BLACKWELL v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NORWOOD C. BLACKWELL )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-319

)

MARTIN J. O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of March, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845

F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D.

Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

1 Martin J. O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

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affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because

it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating the

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician and psychiatrist and that the ALJ incorrectly

analyzed Plaintiff’s functional capacity evaluation. (Doc. No. 11). The Court disagrees

and finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not

disabled.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in crafting his residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

by not properly evaluating the consistency and supportability of the opinions of Dr.

Francesca Galbiati, M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician, and Dr. Erica Smolcic, M.D.,

Plaintiff’s psychiatrist. (Doc. No. 11). As to Dr. Galbiati’s opinion, Plaintiff argues the

ALJ’s statement that this opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s social worker’s

statement was not an adequate consistency evaluation because the ALJ did not properly

explain how she considered this opinion within the social worker’s statement. (Id. at 12).

Further, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain how Dr. Galbiati’s findings were not

supported by her own assessment. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff also posits that the ALJ should

have ordered further medical examinations because the ALJ rejected Dr. Galbiati’s

opinion. (Id. at 21). Additionally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly evaluated Dr.

Smolcic’s opinion by failing to note that Dr. Smolcic’s examinations took place in a highly

controlled setting. (Id. at 24-25). Further, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating

Plaintiff’s functional capacity evaluation because she ignored objective evidence in finding

this evaluation was not persuasive. (Id. at 28-30). Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the

hypothetical posed to the vocational expert (“VE”) was in error because it did not

incorporate all of Plaintiff’s impairments. (Id. at 22).

Defendant counters that Plaintiff is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence.

(Doc. No. 14 at 2). Defendant contends the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Galbiati’s opinion

and that there is no merit to Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ was required to rely on a

specific medical opinion in crafting the Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 12). Further, Defendant

argues that the ALJ properly analyzed Dr. Smolcic’s opinion by noting Plaintiff’s

functioning within a clinical setting and while performing daily activities. (Id. at 15).

Additionally, Defendant posits that the ALJ adequately evaluated Plaintiff’s functional

capacity evaluation because Plaintiff did not provide the examination underlying this

evaluation and it is the Plaintiff’s burden to supply evidence necessary to prove his case.

(Id. at 16-17).

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The Court agrees with Defendant and finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. The Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently evaluated the consistency

and supportability of Dr. Galbiati’s opinion. For cases, such as this one, filed on or after

March 27, 2017, the ALJ analyzes the persuasiveness of doctors’ opinions by analyzing a

variety of factors and “the two most important factors for determining the persuasiveness

of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c). One court has explained the distinction between

supportability and consistency as follows: “supportability relates to the extent to which a

medical source has articulated support for the medical source’s own opinion, while

consistency relates to the relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other

evidence within the record.” Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-1197, 2021 WL

1565832, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2021).

Here, the ALJ sufficiently analyzed the consistency of Dr. Galbiati’s opinion by

noting it was “inconsistent with the objective findings” and was “inconsistent with the

totality of the evidence, in particular the statement above by the claimant’s social worker,

that per his doctors, the claimant had no limitations[.]” (R. 26 (citing Ex. B5F at 136)).

The Court finds this is a sufficient consistency analysis and comparison of Dr. Galbiati’s

opinion to other evidence within the record. Indeed, the ALJ listed a variety of objective

evidence that was inconsistent with Dr. Galbiati’s findings, including Plaintiff’s

unremarkable physical examinations, his normal gait, normal strength, absence of motor

defects, regular heart rate and rhythm, normal range of motion, lack of sensory defects, and

normal tendon reflexes. (Id.).

Further, the ALJ adequately analyzed the supportability of Dr. Galbiati’s opinion

and Dr. Galbiati’s opined environmental limitations. The ALJ noted that while Dr.

Galbiati’s opinion was “generally supported with the [Plaintiff’s] diagnoses, no specific

functional limitations were supported with any specific findings.” (Id.). As noted

above, the ALJ went on to list objective evidence that did not support Dr. Galbiati’s

findings. (Id.). This is a sufficient supportability analysis, as the ALJ stated that Dr.

Galbiati’s opinion was not supported by his own findings. Further, the ALJ noted that

there was no basis for Dr. Galbiati’s opined environmental limitations, as Plaintiff’s

medical record did not support these limitations. (Id.). While the ALJ acknowledged

earlier in her opinion that Plaintiff had chest pain, trouble breathing, and a racing heart, she

found that the evidence as a whole did not support these environmental limitations. (R.

22, 26). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not adequately explain her

supportability analysis and did not address Dr. Galbiati’s opined environmental limitations

is without merit.

As to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have ordered another medical

examination, the Court disagrees. While an ALJ may order a consultative examination to

resolve an inconsistency or if the record is insufficient to render a decision, he or she is

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generally not required to do so. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a, 404.1520b; Thompson v.

Halter, 45 Fed. Appx. 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2002). Generally, an ALJ is authorized to obtain

a consultative examination “if the information needed to make a disability determination,

‘such as clinical findings, laboratory tests, a diagnosis or a prognosis’ cannot be obtained

from the claimant’s medical sources.” Tuulaupua v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-1121, 2015 WL

5769984, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a(a) and (b)).

The decision to order such an examination is within the sound discretion of the ALJ. See

Thompson, 45 Fed. Appx. at 149. Here, Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have ordered a

consultative examination because the ALJ rejected Dr. Galbiati’s opinion and therefore had

no opinion evidence to reasonably rely upon in formulating the RFC. (Doc. No. 11 at

21). This is only a perceived insufficiency that does not require the ALJ to order a

consultative examination. Indeed, the ALJ does not have to order medical opinions until

she finds the one with which she agrees. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d

356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating “[t]he ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State

agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in evaluating the

opinion of Dr. Smolcic. The ALJ found this opinion “minimally persuasive” after

analyzing a variety of factors, including consistency and supportability. (R. 26-27). Dr.

Smolcic opined that Plaintiff was very limited in mental functioning, with several marked

limitations and several moderate limitations. (R. 26; Ex. B10F). The ALJ found “these

limitations were supported with an explanation; however this appeared to be largely based

on the [Plaintiff’s] own statements[.]” (R. 26). This was a sufficient supportability

analysis, as the ALJ is allowed to discount a doctor’s opinion when it is based on Plaintiff’s

statements and Plaintiff’s complaints are properly discounted. See Morris v. Barnhart,

78 Fed. Appx. 820, 824-25 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, this was proper as the ALJ had

previously found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints lacked credibility. (R. 22).

Further, the ALJ’s consistency analysis is also adequate since the ALJ found Dr. Smolcic’s

findings to be inconsistent with the totality of the evidence; for example, other evidence

showed that Plaintiff’s memory was intact, his thought processes were logical, and he was

cooperative. (R. 26). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis of

Dr. Smolcic’s opinion.

The Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider

Plaintiff’s functioning outside the clinical setting in evaluating Dr. Smolcic’s opinion.

While Plaintiff is correct that a doctor’s assessment in a clinical context does not

necessarily contradict that doctor’s seemingly more restrictive opinion as to how Plaintiff

could function in the workplace, Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 356

(3d Cir. 2008), the ALJ here evaluated Plaintiff’s functioning both inside and outside the

clinical setting. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was independent in all activities

of daily living. (R. 24); see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

the ALJ’s decision is read “as a whole”). Thus, the ALJ was aware of Plaintiff’s

functioning within and outside of the clinical setting, and this informed her decision that

Dr. Smolcic’s opinion was inconsistent with the evidence of record.

Further, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in

evaluating Plaintiff’s functional capacity evaluation. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

failed to develop the record, which was necessary to evaluate the Plaintiff’s evaluation, and

that the ALJ erred in conducting the consistency analysis. (Doc. No. 11 at 28-30). The

ALJ noted in her opinion that Plaintiff failed to make the functional capacity evaluation

part of the record. (R. 25). Despite this, the ALJ analyzed the consistency of a

provider’s opined limitations that seemingly made up part of this evaluation, stating, “the

record is consistent with greater sustained capacity, and more specific functional

limitations.” (Id.). It is clear the ALJ did not ignore evidence but weighed all the

evidence and decided that this functional capacity evaluation was not persuasive. (Id.).

Accordingly, the Court will decline Plaintiff’s invitation to reweigh the evidence on this

ground.

Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the hypothetical posed to the VE

was incomplete. (Doc. No. 11 at 27). The Court notes that “objections to the adequacy

of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil down to attacks on the

RFC assessment itself.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005).

As explained above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment, and because

the operative hypothetical accurately conveyed Plaintiff’s RFC, (R. 54-55), the ALJ

appropriately relied upon the VE’s response.

For these reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.

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