DOE v. PINE-RICHLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-51

v. Hon. William S. Stickman IV

PINE-RICHLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge

The Constitution does not give federal courts the authority to decide issues, no matter

how timely and important. Article II of the Constitution confers upon the courts of the United

States only the authority to decide cases and controversies. U.S. Const. Art. HI. Plaintiff Jane

Doe (“Doe”), a parent of a child enrolled in Defendant Pine-Township School District (the

‘District”), filed this action challenging the District’s policy governing gender and gender

identity, Administrative Regulation 103(B) (‘AR 103(B)”). (ECF Nos. 1 and 31). She filed a

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction asking the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the policy.

(ECF No. 5). Because Doe has not demonstrated that she has suffered any harm or that harm is

imminent, the Court finds that she does not have standing to challenge the District’s policy. The

Court must, therefore, deny the requested preliminary injunction.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of a district

court. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 178-79 (d Cir. 2017) (District courts

have the freedom to fashion preliminary equitable relief so long as they do so by ‘exercising their

sound discretion.’” (citation omitted)). The primary purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is

“maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.” Acierno v.

New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994). The “status quo” refers to “the last,

peaceable, noncontested status of the parties.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700,

708 (3d Cir. 2004).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter

v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Rather, such relief “should be granted only in limited

circumstances.” Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 708 (citation omitted). A moving party “must

establish entitlement to relief by clear evidence.” Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d

518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018). Specifically, the movant must demonstrate:

(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if

the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even

greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such

relief.

Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 708; see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The first two factors are “the

most critical,” and the moving party bears the burden of making the requisite showings. Reilly,

858 F.3d at 176, 179 (citations omitted). Once those “gateway factors” are met, a court should

“consider[] the remaining two factors” and then “determine[] in its sound discretion if all four

factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Jd. at 179.

In reaching its decision on a request for injunctive relief, a district court sits as both the

trier of fact and the arbiter of legal disputes. A court must, therefore, make “findings of fact and

conclusions of law upon the granting or refusing of a preliminary injunction.” Bradley v.

Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1178 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2)).

This “mandatory” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a)(2) must be met

“even when there has been no evidentiary hearing on the motion.” Jd Nevertheless, at the

preliminary injunction stage, “procedures [] are less formal and evidence [] is less complete than

in a trial on the merits.” Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 718; see also AT&T Co. v. Winback &

Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 Gd Cir. 1994) (‘[T]he grant or denial of a

preliminary injunction is almost always based on an abbreviated set of facts, requiring a delicate

balancing [that] is the responsibility of the district judge.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, a

court “may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence.”

Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 718 (quoting in parenthetical Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l

Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995)). But the weight given to such materials will

“vary greatly depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case.” Jd. at 719. A court is

also tasked with assessing the credibility of witness testimony and may base the decision to grant

or deny a preliminary injunction on credibility determinations. See, e.g., Hudson Glob. Res.

Holdings, Inc. v. Hill, No. 02:07CV0132, 2007 WL 1545678, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 25, 2007).

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Doe initiated this case by filing a complaint on January 12, 2024. (ECF No. 1). On

February 2, 2024, she filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 5). On April 12,

2024, after briefing concluded on the motion, Doe filed an amended complaint (“Amended

Complaint’). (ECF No. 31). The Court’s review of the allegations in the Amended Complaint

lead it to conclude that no changes were made relevant to the disposition of Doe’s motion. At an

April 8, 2024 status conference, the Court gave the parties the opportunity to have an evidentiary

hearing to develop the record since it can look beyond the pleadings when deciding a preliminary

injunction motion. Doe and the District declined. The parties elected to proceed on the facts set

forth in the Amended Complaint and the declarations attached to their pleadings. (ECF No. 30).

3 ‘

Doe alleges that she is the parent of a student in the District. (ECF No. 31, p. 1). She

challenges AR 103(B), specifically as to the areas where that policy interacts with parental

rights. AR 103(B) is titled: “Nondiscrimination in School and Classroom Practice-Gender and

Gender Identity.” (ECF No. 1-2, p. 1). AR 103(B) includes a “Privacy and Confidentiality”

provision that states:

All students have a right to privacy[,] and this right includes the right to keep

one’s transgender status private at school. Information about a student’s

transgender status, legal name, or birth-assigned sex may also constitute

confidential protected health information. Disclosing this information to other

students, their parents/guardians, or other third parties may violate privacy laws,

such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).

Similar to all students, the District shall ensure that protected health information

and education records relating to transgender and gender-expansive students shall

be kept confidential in accordance with applicable state and federal privacy laws.

Transgender and gender-expansive students have the right to discuss and express

his or her gender identity openly and to decide when, with whom, and how much

to share private information. The fact that a student chooses to disclose his or her

transgender status to District staff or other students does not authorize District

staff to re-disclose that information. .

To ensure the safety and well-being of the student, District personnel should not

disclose a student’s transgender status to others, including the student’s

parents/guardians or other District personnel, unless: (1) legally required to do

so, or (2) the student has authorized such disclosure. Relevant school staff, such

as the building principal, guidance counselor, and school psychologist, will work

actively and immediately to discuss disclosure to parents/guardians given their

legal rights and the importance of collaboration between the school staff, student,

and parents/guardians. When contacting the parent or guardian of a transgender

student, District staff should use the student’s legal name and the pronoun

corresponding to the student’s birth-assigned sex unless the student, parent, or

guardian has specified otherwise.

(Id. at 2) (emphasis added). The provisions of AR 103(B) relating to “Student Transitions” also

addresses the District’s policy toward providing gender-related information to parents:

In most cases, for a transgender student, beginning the process to live openly in a

manner consistent with their gender identity is a very private matter.

Since parents/guardians are generally aware of their child’s development,

notifying a student’s parent/guardian about his or her gender identity or

transition may be unnecessary. In some cases, however, informing

parents/guardians about a student disclosure carries risks for the student, such as

physical and/or emotional abuse, abandonment, and/or removal from the home.

Prior to notification of any parent/guardian regarding the transition process,

District staff must work closely with the student to assess the degree to which, if

any, the parent/guardian will be involved in the process and must consider the

health, well[-]being, and safety of the transitioning student. Upon notification

by a student, parent/guardian, or representative that a student is undertaking,

planning to undergo, or has completed a gender transition, the school will

promptly inform the notifying individual and the student of the right to request a

Student Support Team, consisting of appropriate school staff (e.g., building

principal, guidance counselor, nurse, school psychologist, and teacher(s) as

appropriate).

When a student transitions during the school year, the Student Support Team shall

hold a meeting with the student and parents/guardians, if they are involved in the

process. The Student Support Team should discuss a timeline for the transition in

order to create the conditions supporting a safe and accepting environment at the

school. The District staff will not require proof of medical treatments as

[a]prerequisite for respecting the student’s gender identity. If any objective basis

should occur that would justify questioning whether a student’s asserted gender

identity is genuine, information may be requested to show that the gender identity

is sincerely held.

(Id.) (emphasis added). Doe also takes issue with provisions of AR 103(B) governing the use of

preferred names and pronouns:

Every student has the right to be addressed by a name and pronoun that

corresponds to the student’s gender identity. A court-ordered name or gender

change is not required, and the student need not change his or her official records.

The building principal or a staff member designee should privately ask

transgender or gender-expansive students at the beginning of the school year

how they want to be addressed in class, in correspondence to the home, or at

conferences with the student’s parents/guardians. In compliance with FERPA,

the building principal will ensure that the preferred name and pronoun are

communicated to staff members with a legitimate educational interest.

(/d. at 3) (emphasis added).

The facts supporting Doe’s claims are set forth in her Amended Complaint and the

largely duplicative allegations in her Declaration. (ECF Nos. 31 and 5-2). She pleads and avers

that she “has legitimate concerns regarding her child’s risk of transitioning” because she “found

her child viewing TikTok videos related to transitioning, videos of transgender individuals

advocating transitioning, and videos on sexuality.” (ECF No. 31, p. 6; ECF No. 5-2, p. 1). She

also states that her child has “recently begun hanging out with a new friend group, which

includes children who identify as transgender or who are socially transitioning.” (d.). Doe

“sent written notice to the School District that absent her prior written consent, the School

District shall not refer her child to any mental health counselor or social worker for evaluation”

and requested notice within three days of the District’s learning of any gender identity issues

concerning her child. (ECF No. 31, p. 5; ECF No. 5-2, p. 2). She also had a meeting with

District personnel, making the same requests, only to be told that “under no circumstances”

would she be notified if the District “becomes aware that her child has requested to be addressed

by different pronouns, a different name, or otherwise exhibited behavior consistent with gender

incongruity, gender dysphoria, or a desire to transition to a gender other than her biological

gender” unless “legally required to do so.” (d.).

Dr. Brian Miller, the District’s Superintendent, avers that “[Doe’s] child has not sought

support under [AR] 103(B). [Doe’s] child has not approached any employee, staff member, or

administrator for support, guidance, or in search of any benefit provided by [AR] 103(B).” (ECF

No. 17-1, p. 3). The only interaction between Doe’s child and the school counselor has been

routine and involved class scheduling. (/d.). Beyond Doe and her child, Dr. Miller states that

“Talfter a thorough investigation, I can confirm that a parent/guardian for all students of the Pine-

Richland School District supported under [AR] 103(B) is aware of, and involved in, its

implementation.” (Ud. at 2). He also states that “[t]here is no Policy or Administrative

Regulation of the Pine-Richland School District that permits, encourages, or recommends a

psychological evaluation of a student without parental consent in any circumstance.” (/d. at 3).

Doe asks the Court to enjoin the District from implementing or enforcing Sections C, D,

E, F, G, and H of AR 103(B), claiming that it violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

(Count I), the provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1232(h) (Count IJ), the common law right of parental

consent (Count II), and the Minors’ Consent to Medical Care Act, 35 P.S. § 10101, et seg.

(Count IV). (ECF Nos. 5 and 31).

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Doe has not demonstrated that she is likely to succeed on the merits of

the claims set forth in the Amended Complaint.

In order to obtain the requested preliminary injunctive relief, Doe must demonstrate that

she “can win on the merits.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179. At this stage, Doe does not have to make

“a more-likely-than-not showing of success on the merits.” Jd at 179 n.3. Instead, she must

“show a likelihood of success on the merits (that is, a reasonable chance, or probability, of

winning).” Singer Mgmt. Consultants v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(emphasis in original). This “requires a showing significantly better than negligible but not

necessarily more likely than not.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179.

Doe cannot meet her burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits

because she has not demonstrated an injury-in-fact necessary to confer Article II standing.

Absent standing, the Court cannot examine her substantive claims. As the Court stated in the

introduction to this memorandum opinion, the Constitution only gives it the authority to decide

actual cases and controversies. “Under Article III, federal courts do not adjudicate hypothetical

or abstract disputes. Federal courts do not possess a roving commission to publicly opine on

every legal question. Federal courts do not exercise general legal oversight of the Legislative

and Executive Branches, or of private entities. And federal courts do not issue advisory

opinions.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021). “For there to be a case

or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a ‘personal stake’ in the case—in other

words, standing.” Jd. at 423 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)).

The Supreme Court has explained that to establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1)

that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that

the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed

by judicial relief.” /d. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Thus,

“the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the court

can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve.” Jd. (quoting

Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019)).

As to the injury-in-fact requirement, the Supreme Court has instructed that to satisfy

Article TI, the injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not

‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)

(citation omitted). “An allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is

‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Jd. (quoting

Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). “Although imminence is concededly a

somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the

alleged injury is not too speculative for Article IH purposes—that the injury is certainly

impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Supreme

Court has, therefore “repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to

constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” Jd.

(emphasis in original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).

In determining whether Doe has alleged an injury that is concrete, particularized and

actual or imminent, the Court is guided by persuasive cases of other federal courts addressing

similar issues to those she presents—i.e., in what circumstances parents have Article II standing

to challenge public school gender policies. A number of courts have decided cases that are

factually similar to Doe’s action. In applying the Supreme Court precedent cited above, those

courts have held that for Article III standing to be present, parents must point to something more

than the mere concern that a school may apply its transgender policy to their child.

In John and Jane Parents I v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ. et al., 78 F. 4th 622 (4th

Cir. 2023), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that parent plaintiffs

lacked standing to challenge the defendant school district’s Guidelines for Gender Identity

(dubbed by the plaintiffs as the “Parental Preclusion Policy’). The defendant district

promulgated a comprehensive policy “that permit[s] schools to develop gender support plans for

students. The [policy] allow[s] implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent

of the students’ parents. [It] even authorize[s] the schools to withhold information about the

plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive.” Jd. at 626. The plaintiff

parents alleged that the policy “violates their fundamental right to raise their children under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution as well as various state and federal statutes.” Jd. at

627.

The Fourth Circuit observed:

The parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are

transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. Asaresult, they —

have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any

information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a

substantial risk information will be withheld in the future.

Id. at 626. Jt held that the parents failed to allege an actual or imminent injury required to confer

standing under Article IH. Jd. at 629. It explained that “standing requires either a current injury,

a certainly impending injury or a substantial risk of future injury. And the parents do not allege

one.” Jd. “As for current injury, they have not alleged any of their children have gender support

plans. Nor have they alleged that their children have had any discussions with school officials

about gender-identity or gender-transition issues.” Jd. The Fourth Circuit further explained that

the parents failed to allege a certainly impending future injury: “[flor example, they have not

alleged that they suspect their children might be considering gender transition or have a

heightened risk of dosing so ... [T]he closest the parents come to alleging such a possibility is

stating that ‘[fJor all [they] know,’ their children ‘might soon be’ subject to a gender support plan

that is withheld from them.” Jd at 630. It held that the parents’ claims were based on “a

speculative fear, the occurrence of which requires guesswork as to actions of others.” Jd. at 631.

The Fourth Circuit explained:

Determining whether the parents will ever sustain an injury based on the Parental

Preclusion Policy requires a chain of the following future events to occur: (1)

their minor children must determine they identify as transgender or gender

nonconforming, (2) their minor children must decide they want to approach the

‘school about a gender support plan, (3) the school must deem the parents

unsupportive and (4) it must then decide to keep the information about their

children from them.

Id. Finally, it rejected the idea that Article II standing exists because the parents “may never

know they have been injured.” Jd. It explained that under firm Supreme Court precedent (i.e.,

Clapper), “we do not toss out the injury requirement because the government hides information.”

Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded, “the fact that the Montgomery County Board of Education

permits its schools to keep information about its students’ gender support plans and related

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gender-identity issues from their parents, while perhaps repugnant as a matter of policy, does not

create standing.” Id.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin reached a similar

conclusion to the Fourth Circuit’s Montgomery decision in Parents Protecting Our Children, UA

v. Eau Claire Area Sch. Dist., 657 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (W.D. Wis. 2023). There, an

unincorporated association of parents sued the defendant school district claiming that its internal

guidance on the treatment of transgender, non-binary, and gender-nonconforming students

violates their federal and state constitutional and statutory rights. The Wisconsin district court

held that the parents lacked Article TI standing because they failed to allege an actual or

imminent injury. In so holding, it explained:

More critical to the standing analysis, however, is that plaintiff does not allege (1)

that any of its members’ children are transgender or gender nonconforming, (2)

that the district has applied the gender identity support Guidance or Plan with

respect to its member’s [sic] children or any other children, or (3) that any parent

or guardian has been denied information related to their child’s identity.

Id. at 1169-70. Thus, the district court held that the complaint did not include allegations

“supporting an inference that any actual harm is occurring now.” Jd. at 1170. The court also

found that there was nothing pled to support a determination that injury was imminent:

Plaintiff's entire standing argument is premised on a speculative chain of

possibilities, including future choices made by individuals who have not yet been

identified, indeed, who cannot yet be identified because they have nor acted, and

they might never act. This will not suffice. “[T]he failure to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level is the very definition of insufficient.” Plaintiff's

asserted injuries are based on its belief that the Guidance one day will interfere

with one of its members’ right to direct the upbringing of their child. Therefore,

to sustain an injury, a member’s child must: (1) develop a belief that they have a

gender identity that differs from their biological sex; (2) affirmatively approach a

district employee and request gender identity support; (3) request a gender

support plan; and (4) make the request without parental consent or knowledge.

Also part of this chain of possibilities are: (5) the school must not discuss the

gender support plan with the parent and/or (6) the parent must not request to see

the student’s educational records.

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7d. at 1171 (anternal citations omitted).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, faced with similar

claims, reached the same result in Parents Defending Educ. v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 629 F.

Supp. 3d 891 (N.D. Iowa 2022). An association of parents challenged a comprehensive gender

policy that included a privacy policy containing the following: “[t]he district shall not disclose

information that may reveal a student’s transgender status to others including but not limited to

other students, parents, and school staff unless legally required to do so (such as national

standardized testing, drivers permits, transcripts, etc.), or unless the student has authorized such

disclosure.” Jd. at 900. The parent plaintiffs raised two classes of claims. The first class was

that the defendant district’s policy violated parental rights. The second class was that the policy

included provisions infringing free speech.

The district court held that the parents lacked standing to assert violations of parental

rights (although certain speech-related claims were permitted to proceed). Like the cases

discussed above, the district court concluded that the parents had not asserted injury in fact or an

imminent injury:

[Plaintiff asserts a conjectural possibility of injury via a Gender Support Plan

being created for the children without parental knowledge or consent. They

predict the school and/or their children will not involve the parents in the creation

of or discussions about a Gender Support Plan and that the school will not be

forthcoming about Gender Support Plans when parents ask in violation of their

fundamental rights of child-rearing. Based on the record currently before the

Court, no one has been denied information related to their child’s gender identity

or Gender Support Plan. Though the Court does not doubt their genuine fears, the

facts currently alleged before the Court do not sufficiently show the parents or

their children have been injured or that they face certainly impending injury

through enforcement of the Policy. The theory that (1) their child will express a

desire for or indicate by mistake a desire for a plan, (2) the child will be given a

plan, (3) without parental consent or knowledge, (4) and the information will be

hidden or denied when parents ask requires too many speculative assumptions

without sufficient factual allegations to support a finding of injury.

12

Id. at 908 (citation omitted).!

Finally, the recent decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Ohio in Kaltenbach et al. v. Hilliard City Sch., No. 2:23-cv-187, 2024 WL 1831079 (S.D. OH

Apr. 19, 2024), is an instructive illustration of circumstances where parents do, and do not, have

standing to challenge a school’s gender policy. The policy at issue was described as follows:

The District’s “default” is that it will tell parents anything important about their

children, including things related to LGBTQ+ issues. However, there is a “health

and safety” exception to this default. Separately, the District labels people who

do not support LGBTQ+ youth as “unsafe.” Plaintiffs allege that when a parent is

labeled “unsafe,” the “health and safety” exception applies[,] and, therefore, the

parent will not be told important information. Thus, Plaintiffs allege, if a child

reports that the child is struggling with LGBTQ+-related issues, and if that child's

parent has been labelled “unsafe,” that parent will never be informed about the

child’s struggles.

Id. at *1 (internal citations omitted).

The district court held that one parent had standing to challenge the defendant district’s

policy. The parent had a child who was subjected to the defendant district’s policy without

parental knowledge and who was referred to by a different name and pronouns at school (again,

without parental knowledge). The parent only became aware of the school’s interaction with her

child after the child was hospitalized due to a suicide attempt. This parent had Article III

standing to challenge the defendant district’s policy.”

The Court held that the other parent plaintiffs (whom it referred to as “In-District

Plaintiffs”) lacked standing:

' The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion

on other grounds. The claims relating to parental rights had become moot while the case was on

appeal. Parents Defending Educ. v. Linn-Mar Comty. Sch. Dist., 83 F.4th 658 (8th Cir. 2023).

2 The district court held that the parent only had standing to seek damages from the school

district. She did not have Article III standing to seek any prospective relief with respect to the

district’s policy because the child no longer attended a school in the district and, therefore, was

no longer subjected to the district’s policies. /d. at *5.

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In-District Plaintiffs’ theory for the Claims is as follows: if the District believes a

parent does not support LGBTQ+ youth, the District labels that parent as

“unsafe.” If an “unsafe” parent’s child expresses or questions an LGBTQt

identity (or makes statements suggesting a mental illness), the District may decide

that the fact that the parents [are] “unsafe” warrants a “health and safety”

exception to the default policy of telling parents important things about their

children. If that happens, the District may offer the child mental health treatment

without consulting the parents. These actions, allege In-District Plaintiffs, would

violate their rights to freedom of conscience, familial integrity, and freedom of

speech. Further, because the District allegedly does all these things under

impermissibly vague Policies, the District violates the parents’ due process rights.

In other words, ifa child expresses or questions an LGBTQ+ identity (or shows

signs of a mental illness) to a school official, and ifthe parent has, or is perceived

to have, anti-LGBTQ+ views, and if the school knows about those views, and if

the combination of those facts mean the school does not tell the parent about the

child’s sexual-identity comments, and ifthe school gives the child mental health

treatment without the parent’s consent or knowledge, then the parent’s rights are

violated because the parent is being “punished” for his or her beliefs and speech,

is deprived of the ability to make important health decisions for the child, and has

suffered these deprivations under impermissibly vague Policies.

The number of “ifs” in the preceding paragraph show[s] why In-District Plaintiffs

lack standing. In-District Plaintiffs offer no allegations that their children have

told or will tell the school that they are (or may be) LGBTQ+ or that the children

show any signs of mental illness. Because In-District Plaintiffs have not plausibly

alleged that their children have reported or will report such issues to school

officials, they have likewise not plausibly alleged that they will suffer any injury

as a result of what the District might do in response to such a report.

Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

Many of the considerations that led to the determination that the plaintiffs in the above-

referenced cases lacked Article standing are present in this case. The sum of Doe’s

allegations relating to standing are that she is a parent of a child in the District, that there are

members of her child’s friend group who may identify as transgender, and that she believes her

child has visited websites addressing transgender issues. She has not alleged that her child

identifies as transgender, that her child has approached the District with respect to gender, or that

the District has interacted with her child in any way with respect to gender. Further, Doe agreed

14

to proceed on her pleadings without adducing any further evidence in support of her claims and

without cross-examining the facts presented by Dr. Miller—who declares that Doe’s child has

never approached District personnel with respect to gender issues and that the only interaction

that the District has had with Doe’s child concerns normal school related issues, such as class

scheduling. (ECF No. 17-1, p. 3).

Doe has not pled or presented evidence of a current injury or an imminent future injury.

Rather, like the plaintiffs in the cases discussed above, she has presented concerns that an injury

may arise but nothing to show that that injury is “certainly impending” or that there is a

“substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158 (emphasis

added). The unimpeached facts of record (per Dr. Miller’s Declaration) are that the District has

not applied its gender policy to Doe’s child. It has never been approached by, or otherwise

interacted with, Doe’s child with respect to gender. These facts cannot support a finding of a

current injury. Nor can they support a finding of imminent injury. The mere fact that Doe’s

child has friends who identify as transgender and that the child allegedly looked at internet sites

discussing gender issues does not indicate that Doe’s child identifies as transgender. Even if the

child did, standing still does not exist unless Doe’s child has some interaction with the District

pursuant to its gender policy. But Doe has failed to submit anything to establish a nexus between

her child and the District’s gender policy. At this point, a finding of imminent injury to Doe

“requires too many speculative assumptions without sufficient factual allegations to support a

finding of injury.” Linn-Mar, 629 F. Supp. 3d at 908. Nor, as the Supreme Court instructed in

Clapper, do Doe’s concerns that she may not know about interactions between her child and the

District confer standing.

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Because Doe has not met her burden of establishing standing under Article HI, the Court

cannot address the substance of her claims. As such, for the purposes of the requested

preliminary injunction, the Court holds that Doe has not shown a reasonable likelihood of

success on the merits.

B. Doe has not shown that she will suffer irreparable harm absent the

Court granting her requested preliminary injunction.

The next prong of the test for whether a preliminary injunction may issue asks whether

Doe has established that she “is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179. In other words, Doe must “demonstrate potential

harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Acierno,

40 F.3d at 653 (citation omitted). This potential harm must be “immediate”—it is insufficient to

watrant preliminary injunctive relief “if the harm will occur only in the indefinite future.”

Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

Doe fails under this prong for the same reasons discussed above. She has not

demonstrated that she will suffer irreparable harm absent the grant of a preliminary injunction.

Doe has not demonstrated any actual or immediate harm. Absent the harm required to confer

Article III standing, the type of injury that would support a preliminary injunction does not exist.

If a movant cannot establish the first two prongs—the “gateway factors’”—for

preliminary injunctive relief, the Court does not have to weigh the remaining issues, and a

preliminary injunction may not issue. The Court need not, therefore, conduct an analysis of the

remaining prongs.

IV. CONCLUSION

There is no question that the issues presented by Doe are important and timely. There is

no question that Doe’s concerns about the District’s policies are legitimate. Nevertheless, even

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where a case presents important and timely issues, “[flederal courts do not possess a roving

commission to publicly opine on every legal question.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. The

Constitution only confers jurisdiction over cases and controversies in which a plaintiff has

standing. Because Doe cannot demonstrate that she has incurred an injury, or that an injury is

impending, she lacks the standing necessary to permit the Court to examine the merits of her

claims. The Court must, therefore, deny her motion. An Order of Court will follow.

BY THE COURT:

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WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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SET 29

Date

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