The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SEAN M. BROOKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-253
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY, 1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)
(if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal
1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting
Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the
claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2
2 It is important in this case to remember that the period of time at issue is very limited, as
Plaintiff’s alleged onset date was September 15, 2020, and his date last insured was September
30, 2020. Plaintiff accordingly had to prove he was disabled within those dates. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.131. The reason for this very small window is in large part due to the fact that Plaintiff had
filed a prior claim for benefits that was denied on June 24, 2020, and that was not re-opened. (R.
81-93). Although the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was required to – and did – consider
the record as a whole, including evidence from outside the relevant time period, such evidence is
relevant only so far as it pertains to Plaintiff’s condition during the relevant period. See Ortega
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 232 Fed. Appx. 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). With that understanding, the
Court finds that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled during that period was
supported substantial evidence.
Much of Plaintiff’s lengthy brief constitutes a request for the Court to reconsider the
evidence and find that the ALJ erred in finding him not to be disabled. However, the Court
emphasizes at the outset that, if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision
must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely
because it would have decided the claim differently. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-
91 (3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). Moreover, “[t]he
presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the
[ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). To the extent the Court is being
asked to come to its own conclusion based on the evidence, therefore, it declines to do so.
Though the fact that the ALJ’s well-crafted decision is supported by substantial evidence
needs little further explanation from this Court, the Court will address a few of the points raised
by Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues, for example, that the ALJ erred in finding that his migraine
headaches did not constitute a medically determinable impairment, and that his irritable bowel
syndrome (“IBS”), gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), right shoulder labrum tear, and
residuals of carpal and cubital tunnel syndromes were not “severe” impairments at Step Two of
the sequential analysis. The Court first notes that the ALJ discussed each of these conditions in
some detail during his Step Two analysis, finding that Plaintiff failed to produce evidence
relevant to the period at issue of consistent ongoing care for his migraines, and that the evidence
did not establish that Plaintiff’s IBS, GERD, right shoulder labrum tear, or carpal and cubital
tunnel syndrome significantly limited his ability to work during the relevant time.
However, regardless, the Step Two determination as to whether a claimant is suffering
from a severe impairment is a threshold analysis requiring the showing of only one severe
impairment. See Bradley v. Barnhart, 175 Fed. Appx. 87, 90 (7th Cir. 2006). In other words, as
long as a claim is not denied at Step Two, it is not generally necessary for the ALJ specifically to
have found any additional alleged impairment to be severe. See Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229
Fed. Appx. 140, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); Lee v. Astrue, Civ. No. 06-5167, 2007 WL 1101281, at *3
n.5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2007); Lyons v. Barnhart, Civ. No. 05-104, 2006 WL 1073076, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 27, 2006); Gerald v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00575, 2018 WL 7364649, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:17-575, 2019 WL 719829 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 19, 2019). Since Plaintiff’s claim was not denied at Step Two, it does not matter whether
the ALJ correctly or incorrectly found these other conditions not to be severe impairments.
What matters is whether she properly accounted for any such issues in formulating
Plaintiff’s RFC. In assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ “must consider limitations and restrictions
imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” S.S.R. 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184, at *5 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). “While a ‘not
severe’ impairment(s) standing alone may not significantly limit an individual’s ability to do basic
work activities, it may – when considered with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments
– be critical to the outcome of a claim.” S.S.R. 96-8p at *5. Accordingly, merely because the ALJ
did not find these other conditions to be severe impairments does not mean that they could not still
have affected Plaintiff’s RFC. Here, though, the ALJ expressly discussed Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding his migraines, IBS, GERD, right shoulder labrum tear, and carpal and cubital tunnel
syndrome in explaining how she crafted the RFC. (R. 23-24).
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of his symptoms to be not entirely consistent with the record, emphasizing his minimal
and conservative treatment, and discussing objective medical evidence like clinical findings and
medical imaging evidence, as well as Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. (R. 24-25). Indeed, as
the Commissioner points out, much of Plaintiff’s limited treatment for these conditions occurred
well after his date last insured; for example, Plaintiff’s only documented treatment for migraines
occurred almost a year after the end of the relevant period. (R. 1665-68). Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings, and again, it is not the Court’s place to reweigh the evidence on this
point. It is further worth noting that the mere fact that Plaintiff may have been diagnosed with
migraines, IBS, GERD, right shoulder labrum tear, and carpal and cubital tunnel syndrome is not
really what matters; when determining the RFC, the issue is not whether a claimant has been
diagnosed with a specific condition, but what functional limitations the condition cause. See
Walker v. Barnhart, 172 Fed. Appx. 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2006). Other than very speculative claims
regarding the need for additional absences and off-task time, Plaintiff does not with any
specificity suggest what additional limitations should have been included in the RFC to account
for his conditions.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ incorrectly found that he did not meet Listing 12.04
or 12.06 at Step Three of the sequential analysis. He asserts that the ALJ’s finding that he had
moderate limitations in interacting with others is not supported by substantial evidence because
the evidence showed that he did not get along well with others. He, in fact, believes that this
evidence supports a finding that he was “extremely” limited in his ability to interact with others.
However, the ALJ adequately explained the basis for her finding; the fact that Plaintiff disagrees
and believes the evidence shows something else, as discussed above, is not sufficient to disturb
the ALJ’s findings. Indeed, Plaintiff’s position is based on no more than his own analysis of the
same evidence considered by the ALJ.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 19) is GRANTED as set forth herein.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in finding that he had no limitation in adapting
and managing himself. However, because the ALJ found that Plaintiff had less than marked
limitations in the other three domains, to satisfy the requirements of Part B of either Listing
12.04 or 12.06, Plaintiff would have to prove that he had an extreme limitation in adapting and
managing himself. Accordingly, the question is not whether a finding of no limitations is
justified, but whether the ALJ erred in finding anything less than an extreme limitation. There is
no question that she did not. Moreover, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s claims regarding his
mental and social problems and accounted for these in formulating the RFC, which included
several restrictions about working with others or in stressful situations. (R. 21-22).
Plaintiff further questions how the ALJ could have found the opinions of the state
reviewing agents to be “somewhat persuasive” when, in large part, they found the evidence
insufficient to render an opinion. However, the ALJ explained that she considered evidence not
available to them in crafting the RFC, citing specific record evidence. (R. 25-26). This type of
“[s]urveying the medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of an ALJ’s duties.” Titterington v.
Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). As discussed, the RFC was quite restrictive in
this case. The Court notes that, since there was no supplemental security income claim raised in
this case, and therefore no issue as to whether Plaintiff could qualify for disability benefits after
the insured period ended, there was no need to determine an RFC for before and after the date
that period ended. However, in any event, the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff could
perform the jobs listed assuming either RFC. (R. 62-65).
Throughout his brief, Plaintiff argues that the evidence demonstrates greater restrictions
than were included in his RFC, including in regard to interacting with others, maintaining
attendance, off-task time, and manipulative limitations. However, as noted above, the Court
cannot accept Plaintiff’s invitation to reweigh the evidence and reach its own conclusion. The
ALJ considered the combined effect of all of Plaintiff’s symptoms, and her decision is consistent
with the governing law and supported by substantial evidence, especially in light of the very
limited relevant time frame in this matter. The Court therefore will affirm.