NOLAN v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT J. NOLAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-718

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 14th day of May, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

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decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in determining

his severe impairments and in crafting his residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Doc

No. 14). Specifically, he contends that the ALJ failed to account for his mild limitations

in all four areas of mental functioning, failed to recognize that his mental and cognitive

limitations were severe impairments, and failed to follow the Social Security

Administration’s guidelines for evaluating headaches. (Id.). For the following reasons,

the Court disagrees and affirms the ALJ’s finding of non-disability.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s first argument that the ALJ erred by failing to include

limitations in his RFC accommodating his mild limitations in all four areas of mental

functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with

others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing

oneself (collectively the “Paragraph B Criteria”). (Id. at 4-6). In this case, the ALJ

made the following RFC determination:

[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as

defined in 20 CFR. 404.1567(b) except he could only occasionally climb,

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl and he would need to avoid

concentrated exposure (defined as more than two-thirds of the workday) to

temperature extremes, wetness, humidity, respiratory irritants (like odors,

fumes, dusts, and gases), and hazards.

(R. 22). Plaintiff argues this RFC did not incorporate his mild mental limitations in the

Paragraph B Criteria and that this error was harmful. (Doc. No. 14 at 4-6). The Court

disagrees.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the ALJ’s finding of mild limitations in

each of the Paragraph B Criteria demanded no specific formulation of the RFC. See Hess

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating “no incantations are

required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding has been made at steps

two and three.”). The ALJ needs only have a “valid explanation” for the limitations

included in the RFC. Id. at 211. Accordingly, merely finding that Plaintiff had mild

mental limitations did not require the ALJ to include any specific restrictions in the RFC.

What the ALJ did do was to offer a sufficiently valid explanation for the findings

included in Plaintiff’s RFC with a thorough discussion of the evidence such that the Court

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is satisfied that Plaintiff’s RFC included all “credibly established” limitations.

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005). The ALJ analyzed

Plaintiff’s mental impairments and exercised his discretion in choosing not to include

limitations in the RFC specifically accommodating Plaintiff’s mild limitations in the

Paragraph B Criteria. The ALJ did so by analyzing the opinions of the state agency

psychologists, Drs. Erin Nicole Urbanowicz, Psy. D., and James Vizza, Psy.D., who both

concluded that Plaintiff had mild limitations in each of the Paragraph B Criteria. (R. 25).

While the ALJ found these opinions to be persuasive, he was under no obligation to

incorporate any express language into the RFC to account for them. See Wilkinson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 558 F. Appx. 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (explaining

“no rule or regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an RFC every finding made by

a medical source simply because the ALJ gives the source’s opinion as a whole

‘significant’ weight . . . the controlling regulations are clear that the RFC finding is a

determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner.”); Hess, 931 F.3d at 209 (stating

“no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding has

been made at steps two and three.”). The ALJ also considered the opinion of Dr. Lindsay

Ledwich, D.O., who opined that Plaintiff had some moderate work-related mental

limitations, and the ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive. (R. 26). Further, the ALJ

specifically noted that Plaintiff had received no formal mental health treatment. (R. 25).

The ALJ also evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony concerning his struggles with concentration,

memory, brain fog, and fatigue, which the ALJ found not credible. (R. 23, 45, 55). In

sum, the RFC is supported by substantial evidence, as the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s mental

impairments and concluded limitations were not needed to accommodate Plaintiff’s mild

limitations in the Paragraph B Criteria.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s next argument that the ALJ failed to recognize

that his mental and cognitive limitations were severe impairments. (Doc. No. 14 at 6-8).

Plaintiff contends that his neuropsychological testing, statements, and testimony showed

that his cognitive impairments significantly limited him. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff asserts that

he underwent neuropsychological testing that confirmed impaired memory and showed he

had impaired cognitive processing speed, executive functioning, and mental flexibility.

(Id.) (citing R. 378, 384-85)). Additionally, he notes that his function report revealed that

he can only prepare basic meals, sometimes forgets to shower, and must make lists or notes

to remember things. (Doc No. 14 at 7 (citing R. 256-61)). Further, Plaintiff’s testimony

alleged that his mental limitations impacted his daily functioning. (Doc. No. 14 at 7

(citing R. 45, 51, 55-56)). After review of this evidence and the record as a whole, the

Court finds the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s mental and cognitive limitations is supported

by substantial evidence.

Under the controlling regulations, an impairment is severe only if it significantly

limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do “basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c). The claimant has the burden of showing that an impairment is severe.

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Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). Additionally, as a general matter, when

an ALJ has articulated reasons supporting a credibility determination, that determination is

afforded significant deference. See Horodenski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed. Appx.

183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007). A claimant’s subjective complaints of symptoms alone are

insufficient for establishing disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).

Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s

mental and cognitive limitations were non-severe impairments. The ALJ sufficiently

explained that Plaintiff’s “major depressive disorder and mild cognitive impairment,

considered singly and in combination, do not cause more than a minimal limitation in the

[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic mental work activities[.]” (R. 19). The ALJ did so

by analyzing Plaintiff’s neuropsychological testing, which was largely normal with only

mild abnormalities, and Plaintiff’s mental status examinations, which were also normal.

(Id.). The ALJ also considered the broad functional areas of mental functioning, the

Paragraph B Criteria, and explained how he concluded that Plaintiff had only a mild

limitation in each of these areas. (Id.). In sum, the ALJ thoroughly analyzed Plaintiff’s

mental and cognitive limitations and came to a reasonable conclusion that these were non-

severe impairments.

Plaintiff’s argument that his statements and testimony compelled a different result

is also unconvincing. The ALJ thoroughly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony and concluded

that it was not entirely credible. (R. 23). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff continued to

receive normal examination results, that he engages in many activities of daily living, and

that Plaintiff has not received any formal mental health treatment during the relevant

period. (R. 24-25). Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental and

cognitive impairments were non-severe is supported by substantial evidence. Further,

even assuming the ALJ did err in finding Plaintiff’s mental and cognitive limitations were

non-severe impairments, such an error would be deemed harmless because the ALJ did not

deny Plaintiff’s claim at Step Two. See Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. Appx.

140, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating “[b]ecause the ALJ found in [claimant’s] favor at Step

Two, even if he had erroneously concluded that some of her other impairments were non-

severe, any error was harmless.”).

Moreover, the Court does not find merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed

to follow the Social Security Administration guidelines for evaluating headache disorders.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not follow Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)

19-4p because he did not discuss how Plaintiff’s migraines factor into the RFC and instead

made only a “blanket statement that Listing 11.02 was not met ‘because the record does

not demonstrate abnormalities equivalent to’ the specified criteria for seizures.” (Doc.

No. 14 at 9 (quoting R. 21)). Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the RFC is deficient

because the ALJ found Plaintiff’s migraines were severe at Step Two and did not include

a corresponding RFC limitation. (Id. at 9-10).

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SSR 19-4p provides a framework for ALJs to use in determining if a claimant has

a medically determinable impairment (“MDI”) of a primary headache disorder and

provides guidance on how that disorder is evaluated. SSR 19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635

(Aug. 26, 2019). The Ruling contains nine questions relevant to headache disorders, and

Plaintiff’s arguments center on questions eight and nine: “8. [h]ow do we evaluate an MDI

of a primary headache disorder under the Listing of Impairments? [and] . . . 9. [h]ow do

we consider an MDI of a primary headache disorder in assessing a person’s residual

functional capacity?” Id. at *7. The Ruling provides pursuant to question eight that

Listing 11.02, for epilepsy, “is the mostly closely analogous listed impairment for an MDI

of a primary headache disorder.” Id. Under question nine, the Ruling provides that the

ALJ “must consider and discuss the limiting effects of all impairments and any related

symptoms when assessing a person’s RFC . . . [and the ALJ] consider[s] the extent to which

the person’s impairment-related symptoms are consistent with the evidence in the record.”

Id. at *7-8.

Here, it is clear the ALJ followed SSR 19-4p. First, the ALJ followed the

Administration’s guidance at question eight by evaluating Plaintiff’s migraines under

Listing 11.02. (R. 21). The ALJ explained that this Listing was not met “because the

record [did] not demonstrate abnormalities equivalent to generalized tonic-clonic seizures

. . .” (Id.). The ALJ’s analysis of this Listing was sufficient given that his “decision,

read as a whole, illustrates that [he] considered the appropriate factors in reaching the

conclusion that” Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for this Listing. Jones v.

Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2004). Second, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s

migraines in determining his RFC, in accordance with question nine, by noting Plaintiff’s

diagnosis of “migraine with aura and without status migrainosus” and by acknowledging

that Plaintiff reported his migraine headaches were “very manageable to his PCP” in July

of 2020. (R. 23-24). All of this was factored into the RFC, which incorporated

environmental limitations. (R. 22 (stating Plaintiff would need to avoid concentrated

exposure “to temperature extremes, wetness, humidity, respiratory irritants (like odors,

fumes, dusts, and gases), and hazards.”). These environmental limitations were first

opined by Dr. Nghia Van Tran, M.D., who explained that these limitations were needed

due, in part, to accommodate Plaintiff’s migraines. (R. 25, 101). The ALJ found this

opinion generally persuasive and incorporated these environmental limitations into the

RFC. (R. 25-26). Thus, the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that he followed SSR 19-4p

and substantial evidence supports his findings.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

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