BLAKEMAN v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KIA BLAKEMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-760

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v.

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health

& Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

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1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)

(if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a

federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have

decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in determining

her residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Doc No. 11). Specifically, she contends the

ALJ failed to incorporate her mild impairment in adapting and managing herself within the

RFC finding and subsequent hypothetical posed to the vocational expert (“VE”) and that

the ALJ erred by failing to consider evidence showing that she would be off-task more than

10 percent of the time and miss more than two days of work per month. (Id.). For the

following reasons, the Court disagrees and affirms the ALJ’s finding of non-disability.

The Court reviews the ALJ’s findings to determine whether they are supported by

substantial evidence. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir.

2005) (quotation omitted). This Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own

findings for the ALJ’s findings even when there is evidence in the record to support a

“contrary conclusion.” Malloy v. Comm’r, 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009).

The ALJ uses a five-step evaluation process to determine disability. 20 C.F.R §§

404.1520(a), 416.920(a). Step One requires the ALJ to “consider [the claimant’s] work

activity” to ensure he or she is not doing “substantial gainful activity.” Id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At Step Two, the ALJ “consider[s] the medical

severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s),” and for the inquiry to continue, the ALJ must

find that the claimant has at least one “severe medically determinable physical or mental

impairment . . . or a combination of impairments[,]” that has lasted or is “expected to last

for a continuous period of at least 12 months.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),

416.920(a)(4)(ii); Id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. A claimant’s satisfaction of his or her burden

of proof at Step Two leads to Step Three where the ALJ asks whether the claimant’s

impairments meet or equal the criteria for one of the presumptively disabling impairments

listed in the regulations (the “Listings”). Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

If a Listing is not met, the inquiry continues to Steps Four and Five, which requires an

assessment of the claimant’s RFC and a determination as to whether the claimant can return

to past relevant work or perform other substantial work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v),

416.920(a)(4)(iv)-(v).

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The Court rejects Plaintiff’s first argument that the ALJ erred by failing to include

non-exertional limitations in her RFC and the hypothetical posed to the VE accommodating

her mild impairment in adapting and managing herself. (Doc. No. 11 at 4-7). In this

case, the ALJ made the following RFC determination:

[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in

20 CFR. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except:

• She requires jobs that offer an opportunity to alternate sitting and standing

every 30 minutes.

• She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes,

or scaffolds.

• She can occasionally balance and stoop.

• She can never kneel, crouch, or crawl.

• She is limited to frequent handling, fingering, and feeling with her left upper

extremity.

• She must avoid concentrated exposure to extremes of cold and heat,

vibration, wetness, humidity, environmental irritants such as fumes, odors,

dusts, gases, and areas of poor ventilation, as well as hazards such as

inherently dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights.

• She is limited to simple work, carrying out simple instructions and using

judgment to make simple work-related decisions.

• Her work duties and any changes must be explained, written and or

demonstrated.

• Her work must not have strict production rates or time quotas.

• She can have occasional interaction with others.

(R. 19-20). Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not go far enough in his articulation of non-

exertional limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that evidence of her mild

impairment in her ability to adapt or manage herself warranted further functional

limitations. (Doc. No. 11 at 4-7). The Court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Plaintiff’s contention regarding her RFC

and the VE hypothetical are one and the same. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 n.8 (stating

“objections to the adequacy of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil

down to attacks on the RFC assessment itself.”). Further, the ALJ’s finding of a mild

limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to adapt or manage herself at Step Three demanded no specific

formulation of the RFC at Step Four. See Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 209

(3d Cir. 2019) (stating “no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a

particular finding has been made at steps two and three.”). The Court does not require a

verbatim account of an ALJ’s Step Three findings in the RFC determination; rather, the ALJ

needs only have a “valid explanation” for the limitations included in the RFC. Id. at 211.

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Here, the ALJ offered a valid explanation for the findings included in the RFC with

a thorough discussion of the evidence such that the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s RFC

included all “credibly established” limitations. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 n.8. The

ALJ explained at Step Three that Plaintiff suffered only a mild limitation in her ability to

adapt and manage herself because she was able to perform many tasks of daily living, there

was no indication from her treating providers that she was unable to manage her own

medical care, and her mental status examination showed generally fair insight and

judgment. (R. 19; Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an

ALJ’s decision must be “read as a whole”)). Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

activities of daily life were generally inconsistent with her allegations as she was unable to

perform a wide range of activities. (R. 23). Further, the ALJ noted that while Plaintiff

testified that she experienced anxiety, panic attacks, trouble concentrating, and feelings of

self-harm, her testimony was not entirely consistent with the evidence of record. (R. 20-

21). Additionally, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple work, carrying out simple

instructions, using judgment to make simple work-related decisions, work duties and

changes that must be explained, written and or demonstrated, work without strict

production rates or time quotas, and occasional interaction with others” based on Plaintiff’s

mental health history and her diagnoses of major depressive disorder with psychotic

features and PTSD. (R. 22-23). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s RFC is

supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s argument that this case is similar to Gibson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

17-6507, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217918 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2018), is not convincing. First,

this is merely persuasive authority that is not binding on this Court. Second, the Third

Circuit decision discussed in Gibson, specifically Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d

Cir. 2004), does not stand for the proposition that a mild impairment in adapting or

managing oneself demands a specific corresponding functional limitation in the RFC, but

that the ALJ must provide a “valid explanation” for how he or she formulated the RFC.

Id. at 555. For the reasons explained above, the ALJ provided such an explanation and

incorporated limitations into the RFC to account for all of Plaintiff’s “credibly established”

limitations. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 n.8.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s next argument that the ALJ failed to consider the

VE’s opinion on the impact of Plaintiff being off-task more than 10 percent of the time and

absent beyond the acceptable amount of time. (Doc. No. 11 at 7-10). Plaintiff

specifically cites to her counsel’s cross-examination of the VE during the hearing,

revealing that an employee could only miss less than two days of work per month to

maintain unskilled work. (Id. at 7 (citing R. 62)). Plaintiff points to evidence within the

record, including her testimony and reports to doctors about mental health issues, showing

that Plaintiff would be absent more than the allowed amount of time and would not be able

to remain on task at work and contends that the ALJ failed to discuss this evidence. (Id.

at 8-10). For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

First, the ALJ thoroughly explained why he did not include additional off-task

time and absenteeism in Plaintiff’s RFC and VE hypothetical. As explained above, the

ALJ appropriately rejected Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of her impairments. (R. 21-23). Further, the ALJ explained why he

rejected the opinion of Dr. Stephanie Richards, M.D., who opined that Plaintiff could not

work a normal workday or workweek due to extreme limitations in her ability to behave in

an emotionally stable manner and relate predictably in social situations. (R. 24). The

ALJ explained that he did not find this opinion to be persuasive because it was neither

supported by Dr. Richards’ records nor consistent with evidence of record showing

Plaintiff could perform many activities of daily life. (Id.). Additionally, the record

showed that Plaintiff had normal mental status examination findings, that Plaintiff’s

suicidal ideations resolved following hospitalization, and that Plaintiff did not attend an

intensive outpatient program, as recommended, or therapy until closer in time to the

hearing date. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently considered the record and

determined that Plaintiff did not have work preclusive limitations.

For all these reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.

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