WEBER v. ERIE COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

RICHARD EDWARD WEBER, )

)

Plaintiff 1:23-CV-00167-SPB

vs. RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ERIE COUNTY, ERIE COUNTY PRISON, )

WARDEN BRYANT, MAJOR SYMOUR,

LT BOLT, LT DEFRANCO, NURSE 1 MovIOg ORDER ON PENDING

BRIANNA MUSSINA, DW MICHAEL )

HOLMAN, CAPTAIN HERMAN, LT ) IN RE: ECF NO. 79

BENDER, LT STEVENS, RYAN VOLZ, )

ROBERT SAMLUK, MICHAEL )

BEGANICS, COREY GOSS, MEAGEN )

CARNEY, AMANDA MARIE MILLER, )

)

Defendants )

Plaintiff Richard Edward Weber has filed a “Motion to Seek a Special Order Upon SCI-

Camphill and a Further Extension of Time” (ECF No. 79). Weber’s request for a “Special

Order” specifically seeks an order directing the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI-

Camp Hill) to produce his mental health records that it received from the Erie County Prison

(ECP). He represents that ECP sent these records to SCI-Camp Hill following his transfer to that

institution. He asserts that these records will show that he suffered an “over 3 month ...

psychotic break” that rendered him “not competent” and that his condition explains his delay in

recalling the repeated unprovoked uses of OC spray and other excessive force allegedly

committed against his by certain Defendants. Apparently, Weber seeks his mental health records

to oppose the statute of limitations defense raised by the Defendants in their motions to dismiss

or, alternatively, for summary judgment. See ECF No. 3, p. 7; ECF No. 53, p. 2; ECF No. 74, p.

12. Weber apparently intends to argue that his psychotic break and resulting incapacity/lapse of

memory toll the statute of limitations.

For the reasons explained below, the Court construes Plaintiffs request for a “Special

Order” as a request pursuant to Rule 56(d), which allows a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment to file an affidavit or declaration to state that, “for specified reasons, it cannot present

facts essential to justify its opposition” to the motion and authorizes the court to permit the

nonmoving party, among other things, “to take discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)((2). Having so

construed this portion of Plaintiff's motion, the Court will deny his request because the records

he seeks are not relevant to the issues raised in the motions for summary judgment.

Federal courts must apply both state statute of limitations as well as state tolling

provisions to civil rights claims asserted under § 1983. Callwood v. Questel, 883 F.2d 272, 274

(3d Cir. 1989). Here, Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions

applies to Weber’s civil rights claims. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir.2000); 42 Pa.

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7).

In Pennsylvania, mental illness or incapacity does not toll the statute of limitations. 42

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(a) (“insanity or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this

subchapter for the commencement of a matter.”), Person v. Kieffer, 634 F. Supp. 892, 893 (E.D.

Pa. 1986) (“Under Pennsylvania law, the existence of a mental incapacity is not a defense to the

statute of limitations .... Pennsylvania therefore subscribes to a ‘hard rule [of limitations] as a

matter of legislative policy.’”, quoting in part, Riddick v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal

Board, 499 A.2d 694, 696-97. (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). See also Ziegler v. Cnty. of Bucks, 1992

WL 129643, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1992); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2013)

(“mental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll a statute of limitations”) (citing Lake, 232

F.3d at 371). Courts have acknowledged that Pennsylvania’s statutory prohibition on tolling

based on incapacity may be regarded as harsh. See, e.g., Faber v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2015 WL

1636967, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2015). Nevertheless, the prohibition comports with the

general common law rule in Pennsylvania that mental incapacity does not toll the running of the

relevant limitations period, a rule that the state legislature later codified as applicable to civil

actions generally. See Walker v. Mummert, 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1958) (ruling that the

incapacity of a plaintiff who is non compos mentis at the time of injury does not toll the running

of the limitations period for personal injury actions); see also Walters v. Ditzler, 227 A.2d 833,

835 (Pa. 1967) (“[T]he statute of limitations will run against persons under a disability, including

... incompetents.”); Pearce v. Salvation Army, 674 A.2d 1123, 1124 n. 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)

(“In 1978, the Judicial Code was amended in order to codify existing law precluding extension of

the statute based on ... insanity....”); 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by □

statute, insanity ... does not extend the time limited by this subchapter for the commencement of

a matter.”’).

Weber asserts that he only recently recalled relevant events at the ECP because his

memory was impaired by a “psychotic break” he experienced at the prison. Such assertions of

“repressed memory” and other memory impairments fall within the scope of “mental incapacity”

excluded from tolling under § 5533(a). See, e.g., Dever-Gorka v. Hosler, 1994 WL 902046, at

*4 (Com. Pl. 1994), aff'd, 667 A.2d 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (plaintiffs “repressed memory”

was a form of “mental incapacity” that § 5533(a) precludes as a basis for tolling). Therefore, any

records Weber might obtain to support his assertion of a psychotic break while at ECP are

irrelevant to Defendants’ statute of limitation defense. Accordingly, his request for a “Special

Order” directing the production of his mental health records is DENIED.

Given that no extension of time is necessary to accommodate production of mental health

records, Weber’s papers in opposition to Defendants’ pending motions remain due by February

7, 2024.

DATED this 8th day of January 2024.

BY THE COURT:

RICHARD A. a2

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE