In Re: Adoption of: P.G.D.W., a Minor

J-A11037-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: P.G.D.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: S.A.B., MOTHER :

:

:

:

: No. 1741 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 21, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):

2022-0055a

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2024

S.A.B. a/k/a S.B. (Mother) appeals from the decree involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, P.G.D.W. a/k/a P.W.

(Child), who was born in May 2019. After careful review, we affirm.

A prior panel of this Court summarized the factual and procedural history

underlying this appeal:

The family has been involved with [York County Office of

Children, Youth & Families (“CYF” or “the Agency”)] since 2017….

N.T., 7/11/22, at 65, 89. CYF obtained emergency protective

custody of Child on January 29, 2021, following Mother’s arrest

and incarceration on driving under the influence and other

charges, and placed Child with foster mother, a pre-adoptive

resource, where [Child] has since remained. Id. at 90, 94, 114-

15; Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/11/21, at 1-2.[FN1]

Mother was incarcerated until February 26, 2021. N.T., 7/11/22,

at 68, 70-71, 90, 117. She was then re-incarcerated from March

25, 2021, to July 14, 2021.[FN2] Id. at 68, 70-71, 91, 119.

J-A11037-24

[FN1]We observe that counsel for CYF requested that the court

incorporate the dependency record, which the court granted

without objection. N.T., 6/2/22, at 9. As such, Child’s

dependency record was included as part of the certified record.

[FN2] Mother was released to a human trafficking shelter and then

moved to a halfway house. Following that, she resided in a hotel,

where she remained until just prior to the July 11, 2022[,]

hearing. N.T., 7/11/22, at 67-71, 120, 123-25.

The court adjudicated Child dependent on February 11,

2021, and established a placement goal of return to parent or

guardian. Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/11/21, at 2-3.

Thereafter, CYF instituted objectives aimed at reunification, which

were communicated to Mother. CYF Exhibit 6; N.T., 7/11/22, at

66. As testified by CYF caseworker, Elyse Nangle, Mother was

required to address mental health, substance abuse, and housing,

which remained consistent [concerns] throughout the case. N.T.,

7/11/22, at 66-67; see also CYF Exhibits 6-8.

Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court

found Mother to be in minimal or no compliance with the

permanency plan, and [that she exhibited] minimal or no

progression toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating

placement. As a result, on January 11, 2022, the court changed

Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Thereafter, on March 8, 2022, CYF filed a petition for the

termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed a motion to

dismiss the termination petition on April 25, 2022, alleging that

the petition failed to strictly comply with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b)

[(governing contents of petitions for involuntary termination)]. As

such, she asserted that the [orphans’] court lacked jurisdiction to

hear the petition. Motion to Dismiss Petition for Involuntary

Termination of Parental Rights, 4/25/22, at [¶¶] 7-9. The court

denied Mother’s motion the following day, on April 26, 2022.

The [orphans’] court held hearings on June 2, 2022, and

July 11, 2022.[FN3] Mother was present and represented by legal

counsel[. Child was represented by legal counsel,] as well as a

guardian ad litem (“GAL”).[FN4]

-2-

J-A11037-24

[FN3] Aside from a continued termination hearing as to Child, the

July 11, 2022, hearing also served as a permanency review

hearing with respect to Child and her [minor] half-sibling, I.B.,

who is not a subject of the instant appeal. N.T., 7/11/22, at 3.

[FN4] Both legal counsel and the GAL argued in favor of termination

of Mother’s parental rights. N.T., 7/11/22, at 148-50. ….

On June 2, 2022, CYF presented the testimony of Abbie

Fulton, (a family advocate[ for] Catholic Charities); Robert Gordon

(M.Ed., [a] licensed psychologist, who conducted an evaluation of

Mother, dated November 30, 2021, and was accepted [by the

orphans’ court] as an expert in parenting capacity examinations

without objection); and Christianne Brennan (family therapist,

Catholic Charities). On July 11, 2022, CYF presented the

testimony of [] Nangle []; Jill Egbert ([Drug and Alcohol] Program

Supervisor, Family United Network); Carla Arp (therapist, Pressley

Ridge); and Katlyn Gumpper (parent advocate, PA Child TIFFSS

(Trauma Intensive Family Focused Support Services) Program).

Mother presented the testimony of J.G., Child’s foster mother.

[Mother] additionally testified on her own behalf.

By decree … entered July 11, 2022, the [orphans’] court

terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

See In re P.G.D.W., 296 A.3d 638 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished

memorandum at 2-4) (footnotes in original (renumbered); paragraph break

and some punctuation modified).

Mother timely appealed the order terminating her parental rights. On

appeal, a panel of this Court determined the orphans’ court lacked jurisdiction

to consider CYF’s termination petition, “[a]s the subject petition failed to

-3-

J-A11037-24

strictly comply with [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b)(1)1] to allege even minimal facts

to support the petition[.]” Id. at 11 (footnote added). Accordingly, the panel

vacated the termination decree and remanded the matter for the orphans’

court to enter an order dismissing CYF’s petition. Id. at 12.

On March 27, 2023, the orphans’ court dismissed CYF’s petition

consistent with this Court’s memorandum decision. On August 18, 2023, CYF

filed a second petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights,

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). CYF

contemporaneously filed a “motion for judicial notice,” wherein CYF requested

the orphans’ court “take judicial notice of the specific prior findings of the

[orphans’ court] under the dependency docket[.]” Motion for Judicial Notice,

8/18/23, at 16. By order dated August 24, 2023, the orphans’ court scheduled

a hearing on the termination petition, and directed the parties to confer

regarding any “joint stipulation of facts for submission at the start of trial.”2

Order, 8/24/23, at 1 (unpaginated).

The orphans’ court held a termination hearing on November 21, 2023.3

Mother was present and represented by counsel. Child was represented by a

GAL and, separately, by legal counsel.

____________________________________________

1 Section 2512 provides the contents of a termination petition “shall set forth

specifically those grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating

parental rights.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b)(1).

2 The orphans’ court took no further action on CYF’s motion for judicial notice.

3 The proceeding also served as a permanency review hearing. N.T.,

11/21/23, at 3.

-4-

J-A11037-24

At the termination hearing, CYF initially moved to incorporate “the

actions and proceedings as docketed with the clerk of courts in the

dependency action” into the orphans’ court file. N.T., 11/21/23, at 3. Mother

objected, arguing the incorporation of the dependency record violated the rule

against hearsay. Id. at 4. The orphans’ court overruled the objection, stating

“dependency is a cumulative matter and we rely in each hearing [on]

everything that has been determined in a prior hearing.” Id. CYF then

requested that the orphans’ court take judicial notice of “all applications,

motions, petitions and orders as docketed with the clerk of courts in the

dependency action for the minor child.” Id. at 4-5. Notably, Mother objected;

the orphans’ court overruled the objection and took judicial notice of the

dependency filings. Id. at 5. The orphans’ court sustained Mother’s separate

objection to CYF’s request to incorporate the notes of testimony from the July

11, 2022, termination hearing. Id. at 7.

CYF called a single witness, Nangle. Nangle testified CYF’s primary areas

of concern regarding Mother were “[d]rug and alcohol, mental health and

housing.” N.T., 11/21/23, at 11. Nangle further testified to the following:

Mother had been accepted into, but did not complete, two drug rehabilitation

programs. Id. at 12. Mother failed to maintain stable housing, and recently

moved to Alabama. Id. at 13-14. Mother had not exercised visitation with

Child since June 2022. Id. at 15. Since February 2021, Mother never

progressed from supervised visits to partially-supervised or unsupervised

visits. Id. at 18. The Agency offered additional services relating to drug and

-5-

J-A11037-24

alcohol and mental health treatment, but Mother “had gotten into it with the

provider[,]” causing the provider to close out services. Id. at 23. Mother has

never “provided any documentation that she is able to meet her own needs,

let alone the needs of she and her minor child[.]” Id. at 41. The Child is

currently in a pre-adoptive foster home. Id. at 39.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court granted CYF’s

termination petition, and entered its final decree involuntarily terminating

Mother’s parental rights to Child. Mother filed a timely appeal and concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal.

On January 18, 2024, the orphans’ court mailed correspondence to this

Court conceding that it had committed error, and requesting that the case be

remanded. Correspondence, 1/18/24, at 1 (unpaginated). This Court

responded on January 22, 2024, directing the orphans’ court to address any

concerns in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. On January 24, 2024, the orphans’

court filed a one-page Rule 1925(a) opinion indicating, “upon further review,

the court does not affirm its order” involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental

rights. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/24/24, at 1 (unpaginated) (capitalization

modified).

On May 16, 2024, following oral argument before this Court, we

remanded the case for the orphans’ court to clarify under which subsections

of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) the court terminated Mother’s parental rights. We

directed the orphans’ court to file a “clarified order and supplemental Pa.R.A.P.

-6-

J-A11037-24

1925 opinion within 14 days[.]” Order, 5/16/24. On May 30, 2024, the

orphans’ court filed a supplemental 1925 opinion.

Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a

matter of law in taking judicial notice of records of another case

(over objection) and incorporating the record from the related

dependency proceedings (over objection)[,] wherein evidence and

documents contained within said record were admitted under a

separate and distinct body of law (the Juvenile Act), contained

documents admitted into evidence under a lower standard of

proof, were not properly authenticated, and consisted of hearsay

within hearsay with no exceptions presented?

2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a

matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s conduct

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to

her child or has refused to perform parental duties pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

3. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a

matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s repeated

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the

child to be without essential care, control, or subsistence

necessary for their physical or mental well-being, and the

conditions and causes cannot or will not be remedied by Mother

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?

4. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a

matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions

which led to the removal and placement of the child continued to

exist and Mother failed to remedy those conditions within a

reasonable time pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?

5. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a

matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to

-7-

J-A11037-24

exist, and termination of parental rights would best serve the

needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(8)?

6. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a

matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of

Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare

of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 5-7 (numbering modified).

We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion.

See In the Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1104 (Pa. 2023). This standard of

review requires appellate courts to

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the

trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has

been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely

because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in [In re:]

R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons

for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review…. [U]nlike

trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make fact-

specific determinations on a cold record, where trial judges are

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and

parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts

could support an opposite result, as is often the case in

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own

credibility determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer

to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by

the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of

an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

-8-

J-A11037-24

In re Adoption of S.P., 74 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations

omitted).

Mother’s first issue challenges the orphans’ court’s evidentiary ruling

taking judicial notice of Child’s dependency proceedings and incorporating the

dependency record into the involuntary termination proceeding, over Mother’s

objection. Mother argues,

[w]hile it is sometimes common for the parties in termination

cases to agree to ‘incorporate’ the dependency record into the

termination proceedings, no such agreement occurred in this case.

It is the Agency’s burden to prove termination is appropriate using

evidence derived from the termination proceeding itself[,] not

some earlier hearing in another court, using different evidentiary

standards[,] having different goals, and different burdens of

proof.

Mother’s Brief at 21-22. Mother further argues that dependency proceedings

do not qualify as “adjudicative facts” of which the orphans’ court could take

judicial notice. Id. at 24 (citing Pa.R.E. 201(b)); see also id. (citing 220

Partnership v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 650 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Pa. Super.

1994)). As a result, Mother maintains the orphans’ court “improperly

considered and used evidence from the dependency case to terminate [her]

parental rights.” Id. at 20-21.4

We review questions concerning the admissibility of evidence under the

following standard:

____________________________________________

4 CYF does not concede error, unlike the orphans’ court.

See CYF Brief at 29

(citing In re T.B., 266 A.3d 609 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished

memorandum).

-9-

J-A11037-24

[T]he decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence is within

the sound discretion of the orphans’ court. A reviewing court will

not disturb these rulings absent an abuse of discretion. Discretion

is abused if, inter alia, the orphans’ court overrides or misapplies

the law.

In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1166-67 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a “statement that

… the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing”

that the proponent “offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). “Hearsay generally is

inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule

delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 492 (Pa. 2020); Pa.R.E. 802 (general hearsay rule).

In support of her position that the orphans’ court erroneously admitted

this evidence, Mother relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in In re A.J.R.-

H. In A.J.R.-H, at the commencement of an involuntary termination hearing,

Berks County Children and Youth Services (CYS) moved to admit 168 exhibits

“spanning more than 1[,]230 pages, cover[ing] a wide range of subjects from

an array of sources and authors.” 188 A.3d at 1161. The orphans’ court

overruled the parents’ hearsay objection to entry of all but one exhibit. Id.

The orphans’ court concluded the records were admissible under the business

records exception to the rule against hearsay. Id.; see also Pa.R.E. 803(6).

In reversing the orphans’ court, our Supreme Court determined CYS

failed “in the first instance” to satisfy the requirements of the business records

- 10 -

J-A11037-24

exception, by not presenting any witness to support the exhibits’ admission.

A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1167. Additionally,

a large number of the exhibits contained multiple levels of

hearsay. Where a hearsay document contains additional hearsay

within it …, each level of hearsay must satisfy an exception to the

rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence.

Id. at 1169 (citations omitted). Finally, the Court concluded the orphans’

court’s error was not harmless:

[T]he fact that there may have been sufficient evidence presented

at the hearing to support termination is not, alone, a basis for

finding harmless error…. [T]he standard for finding harmlessness

in a termination case requires us to conclude that the evidentiary

error could not have had any impact upon the orphans’

court’s decision. That there may have been properly admitted

evidence sufficient to support termination does not render the

orphans’ court’s substantial evidentiary error harmless.

Id. at 1175 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Instantly, based on the record and foregoing legal authority, we

conclude the orphans’ court erred in admitting Child’s dependency file into the

record over Mother’s objection and absent witness testimony. See A.J.R.-H.,

188 A.3d at 1167 (noting CYS’s failure to call an authenticating witness); see

also In re T.B., 266 A.3d 609 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum

at 17-18)5 (“[A] court may not ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of

the records of another case, whether in another court or its own, even though

____________________________________________

5 Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their

persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2).

- 11 -

J-A11037-24

the contents of those records may be known to the court.” (quoting 220

Partnership, 650 A.2d at 1097)).

However, unlike in A.J.R.-H., our review confirms the orphans’ court’s

error in admitting this evidence was harmless. In A.J.R.-H., a testifying CYS

caseworker was only “assigned as the agency caseworker for the family

around the time CYS filed the” termination petitions. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d

at 1163. The caseworker consistently relied on improperly admitted evidence

“to provide answers to questions posed to her regarding the history of CYS’s

involvement with the family and the parties’ compliance with the court[-

]ordered services.” Id. at 1173. As no other witness testified regarding the

family’s history with CYS, and the parties’ compliance with court-ordered

goals, the orphans’ court improperly relied on incompetent evidence in support

of termination. Id.

Here, Nangle testified that she served as the family’s caseworker since

2021, see N.T., 11/21/23, at 9, and much of her testimony was based on her

own personal knowledge and observations. See generally id. at 8-52.

Further, and significantly, the orphans’ court did not rely upon incompetent

evidence in concluding the Agency met its burden of proving Mother’s

involuntary termination of parental rights was warranted. As the court

reasoned in its supplemental Rule 1925 opinion:

The court agrees that it was not advisable to incorporate the

dependency record or take judicial notice of it over [Mother’s]

objection. However, the court does not believe that its decision

in this case was impacted. The Agency caseworker, Ms.

- 12 -

J-A11037-24

Nangle[,] testified largely based on her personal

knowledge and interaction with Mother, Child, and [foster

m]other. Mother also testified.

Ms. Nangle had been the caseworker since the end of 2021.

Regarding the Agency file, the court heard testimony with regard

to why the business record exception was applicable, at least with

regard to the Agency’s file. N.T., 11/21/23, at 8-9. The court

agrees that third-party material in the file may not qualify for the

business records exception. However, in answering questions,

Ms. Nangle indicated when she did not know an answer[,] based

on the fact that another caseworker may have been on the case

at the time.6 When Ms. Nangle was asked about particular dates,

such as when a third-party provider opened or closed [services]

or why, she indicated that she would have to consult the file to

find these answers …. For example, Ms. Nangle testified that

certain providers closed unsuccessfully. However, Mother also

testified that the providers closed [services] unsuccessfully and

gave her opinion as to why. At any rate, the court did not base

its decision on such testimony regarding third parties

presented by Ms. Nangle.

The court’s concerns and the basis for its decision, [were]

Child being in placement for thirty-four months, Mother’s lack of

participation with visits or performance of parental duties, lack of

progress to unsupervised visits, and no parental bond with Child,

etc. ….

Orphans’ Court Opinion (Supplemental), 5/30/24, at 27-29 (citation modified;

emphasis and footnote added).

Our review of the record and the orphans’ court’s supplemental 1925

opinion confirms the orphans’ court solely based its termination of Mother’s

parental rights on competent evidence, see A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1171, and

____________________________________________

6 In response to the Agency’s question regarding whether Mother visited with

Child in December 2021, Ms. Nangle testified, “I was not in the case at that

point, so I don’t have that answer.” N.T., 11/21/23, at 16.

- 13 -

J-A11037-24

therefore its evidentiary error was harmless. Accordingly, we next consider

Mother’s challenge to the termination of her parental rights.

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for

termination delineated in [Section] 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to [Section] 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 48 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted). “The standard of ‘clear and convincing’ evidence is defined as

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004

(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Finally, this Court need only

agree with the orphans’ court as to “any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a),

in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental

rights.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

Instantly, we examine Mother’s challenge pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), which provides:

- 14 -

J-A11037-24

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform

parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the petitioner “must produce clear and

convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental

duties.” See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708

A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (“Section 2511[(a)(1)] does not require that the parent

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child

and refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” (citation omitted; emphasis

in original)).

We have explained that in applying Section 2511(a)(1),

[t]he court should consider the entire background of the case and

not simply … mechanically apply the six-month statutory

provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances

of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent

facing termination of h[er] parental rights, to determine if the

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly

warrants the involuntary termination.

- 15 -

J-A11037-24

In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1129 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

and paragraph break omitted). However, the General Assembly’s emphasis

on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition indicates

the timeframe is the “most critical period for evaluation” of a parent’s conduct.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” our Supreme Court has

explained:

Our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the

needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.

Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that

develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of

such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and

association. The performance of parental duties requires that a

parent exert [herself] to take and maintain a place of importance

in a child’s life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with

“reasonable firmness” to overcome obstacles that stand in

the way of preserving a parent-child relationship and may

not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental

responsibilities.

Id. (citations, some quotation marks, and brackets omitted; emphasis

added).

Instantly, Mother argues that rather than demonstrating “a settled

purpose of relinquishing her parental rights,” the record evidences Mother’s

“love, communication, and association” with Child. Mother’s Brief at 28.

Mother maintains that in the six months preceding the filing of the termination

petition, she has “stay[ed] consistent with her positive and appropriate

visitations with the [C]hild[,] and [secured] housing.” Id. at 28-29.

The Agency disagrees:

- 16 -

J-A11037-24

Mother has not consistently performed parental duties in the six[-

]month period prior to the filing of the [termination p]etition …,

not even visitation. After approximately thirty[-]four months of

court involvement, Mother has not consistently been able to

discharge her parental duties and obligations. There is no

evidence whatsoever that Mother can independently meet her own

needs as well as the needs of the minor [C]hild….

Agency’s Brief at 34-35.

Although the orphans’ court acknowledged Mother made some progress

toward her court-ordered goals, it concluded termination was appropriate

under Section 2511(a)(1). The court explained:

[I]t is clear from the record that CYF offered clear and convincing

evidence that Mother has refused or failed to perform parental

duties for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of

the petition to terminate her parental rights. … Mother had

supervised visits which never progressed to unsupervised or

partially unsupervised. Even after visits were scheduled to

resume in April 2023, Mother missed in-person visits with Child[,]

apparently due to moving out of York County and to transportation

issues. Mother’s participation in programs is commendable, but

presented a hindrance to her ability to perform parental duties.

In wanting to work on herself, Mother somehow chose or ended

up in programs that were [far away from Child] and outside

Pennsylvania. As of April 2023, Mother was living in Lancaster,

PA. By September 2023, Mother had moved to Michigan, and by

October 2023[,] Mother had moved to Alabama. These moves

prevented Mother from having in-person visits or

performing parental duties such as consistently providing

for Child. Mother’s failure persisted[, with] no progression to

less[er] supervision, lack of housing, etc.

The court did hear testimony that Mother had brought items

for Child to her last visit in June 2022, and had attended one or

two doctor’s appointments. Although Mother has made progress

with [her] drug and alcohol use and with securing an apartment

which occurred after the filing of the petition to terminate her

parental rights, the court must consider the totality of the

circumstances. Even when Mother’s visitation rights were

restored, Mother did not or could not do in-person visits[,] and

- 17 -

J-A11037-24

apparently would not participate in virtual visits if she could not

record them or have a third party in the room to monitor[,] due

to her lack of trust of the Agency. The court recognizes that

Mother has made efforts, but they have not been diligent

and sustained efforts. N.T., 11/21/23, at 36.

CYF has provided sufficient evidence under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(1) that Mother has failed to perform parental duties for

well beyond the previous six months prior to the filing of the

petition to terminate parental rights.

Orphans’ Court Opinion (Supplemental), 5/30/24, at 14-16 (record citation

modified; emphasis added).

Our review confirms the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the

record, and free of legal error. Therefore, we discern no error in the orphans’

court’s determination that CYF proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted under Section

2511(a)(1). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (“an appellate court must … defer to

the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse

of discretion.”). Mother’s challenge to termination of her parental rights of

Child is without merit.7

In her final issue, Mother challenges termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b). When the orphans’ court finds grounds for termination under Section

2511(a), it must separately consider a child’s needs and welfare:

____________________________________________

7Accordingly, we do not address Mother’s issues three through five. See

M.E., 283 A.3d at 830.

- 18 -

J-A11037-24

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. ….

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

“Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,

placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. Courts must also

“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation

omitted). However, “the parental bond is but one part of the overall

subsection (b) analysis.” Id. at 1113.

The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration

of other important factors such as: the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care …; whether the child

is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love,

comfort, security, safety, and stability.

Id. (footnote and citations omitted).

Mother faults the Agency for creating “roadblocks” towards reunification

with Child by not “start[ing] cooperation with Alabama[,]” until “well after the

filing of [the] termination petition.” Mother’s Brief at 41. She further

maintains:

Mother loves [Child] and has much to offer for the [C]hild’s

benefit. The relationship between Mother and [Child] adds value

- 19 -

J-A11037-24

to [Child]’s life. [Child] enjoys being with Mother and they have

a very positive bond. Termination would unnecessarily and

permanently deprive [Child] of the relationship with Mother and

would not best serve the [C]hild’s needs and welfare. [Child]

deserves to have her relationship with her mother preserved,

which can only be assured if Mother retains her parental rights.

Id.

Mother cites to no supporting legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)

(providing appellant’s argument shall include “discussion and citation of

authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); see also V.I.-P. v. S.R.D., 288 A.3d

502, 523 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“[T]his Court will not act as counsel and will not

develop arguments on behalf of appellant.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, her

argument is belied by the record.

At the termination hearing, Nangle testified that Child does not share a

parental bond with Mother.8 N.T., 11/21/23, at 21. In contrast, during

Nangle’s monthly visits to Child’s pre-adoptive foster home, she observed

Child’s positive connection with her foster family. Id. at 19. Child refers to

her foster mother as “mother,” id., has resided with the foster family since

____________________________________________

8 Mother also argues, in a single sentence of her brief (for the first time), that

Nangle “was improperly allowed to testify about a parental bond or lack

thereof as she is not an expert.” Mother’s Brief at 41. Mother neither included

this issue in her 1925 concise statement of errors, nor does she offer any

argument or citation to authority. Therefore, this claim is waived. See In re

Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1053 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding claim

that the orphans’ court considered irrelevant evidence waived where it was

not included in concise statement of errors); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

- 20 -

J-A11037-24

2021, and “is absolutely adored in that home. … [Foster mother] spoils [Child]

in a good way and she is the princess of that house.” Id. at 22.

The orphans’ court explained its rationale for concluding termination was

in Child’s best interests:

In analyzing this case under [Section] 2511(b), it is clear

from the record that CYF offered clear and convincing evidence

that the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare of Child is best served by terminating parental rights. …

[T]he court heard testimony that Child is bonded to the

[foster] mother[,] whom she refers to as “mom.” [Nangle]

testified that Child is [not] bonded to Mother and both

Child’s legal counsel and [GAL] reported observing Child’s

bond with the [foster] mother. N.T., 11/21/23, at 72-73.

[Mother] did not see Child between June 2022 and April

2023 due to the termination and subsequent appeal period. But

even after visitation was restored, Mother did not participate in

visits with Child. Maintaining the bond does not serve the

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. The

court heard testimony that Child does not ask for contact

with Mother, and Mother’s contact has been sporadic. Since

January 2021, Child’s needs have been and are being addressed

by her [foster] mother[,] who is an adoptive resource for Child

and with whom Child is bonded. [Foster m]other meets Child’s

intangible needs for love, comfort, safety, and stability, as well

as[] her physical and developmental needs related to her

[medical] diagnoses and medication. The court heard testimony

that Child does not have a parental bond with Mother. Id. at 21.

Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence on the record that

the bond, if it still exists, is not necessary or beneficial to Child.

Child has been in foster care for thirty-four months as of the date

that termination of parental rights was granted. [C]hild’s need for

permanency is paramount at this time. …

Orphans’ Court Opinion (Supplemental), 5/30/24, at 25-26 (record citations

modified; emphasis added).

- 21 -

J-A11037-24

We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the orphans’ court, as it

is supported by the record and free of legal error. S.P., 74 A.3d 817, 826-27.

As we have previously observed, a “court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to the parent’s claim

to progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d

502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Further, the orphans’ court acted within its

discretion when it credited Nangle’s testimony regarding the Child’s bond with

foster mother, and absence of a bond with Mother. See L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d

at 48 (“It is the province of the orphans’ court to assess credibility and resolve

any conflicts in the evidence, and in doing so it is free to believe all, part, or

none of the evidence presented.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, Mother is entitled no relief, and we affirm the order terminating

Mother’s parental rights.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/27/2024

- 22 -