recusal proper where judge in a bench trial sat on the board of trustees of a party negotiating with one of the litigants over property, the ownership of which was at issue in the bench trial
How later courts described this case
- recusal proper where judge in a bench trial sat on the board of trustees of a party negotiating with one of the litigants over property, the ownership of which was at issue in the bench trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID R. KAUFFMAN, :
Plaintiff :
v. : Case No. 3:23-cv-239-KRG-KAP
BARRY SMITH, et al., :
Defendants :
Memorandum Order
Plaintiff’s objections at ECF no. 24 to my order at ECF no. 20 are still pending.
Meanwhile, the Clerk sent the completed complaints and service paperwork to the
Marshal for service.
Plaintiff has now filed repetitive motions about service, ECF no. 32, ECF no. 33,
plus a motion for my recusal based on his dissatisfaction with my handling of his case,
ECF no. 31. Under 28 U.S.C.§ 455(a), a successful motion should identify “facts that might
reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the presiding judge’s] impartiality.”
See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)(recusal
proper where judge in a bench trial sat on the board of trustees of a party negotiating with
one of the litigants over property, the ownership of which was at issue in the bench trial);
Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir.2004)(recusal from habeas proceedings
required of a judge who before taking the federal bench presided over the state court
criminal proceedings). Recusal is almost never proper on the basis of a judge’s actions in
a case, unless they display “unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment
impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994), and a motion cannot be
based “merely on repeated adverse rulings.” See Kirlew v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 267
Fed.Appx. 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2008)(citing Liteky). If plaintiff wants to characterize my
rulings as adverse rulings he is free to do so, but it does not strengthen his motion.
As I said last week, ECF no. 30, service and the time for service is now the Marshal’s
responsibility: plaintiff does not need to file motions or additional motions to extend the
time for service. Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis but he also wants to be
relieved from paying the cost of service. He cannot do that without a showing that he is
indigent, so that motion is denied without prejudice: plaintiff needs to submit a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis including an inmate account statement for the most recent
six months.
With that explanation, the following motions are terminated: ECF no. 33
(clarification granted), ECF no. 32 (denied as unnecessary), ECF no. 31 (denied as
meritless.
1
As before, plaintiff can appeal from this nondispositive order to the presiding
district judge.
DATE:_April 15, 2024
Keith A. Pesto,
Notice by U.S. Mail to: United States Magistrate Judge
David R Kauffman QD-9561
S.C.I. Forest
P.O. Box 945
286 Woodland Drive
Marienville, PA 16239