MCLAREN v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT McLAREN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-558

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

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decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed errors of

fact and law in assessing his subjective reports and in determining his residual functional

capacity (“RFC”). (Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff specifically asserts that the ALJ did not

credit significant probative evidence and committed an error of law by rejecting his

subjective complaints because they were not established by objective evidence. (Id. at

11-15). Further, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ’s RFC limiting him to light work with

postural and environmental limitations was made in error because the ALJ did not

acknowledge Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis of both knees, obesity, chronic obstructive

pulmonary disease (“COPD”), and fatigue. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff attaches to his

brief an exhibit titled “index to medical record” containing a chart summary of each

doctor’s opinion and organized by those produced before his date of last insured (“DLI”)

and those produced after his DLI. (Doc. No. 11-1). For the following reasons, the Court

finds no merit in Plaintiff’s arguments and affirms the ALJ’s finding of non-disability.

In disagreeing with Plaintiff’s first argument that the ALJ erred by rejecting his

subjective complaints and ignoring significant probative evidence, the Court notes that an

ALJ is not under an obligation to simply accept what the claimant said without question.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d

Cir. 2011). Further, when an ALJ has articulated reasons supporting a credibility

determination, that determination is afforded significant deference. See Horodenski v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007); Reefer v. Barnhart, 326

F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). While Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ cannot ignore

significant probative evidence, see Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-04

(3d Cir. 2008), here the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony and reasonably concluded

that it was not credible.

The Court finds that the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s testimony was logical and that

the ALJ did not ignore significant probative evidence. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed

to credit significant probative evidence without explanation, failed to discuss evidence

contrary to Plaintiff’s complaints, and rejected Plaintiff’s testimony solely because it was

not established by objective evidence. (Doc. No. 11 at 7-15). Plaintiff points to

evidence outside the relevant period, namely a stroke he suffered in November 2015 and a

diagnosis of osteoarthritis in both knees, to show that his testimony was credible. (Id. at

12-13; R. 19, 529 (noting the relevant period was May 30 to Dec. 31, 2018 and Plaintiff

suffered a stroke in November 2015 and was diagnosed with osteoarthritis on January 29,

2018)). However, during the relevant period, Plaintiff’s physical exam findings were

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unremarkable, Plaintiff denied symptoms to his providers, and he reported feeling well.

(R. 24-25). Further, while Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored his complaints of fatigue,

Plaintiff does not point to any part of the record where he complained of fatigue during the

relevant period, as Defendant points out. (Doc. No. 17 at 12). Rather, Plaintiff points

to extraneous evidence, including an article from the American Stroke Association,

showing that there is a correlation between strokes and fatigue. (Doc. No. 11 at 12-13).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s first argument is without merit.

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ could not reject his complaints solely because

they are not established by objective evidence is equally unconvincing. (Id. at 11) (citing

Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d

546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005)). In both Mason and Rutherford, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that subjective complaints can be rejected when

contrary medical evidence exists within the record. See Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067 (noting

the claimant’s complaints “may not be disregarded unless there exists contrary medical

evidence”); Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (stating an “ALJ can reject such a limitation if

there is conflicting evidence in the record”). In this case, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints based on contrary medical evidence; indeed, the ALJ explained that

Plaintiff’s symptoms such as shortness of breath and chest pain were refuted by objective

medical evidence during the relevant period, specifically Plaintiff’s exams showing normal

respiration, clear lungs, and regular heart rate. (R. 24; Ex. B2F/37). Accordingly, the

ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is supported by substantial evidence.

The Court also finds no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ ignored medical

evidence in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to

incorporate his osteoarthritis in both knees, obesity, COPD, and fatigue into his RFC. The

Court notes that in making an RFC determination, the ALJ, of course, must consider all the

evidence before him. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. The ALJ must give an indication

of the evidence which he or she rejects and the reasons for discounting such evidence. See

id.; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. “In the absence of such an indication, the reviewing court

cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.” Cotter,

642 F.2d at 705. Here, it is clear the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s obesity, COPD, and

fatigue to the extent they were relevant during the applicable period. As to his obesity,

the ALJ specifically incorporated this into Plaintiff’s RFC, stating, “[a]lthough the claimant

has alleged no specific limitations due to his weight, the effects of obesity, alone and in

combination with other impairments, have been considered in determining his residual

functional capacity.” (R. 25). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s COPD and

intermittent use of oxygen. (R. 23, 26). The ALJ considered this even though Plaintiff

admitted during his hearing that he did not need oxygen during the relevant period in 2018.

(R. 47). As to Plaintiff’s fatigue, Plaintiff cites no evidence that he suffered from fatigue

during the relevant period, and he denied feeling fatigued several times at his doctors’

appointments. (R. 444, 555). Moreover, the ALJ specifically decided to limit Plaintiff

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

to light work “to further address the claimant’s described symptoms of chest pain and

shortness of breath, as well as the references to long-standing cardiac problems, leg pain,

and obesity.” (R. 26). The ALJ therefore more than adequately addressed this evidence.

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to

consider Plaintiff’s bilateral osteoarthritis. While Plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral

osteoarthritis before the relevant period, the record reveals that Plaintiff did not seek

treatment for knee pain, denied musculoskeletal symptoms, and walked with a normal gait

during the relevant period. (R. 490-91). Plaintiff’s lack of symptoms during this period

account for the ALJ’s lack of specific limitations incorporating this impairment. See

Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (stating the ALJ need only incorporate “credibly established

limitations” into the RFC). In sum, the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence.

Lastly, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, titled “index to medical record[,]”

is cumulative evidence that does not qualify for a “new evidence” remand. See 42

U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (stating that to support a “new evidence” remand of a case, the evidence

must be new and not merely cumulative of what is already in the record, among other

criteria); Szubak v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir.

1984) (explaining that “§ 405(g) now requires that to support a ‘new evidence’ remand the

evidence must first be ‘new’ and not merely cumulative of what is already in the record.”).

Accordingly, the Court did not consider this exhibit as substantive evidence.

For all these reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.

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