CLARK v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEWANEE OPAL CLARK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 22-1541

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2023, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under Subchapter II

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845

F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D.

Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because

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it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff raises four arguments as to why she believes the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) erred in finding her not disabled. First, she argues that the ALJ incorrectly analyzed

her treating physician’s opinion addressing her narcolepsy diagnosis. Second, she posits that

the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) findings are illogical because they fail to

address how often and how long Plaintiff is likely to fall asleep in a workday due to narcolepsy.

Third, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly analyze her subjective complaints in

context of the record as a whole. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider her

work history as part of the ALJ’s credibility assessment. (Doc. No. 13).

The crux of Plaintiff’s argument regarding evaluation of the opinion of her treating

physician and sleep specialist, Ananth Raman, MD, is that the ALJ failed to discuss

“supportability” and “consistency” beyond cursory statements and did not consider the other

factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, including the treatment relationship and specialization of

the physician. (Doc. No. 13 at 12-13). Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s “vague

discussion” of Dr. Raman’s opinion where the ALJ seemingly “accepts the underlying

premise” of Dr. Raman’s opinion but rejects Dr. Raman’s conclusion. (Id. at 13). The

Court first notes that for cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the

regulations have eliminated the “treating physician rule.” Compare 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(a) (applying to later cases); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853 (Jan. 18,

2017). While the ALJ still considers the medical source’s treating relationship with the

claimant, “the two most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical

opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853; see also §§

404.1520c(b) and (c). As the regulations state, the ALJ may, but is not required to, explain

how she considered the other factors in explaining the persuasiveness of each medical

opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

Here, the ALJ summarized Dr. Raman’s opinion, indicating that “the claimant would

have concerns of hitting her head, falling asleep during interactions with others, and

impairment of her ability to maintain task performance[.]” (R. 18). Further, the ALJ

analyzed whether Dr. Raman’s opinion was consistent and supported by the record, writing,

“[w]hile the undersigned finds that Dr. Raman’s opinion is somewhat consistent with and

supported by the totality of the record, including the claimant’s own subjective allegations,

there are very few treatment records during the relevant period that would render the

claimant incapable of working . . . [a]s such, Dr. Raman’s opinion is only somewhat

persuasive.” (Id.) The ALJ’s analysis of consistency and supportability is sufficient as it

speaks directly to the required factors of consistency and supportability described in the

Social Security Regulations, and the ALJ did not err in not expressly discussing the other

factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ further incorporated into the RFC mental

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restrictions and limitations to avoid workplace hazards and other environmental factors to

“ensure that the claimant’s limitations are more than fully accommodated for under the

within residual functional capacity[.]” (R. 18). This was not an acceptance of Dr.

Raman’s premise and then a rejection of her opinion, but rather a limitation the ALJ found

was needed based on a totality of the record. Accordingly, the ALJ’s analysis of Dr.

Raman’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination is illogical because the ALJ

acknowledged Plaintiff’s severe narcolepsy but failed to account for narcolepsy symptoms

in Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. No. 13 at 14). Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ did not

address how often and how long Plaintiff is likely to fall asleep or sleep during an eight-hour

workday. (Doc. No. 13 at 14). Here, as explained above, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s

narcolepsy in formulating the RFC by analyzing Plaintiff’s complaints and Dr. Raman’s

medical source statement. (R. 16, 18). The ALJ also analyzed the third-party statements,

which “reported that the claimant falls asleep intermittently throughout the day, has to plan

around naps, and falls asleep while in conversation or while socializing.” (R. 19). The

ALJ rejected these claims regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s narcolepsy, however, because

she found they were not entirely consistent with the totality of the evidence. (R. 18-19).

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a

federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have

decided the claim differently. See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91

(3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). “The presence

of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s]

decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ explained

why evidence of Plaintiff’s claims regarding the severity of her narcolepsy symptoms was

deemed unpersuasive in her opinion and, accordingly, substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s determination.

Plaintiff next posits that the ALJ failed to analyze her subjective complaints in light

of the record as a whole and in conformity with 20 CFR § 404.1529. (Doc. No. 13 at 10-

12). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s statements

within the context of consistent statements from her treating sleep specialist, statements from

friends and family, documented reports to treatment professions, and her activities of daily

living. (Id. at 10). The Court first notes that while a claimant’s testimony regarding her

subjective complaints is certainly relevant, an ALJ is not under an obligation to simply

accept what the claimant said without question. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Chandler

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, an ALJ’s determination

as to the veracity of a claimant’s testimony is afforded significant deference. See Reefer v.

Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s opinion is also read “as a whole.”

Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, after summarizing Plaintiff’s

testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of her symptoms to be inconsistent with the overall evidence of record. (R. 16).

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The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s statements were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of daily

living and with Plaintiff’s own notes in her application materials, indicating that she helps

her parents with matters related to medical or personal affairs, and that she is able to drive,

shop, and manage her finances. (Id.). The ALJ further analyzed in her decision Plaintiff’s

treating sleep specialist’s medical source statement, third-party statements, and the state

agency consultants’ medical opinions. (R. 18-19). The ALJ specifically noted that she

found Dr. Raman’s opinion to be somewhat consistent and supported by the claimant’s own

subjective allegations. (R. 18). Accordingly, it is clear that the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints in light of the record as a whole, and her findings are supported by

substantial evidence.

Further, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s finding of “inconsistency” between her

daily activities, which she alleges are “sporadic,” and a claim of disability. (Doc. No. 13

at 11-12). The Court disagrees. The ALJ is required to consider a claimant’s activities of

daily living in evaluating the severity of a claimant’s symptoms and limitations. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); Wright v. Astrue, No. Civ. 10-942, 2011 WL 4079067, at *3

(W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011). However, as Plaintiff points out, an ALJ may not use evidence

of sporadic and transitory activities as support for a finding that the Plaintiff can engage

continuously in substantial gainful activity. See Fargnoli v. Astrue, 247 F.3d 34, 40 n.5

(3d Cir. 2001). The question here, as in many cases, is whether the ALJ’s consideration of

Plaintiff’s daily activities crossed over into an improper reliance on sporadic and transitory

activities. Here, it did not.

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s performance of daily tasks, including laundry,

preparing meals, household chores, and taking care of finances. (R. 16). As Defendant

point out, these activities differ greatly from the single trip to Europe analyzed in Fargnoli,

and, accordingly, Plaintiff’s analogy to this case is misplaced. Again, where an ALJ has

articulated reasons supporting a “credibility” determination, that determination is afforded

significant deference. See Reefer, 326 F.3d at 380; Horodenski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215

Fed. Appx. 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court finds that such deference is warranted

in this case. See also Paula R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 20-18808 (RBK), 2022 WL

950242, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2022) (quoting Hoyman v. Colvin, 606 Fed. Appx. 678, 681

(3d Cir. 2015)) (“Credibility determinations are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal.’”).

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in finding “inconsistency” between her

reports regarding her condition and a claim of disability because the ALJ failed to consider

the context of Plaintiff’s reports. (Id. at 11-12). This is another attempt to request that

the Court reweigh the evidence. The ALJ afforded sufficient context to Plaintiff’s

statements that she was “managing well” and was “okay,” as the ALJ questioned Plaintiff

thoroughly at the hearing regarding her narcolepsy and symptoms arising therefrom and

heard her attorney’s questioning regarding the same. (R. 47-53). Accordingly, the ALJ’s

analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are supported by substantial evidence.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider her “exemplary work history”

as part of the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. No. 13 at 14-15). The

Court notes that an ALJ does not err by failing to afford a claimant’s testimony heightened

consideration based solely on her work history. See Corley v. Barnhart, 102 Fed. Appx.

752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004). Generally, the ALJ cannot find a claimant is entitled to heightened

credibility unless other factors, such as evidence of severe impairments or attempts to return

to work, dictate such a result. See, e.g., id.; Hodnett v. Saul, No. CV-2:18-1074, 2019 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 135201, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2019); Polardino v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 12-

806, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116749, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2013). Rather than focusing

solely on work history, an ALJ should base his or her evaluation of a claimant’s testimony

and credibility on a broad view of the record. See Sanborn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613

Fed. Appx. 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ based her credibility assessment on the

entirety of the record. (R. 16). The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s complaints in context of

the record evidence and found that Plaintiff was not entirely credible. (Id.) This was not

error as there is no evidence in the record of any attempts to return to work that would

warrant a finding of heightened credibility. Moreover, the ALJ was clearly aware of

Plaintiff’s work history as she discussed at length Plaintiff’s work history with her at the

hearing. (R. 34-44).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will affirm the underlying

decision.

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