MCDONOUGH v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS JAMES MCDONOUGH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 22-1604

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and his claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,

48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

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1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported

by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court

may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the

claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff first argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to

specifically consider and weigh the opinion of Plaintiff’s oncologist, Dr. Lauren Veltri,

M.D. (Doc No. 13 at 14-15). In so doing, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to note

that Dr. Veltri repeatedly documented that Plaintiff was not cleared to perform any type of

work activity due to his cancer and related treatments until October 27, 2020. (Id.).

However, Plaintiff overlooks that “a statement that a claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to

work’ is not binding on the ALJ.” Iannance v. Kijakazi, No. 21-177, 2022 WL 2651970,

at *2 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2022) (citations omitted).

The Court notes that the ultimate question of disability has long been an issue

reserved solely for the Commissioner, and the ALJ is not required to address opinions on

the same. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consistently

provided that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants

– must make the ultimate disability and RFC [residual functional capacity]

determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011); see

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c; 404.1546(c); 416.920c; 416.946(c). Thus, the ALJ is not

bound by a physician’s statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c)(3)(i); 416.920b(c)(3)(i). This evidence is “inherently neither

valuable nor persuasive,” and an ALJ is under no obligation to provide “any analysis about

how [he/she] considered such evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c); 416.920b(c). As

such, here, the ALJ was not required to consider such evidence, and the Court finds no

error in the ALJ’s lack of discussion on this point.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider if Plaintiff proved that he was

disabled for a “closed period of time.” (Doc. No. 13 at 16). As a continuation of the

first argument, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to consider whether Plaintiff was

disabled from October 2018, when Plaintiff was first diagnosed with cancer, until October

27, 2020, when Dr. Veltri stated Plaintiff could return to work. (Id.). For the following

reasons, the Court is not persuaded by this argument.

An ALJ reviews the entire record to determine if the claimant was disabled during

the relevant period. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). If the ALJ

finds the claimant was disabled at any point during this time, “the ALJ must also determine

if [the] disability continues through the date of decision, i.e., if the disability is limited to a

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

‘closed period.’” Dolbow v. Astrue, 799 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326 (D. Del. 2011). In other

words, the ALJ determines whether an applicant “was disabled for a finite period of time

which started and stopped prior to the date of his [or her] decision.” Waters v. Barnhart,

276 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 2002).

Here, while the ALJ did not explicitly use the term “closed period,” the ALJ’s

decision and findings reveal that she considered whether Plaintiff was disabled “for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months” and concluded that the Plaintiff “has not

been under a disability . . . from September 26, 2018, through the date of this decision[.]”

(R. 13, 24). The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled during the entire period

from the alleged onset date through the date of decision necessarily precludes a finding that

he was entitled to a closed period of disability. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 Fed. Appx.

775, 782 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the contention that the ALJ erred in failing to consider

claimant for a closed period of disability because it ignored the ALJ’s finding that the

claimant had the RFC to perform a limited range of sedentary work from his alleged onset

date and all times thereafter). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

For these reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.

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