findings with reports that the claimant felt more
stable[.]” (R. 28 (citing Ex. 16F)). Accordingly, the Court affirms the ALJ’s finding on
this point.
The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ incorrectly
stated that Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s denial of
depressive symptoms on negative PHQ screenings and inconsistent with Plaintiff’s PHQ-
9 and GAD-7 scores. The PHQ-9 and GAD-7 exams are self-administered tests for
depression and anxiety, respectively. Drumm v. Kijakazi, No. 20-3309, 2022 WL
1320394, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2022). The ALJ appropriately found that Dr. Mattila-
Evenden’s opinion, finding that Plaintiff would frequently have difficulty managing even
a low stress work environment, was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s “repeated denial of
depressive symptoms with her primary care provider as demonstrated by negative PHQ
screenings” and therapy records showing “only mild depression on the PHQ-9 and
moderate anxiety on the GAD-7[.]” (R. 28 (citing Exs. 11F, 17F, 18F)). Plaintiff does
not assert that these statements were incorrect, but rather that these are an
oversimplification of the waxing and waning of Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms.
(Doc. No. 9 at 16-17). The Court views this as an invitation to re-weigh the evidence,
which it cannot do. See, e.g., Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument on this point.
Lastly, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ inappropriately
considered Plaintiff’s sporadic daily activities as a reason to reject Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s
opinion. The ALJ is required to consider a claimant's activities of daily living in
evaluating the severity of a claimant's symptoms and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §
5
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
404.1529(c)(3)(i); Wright v. Astrue, No. Civ. 10-942, 2011 WL 4079067, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 13, 2011). However, as Plaintiff points out, an ALJ may not use evidence of
sporadic and transitory activities to support a finding that the Plaintiff can engage
continuously in substantial gainful activity. See Fargnoli v. Astrue, 247 F.3d 34, 40 n.5
(3d Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s performance of daily tasks, including
spending time with an old friend, living alone, performing personal care tasks, preparing
simple food, doing laundry, dusting, washing dishes, and vacuuming. (R. 28). The ALJ
noted that Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s opinion.
(Id.). These activities differ greatly from transitory and sporadic activities, such as the
single trip to Europe in Fargnoli. Accordingly, the ALJ appropriately considered
Plaintiff’s daily activities in evaluating and rejecting Dr. Mattila-Evenden’s opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.
6